[UK1679666180]

Lee, he's the better hitter.

 

Clutch hitting is just that, hitting in an important situation, if you produce in that situation, it was a clutch hit.

 

The GS by Konerko in the WS as well as the HR by Pujols in the NLCS were 2 clutch hits that had determined the outcome of that game and in the case of Konerko, the season. It just happens that both are very good hitters (Pujols is elite) at any given offensive situation.

[Magnetic Curses]

One question for you guys believing in clutch hitting. Let's pretend like Jauque Jones outpreforms Derrek Lee this year in "clutch" situations by a decent size margin. Now lets pretend that we're playing Houston in a one game playoff for the wild card. There's 2 outs in the bottom of the 9th inning and Brad Lidge is on the mound. Runners are on 1st and second. Very, very crucial situation. Now remember, Jones has clearly outpreformed Lee this year in terms of clutch hitting. Who would you rather have up Derrek Lee or Jauque Jones?

 

it's very likely that this is a very far-fetched situation that probably wouldn't come up.

 

i'd obviously take lee, though.

[Bull]

Every time I read a clutch hitting thread, my mind always goes back to this Bill James article someone posted a link to a while ago:

 

http://www.sabr.org/cmsfiles/underestimating.pdf

 

The pertinent part from Bill James:

 

We ran astray because we have been assuming that random data is proof of nothingness, when in reality random data proves nothing. In essence, starting with Dick Cramer’s article, Cramer argued, “I did an analysis which should have identified clutch hitters, if clutch hitting exists. I got random data; therefore, clutch hitters don’t exist.”

Cramer was using random data as proof of nothingness—and I did the same, many times, and many other people also have done the same. But I’m saying now that’s not right; random data proves nothing—and it cannot be used as proof of nothingness.

Why? Because whenever you do a study, if your study completely fails, you will get random data. Therefore, when you get random data, all you may conclude is that your study has failed. Cramer’s study may have failed to identify clutch hitters because clutch hitters don’t exist—as he concluded—or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

As I understand it, James is saying that due to the small sample size of 'clutch' at-bats per year and the high amount of luck involved in every at-bat, it is impossible to compare yearly 'clutch' numbers - there is too much luck involved.

 

Exactly, there's way too much variation for performance in 'clutch' situations to be predictive or more than an afterthought in player evaluation.

 

That's not what he's saying at all. He's saying that all studies to date have failed to prove "clutch" AND have failed to disprove it.

or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

James believes the methods used to determine if clutch exists were flawed. He seems open to the idea that someday there may be a study that proves clutch, but the right metric has yet to be discovered.

[Transmogrified Tiger]

Every time I read a clutch hitting thread, my mind always goes back to this Bill James article someone posted a link to a while ago:

 

http://www.sabr.org/cmsfiles/underestimating.pdf

 

The pertinent part from Bill James:

 

We ran astray because we have been assuming that random data is proof of nothingness, when in reality random data proves nothing. In essence, starting with Dick Cramer’s article, Cramer argued, “I did an analysis which should have identified clutch hitters, if clutch hitting exists. I got random data; therefore, clutch hitters don’t exist.”

Cramer was using random data as proof of nothingness—and I did the same, many times, and many other people also have done the same. But I’m saying now that’s not right; random data proves nothing—and it cannot be used as proof of nothingness.

Why? Because whenever you do a study, if your study completely fails, you will get random data. Therefore, when you get random data, all you may conclude is that your study has failed. Cramer’s study may have failed to identify clutch hitters because clutch hitters don’t exist—as he concluded—or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

As I understand it, James is saying that due to the small sample size of 'clutch' at-bats per year and the high amount of luck involved in every at-bat, it is impossible to compare yearly 'clutch' numbers - there is too much luck involved.

 

Exactly, there's way too much variation for performance in 'clutch' situations to be predictive or more than an afterthought in player evaluation.

 

That's not what he's saying at all. He's saying that all studies to date have failed to prove "clutch" AND have failed to disprove it.

or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

James believes the methods used to determine if clutch exists were flawed. He seems open to the idea that someday there may be a study that proves clutch, but the right metric has yet to be discovered.

