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Image courtesy of © Erik Williams-Imagn Images The Chicago Cubs have had 17 players record at least five plate appearances in 2025. Of those 17, eight fall below the threshold of a 100 wRC+ that signifies average performance. Two of those eight are starters (Dansby Swanson, Matt Shaw), and next on the list is Moisés Ballesteros, who has all of 20 plate appearances to his name. It probably isn't too difficult an exercise to predict the next five names you'd see on that list. Two of the five are no longer in the organization (Gage Workman and Nicky Lopez). Another (Vidal Bruján) is in limbo, after the Cubs designated him for assignment earlier this week. That leaves Justin Turner and Jon Berti. Across those five players, you're looking at 204 plate appearances for the year. The average wRC+? About 42. Even if you wanted to isolate it specifically to the three who have been on the roster most of the year, you're still looking at a 51 aggregate wRC+. This is all to say that the Cubs' bench has been, objectively, quite bad in. Catcher is obviously an entirely different conversation, as Carson Kelly, Miguel Amaya, and Reese McGuire have averaged a 126 wRC+ in an occasionally ambiguous timeshare. But as far as those who do most of their work in fair territory, it's been difficult to rationalize the playing of any of the team's bench players. Luckily, to this point, Craig Counsell hasn't been forced into using his bench all that much. In any case, enter Willi Castro. Aside from a bopper like Eugenio Suárez, Castro represented perhaps the most appealing position player for the Cubs ahead of the 2025 deadline, especially when you consider the context of the roster. It's not as if the team had many spots where they had flexibility to upgrade. They were set across the infield, set behind the plate, and set at three of the four infield spots. Matt Shaw's first-half struggles with the stick provided one of the only lanes for a potential upgrade. Even there, though, it was sort of Suárez or bust, as the third base market didn't feature much upside beyond him. Castro, though, represents exactly the type of player that this roster needs: a versatile bench piece who brings actual value with the bat. With Minnesota this year, Castro has appeared at six different positions (seven, if you want to include the single inning he pitched). His positional totals on the infield read: 224 innings at second base, 74 innings at third, and 26 at shortstop. Across the three outfield spots, he's gone for 252 innings in left field and 156 in right, with just one inning in center. It may be worth noting, however, that he received a much more sizable chunk of time last year at the two spots where he appeared the least for the Twins this year. In 2024, Castro was at short for over 460 innings and spent over 200 in center. That Minnesota chose to roll him out on fewer occasions at those two spots speaks to his defensive shortcomings at the two premium positions. His Fielding Run Value at shortstop for his career (1,123 innings) reads -3, while his FRV in center (594.2 innings) checks in at -2. Ultimately, neither position is where we'll see Castro ply his trade for the Cubs with any sort of frequency, given the presence of Dansby Swanson('s glove) and Pete Crow-Armstrong at the two spots, respectively. That lends some clarity as to how Castro could best be utilized in this lineup. A central concept for Craig Counsell will be to run Castro out at third base. While Shaw has ascended since the All-Star break, Counsell has shown he likes to give his rookie the occasional off day, depending on the matchup. With Castro as a switch-hitter, there's plenty of potential for him to get in on the action as a left-handed complement to Shaw. It wouldn't be a traditional platoon, but could prove a solid setup. What you lose on the defensive side—though Castro was a much better defender there in the two years before this—you get back at the plate. While Castro doesn't offer as much impact as a lefty swinger, his keen approach has resulted in an 11.5% walk rate in 2025, so you're getting some value on the on-base side. In terms of starting potential, there's also an argument to be made for regular work in left field. If the eye test wasn't enough to know about Ian Happ's lackluster production vs. southpaws, his 104 wRC+ and .122 isolated power certainly are. Castro stands as a contrast, offering a 131 wRC+ and .222 ISO against such pitchers. Counsell has already shown a willingness to move Happ down in the lineup based on production, so it stands to reason that he'd be willing to do so in matchup plays. Those are two very different scenarios that offer very clear opportunities for Castro to work his way into the lineup. And those are just the starting versions. There are a number of ways to get creative, besides. Either of the above scenarios late in the game? Maybe Castro gives you a better shot at a desirable outcome. A pinch-running situation? Castro has nine steals (14 in 2024). An unfavorable Dansby Swanson matchup during one of Swanson's periods of offensive turmoil? Castro might give you a little more there, too, even if that one (wherein you hit him for Swanson, have him take over at the keystone, and flip Nico Hoerner over to shortstop) might be a stretch. The beauty of a player like Castro is that you can insert him almost anywhere, at any point, and receive competence in return. That's exactly what the Cubs have lacked out of their bench all year. In Castro, they not only acquired competence, but gained the chance to spread it just about everywhere. View full article

Image courtesy of © Kamil Krzaczynski-Imagn Images When the Chicago Cubs announced a multi-year extension for president of baseball operations Jed Hoyer on Monday, my initial reaction was... "sure." That was followed by "okay," which was succeeded by "fine." In short, it was a fairly muted reaction. Judging by the lack of acute polarization across social media from a fan base that always finds ways to deeply meet each end of the emotional spectrum upon any move from the franchise, it sort of speaks to the magnitude of the move. Or, perhaps, the lack thereof. It's a move that ultimately signals that Tom Ricketts and the ownership group are satisfied with the work Hoyer has turned in since 2020, with the team doing enough thus far in 2025 to merit a longer runway with which to continue to work. Lacking the candor of his predecessor, Theo Epstein, Hoyer's word salad-y defense of apparently constant payroll constraints was enough to compensate for the absence of a postseason appearance since his promotion. Not that there haven't been victories for Hoyer within the organization. It was the Hoyer-led front office that acquired Pete Crow-Armstrong while he was plying his trade in A ball. They signed Seiya Suzuki and Shota Imanaga. They acquired a post-hype Michael Busch and a present-hype Kyle Tucker (sans extension at present, of course). To say it's been a mixed bag, though, would be appropriately euphemistic. It's been entirely imperfect and entirely underwhelming, given the aforementioned lack of playoff success. We don't need to rehash that here, however; Matt Trueblood already covered the basics in his initial writeup of the news. As a chief of baseball ops, your game is winning. Hoyer hasn't done enough, so we can state with a certain level of objectivity that he has not succeeded in the role. What is worth exploring, though, is whether Hoyer has, in fact, found success by his own standards, and in his own words. Let's start with a softball from his initial press conference: That particular quote was in reference to the 2020 group. That team still featured many of the important names from the championship squad of 2016. We know how things unfolded the following season. By the end of that winter, Kyle Schwarber was non-tendered. Each of Anthony Rizzo, Kris Bryant, and Javier Báez was traded during the 2021 campaign. Of those from the organization's last (technical) postseason appearance, only Ian Happ and Nico Hoerner remain. Each player signed a three-year extension in 2023. It's unclear whether those were the players to whom Hoyer was referring. My assumption, however, is that he was talking more about extending the very guys he ended trading instead. Failing to extend (and instead trading away) multiple franchise icons didn't get his tenure off to the greatest of starts. Schwarber has gone on to thrive in subsequent stops, and while none of the other three remotely reached the same heights they did on the North Side, those initial comments still stand as an indicator of some failure from the jump. Here's another, more striking quote, from that same press conference: This is the big one, because this has been the driver of