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Image courtesy of © Kamil Krzaczynski-Imagn Images While there was room for discussion around the extent of it, we know that the Chicago Cubs attempted to sign third baseman Alex Bregman last winter. He eventually landed in Boston, though an opt-out in his contract has him back on the free agent market. The Cubs have already been connected, and such a signing could have a bearing on what shape their infield takes for the remainder of this offseason. That's in an entirely hypothetical world, however, and we have little reason to think the chances of a Bregman signing are good at this point. As such, we continue to operate under the assumption that the team's infield will look much the same as it did for most of 2025: Carson Kelly and Miguel Amaya behind the plate, and Michael Busch, Nico Hoerner, Dansby Swanson, and Matt Shaw occupying their spots around the remainder of the dirt. At the same time, third base does offer a position of intrigue. Shaw demonstrated improvement as the season wore on, but stretches throughout the regular season and into October showed us that as good as he can be on the defensive side, his offense remains a work in progress. Given that, it might behoove the Cubs to explore more of a safety net than they had at any point in 2025. The team's failed pursuit of Bregman left them without a true alternative to Shaw. When he struggled out of the gate (61 wRC+ in April), Craig Counsell was forced to reckon with the absence of a suitable supplement. A collection of Jon Berti, Vidal Bruján, Nicky Lopez, Justin Turner, and Gage Workman filled space both during Shaw's time back in Iowa and other parts of the year. Only Turner finished the year still in the organization, with trade deadline acquisition Willi Castro offering more depth at the position in the season's final two months. Turner and Castro hit free agency this winter, with no clear indicator that either would (or should) be back. That means that the Cubs—who finished with exactly 0.0 fWAR from third base in 2025—are going to once again rely on Shaw realizing his next stages of development. That's easier said than done, considering some of the areas of concern around him. Shaw was far better in the second half of 2025 than in the first. His line after the All-Star break read .258/.317/.522 with a 130 wRC+, versus a .198/.276/.280 (60 wRC+) slash from the first half. The increase in power output is notable, as Shaw was able to elevate at a rate 11 percentage points above his flyball rate from the first half (46.0 percent). The way he closed the year, however, leaves a much more muddled picture than the splits imply. For one, Shaw's strikeout rate was up about 4.5 percentage points in the second half (23.9% overall), while his walk rate was down (8.3%). His swing-and-miss rate in September was his second-highest in an individual month, with the 25.5% whiff rate trailing only April (30.8%). His hard-hit rate, which rose steadily as the months wore on, cratered in September, with a 22.0% rate checking in 15 percentage points below his August peak. It all carried into October, where he notched only a pair of hits in 15 plate appearances and provided his only value via the walk (of which he had five). That's not to say that Shaw is destined to have another volatile season in 2026. We'll likely continue to see the ups and downs associated with natural development. We just don't know what the peaks and valleys could look like at this point. That's all the more reason for the Cubs to pursue a legitimate safety net for Shaw this time around. The goal with such an addition isn't necessarily to prepare for a worst-case scenario. Instead, it's to supplement Shaw in those moments where you don't love a matchup or he needs an opportunity to reset for a day or two. As such, it's not about signing or acquiring a pure third baseman as said safety net. You're looking for a versatile player who can bring at least one particular skill, while not being a total loss filling in at third base defensively—especially given what you lose with Shaw's glove when he's on the bench. Consider someone like Luis Urías, who has a career walk rate around 10% and is coming off a year in which he struck out a career-low 13.6 percent of the time. Former Cub Ildemaro Vargas doesn't offer the same level of contact ability, but he hit well enough last year (85 wRC+) and was perfectly average in a small sample at third to offer at least an upgrade over how the team supplemented third base last season. Miguel Andujar could provide a little bit more in the way of power and contact ability, even if his ability to draw walks and his defensive shortcomings don't entirely fit the bill. None are exciting options in a thin free-agent class this side of Bregman, but they could at least provide the type of supplementation that's needed as Shaw continues his development. That's something that the Cubs need to prioritize when they build the bench. Swanson and Hoerner are going to provide you with playing time volume and established skill sets. The same largely goes for Busch, even if the team maintains a desire to protect him against certain left-handed arms. It's not just about acquiring a player who can fill in as a body at third base, either. It's about a clear offensive skill set, so that the lineup can hold together when Shaw's development is at the wrong end of its volatility. View full article