 

Sorry, I was referring to noisesquared's comment below the quote, I had already read the article previously.

[Bull]

Every time I read a clutch hitting thread, my mind always goes back to this Bill James article someone posted a link to a while ago:

 

http://www.sabr.org/cmsfiles/underestimating.pdf

 

The pertinent part from Bill James:

 

We ran astray because we have been assuming that random data is proof of nothingness, when in reality random data proves nothing. In essence, starting with Dick Cramer’s article, Cramer argued, “I did an analysis which should have identified clutch hitters, if clutch hitting exists. I got random data; therefore, clutch hitters don’t exist.”

Cramer was using random data as proof of nothingness—and I did the same, many times, and many other people also have done the same. But I’m saying now that’s not right; random data proves nothing—and it cannot be used as proof of nothingness.

Why? Because whenever you do a study, if your study completely fails, you will get random data. Therefore, when you get random data, all you may conclude is that your study has failed. Cramer’s study may have failed to identify clutch hitters because clutch hitters don’t exist—as he concluded—or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

As I understand it, James is saying that due to the small sample size of 'clutch' at-bats per year and the high amount of luck involved in every at-bat, it is impossible to compare yearly 'clutch' numbers - there is too much luck involved.

 

Exactly, there's way too much variation for performance in 'clutch' situations to be predictive or more than an afterthought in player evaluation.

 

That's not what he's saying at all. He's saying that all studies to date have failed to prove "clutch" AND have failed to disprove it.

or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

James believes the methods used to determine if clutch exists were flawed. He seems open to the idea that someday there may be a study that proves clutch, but the right metric has yet to be discovered.

 

Sorry, I was referring to noisesquared's comment below the quote, I had already read the article previously.

 

Maybe I should have responded to noisesquared and not you. But my point is that James is not saying that study has disproved clutch, or that there's too small a sample size. He's saying it HAS NOT been disproven, and that there is not yet a metric to measure it. In essence -stretch- he's saying its an intangible.

[Magnetic Curses]

if you can't measure clutch accurately, there's no way of identifying a unicorn. so anyone who says that a hitter is a unicorn based on what flawed metrics there are, they are probably wrong. and if someone tries to identify a unicorn by simply watching a game, they are almost always wrong.

[Ding Dong Johnson]

if you can't measure clutch accurately, there's no way of identifying a unicorn. so anyone who says that a hitter is a unicorn based on what flawed metrics there are, they are probably wrong. and if someone tries to identify a unicorn by simply watching a game, they are almost always wrong.

 

Clutch post.

[craig]

James may believe there might be some clutch hitting thing that no Saber guy has been able to come up with a way to measure, relative to the noise of data scatter. Clearly the majority of perceived "clutch" hitters it's a results of data noise.

 

It still seems to me that if I were a saber guy, I'd think it might be easier to come up with some way to measure somebody who's anti-clutch. Hard to find guys who persistently overachieve in clutch, if any such exist. But it seems much more qualitatively plausible to me that there are other guys who underchieve in the clutch. I'm just wondering whether any study to that effect has ever been done? It's a lot easier to perform below one's capabilities than beyond one's capabilities!

 

With MPrior, I think this seems consistent with some closer guys, including Hawkins. Certainly it's well possible that Hawkins non-success as closer was coincidental, random, noise, etc.. But the long-standing view that any pitcher can do as well in the 9th as he does in any other situation, I'm just not convinced yet that it's true. Some guys can, I'm sure that's true. But others, I find it very plausible that guys who are used to pitching 7th inning and do it decently, that if suddenly switched into 9th inning duties, knowing their team is on the line, their reputation is on the line, their future career and future earnings and future fame and glory is on the line, it seems entirely plausible to imagine that for some guys, they might not perform interchangeably.

 

I have no saber evidence that the hypothesis that some guys tend to underperform under special pressure is true.