seemingly every decision Hoyer has made atop the Cubs' front office. Budget constraints notwithstanding, Hoyer has constantly erred on the side of playing things conservatively. Maintaining an eye on the present and the future simultaneously is a difficult needle to thread, but it's never felt like the present was as much of a priority as the future. Under Hoyer, the Cubs have regularly chosen to avoid the big move or the notable free-agent signing. Before Kyle Tucker, there was an apprehension in making the big trade that many of their big-market counterparts are more willing to execute. Opportunities were there, though. It was that the Cubs were content to let those opportunities pass, in the name of not even risking mortgaging the future. And such failure isn't isolated to the "big" moves. There has been a consistent struggle to build on the margins that has left the Cubs in a sort of purgatory for much of the last five years. What Hoyer has done, however, is keep that other eye on the future. Under his supervision, the team has seen improvements in the draft (Matt Shaw, Cade Horton) and in the pitching infrastructure. It's not that Hoyer alone is responsible for this, but his leadership has certainly been a factor in some of the more foundational components of organizational operations. The proverbial needle hasn't quite been threaded, but success in one arena is better than success in zero arenas, I suppose. And lastly, here are a few bits from his comments last winter: (Prior to the Kyle Tucker trade) (Still pre-Kyle Tucker trade) (Post Kyle Tucker trade) On one hand, there's a lot of earnest success here. Hoyer said, straight up, that the team wasn't interested in marginal improvements. He very much proved that in acquiring an elite hitter in Tucker, who has come as advertised for almost all of 2025. At the same time, it's also an imperfect measure. If we wanted to get cynical, we could point out that he essentially ignored the margins in filling out the rest of the roster on the positional side. Handing the third base job to Shaw and bringing in the likes of Justin Turner and Vidal Bruján for bench jobs doesn't jibe with a Tucker acquisition in matters of actually building out a contending roster. I'd never call something like trading for Kyle Tucker a half-measure. It's obviously not. I'm just pointing out the words as Hoyer said them. The Tucker deal fit the criteria of a "hard" deal that Hoyer described in the middle quote. Parting with Cam Smith after he thrived almost immediately upon his selection in the 2024 MLB Draft couldn't have been easy. It was, however, necessary, and a sharp deviation from the type of conservative activity we'd seen from Hoyer in the years prior. If we're taking his words at face value, though, he did accomplish what he set out to do: set the Cubs up for an exciting future and exciting present (and here it's probably worth noting that signing Kyle Tucker long-term would go a long way toward solidifying those comments). The outset of Jed Hoyer's tenure likely wouldn't be deemed a success by his own criteria. He jettisoned multiple franchise icons despite an interest in retaining "some" of them (and we have to assume he was referring to some of that core group rather than a Happ or a Hoerner). As it progressed, though, we might be able to make a case for it. He's helped position the organization into solid standing for the medium-term future. The system remains in good shape, and the infrastructure is more robust than it was, particularly on the pitching side. But he hasn't threaded that needle. We've heard about the needle more frequently than any other talking point from the Cubs' president. Compounding present winning with future winning. By that criteria alone, it's hard to outright justify Hoyer's new deal, from his perspective or our own. View full article

Image courtesy of © David Banks-Imagn Images In the Chicago Cubs' final game before the All-Star break, Craig Counsell put his emerging first baseman in the top spot in the lineup. In the two games immediately coming out of it, Michael Busch was there once again. It's likely not a permanent solution; Counsell's need to rotate new faces in leadoff has more to do with Ian Happ's struggles than a desire to inject others into the role. But, the skill set Busch flashed last year has evolved into something entirely capable of handling such duty for as long as the Cubs might need. Busch's success in 2025 has unfolded in a very broad context but has come as the result of specific developments. Most notably, his ability to manage an approach and control the strike zone was something that became increasingly evident during his rookie year in '24. He's really dialed in that component of his game this year, though, which @Matthew Trueblood examined earlier this month. It's the approach that has served as the driver of Busch's success. "Success", in this case, is the reveal of an all-around hitter in a way that we maybe didn't anticipate last year. He's leading the team in average (.288) & wRC+ (159), is second in on-base percentage (.376), and is third in isolated power (.262). The same component keying his success this year (the approach) is the same one that could sustain a stint in the leadoff spot for however long the Cubs need. Ian Happ was able to exist at the team's top hitter purely on the merits of his own approach. However, the approach by which Happ lives manifests itself differently than that of Michael Busch. Happ relies on pure patience to create an on-base presence. His modest power has shrunk even more in '25 while his baserunning has regressed in a number of respects. What's impressive about Busch, though, is that he's able to utilize his approach to do some of the same things Happ does while, at the same time, offering much more upside. Happ's pitches per plate appearance this year is at 4.12, which ranks 30th in the league. Busch is at 4.01 P/PA (48th). For context, league average (per 600 plate appearances) is 3.86. Busch's overall swing rate (46.5 percent) and chase rate (27.6 percent) each check in about three percent higher than Happ. The difference in contact rate, however, is marginal. Busch's 77.0 Contact% comes in just about one percent behind Happ. Where the two hitters differ is in their ability to parlay that approach into something of value. When Busch has the chase rate tamped down, he's become increasingly dangerous: It's not a complicated concept. When the chase rate is down, Busch's overall value, reflected here by wOBA, is up. In those moments where he starts to expand the zone, then the value goes down. It's a clear trend. Not an uncommon one, mind you, but one which Busch has been able to maximize by limiting those moments of zone expansion. Happ, however, doesn't experience quite the same trend: This isn't so much an argument that Busch is a better hitter (or a better leadoff candidate) than Happ. Objectively, he's certainly the former. He could, ultimately, be the latter. Rather, the purpose is to showcase the difference between the two. Busch is able to incorporate his approach into a steady offensive output, both in power and contact. Happ, however, relies on his walk rate to prop up his output given the regression he's experienced in a handful of areas. In matters of the role itself, though, it's less about Happ and more about what Busch has been able to become in a short time for the Cubs. He improved the approach over the year in 2024. From May on last year, he was able to drop the strikeout rate but saw uneven outcomes. This year, he's spinning the patience into sustained outcomes. Because of that, Busch becomes an ideal candidate in the leadoff spot for the Cubs right now. We're not even talking about the sample, which is only three games (as of this writing). We're talking about skill set. Busch is able to provide much of the same on-base quality that Happ can, with only a slight decrease in the walks game. Where he compensates in his ability to create offense off the approach. Busch led off two of his three starts with a homer. That speaks to what he can provide in the role, for however long he serves it. View full article