Image courtesy of © Katie Stratman-Imagn Images When the Chicago Cubs acquired Michael Busch ahead of the 2024 season, it was clear where the upside existed. He was a bat-first prospect without a true defensive home and, as a result, without a pathway to playing time with his former team in Los Angeles. Typically with a prospect that fits that profile, you worry about the athleticism aspect and whether there's a glove to play at all, let alone where to play it. In Busch's case, though, he had the athleticism; the Dodgers had deployed him primarily at second and third base as an upper-level prospect in their minor-league ranks. The Cubs, however, made the almost-immediate decision to entrench him at first base, a position where the team lacked a long-term solution. The immediate returns were promising, too. Over the course of that first season, Busch demonstrated improvement on both sides of the ball. He finished above average by wRC+ in each individual month (save one), progressively cut down on his strikeout rate throughout the season, and ended the year with his highest isolated power figure in an individual month (.243). Defensively, he landed on the positive side of the Outs Above Average threshold, finishing with 2 OAA. Even with such steady improvement throughout his rookie campaign, the needed areas of improvement were clear. The ideal progression would've included a continued decrease in what landed as a 28.6 percent strikeout rate, more consistency on the power side (.192 ISO for the full year), and further (and sustainable) development on the defensive side. There were intricacies therein, but those represented the simple version of the pathway toward improvement for Busch ahead of '25. Busch's percentile distribution from this season alone is indicative of him meeting the moment: Above all, Busch was able to drive his power numbers way up via his quality of contact. The fact that he ended the year with a .261 ISO is indicative of a hard-hit rate that graduated from 39.9 percent in 2024 to 47.3 percent in 2025. That output came against fastballs and off-speed pitches, each of which represented his two highest swing rates among the three pitch groups (breaking balls being the other). They sat neck-and-neck, with fastballs accounting for a 48.2 percent swing rate and off-speed at a 48.3 percent mark. While there were still some swing-and-miss issues, the approach was illustrative of a good process on Busch's part. Good process begets hard contact which, in turn, begets impact output. Hence, the near-70-point ISO jump year over year. Busch didn't demonstrate quite the same growth defensively, however, as his OAA dropped to -2. Of course, first base is a difficult position to judge on metrics alone. It is worth noting, though, that his work to his right dropped from 1 OAA in '24 to -4 OAA in '25. It's a strange development considering the defensive wizardry occurring to his right in the form of Nico Hoerner. Nevertheless, the metrics are indicative of a step back with the glove. Which, at least, offers continued clarity in what shape Busch's next phase of development could take. There's a need for continued improvement in the contact game. The quality of contact and chase rates are each, in their own way, indicative of a player with a keen awareness of the zone. Approach isn't the concern. Instead, Busch needs to demonstrate continued improvement in the swing-and-miss element of his game, particularly on off-speed pitches. Given the high volume of swings against that pitch type, the fact that Busch is whiffing at off-speed 37.9 percent of the time (easily his highest against any of the three primary pitch groups) represents a clear developmental target. The outcomes with contact are positive. He simply needs to make more of it. That lands in conjunction with additional consistency on the defensive end. Again, it's hard to judge first base on the merits of analytics alone. But given Busch's decline that unfolded specifically in moving to his right, there's some work to be done. Doing so as a right-handed fielder at this particular position isn't easy (and that fact is likely some of what pinned down his OAA last year), but when you're working with a second baseman who thrives to his left (4 OAA for Hoerner in that direction), the statistical outcomes should look at least a little bit better in a larger, multi-year sample. It almost feels somewhat "nit-picky" given the massive strides that Michael Busch made between 2024 and 2025 to suggest he needs to find another gear. He finished this past year as an upper-tier power bat with a refined approach. Now in possession of a clear skill set and a defensive home, it's a matter of more specific improvement. Development isn't linear, but the fine-tuning stage should yield only a better player, not one in need of a total profile overhaul. View full article