 

Obviously tons of baseball players believe it. They may all be idiots. But how many times haven't we heard pitchers talk about needing to just relax and throw their game? And how many times haven't we seen rookie pitchers *not* pitching relaxed, and pitching with much poorer control than they did in the minors? I never expect a debut pitcher to have the same kind of control that I think he had in Iowa, or that I think he might have once he settles in. Maybe those pitchers are all idiots who think they need to "relax" and that they pitch worse when they don't. But maybe they aren't, and saber guys just haven't taken the time to study or figured a way to study the performance of nervous pitchers versus relaxed one?

 

And how many times haven't we heard hitters talking about being in a team slump, that everybody is pressing, that too many guys are trying to win it all by themselves (swinging for HR, swinging at pitches outside of the strike zone?) Maybe these idiot athletes are cracked, and are totally mistaken that they perhaps produce worse when they are pressing or swinging too hard or too aggressively at bad balls. But it doesn't seem impossible that perhaps they are right?

 

I think saber guys when they've looked have always tried to look for "clutch" guys, overachievers. I think identifying underachievers, anti-clutch guys, might be a lot more possible because it seems so much more possible to underperform than to overperform. [/i]

Edited January 5, 2006 by craig

[goonys evil twin]

But the long-standing view that any pitcher can do as well in the 9th as he does in any other situation, I'm just not convinced yet that it's true. Some guys can, I'm sure that's true. But others, I find it very plausible that guys who are used to pitching 7th inning and do it decently, that if suddenly switched into 9th inning duties, knowing their team is on the line, their reputation is on the line, their future career and future earnings and future fame and glory is on the line, it seems entirely plausible to imagine that for some guys, they might not perform interchangeably.

 

I think the vast majority of guys could handle it. It's only the few like Hawkins that fail. If you put up consistently great numbers in the 7th or 8th, odds are more likely than not that you can put them up in the 9th. The tough thing is not finding a guy with the mentality, the tough part is finding the guy who can put up the numbers in the first place. Most relievers turned closer that fail do so because they weren't that good of a reliever in the first place, and were thrust into a position they couldn't handle, not because of mental issues, but because they weren't good pitchers.

[Magnetic Curses]

With MPrior, I think this seems consistent with some closer guys, including Hawkins. Certainly it's well possible that Hawkins non-success as closer was coincidental, random, noise, etc.. But the long-standing view that any pitcher can do as well in the 9th as he does in any other situation, I'm just not convinced yet that it's true. Some guys can, I'm sure that's true. But others, I find it very plausible that guys who are used to pitching 7th inning and do it decently, that if suddenly switched into 9th inning duties, knowing their team is on the line, their reputation is on the line, their future career and future earnings and future fame and glory is on the line, it seems entirely plausible to imagine that for some guys, they might not perform interchangeably.

 

you have a point with hawkins. hawkins does not have the peripherals to close, imo. he doesn't strike enough guys out or induce enough groundballs to be a closer.

 

i think he may be more relaxed in the 7th or 8th, and is able to use his offspeed stuff more effectively, thus getting more awkward swings at pitches without much downward movement. if he had a dominant pitch (a sinking fastball, sinker, or slider), he might be able to get more k's and gbs, but he doesn't, so he must rely more on spotting his fastball and picking the places to throw his breaking stuff. if he's pressing, it's probably harder to locate his fastball effectively, thus setting up his offspeed stuff.

 

i think this was really evident in the years that he closed for the cubs. he threw nothing but fastballs because he was unable to hit corners with them and refused to throw anything out of the zone--this caused him to get hit real hard.

[wiumike]

Here is another way to look at a clutch player, they are slackers. If they have the ability to suddenly hit for more power, fewer strikeouts or higher average in key situations. Why can't they do it every time? If a player were notorious for loafing it on the base paths in routine situation, it would make since for him to perform better when it counts. He would be trying his hardest from the start of the at bat, thus might make it to first base a few steps quicker.

[UBlink]

It's a lot easier to perform below one's capabilities than beyond one's capabilities!