Image courtesy of © Gregory Fisher-Imagn Images In an ideal world, Ian Happ represents the ideal leadoff hitter for the 2025 Chicago Cubs. Past iterations of Happ have indicated a player with consistent output, combining upper-tier plate discipline with competence on the basepaths. Even with modest power and limitations in the steals game, the on-base presence alone should be a boon for the bulk of the guys hitting behind him. Except, that hasn't been the case this year. A strong March & April aside, Happ is enduring his worst season since 2021. He's turned in a .312 wOBA, a 102 wRC+, and a slash line that goes .228/.326/.375. His isolated power sits at just .147. And those numbers include a legitimate power surge in June that saw Happ hit nine homers and post a .274 ISO. This, of course, doesn't even include the baserunning situation, where Happ has showcased legitimate regression. The situation has become untenable enough that Craig Counsell removed him from the top spot in the lineup for the three games prior to the All-Star break. In a vacuum, though, the numbers aren't particularly terrible. They're passable, really. If you were getting a .330-ish OBP and occasional power, you'd be happy enough with that considering the successes the Cubs have seen up and down the lineup. Instead, there's an issue in that the numbers have actually gotten worse as the season has worn on: If it weren't outright concerning, it would read as something actually fascinating. Happ started the year much the same as he generally has in years prior. His approach drove his production and allowed him to land as a technically-above-average bat (by wRC+) in March & April. If prior seasons were any indication, the power would come as the temperature warmed up. That very much did, but only while everything else fell off. Except the approach, that is, as Happ has been able to deploy his keen eye to prop up his numbers into something even remotely serviceable. Some of this can just read as the nature of baseball. It ebbs, it flows, and it eventually evens out. At first blush, that could almost be the case, especially when you look at the BABIP column. However, the fact that performance trends don't look terribly favorable for Happ pulling himself out of this anytime soon does register as legitimately worrisome: Essentially, all you're getting at this point, in terms of actual production, is derived from the patience. Happ has maintained his ability to tamp down the swing rates and generate walks. But, he also isn't parlaying that patience into anything of value, other than the occasional walk. From here, we confront a couple of different issues in evaluating what the remainder of Happ's 2025 looks like. The first is simply examining how much of what we've seen from Happ can be attributed to bad luck versus some other element that is stifling his production. The expected statistics (xBA, xwOBA) do indicate Happ should be better than we've seen. We could also use the BABIP numbers to determine that. However, even those don't serve Happ on their own when you consider individual months. The xBA was at .225 and .235, respectively, in May & June, while the xwOBA checked in at .301 in May. We can broadly state, however, that Happ's production should be better based on the majority of the expected metrics. Another issue is Happ's nature as a switch hitter. Rather than look for issues in one swing, you're looking for issues in two. Not only that, but you're looking at different pitcher tendencies depending on handedness. It's a much more complex investigation than you might find with a hitter of one-handedness. And that's where things start to get really messy. Take, for example, Happ's attack angle. Swinging as a lefty, it's been intensely consistent this year: His right-handed swing, however, offers something entirely different: Happ's making contact at deeply different angles depending on the handedness in which he's operating. At the same time, even the swing path itself is prone to bouts of inconsistency in a different way. Here's Happ's swing path when swinging right-handed: That's a marginal change to begin with, but it's also stabilized as the season has worn on. You're getting a consistent swing path from Happ against lefties. Then, you look at the other side of the plate: It presents something entirely erratic but also something that makes a certain degree of sense. The inconsistency in the mechanics offers a possible explanation for why you're seeing so much variance in different aspects of Happ's game in '25. Not that there's clear-cut correlation, but the months with a flatter swing (April & June) from the left side of the plate, for example, offered higher barrel rates than the other two. His month of steepest attack angles (June) gave him his highest quality of contact from the right. Again, we're not necessarily seeing correlation, but it does offer at least some semblance of an explanation as to why Happ's been all over the map from a production standpoint, and neither side of the plate has been immune to it. There hasn't been a marked enough change in the approach in a given month to lead us to believe anything other than a mechanic issue could be the source of Happ's unfortunate luck. Sure, we could point to his emphasis on swinging at fastballs in June as a reason for his power output there, but that also doesn't offer up explanation for everything else happening underneath the surface across the months of data we've seen to this point. It's a soft conclusion to reach without correlation. But, considering just how all over the spectrum the batted ball types and the outcomes have been this year, a mechanical issue is really all we have to go off at this point. Which is why it probably makes sense for Craig Counsell to consider leaving Happ out of the top spot coming out of the break in favor of a more stable option, at least until he's able to regain some consistency on the mechanical side. View full article

Image courtesy of © Jordan Johnson-Imagn Images Carson Kelly's start to 2025 was going to be sustainable. The Chicago Cubs catcher spent March and April hitting .360, reaching base at a clip over .500, and providing absolutely massive power numbers, to the tune of a .480 isolated power figure. He struck out only six times (9.0 K%) against 15 walks (22.4 BB%) and checked in at an absurd 260 wRC+. Forget catchers: Kelly's start had him as effectively the top overall offensive player (minimum of 50 plate appearances) through the first month of the year. A dropoff was expected, and for a hitter with a career .307 wOBA and 93 wRC+, you figured it would more closely resemble a cliff face than a rolling hill. But even with that expectation in place, a drop to a .203/.292/.328 line and 79 wRC+ in May stung. It got worse in June, as Kelly turned in a .232/.283/.286 line and 63 wRC+. The power vanished almost entirely, as he went for a .125 and .054 ISO in the two months, respectively. It also wasn't difficult to figure out just why it happened. It wasn't simple regression, wherein Kelly was doing some of the same things and running into some hard luck. Instead, it came due to increased aggression on his part. Kelly's chase rate rose from 17.0% through April to 23.5% in May. With that, his contact rate sagged from 83.6% in the first month to 79.2% in May. On its own, that wouldn't set off alarm bells, if it didn't carry the contact quality along with it. But as the chase went up and the contact went down, the hard-hit rate cratered. Kelly went from a hard-hit rate of roughly 60% in the first month-plus to just 30.8% in May. His BABIP dropped nearly 70 points as a result. So while regression was always going to be in the cards, the path back was reasonably clear: recover the good process he'd discovered in the early going, in terms of both approach and mechanics at the plate. It doesn't happen often, but things in baseball can sometimes work out the way they're (logically) supposed to. If Kelly could get his plate discipline back in order, then perhaps he could find his way to being a regular contributor at the plate again—especially since he was pressed into increased service due to Miguel Amaya's long-term absence with an oblique strain. That's exactly what's happened since the start of July. While there were marginal improvements in the plate discipline game in June, it wasn't until July that Kelly was really able to round back into form. In a way, it's almost entirely on the strength of his Chase%: Kelly's chase rate in July is just 11.9%. Unsurprisingly, the rest of the contact trends have come along with it. His 88.9% contact rate tops the Cubs this month, and his hard-hit rate is back to a touch over 48%. Kelly also has his walk rate (14.3%) back above his strikeout rate (8.6%) this month. Even working off a small sample (and with the contact rate coming in higher than we'd expect), there's a clear correlation between Kelly's discipline and his ability to make high-value contact. There isn't much more nuance than that. Kelly isn't feasting off one particular pitch type; he has individual months of whiff against offspeed more than breaking pitches or months of harder contact off both offspeed and breaking than against fastballs. It's simply a matter of reining in his swing, in order to make solid contact within the strike zone. Even if he's due for a slight regression in the second half of this month (his .333 BABIP reads a touch high), there's a certain simplicity in Kelly's ability to create offensive value that should allow him to continue to do so down the stretch—provided he keeps it steady in matters of the approach. View full article