 

 

That's my excuse for my performance in the Free Agent signing contest.

[craig]

I think the vast majority of guys could handle it. It's only the few like Hawkins that fail. If you put up consistently great numbers in the 7th or 8th, odds are more likely than not that you can put them up in the 9th. The tough thing is not finding a guy with the mentality, the tough part is finding the guy who can put up the numbers in the first place. Most relievers turned closer that fail do so because they weren't that good of a reliever in the first place, and were thrust into a position they couldn't handle, not because of mental issues, but because they weren't good pitchers.

 

I agree. But in terms of the "clutchness" thing, if there are 10% of players who would fail for mental reasons, it would be interesting to know in advance. And in terms of the theory, it would be interesting to ascertain whether in fact there is some pool (perhaps small) of players who do underperform in clutch.

 

Most relievers turned closer that fail do so because they weren't that good of a reliever in the first place, and were thrust into a position they couldn't handle, not because of mental issues, but because they weren't good pitchers.

 

This gets exactly to the point. If there is no such thing as anti-clutchness, then a guy who can post 3.3 ERA in the 7th ought to be able to post 3.3 ERA in the 9th. A guy may be nothing more than a 3.6 ERA guy in the 8th, but then he ought to be able to perform comparable in the 9th, if in fact there is no anti-clutchness involved.

 

If a team considers pitching 3.2-ball in the 7th to be good, but considers the same guy pitching the same 3.2-ball in the 9th to be a failure, that could happen I imagine. Then the team is stupid. Obviously they shouldn't expect any more. But if no anti-clutchness exists, neither should the pitcher perform any worse.

 

You have a point with hawkins. hawkins does not have the peripherals to close, imo. he doesn't strike enough guys out or induce enough groundballs to be a closer. i think he may be more relaxed in the 7th or 8th, and is able to use his offspeed stuff more effectively, thus getting more awkward swings at pitches without much downward movement.

 

This argument is that Hawkins is anti-clutch, and that clutchness (or it's lack) does exist. Why does he need any different peripherals or any different offspeed stuff in the 9th than in the 8th or 7th, if clutchness does not exist? The suggestion is that he's more relaxed in 7th/8th and thus has a better breaking ball is arguing that he's anti-clutch and being unrelaxed in the 9th compromises his effectiveness. He didn't need to be magically clutch, or overachieve; if he'd simply been able to pitch at the same level, with the same kind of K rate and GB/FB rates that were good enough to give him 2.13/1.86 ERA's in setup, if he'd simply pitched that same way in closing he'd have been fine.

 

I'm not concluding that Hawkins was anti-clutch, by the way. It's possible that his demise was simply coincidental. His arm was sore, or his mechanics changed, or whatever.

[wiumike]

Try to apply clutch to hitting a golf ball a long distance. If you were a clutch golfer you would suddenly be able to hit a longer and more accurate shot during a pressure situation. But if had this ability to hit a longer straighter drive, you would always want to hit that shot; so it would become your normal drive.

 

What happens to most people when pressure is applied, they attempt to do more than they are able to and end up regressing. This would be the previously mentioned concept of anti-clutch. I can speak for myself that I am an anti-clutch golfer. If I am trying to hit a “longest drive” I swing harder and end up hitting a bad shot into the rough. Sure, occasionally the hard swing works and a clutch drive is the end result, but that doesn’t take in to account the previous 9 balls I hit out of bounds in the same situation.

 

This is why I agree with the mindset a clutch performer is one who performs up to their average outcome. And a player who is unable to duplicate their expected outcome would have an anti-clutchness associated with them.

[goonys evil twin]

This gets exactly to the point. If there is no such thing as anti-clutchness, then a guy who can post 3.3 ERA in the 7th ought to be able to post 3.3 ERA in the 9th. A guy may be nothing more than a 3.6 ERA guy in the 8th, but then he ought to be able to perform comparable in the 9th, if in fact there is no anti-clutchness involved.