Image courtesy of © Matt Marton-Imagn Images If you've followed this space at any point within the last year, you know I have struggled to balance my opinion of Ian Happ. I've made a habit of questioning the overall offensive toolbox and, occasionally, bringing passive opposition to his defensive reputation. While I've come to understand his value to the lineup at large—and developed a rather complimentary stance on his defense—I've returned to a familiar headspace for much of 2025 in pondering another facet of Happ's game: baserunning. Happ, quite obviously, is not a burner out of the leadoff spot, but he works atop the lineup because of his approach. His 12.8% walk rate sits in the top 20 among qualifying hitters, and he's enough of a fixture on the bases as a result that he ranks in the top 25 in the league in runs scored (53). At the same time, there are some signs that he's no longer able to run the bases at the level you hope for from a catalyst atop the lineup card. This isn't about steals. Happ has turned in 27 combined steals over the last two seasons, but hadn't reached double-digit swipes in any season before. Instead, our focus is on the concept of baserunning as a skill. Speed is a helpful component within the larger context of the skill, but it's not the sole one. It is worth noting, however, that Happ is showing up a little bit slower in 2025. While never returning to the 28.8 feet-per-second speed of his first big-league appearance back in 2017, Happ has generally remained respectable in that department. In the years since, he's undergone the typical, slow loss of a step or two, down to 27.9 ft/sec in 2024. This year, however, Happ is at 27.2 ft/sec. It's not a dramatic dip in terms of the raw number, but it does represent a decrease all the same. So if your eyes are telling you what mine are (that Ian Happ looks slower), it's because he technically is. But then there's the more value-centered side of things. The age of analytics has wrought a number of different ways in which we can evaluate the ability of a baserunner. Unfortunately for Happ, none of them are ringing too positive thus far in 2025. We can start with FanGraphs's Base Running tool, BsR. BsR considers factors like extra bases taken or outs made on the bases and spins them into the metric indicating runs above or below average. Happ started out rough in this area (-1.8 in 2017) but has fallen above average in every other season in the big leagues (2020 notwithstanding). Last year's number came in at 1.2, which matched his 2023 output. This year, however, Happ sits at -3.0 BsR. Among 157 qualifying position players, that figure checks in as one of the 10 worst in that area. For additional context, Michael Busch and Kyle Tucker each feature slower sprint speeds than Happ. However, Busch is at -1.6 (17 spots higher than Happ as a first baseman) and Tucker's 4.5 has him in the top five. The context with each player differs, of course; Tucker is notable for being an upper-tier baserunner with sensational instincts. But BsR alone is indicative of exactly the issue we're discussing with Happ. Statcast employs multiple ways in which to evaluate baserunners. For our purposes, there's the more specific Extra Bases Taken (measured in run value via Runner Runs) and Baserunning Run Value (which does incorporate steals to soak up more context and is measured in Baserunning Runs). The purpose of including both is a desire to evaluate Happ's value in navigating the basepaths while also exploring the more comprehensive angle through Baserunning Run Value. Extra Bases Taken includes 298 baserunners in its Runner Runs leaderboard. At -3, Happ ranks 292nd and features the second-worst value listed. In fact, If you wanted to isolate such a list to just the Cubs over the last three seasons, Happ's -3 in 2025 ranks 27th out of 27 names listed. He was at 1 and sitting 12th and 14th in each of 2023 and 2024, for some context as to how steep the drop has been. Factoring in the steals via the Baserunning Run Value doesn't particularly help matters, either. He's still at -3, ranking 219 out of 224, and presents -4 stolen bases versus the average. So whether the steals are factored in or not, Ian Happ is very visibly not ranking favorably among his peers in the baserunning aspect of the sport. Statcast does break down the value a player creates or destroys on the bases into their propensity to advance and their skill at avoiding extra outs, which can tell us where Happ is succeeding and failing. He's 4-for-5 on steal attempts, for instance, so why is the framework down on his base-stealing? Simple: he's on base so much that the system is faulting him for not running more. At 0.6%, his Attempt Rate when on base in a steal opportunity situation is very low. He's been 2 (non-)outs better than average in terms of outs created, which is to say, not running much has spared the Cubs him running into a few outs. However, he's been 6 bases shy of an average runner's expected number of thefts. On balance, then, he's missing four bases he ought to have taken. When it comes to the running aspect on balls in play, there seem to be two problems. Yes, he's a bit slower than he used to be, but he's done well at getting secondary leads. The second problem he's encountering is not reading balls off the bats of his teammates and breaking aggressively enough, at times. This is a ball on which you just have to score, and the Statcast framework docks Happ himself about 0.8 runs for not having done so. The way the ball was hit, it was sure to drop, and Happ got a clean break. He was just insufficiently confident and didn't get up to speed the way he still can and should have. TkE5RDVfWGw0TUFRPT1fVndsUkJnVUFVQUVBWEFaVUJBQUhVQVZTQUZoWFZ3Y0FVMWNDQndjQUNRVldCUUpR.mp4 Now, this system also has some blind spots, and you can make a fine case that Happ has been better than it would paint him. Here's a play on which he was docked 0.2 runs for not advancing to third, but on which any runner needs to go just halfway from first to second until it drops. Then, assuming the fielders scoop it cleanly, there's really no time to advance. Whatever the system looks at to estimate the expectations that a runner would advance, it's being too harsh on Happ here. ZU44ZzNfWGw0TUFRPT1fQkFKU0J3WlZVRkFBREZjR0F3QUhVZzVWQUZoUUJWY0FBVndIVXdWWEFnQmNVUVlF.mp4 Like many technological solutions we come up with for measurement problems, this one can be a bit overconfident. That can push numbers to the ends of a spectrum where you actually want most values to cluster in the middle. Maybe it's best to consult Baseball Prospectus's Deserved Runs on the Bases (DRB), which has Happ at... -0.2 runs for the season. That, perhaps, is a fairer evaluation. Is he adding value? No. But he probably isn't removing it, either. After all, Happ has scored 36.3% of the time after reaching base this year. The league average is 30.9%. Some of the reasons why he's not advancing on hits or stealing bases is that he's often along for the ride on homers. He's scoring at the 32nd-highest rate of 155 qualifying hitters, so even if he's not creating value by pushing the envelope, he's doing a baserunner's most important job: getting home safely. Ultimately, though, the aim here was to look at whether the data supports the eye test. The eyes are telling us that Ian Happ looks slow. The numbers say the same thing. At this point, it's more of a hindrance on a situational level (runners on and a ground ball in play from Happ, as an example). But considering that the power comes in waves and the on-base is supported by his approach, one does wonder how much such a trend could lead to the diminution of Happ as a viable leadoff candidate. We're probably not close to that yet, but these trends are, at least, worth monitoring. View full article

Image courtesy of © David Banks-Imagn Images We live in the golden era of Chicago Cubs baseball, such as it is. The organization hasn't known prolonged, uninterrupted success for (say) a decade at any point since World War II, but they've come closest in the period since Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer took over at the end of 2011. Mostly, that run of success has been fueled by position players. Position players were the cornerstones of the team's rebuild. They drafted position players in the first round for their first four years in the organization. They traded Andrew Cashner for Anthony Rizzo, then extended both Rizzo and Starlin Castro, but they didn't extend Jake Arrieta. Arrieta, of course, is one example of a pitcher achieving breakout stardom in a Cubs uniform during this era. Jon Lester is an example of the team going and getting a star who defined their competitive window on the mound. Justin Steele is the rare win for the team when it comes to homegrown pitching. All of them, however, are starters. The team hasn't churned out its own high-octane, high-caliber relievers at the rate that other teams have—and certainly, those guys haven't had star or staying power. That is to say, the collective of Cub fans likely spends a lot of time fawning over other teams' relief pitchers, and closers, in particular. The Emmanuel Clase class. The Edwin Díaz dais. The Josh Hader type. Sure, the Cubs have had guys of a recent vintage capable of putting the clamps on a ballgame, but rarely has it been someone with real electricity. When it has, it's generally a past-their-prime-but-still-at-least-mildly-effective version of someone, like Craig Kimbrel. Adbert Alzolay was that guy, but only for a moment, between injuries. Daniel Palencia has a chance to put an end to that waiting and, subsequently, such fawning. Armed with a triple-digit fastball, Palencia has nailed down the closer job for the 2025 Cubs. What was Ryan Pressly's role passed right through the hands of Porter Hodge, following the former's massive struggles to start the year. Hodge's injury passed it over to Palencia, and virtually nothing he's done in the ninth inning gives us reason to think his job security is in doubt for the foreseeable future. The stuff, on its own, is worthy of emotional investment. Palencia relies almost exclusively on the fastball and slider, heavily favoring the heat. The four-seamer ranks 29th in FanGraphs's Stuff+ (110) among 173 qualifying relievers, while the slider (119) sits 16th among that same group. For the uninitiated, the Stuff+ model measures the physical characteristics of a pitch. Suffice to say, where Palencia lands—courtesy of his running fastball and that vertically-active slider—is quite good: The nature of Palencia's breakout is not only due to his ability to generate strikeouts. He's certainly doing that; his 28.7% strikeout rate ranks 32nd among that reliever group. But opposing hitters are also finding it difficult to get the barrel on a baseball. His minuscule 2.7 percent barrel rate tells that story. So when you're not getting a save that looks like this... ...you're getting one that looks like this: But even beyond the statistical aspects of it, there's the excitement factor explored at the top. Palencia is increasingly becoming the type of arm where you know the game is over. His energy alone is enough to bury a hitter, before he even deploys one of his above-average offerings. It's the type of presence in the ninth that Cub fans have been pining for for quite some time. Baseball Reference has a handy little tool that lists the players who have occupied each role each year, throughout an organization's history. The Cubs' closer column is quite an adventure. You've got converted starters (Ryan Dempster, Kerry Wood), stopgaps during periods of organizational turmoil (Kevin Gregg), electric pitchers wrought with volatility (Carlos Marmól), and plenty of other archetypes. It's a grab bag. I've been alive since 1990. On only four occasions, since then, have the Cubs had the same closer for three consecutive years: Randy Myers from 1993 to 1995; Dempster from 2005 to 2007; Marmól from 2010 to 2012; and Héctor Rondón from 2014 to 2016. If we're going to continue to use that year as a benchmark, then you're looking at 25 different names over 35 years. It's not just that the Cubs haven't had a long-term closer; the nature of relievers is such that sustainability is rare. They've barely strung together consecutive seasons of the same name in the ninth. At no point in recent memory have the Cubs had someone like Palencia. They've had closers, yes. Some good closers, even. But Daniel Palencia is a narrative shift for the Chicago Cubs. He could be their first long-term closer (in a true sense) since Marmól, and the first one who didn't make sweat pour from your armpits since Lee Smith. Acquired from the Athletics in 2021, Palencia's development has come almost entirely within the Cubs organization. He possesses a pair of elite pitches and brings an aura and a burly frame that enhances them even further. With team control through 2031, he's the type of pitcher at the back end of ballgames that this team has lacked over the last few decades. It took a stroke of (mis)fortune to get him there, but it's hard to imagine an outcome more worth it—both on a day-to-day level and on a broader, organizational one. View full article

Image courtesy of © Dennis Lee-Imagn Images The more we progress into July, the closer we get to the Chicago Cubs making a move to fortify what should be a playoff roster. While starting pitching will (and should) grab much of the focus, there's also the matter of shoring up the positional side of things. Whether it's someone to hold down third base while Matt Shaw sorts what's left of his offensive development or a bat for the bench, it's likely that we'll see at least one new face step into the lineup before August rolls around. Willi Castro is a player who could, technically, serve either of the above roles. It's a bit more of a stretch to say he's the type of player that could supplant Shaw for the remainder of 2025, however. Such a role might be better left to someone like Eugenio Suárez. Instead, Castro is exactly the type of player whom the Cubs should be coveting to shore up their bench. It's no secret that the Cubs haven't gotten much out of their depth in 2025 (with the exception of the catcher spot, where both Carson Kelly and Reese McGuire have thrived). Jon Berti appeared only 10 times in June, and many of those were as a pinch-hitter or pinch-runner. Vidal Bruján made the same number of appearances but was even less impactful, given that many of those were late-inning pinch-run appearances that didn't even get him time in the field. One (or both) might not be long for the roster. Such conditions put a lot of pressure on the team's regulars to maintain production without much of a blow in between longer stretches. Enter Castro. The potential for a starting bat at third base notwithstanding, Castro has the ability to raise the floor of the Cubs' reserves considerably. He offers versatility similar to Berti's or Bruján's; he's logged time at second base, shortstop, third base, and each of the corner outfield positions in 2025. But he also comes with vastly more offensive upside. He's evolved into an everyday player for the Minnesota Twins, almost never at the same position on consecutive days. Of course, an acquisition like Castro comes with certain caveats—the first being whether his team would even be willing to move him. The Twins are not currently in playoff position. As of this writing, they're 12.5 games back in the American League Central. At the same time, they're only four back in the Wild Card race. While their volume of injuries in their starting rotation is problematic, it's possible they're less inclined to sell than we might instinctively assume. They've had some torrid stretches, mixed in with the underwhelming ones, and moving an essential component of their roster (like Castro) would signal the start of a sale. He is a free agent after the season, though, so any prolonged struggle in July could eliminate this as a potential hurdle. That brings us to the second caveat: the quality of Castro's defense. Yes, Castro can play virtually every position on a baseball field. But of the five positions at which he's appeared this year, he's only been average at two of them, and only by certain metrics. Fielding Bible has him at -2 Runs Saved at second, -1 at third, and -2 at shortstop, the latter of which has come in a sample of only 25 1/3 innings. Statcast goes -1, -3, and -2 in Outs Above Average at the three positions, respectively. Where he has found success is on either side of the outfield grass. While Fielding Bible has him at -1 in either of left and right, Statcast has him at 0 OAA in left and 1 OAA in right. So you're going to get a little more stability at those positions than you might on the infield. It's important to note, however, that Castro does have a historical precedent for being quite a bit better with the glove than he has been in 2025. With the exception of shortstop (where he was considerably worse across a larger sample), he was above-average at every position in each of the two previous years. The good news is that Castro wouldn't be poised to play either of the middle infield positions with any level of consistency. You're talking about an occasional fill-in for Nico Hoerner or Dansby Swanson. He's proven he can hang at third and is steady in the corners. Such a reality would allow him to step into a role similar to that of Berti or Bruján, with far more to offer at the plate. That's the important distinction between Castro and his versatile contemporaries currently floating around the Cubs' bench. Castro's at a 123 wRC+ this year, contributing a .267 average, a .353 on-base percentage, and a .167 isolated power to the cause in Minnesota. That's an exponential upgrade to what the Cubs have out of their reserve players at present, to say nothing of the fact that the versatility Castro brings to the field is something he also brings to the lineup. He has at least 18 plate appearances in every spot in the order that isn't the leadoff or the cleanup. He switch-hits. He'd be an entire Swiss Army knife for Craig Counsell to have at his disposal on either side of the ball. There's some obvious context to consider as it relates to Castro, particularly in terms of the Twins' desire to compete and what the Cubs might pursue elsewhere in order to address their lineup. The two teams may not come together, if the Twins pursue a playoff berth or the Cubs are working on another front. But it's hard to argue against the prospect of Castro in this lineup. View full article