 

If a team considers pitching 3.2-ball in the 7th to be good, but considers the same guy pitching the same 3.2-ball in the 9th to be a failure, that could happen I imagine. Then the team is stupid. Obviously they shouldn't expect any more. But if no anti-clutchness exists, neither should the pitcher perform any worse.

 

The problem of course is that ERA is not a good way to judge a reliever's effectiveness, and that non-elite relievers have a very short shelf life anyway. A guy might also be effective in the 7th and not in the 9th because when he comes in during the 9th he's asked to get one or two outs, and doesn't face the big boys. There's a lot of variables to look at.

[Magnetic Curses]

This argument is that Hawkins is anti-clutch, and that clutchness (or it's lack) does exist. Why does he need any different peripherals or any different offspeed stuff in the 9th than in the 8th or 7th, if clutchness does not exist? The suggestion is that he's more relaxed in 7th/8th and thus has a better breaking ball is arguing that he's anti-clutch and being unrelaxed in the 9th compromises his effectiveness. He didn't need to be magically clutch, or overachieve; if he'd simply been able to pitch at the same level, with the same kind of K rate and GB/FB rates that were good enough to give him 2.13/1.86 ERA's in setup, if he'd simply pitched that same way in closing he'd have been fine.

 

I'm not concluding that Hawkins was anti-clutch, by the way. It's possible that his demise was simply coincidental. His arm was sore, or his mechanics changed, or whatever.

 

i never said that clutch pitching was fictional, just clutch hitting.

 

pitchers, i believe, are subject to "clutchness".

[noisesquared]

This argument is that Hawkins is anti-clutch, and that clutchness (or it's lack) does exist. Why does he need any different peripherals or any different offspeed stuff in the 9th than in the 8th or 7th, if clutchness does not exist? The suggestion is that he's more relaxed in 7th/8th and thus has a better breaking ball is arguing that he's anti-clutch and being unrelaxed in the 9th compromises his effectiveness. He didn't need to be magically clutch, or overachieve; if he'd simply been able to pitch at the same level, with the same kind of K rate and GB/FB rates that were good enough to give him 2.13/1.86 ERA's in setup, if he'd simply pitched that same way in closing he'd have been fine.

 

I'm not concluding that Hawkins was anti-clutch, by the way. It's possible that his demise was simply coincidental. His arm was sore, or his mechanics changed, or whatever.

 

i never said that clutch pitching was fictional, just clutch hitting.

 

pitchers, i believe, are subject to "clutchness".

 

Pitchers have more control over their performance than hitters - i.e. they are trying to throw a specific pitch to a specific location at a specific speed. If there is any sort of 'anti-clutch' issue, then the pitcher is more likely to lose his mechanics/concentration during pressure situations and it is going to be very noticeable. Hawkins seemed to be the poster boy for this type of situation.

[noisesquared]

Every time I read a clutch hitting thread, my mind always goes back to this Bill James article someone posted a link to a while ago:

 

http://www.sabr.org/cmsfiles/underestimating.pdf

 

The pertinent part from Bill James:

 

We ran astray because we have been assuming that random data is proof of nothingness, when in reality random data proves nothing. In essence, starting with Dick Cramer’s article, Cramer argued, “I did an analysis which should have identified clutch hitters, if clutch hitting exists. I got random data; therefore, clutch hitters don’t exist.”

Cramer was using random data as proof of nothingness—and I did the same, many times, and many other people also have done the same. But I’m saying now that’s not right; random data proves nothing—and it cannot be used as proof of nothingness.

Why? Because whenever you do a study, if your study completely fails, you will get random data. Therefore, when you get random data, all you may conclude is that your study has failed. Cramer’s study may have failed to identify clutch hitters because clutch hitters don’t exist—as he concluded—or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

As I understand it, James is saying that due to the small sample size of 'clutch' at-bats per year and the high amount of luck involved in every at-bat, it is impossible to compare yearly 'clutch' numbers - there is too much luck involved.

 

Exactly, there's way too much variation for performance in 'clutch' situations to be predictive or more than an afterthought in player evaluation.