Image courtesy of © Charles LeClaire-Imagn Images While my memory of the more specific context is a little spotty for someone who was 13 years old at the time, the impact of the Chicago Cubs' 2003 trade with the Pittsburgh Pirates is anything but. That year, the Cubs shored up what then-GM Jim Hendry believed to be a playoff-caliber roster by acquiring third baseman Aramis Ramírez and Kenny Lofton for a relatively unimpactful package that included infielder José Hernández off their active roster. Lofton was a journeyman leadoff man who fit perfectly into a Corey Patterson-less roster, while Ramírez was a bounceback candidate (after a rough 2002) who ended up becoming one of the more important Cubs in modern history. The deal, of course, propelled the Cubs into the postseason. Ramírez came up with several clutch hits to push them deeper into October, and that would be his habit for most of the next decade. Now sitting 22 years clear of such a one-sided deal, could the Cubs and Pirates align on another landmark transaction? The Cubs' needs at this point are clear. Starting pitching tops the listt. A bat (of the impending free-agent variety) has jumped the line to just behind said starting pitcher, given Matt Shaw's underwhelming offensive output at third base, even if he has been better since his return from Iowa. Some help off the bench would be nice, too. Like any playoff hopeful, they'll also try to upgrade their bullpen. That brings us to the Pittsburgh Pirates. The Bucs are, objectively, bad. Their pitching and defense can make life difficult for contenders as the season wears on, and they've done some of the Cubs' dirty work by beating up the Mets and Cardinals over the last week, but at 37-50, they're one of the few clear-cut sellers here in July. They're 14 games behind the Cubs and 10 games out of a Wild Card spot. Given the Cubs' desire to act on their needs within a more immediate timeline, it's only natural that the two teams would be connected in trade talks. We've already heard the rumor that the Cubs are targeting starter Mitch Keller. On the Pirates' end, the context of their season thus far has them listening on just about everybody. Before this is all said and done, we could hear about far more than Keller as it relates to the Cubs and their July trade targets. "Just about everybody" is an important qualifier in all of this. Paul Skenes isn't likely to be moved, and while Andrew McCutchen would be a sort of ideal target in a Justin Turner-type role (without the first-base acumen), he appears set on playing out what's left of his career in the Steel City. So those two—along with a top pitching prospect like Bubba Chandler or an injured one like Jared Jones—are out. That still leaves plenty of room for the Cubs to strike a deal that fills multiple needs, however. The framework starts with Keller, a logical trade target given that he: is a starting pitcher; and carries a certain level of cost certainty on a contract that runs through 2028. Keller has never fully realized his potential in Pittsburgh, but he's turning in a solid season for the Pirates. Even with a strikeout decline, he's pitched to a 3.90 ERA, a 3.33 FIP, and is averaging 5.8 innings per start thus far. That's exactly the type of arm that the Cubs could use: someone who offers a little bit of stability in between what you're getting out of a young arm and Jameson Taillon's propensity for the occasional clunker of an outing. But the Cubs have an opportunity here to extend beyond only their largest need. Andrew Heaney is a shorter-term commitment on a one-year deal, but he provides a similar level of length (5.5 innings per outing) with steadiness reflected in his 4.20 ERA over the last three years. There isn't as much upside here, but the term is favorable and he'll eat some innings in the back end of the rotation. In an ideal world, you're getting a Keller type with the upside and a Heaney type with the stability. We, of course, don't live in that type of world, but either one represents a sensible target, nonetheless. Meanwhile, David Bednar has been excellent after yet another early-season demotion. He's pitched to a 2.93 ERA, and the 35.3% strikeout rate is a career-best. If you remove pre-April 19th, things get even better; the K-rate jumps to 37.4% and the ERA shrinks to 1.95. Similarly, Dennis Santana has worked to a 1.50 ERA (2.39 FIP) in a predominantly late-inning role. If the Cubs are trying to shore up the end of games, either would represent a fantastic get, with each having a year and a half of team control remaining. "But what about the bats?" you might be asking. McCutchen would certainly be a big right-handed upgrade to the bench if he was, in fact, willing to join a contender for a couple of months, but we don't know what that looks like. We've heard some whispers about Ke'Bryan Hayes' availability, but he doesn't offer much of a bump in the lineup, and the commitment is such that you're pivoting to a block of Matt Shaw (club option in 2030). Isiah Kiner-Falefa, though, offers a bit better of a hit tool with an experienced glove (27 Outs Above Average in his career at third base). In pursuit of depth, he's a logical target. Ultimately, though, the Cubs may have to look elsewhere for their offensive pursuits. If McCutchen is indeed committed to staying, options are few and far between. You've nowhere to put Oneil Cruz, nowhere to put Bryan Reynolds, and no chance of prying either of them away from Pittsburgh, anyway. Outside of the couple of infielders noted above, there just isn't enough upside to complicate a potential deal by trying to shoehorn a position player in as well. A starter-starter or starter-reliever combination would yield crucial components of a potential postseason roster. There's just one other complication: an in-division opponent. That doesn't feel like as much of a hurdle between these two clubs as it would be between, say, the Cubs and the Milwaukee Brewers or the Cubs and the St. Louis Cardinals. By my count, these two clubs have consummated roughly 50 trades of varying natures in their respective histories. Not all of them have carried the weight of 2003's, but there are certainly deals where the Pirates have included important contributors. The 2009 season comes to mind, when John Grabow and Tom Gorzelanny were sent to the North Side in a deal that included Josh Harrison (yes, that one) and Kevin Hart (no, not that one). So there's a little bit more of a precedent here between the Cubs and Pirates that doesn't exist with other in-division rivals. Besides, Jed Hoyer and Pirates GM Ben Cherington are old mates from their Boston days. That divisional component presents as less of a factor, given such historical dynamics between executives and organizations. The two are kind of a natural fit for a trade. The Cubs have their very obvious needs; the Pirates are a seller without a lot of direction, making most of their roster available. It's difficult to pinpoint the exact intricacies of a trade could look like, but there's a match here. View full article

Image courtesy of Eric Hartline-Imagn Images The calendar now reads July, indicating an increased fervor around potential trade candidates. Given the Chicago Cubs' increasingly-apparent needs, they're primed to exist firmly in the middle of a handful of various rumors in connection with a handful of various targets. Starting pitching will grab the bulk of the headlines in that respect, but third base likely won't be too far behind. As a lineup, the Cubs are in solid standing. We knew this going back to the offseason when they had very little flexibility considering how many different players are firmly entrenched in their spot for 2025. Third base, though, was seen as the one position in which the team could use an upgrade. Not much has changed on that front midway through the season. This, of course, comes after Matt Shaw was given the third base job out of spring training, subsequently struggled, and was optioned before returning after about a month in Iowa. While there has been marked improvement, it's a position that still leaves plenty to be desired for the Cubs at large, at least on the offensive side. Prior to his demotion, Shaw's slash carried at just .172/.294/.241. He was striking out nearly 27 percent of the time while offering very little when he was making contact. His ISO checked in at just .069, and his his Hard-Hit% read just 22.5 percent. His wRC+ was 62. Just about everywhere on the stat sheet indicated Shaw as the team's worst hitter through roughly a month. The defense hadn't progressed at that point either, leading to the Iowa stint. Upon his return, though, we've seen plenty of improvement on the Shaw front. His slash since his mid-May return reads .246/.303/.352, with a strikeout rate down to 18.2 percent and a slight uptick in contact quality (27.6 Hard-Hit%). He still isn't providing much on the power front, however, as his ISO is just .107 during this recent stretch. His wRC+, at 87, still indicates a below-average performer. So, while the defense has gotten better, both from the eye test and on the stat sheet, third base still represents a position that the Cubs need more from, especially as we've seen them prone to bouts of offensive depression. The Cubs will, undoubtedly, be heavily involved in trade discussions for starting pitching. But, given how much a veteran third baseman could help to stabilize the lineup over Shaw's still-developing bat, it could behoove them to pursue such a player ahead of the July 31st deadline. That's not to say I'm suggesting the Cubs pull the plug on Matt Shaw as an option, mind you. The Cubs are in a position where they represent a top National League contender. There's a certain degree of uncertainty with Kyle Tucker as an impending free agent, so there's a need to fortify the 2025 roster as much as possible. A move for a third baseman wouldn't represent a long-term change in terms of Shaw's involvement in the lineup; it would merely serve to boost the lineup for the short-term as it relates to this season. The issue is that there aren't a wealth of candidates that appear feasible for such a move. Philadelphia Phillies third sacker Alec Bohm, for example, is a player that has been floated in trade rumors for the last couple of winters. And while the Phillies could move him to change the shape of their own roster, they're still a contending team, and Bohm still has another year of team control, to say nothing of the fact that while his approach and defense have remained strong, his power has taken a massive dip in '25 (.109 ISO). So, even if the Phillies were interested in moving him in-season, you're not improving your roster in a preferred manner. It's not an entirely dissimilar situation with Colorado's Ryan McMahon, who was floated as a name the Cubs were interested earlier in the year but presents issues on a couple of fronts. For one, his contract runs for two seasons beyond 2025. He does have some versatility, but it's not as if the Cubs have openings elsewhere when they'd be ready to give Shaw another run in '26. For another, he's striking out at a clip over 30 percent, and his impact is certainly of a higher quality at home (.230 ISO) versus away (.134). So, despite the purported interest earlier this year, we can probably rule him out as well. Which brings us to Alex Bregman. He's having his best season since roughly 2019, thriving both in approach (9.7 percent walk rate) and impact (.254 ISO). Playing his home games at Fenway has helped some, as it's been the ninth-most favorable park for righties by Statcast's Park Factors. Nonetheless, we know the team had interest in the offseason (regardless to what extent that actually looked like). The issue is in the contract. Bregman has a guaranteed year with an opt-out for 2026 and a player option for 2027, both at a $25 million price point. At this point in time, it seems clear that Bregman will, in fact, opt out and retest the market this winter in order to get more term on his deal. Should he come to Wrigley — which sits as the 18th-best park for right-handed hitters this year — and struggle, though, opting in would present certain challenges for a Cubs team that hopes to sign Kyle Tucker long-term. Boston is also only two games out of a wild card spot, too. So, we don't even know how compelled they'd be to trade a player like Bregman. All of this is to say that the Cubs could have just one viable option to acquire for their third base position: Arizona's Eugenio Suárez. By no measure are the Arizona Diamondbacks out of the postseason race at this point. While they sit 10 games back in the National League West, they're just four games out of a wild card spot. At the same time, though, taking stock of their actual chances could compel them to sell by month's end. They've lost their stop starter (Corbin Burnes) and their top two relievers (Justin Martinez & A.J. Puk) out of an already-shaky bullpen for the season. Corbin Carroll is on the Injured List with a fracture in his wrist, and Gabriel Moreno is with him due to a hand injury. Such injury volume will become increasingly difficult to overcome in one of the league's best divisions. Suárez is a free agent after this year and in the midst of doing what he's always done: playing solid defense and hitting for obscene amounts of power. If you're checking boxes, Suárez is probably the name we'll hear that hits the most, and he does so resoundingly. The 33-year-old is slashing .253/.323/.565 with 25 homers and a .312 ISO. He strikes out at a higher rate than you may like (25.6 percent) and doesn't walk as much as he used to (6.4 percent), but the impact there is significant. Only four players carry a higher ISO than Suárez does at this point, and two of their names are Aaron Judge & Shohei Ohtani. So, it's a worthy tradeoff. Defensively, Suárez is at a -3 Outs Above Average in 2025. That's a downgrade from what Shaw has provided since his return, but it's also not so bad that he can't easily compensate on the offensive side. And it's certainly better than what the team was getting in their other internal options while Shaw spent his time in Iowa. In short, you can live with it. Add in the fact that Suárez is a free agent after this year, which means that you're capitalizing on his bat and not dealing with a defensive issue long-term, and you've got the ideal trade candidate for the Cubs to land before the deadline. Again, this isn't about Matt Shaw not being a viable long-term option. This is about the Cubs fortifying their lineup for the only season in which they are currently guaranteed a certain level of success. We don't know what the 2026 season will look like. So adding in a player like Suárez, who boosts your lineup significantly on the power side while not impacting Shaw's long-term outlook, becomes a rather obvious move for the Cubs to make. Of course, they won't be the only ones there either. Seattle needs some extra offense in their wild card race, specifically at third base. Detroit could use an infield bat. Even a fringe team like Cincinnati could be in the mix to bring in an old friend. Ultimately, it's not a slam dunk that the Cubs would get a player like Suárez even if they try. But the concept — in acquiring a steady bat at third base to play out the remainder of '25 and lift the floor of the collective — is sound. View full article