 

That's not what he's saying at all. He's saying that all studies to date have failed to prove "clutch" AND have failed to disprove it.

or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

James believes the methods used to determine if clutch exists were flawed. He seems open to the idea that someday there may be a study that proves clutch, but the right metric has yet to be discovered.

 

Sorry, I was referring to noisesquared's comment below the quote, I had already read the article previously.

 

Maybe I should have responded to noisesquared and not you. But my point is that James is not saying that study has disproved clutch, or that there's too small a sample size. He's saying it HAS NOT been disproven, and that there is not yet a metric to measure it. In essence -stretch- he's saying its an intangible.

 

I would be curious to see, as a clutch metric, what a player's OPS over a 5 year span would be in the following condition:

- the 7th inning or later of games their team is losing by 4 or less runs

 

This would encompass a lot of scenarios not covered by 2 out RISP BA, or late inning BA. I mean, if a guy takes a wlk to lead off an inning when his team is down by 1, that's a clutch AB. If a player hits a 2 run HR with his team down by one in the bottom of the eighth with nobody out, that's still clutch. The five year span would be necessary to generate sample size, and the 4 runs would differentiate from a blowout game. I would bet the numbers would be at least slightly below career norms in most cases, with a lot more anti-clutch cases than clutch cases. I guess you'd also have to factor in that if our team is losing late in a gmes, a batter is more likely to see righty/lefty bullpen matchups and specialist setup men and closers, further decreasing the likelihood of attaining career norm type numbers.

[brfahey]

Every time I read a clutch hitting thread, my mind always goes back to this Bill James article someone posted a link to a while ago:

 

http://www.sabr.org/cmsfiles/underestimating.pdf

 

The pertinent part from Bill James:

 

We ran astray because we have been assuming that random data is proof of nothingness, when in reality random data proves nothing. In essence, starting with Dick Cramer’s article, Cramer argued, “I did an analysis which should have identified clutch hitters, if clutch hitting exists. I got random data; therefore, clutch hitters don’t exist.”

Cramer was using random data as proof of nothingness—and I did the same, many times, and many other people also have done the same. But I’m saying now that’s not right; random data proves nothing—and it cannot be used as proof of nothingness.

Why? Because whenever you do a study, if your study completely fails, you will get random data. Therefore, when you get random data, all you may conclude is that your study has failed. Cramer’s study may have failed to identify clutch hitters because clutch hitters don’t exist—as he concluded—or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

As I understand it, James is saying that due to the small sample size of 'clutch' at-bats per year and the high amount of luck involved in every at-bat, it is impossible to compare yearly 'clutch' numbers - there is too much luck involved.

 

Exactly, there's way too much variation for performance in 'clutch' situations to be predictive or more than an afterthought in player evaluation.

 

That's not what he's saying at all. He's saying that all studies to date have failed to prove "clutch" AND have failed to disprove it.

or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

James believes the methods used to determine if clutch exists were flawed. He seems open to the idea that someday there may be a study that proves clutch, but the right metric has yet to be discovered.

 

Sorry, I was referring to noisesquared's comment below the quote, I had already read the article previously.

 

Maybe I should have responded to noisesquared and not you. But my point is that James is not saying that study has disproved clutch, or that there's too small a sample size. He's saying it HAS NOT been disproven, and that there is not yet a metric to measure it. In essence -stretch- he's saying its an intangible.

 

I would be curious to see, as a clutch metric, what a player's OPS over a 5 year span would be in the following condition:

- the 7th inning or later of games their team is losing by 4 or less runs

 

This would encompass a lot of scenarios not covered by 2 out RISP BA, or late inning BA. I mean, if a guy takes a wlk to lead off an inning when his team is down by 1, that's a clutch AB. If a player hits a 2 run HR with his team down by one in the bottom of the eighth with nobody out, that's still clutch. The five year span would be necessary to generate sample size, and the 4 runs would differentiate from a blowout game. I would bet the numbers would be at least slightly below career norms in most cases, with a lot more anti-clutch cases than clutch cases. I guess you'd also have to factor in that if our team is losing late in a gmes, a batter is more likely to see righty/lefty bullpen matchups and specialist setup men and closers, further decreasing the likelihood of attaining career norm type numbers.