Image courtesy of John Antonoff/Chicago Sun-Times With the exception of the work being done behind (and at) the plate, the bench that the Chicago Cubs cobbled together for 2025 has been an underwhelming presence on an otherwise offensively-capable roster. Perhaps that's a level of understatement given where things stand, but while an upgrade should be expected over the next month, there's at least one aspect in need of more immediate addressing. That aspect takes shape in the form of Vidal Bruján, who has essentially been the team's least valuable player. Yes, Justin Turner has been underwhelming as a short-side platoon option at first base. Sure, Jon Berti's .256 on-base percentage is pinning him down from utilizing his baserunning tool. But it's been Bruján serving as the deadest of weight on a roster that could use just a little bit of extra depth. It's difficult to get on a player too much given the role he was expected to fill. Nobody was deceiving themselves into thinking that Bruján was going to be anything other than a versatile, glove-only option. But, as recently as 2023, he was an intriguing offensive player at Triple-A. That's essentially been wiped off the map thus far in '25. To date, Bruján has appeared at the plate just 32 times, which probably speaks to where he stands anyway given that Matt Shaw spent a month at Triple-A. Within those 32 plate appearances, though, Bruján has turned in the following: a .161/.188/.226 slash line, a 25.0 K%, a 3.1 BB%, and a .065 ISO. His wRC+ stands at 13. Among Cubs players that have taken at least five trips to the plate this year, only Nicky Lopez was worse (1 wRC+). Worse yet, there's nothing here to indicate that Bruján has more in the tank to offer or that there's been any kind of luck component. He has yet to barrel a pitch this year (0.0 Barrel%) and is hitting the ball in the air over half the time. That blend of soft contact and fly ball energy isn't going to carry you anywhere offensively. That his xBA is actually lower than his current mark (.151) doesn't ring as any sort of surprise. Even with a lower hard hit rate last year, he was still able to work a .276 BABIP given that he was putting the ball on the ground — something of an essential for a light-hitting presence like Bruján — with a little more frequency. Not that it's worth getting worked up over a player whose role has been so minimal. Craig Counsell has clearly recognized the empty impact Bruján brings given that extraordinarily low volume of plate appearances at this juncture in the season. But. when you talk about depth, you'd like to have at least mild competence off the bench when you're trying to give your starters a rest, especially as the summer heat waves continue. With Bruján, you'd be inserting a total offensive zero at the plate whose defense has also checked in at varying levels of "fine." The main issue for the Cubs is that they simply have no additional options with which they can replace him. There isn't a player in Iowa that could fill such a role, as you want more of an extended run for upper-tier prospects than a bench role would provide. Even someone like James Triantos, who could bounce around the field a bit if the Cubs were so inclined, has regressed in just about every way offensively in 2025. It's just not there. Nor do we know about potential trade candidates. Fringe guys aren't featured in trade rumors like the bigger names are. But that's what the Cubs need: a fringe guy. Someone capable of contributing on occasion and possessing a level of versatility. Bruján has the latter but has proven incapable of the former. And, unlike the value of someone like Turner (noted veteran leadership) or Berti (speed), we don't have a benchmark for the value that Bruján provides to this roster. The broader context of his numbers, even in being deployed so infrequently, casts doubt over whether he provides this roster with any value. As trade season starts to heat up, it's likely that Vidal Bruján won't be long for the roster. It was a worthwhile pickup; there was some minor league upside at the plate and the versatility will play on any bench. But, we've already seen the Cubs move on from two other zeroes at the plate in Lopez & Gage Workman. It's getting close to time to shore up the fringes, which means that Bruján could be next... once a viable replacement option manifests. View full article

Image courtesy of © Patrick Gorski-Imagn Images Despite just about everything that unfolded at Wrigley Field over the weekend, the Chicago Cubs' bullpen had been one of the league's best since the start of May. Even including the trio of rough outings for the collective against Seattle, the relief corps features the best ERA (2.71), the fourth-best FIP (3.48), and the fourth-best walk rate (7.7 percent) in Major League Baseball since May 1st. There are, of course, a handful of reasons for the increased success of the 'pen (and how "real" various runs are for various arms). But, Chris Flexen has certainly played a role in such an ascent for a group which Craig Counsell struggled to piece together innings in April. Through a baker's dozen worth of outings for the Cubs, Flexen has been nearly flawless, at least to this point. Across those 13 appearances, Flexen has posted a sterling 0.78 ERA. Within the broader context of the Cubs' bullpen, Flexen features both the team's lowest ERA and lowest WHIP (0.87) among those with at least 10 innings. Sunday's tough one was the first time he'd allowed an earned run to score, which becomes even more impressive when you consider that eight of his appearances have been of the multi-inning variety. That includes the notable outing last Thursday, in which Flexen tossed three clean innings to allow the Cubs a chance in what ultimately resulted in an 8-7 loss following a brutal Jameson Taillon start. Prior to Sunday, Flexen's success had me wondering if the Cubs should give him a little bit of a run as a starter until reinforcements arrived in the shape of health or trade. After all, this was a guy that pieced together at least reasonable results (4.80 FIP) for a historically bad Chicago White Sox team in 2024. "If he's capable of handing multi-inning stretches in relief, perhaps it would behoove Counsell to give him a start in favor of Colin Rea or Ben Brown considering their respective struggles of late," was a thought that crossed my mind more than a couple of times in the last couple of weeks. Until I looked deeper. Not only would it be ill-advised to deploy Flexen out of the gate, it's possible that regression is nigh for the reliever, if expected outcomes are to be believed. His ERA looks quite good, yes. His WHIP, too. But, under the surface, this is a guy who, at first blush, appears to take a step back as his 2025 volume increases. The hallmarks are there. Flexen's BABIP against is .188. He's working with a 91.4 percent strand rate. His HR/FB ratio is 4.8 percent. Flexen's career marks in each category? .304, 71.8, and 11.4, respectively. While the career totals are at least something of an oversimplification given his condensed role with the Cubs, the expected stats still aren't as favorable as his actual outcomes. He's at a 3.19 xERA, a .244 xBA, and a .350 xSLG. We likely wouldn't consider those bad as true outcomes, but they do speak to how much he's been able to outperform his peripherals. And that's due to the fact that his stuff just isn't overpowering enough to sustain such a stretch. It's a 20th percentile fastball in terms of velocity with a 15.3 percent strikeout rate that sits ahead of only Nate Pearson among the Cubs' bullpen regulars. His "best" pitch by Stuff+ is his changeup (94), which he only throws 2.1 percent of the time. A contact-oriented, primarily multi-inning reliever is always going to be the first guy to go in the regression game. Volatility is the nature of relief, after all. What Flexen does have working in his favor, at least, is his ability to minimize quality contact. And that works as a starting point for why regression might not be around the next corner, but maybe the one after that. His 3.1 Barrel% is easily the best of his career, along with a 35.4 percent Hard-Hit rate that serves as his best since 2017. When you work those in with a solid 46.2 groundball rate, it's no wonder Flexen has been able to string together success in the way he has. It's that ability to work around the barrel that could allow Flexen to maintain this performance longer than he has any right to. Flexen's three primary pitches this year have been his fastball, his cutter, and his curveball: The first two pitches represent the norm for his career. But the introduction of the curveball as more of a fixture in his arsenal appears to be what is making the difference. Opposing hitters have mustered a Hard-Hit% of just 22.2 against the hook and have yet to barrel one off Flexen. At 44.4 percent, it's also where he's garnering the highest rate of groundballs. So, that uptick in usage appears to be making the difference for him. What important to note about the offering is that it's not a strikeout pitch, but a driver of Flexen's success in 2025. He's dropping that pitch into the middle of the zone horizontally while varying the vertical: Subsequently, he's getting a fair bit of chase (30.4 percent), a fair bit of whiff (29.6), and a terrific bit of both (57.1 chase & miss rate). Factor in the groundballs, and it starts to become valid thinking that Flexen could stave off regression quite a while longer when you add in a near 20-point gap below his fastball & cutter in Hard-Hit%. Plus, he has a manager deploying him the correct spots and in possession of the knowledge as to when his outings should carry into a second or third inning. The regression monster comes for us all eventually. But, thanks to the curveball, Chris Flexen might have the silver bullet to keep it at bay a while longer. View full article