 

Now you are talking and realizing that not all at-bats are created equal. I would expand the sample to encompass when a team is ahead by only a run or two as well as behind. And maybe, if expanded like that, the category need not be limited to late innings. Games can turn early sometimes.

[KingKongvs.Godzilla]

A really good point Tim makes everytime this argument comes up is that, in order to make it all the way to the major leagues, you have to perform under extreme amounts of a lot. You have to perform in front of scouts in high school and college, and in front of more scouts in the minor leagues. That's an enormous amount of pressure, in some cases you could probably argue that there's MORE pressure on the kid in high school.

 

It seems silly to say that you'd be able to make it to the major leagues without being able to perform under pressure.

 

Exactly. Its why I can't believe in "clutch" players. I DO believe in clutch MOMENTS though. Theres no doubt you can go ahead a hit clutch, but I would never say that player is now a big game player because of it. I know its human and all to do it, but it just seems so jumpy to label a guy clutch. Cause that "clutch" label usually comes after ONE big moment he does something in.

 

I guess I'm just not a jumpy guy when it comes to labeling people.

[noisesquared]

A really good point Tim makes everytime this argument comes up is that, in order to make it all the way to the major leagues, you have to perform under extreme amounts of a lot. You have to perform in front of scouts in high school and college, and in front of more scouts in the minor leagues. That's an enormous amount of pressure, in some cases you could probably argue that there's MORE pressure on the kid in high school.

 

It seems silly to say that you'd be able to make it to the major leagues without being able to perform under pressure.

 

Exactly. Its why I can't believe in "clutch" players. I DO believe in clutch MOMENTS though. Theres no doubt you can go ahead a hit clutch, but I would never say that player is now a big game player because of it. I know its human and all to do it, but it just seems so jumpy to label a guy clutch. Cause that "clutch" label usually comes after ONE big moment he does something in.

 

I guess I'm just not a jumpy guy when it comes to labeling people.

 

What happens if a high school player is so far ahead of his peers talent wise that he is able to perform regardless of pressure? I would guess a high school age player that is showing the talent that interests scouts is playing on a different level than most of his peers. This could contine through that player's ascent through college/minors, until one day he's playing with peers who are equal or superior talentwise at whatever level, at which point performing becomes a challenge, and the on-field pressure to perform becomes something that this player has not yet encountered. I agree that all players do encounter pressure from early on in their careers, but if there is a significant talent-gap between that player and his peers, he probably can't help but to perform, regardless of the pressure.

[pete the dog]

Every time I read a clutch hitting thread, my mind always goes back to this Bill James article someone posted a link to a while ago:

 

http://www.sabr.org/cmsfiles/underestimating.pdf

 

The pertinent part from Bill James:

 

We ran astray because we have been assuming that random data is proof of nothingness, when in reality random data proves nothing. In essence, starting with Dick Cramer’s article, Cramer argued, “I did an analysis which should have identified clutch hitters, if clutch hitting exists. I got random data; therefore, clutch hitters don’t exist.”

Cramer was using random data as proof of nothingness—and I did the same, many times, and many other people also have done the same. But I’m saying now that’s not right; random data proves nothing—and it cannot be used as proof of nothingness.

Why? Because whenever you do a study, if your study completely fails, you will get random data. Therefore, when you get random data, all you may conclude is that your study has failed. Cramer’s study may have failed to identify clutch hitters because clutch hitters don’t exist—as he concluded—or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

As I understand it, James is saying that due to the small sample size of 'clutch' at-bats per year and the high amount of luck involved in every at-bat, it is impossible to compare yearly 'clutch' numbers - there is too much luck involved.

 

Exactly, there's way too much variation for performance in 'clutch' situations to be predictive or more than an afterthought in player evaluation.

 

That's not what he's saying at all. He's saying that all studies to date have failed to prove "clutch" AND have failed to disprove it.

or it may have failed to identify clutch hitters because the method doesn’t work—as I now believe. We don’t know. All we can say is that the study has failed.

 

James believes the methods used to determine if clutch exists were flawed. He seems open to the idea that someday there may be a study that proves clutch, but the right metric has yet to be discovered.

 

Sorry, I was referring to noisesquared's comment below the quote, I had already read the article previously.

 

Maybe I should have responded to noisesquared and not you. But my point is that James is not saying that study has disproved clutch, or that there's too small a sample size. He's saying it HAS NOT been disproven, and that there is not yet a metric to measure it. In essence -stretch- he's saying its an intangible.

 

I would be curious to see, as a clutch metric, what a player's OPS over a 5 year span would be in the following condition:

- the 7th inning or later of games their team is losing by 4 or less runs

 

This would encompass a lot of scenarios not covered by 2 out RISP BA, or late inning BA. I mean, if a guy takes a wlk to lead off an inning when his team is down by 1, that's a clutch AB. If a player hits a 2 run HR with his team down by one in the bottom of the eighth with nobody out, that's still clutch. The five year span would be necessary to generate sample size, and the 4 runs would differentiate from a blowout game. I would bet the numbers would be at least slightly below career norms in most cases, with a lot more anti-clutch cases than clutch cases. I guess you'd also have to factor in that if our team is losing late in a gmes, a batter is more likely to see righty/lefty bullpen matchups and specialist setup men and closers, further decreasing the likelihood of attaining career norm type numbers.

 

 

I'm sure these stats are available, and I wouldn't be surprised if someone has already done this kind of analysis. But what you still need to show is that this player's relative performance in these situations is not only better than other players in these situations, but is *more* better than in other situations. That is, if player X has an OBP that is .50 higher in these situations, but also is .50 better in "non-clutch" situations, then this batter is not a "clutch hitter." He is simply a better hitter. There may be a large main effect such that all hitters are better or worse in these situations. What I'd want to see is that this player's relative advantage over others is particularly high in these situations.

[BigbadB]

Here is another way to look at a clutch player, they are slackers. If they have the ability to suddenly hit for more power, fewer strikeouts or higher average in key situations. Why can't they do it every time?

 

=D>

[T2E]

This argument is that Hawkins is anti-clutch, and that clutchness (or it's lack) does exist. Why does he need any different peripherals or any different offspeed stuff in the 9th than in the 8th or 7th, if clutchness does not exist? The suggestion is that he's more relaxed in 7th/8th and thus has a better breaking ball is arguing that he's anti-clutch and being unrelaxed in the 9th compromises his effectiveness. He didn't need to be magically clutch, or overachieve; if he'd simply been able to pitch at the same level, with the same kind of K rate and GB/FB rates that were good enough to give him 2.13/1.86 ERA's in setup, if he'd simply pitched that same way in closing he'd have been fine.

 

I'm not concluding that Hawkins was anti-clutch, by the way. It's possible that his demise was simply coincidental. His arm was sore, or his mechanics changed, or whatever.

 

i never said that clutch pitching was fictional, just clutch hitting.

 

pitchers, i believe, are subject to "clutchness".

 

I don't understand the logic that pitchers can be subject to clutchness and not hitters. Hitters are subject to the same pressure as pitchers, and they too can have their mechanics falter as they try to press.

[Careless]

In every field, it is nearly impossible to prove that something does not exist. I don't believe in ghosts, but I cannot prove they are not real. However, the burden of proof should lie with the people who are positing that something does exist. I have yet to see any compelling evidence that there are players who are clutch.

 

What cracks me up about this argument is when people say it has a huge impact....but can't be measured. That is what I'd really like to have explained sometime.

Personally, I believe that clutch exists, but that MLB hitters operate at such a high mental state that there is very little margin for improvement for most of them, and therefore virtually no possibility for clutch hitting. given that, I consider anti-clutch as proof of clutch.

(in other words, it has a smaller impact on hitting in the majors than other levels)