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images Ben Brown's trajectory over the course of 2025 landed as one of the more enigmatic episodes of the 2025 Chicago Cubs. On one hand, his mix of an upper-90s fastball and destructive knuckle-curve led to some strong results in matters of balls and strikes. Brown's 25.6 percent strikeout rate sat in the 73rd percentile and his 6.8 percent walk rate finished in the 71st. Of course, on the other hand, he got touched up in the contact game to the tune of a sixth-percentile hard-hit rate (47.3 percent) and a seventh-percentile barrel rate (11.4 percent). That somewhat paradoxical mix left him with an unsightly 5.92 ERA, an eventual demotion to Iowa, and larger questions about his future role as a member of this pitching staff. Namely, the following question: Is there a path toward continued starting opportunities for Ben Brown, or is he destined for relief work in some form? While not initially a rotation candidate, a strong spring performance during the exhibition season afforded Brown a legitimate shot at being part of the starting five from 2025's outset. A competition that seemingly came down to he and Colin Rea resulted in Brown winning the job on the heels of the tantalizing stuff wrought by that two-pitch mix. While Rea became a necessity within the rotation in his own right, Brown held onto regular duty for most of the first two months of the season. By the end of May, however, Craig Counsell experimented with an opener given Brown's struggles that resulted in starts in which he allowed five, six, six, and eight earned runs. Injuries necessitated continued turns, but Brown found himself out of the starting five permanently by the end of July. From there, he was deployed in relief (primarily as a bulk arm) for the remaining 18 of his 106 1/3 total innings for the year. Split between starting and bullpen work, the following is how Brown's numbers shook out in 2025: As a Starter: 75 2/3 IP, 6.30 ERA (4.47 FIP), 23.8 K%, 6.7 BB%, .362 wOBA against As a Reliever: 30 2/3 IP, 4.99 ERA (3.10 FIP), 30.5 K%, 6.9 BB%, .300 wOBA against Despite the innings sample heavily leaning toward the starting side, there's immediately sort of a clear picture as to which path makes more sense for Brown. Such an idea is furthered by a 4.19 ERA the first time facing hitters as a reliever against a 5.70 ERA the first time facing hitters as a starter. His 35.3 percent strikeout rate the first time through the order as a reliever was also his best individual mark in any trip through the order, regardless of role. In relief, Brown was also able to work at an eight-percent dip in hard contact (by FanGraphs' definition), a decreased fly-ball rate, and a subsequent decrease in his homer-to-fly-ball ratio. In a number of different ways, the numbers pretty easily support Ben Brown making a transition to full-time relief duty. But it's also not as simple as "this guy is performing better in this scenario, so we should drop him into said scenario full time." Instead, the reason for keeping Brown in relief is the same as it's always been: his failure to develop a third pitch. Brown attempted to incorporate a changeup as the season wore on. It was a journey that would prove to be unsuccessful, not only in terms of usage, but outcomes. Brown threw the changeup just 4.5 percent of the time in 2025, with its usage peaking at 10 percent in July. By the time he entered regular work out of the bullpen, it dropped to 3.5 and 4.3 percent usage in the season's final two months, respectively. And it's not just a matter of his struggling to incorporate the pitch. It's what happened when he did. Even with a smaller sample in its use, Brown's changeup was touched for hard contact exactly 50 percent of the time, with a barrel rate of 20 percent and a fly-ball rate lingering around 30. Obviously, none of those trends represent a recipe for success. On just about every level, Brown struggled to maintain anything effective with that pitch despite the movement he was able to generate with it. The following is the contour of each of Brown's two primary pitches from 2025 (the fastball and the knuckle-curve): For the most part, that's exactly how those should look. You want a concentrated area with a pitch like a fastball. Something like a knuckle-curve is going to expand that concentration a little, but the vertical nature of the contour's trend still reads in exactly the way it should. And then you get to the changeup: Again, it's not only a matter of Brown's inability to know when to use the pitch, but throwing the pitch at all. It's not that it got touched up by opposing hitters—it's that he had very little command over the pitch at large. Part of that is the nature of trying to add a pitch on the fly. The pitch flailing so erratically doesn't lend itself to much confidence that Brown would be able to do it over the long-term, either. Without that third pitch coming to fruition, there's no argument for providing Brown with an opportunity to get back into the starting five. The other two pitches would have to be elite. And while the knuckle-curve might offer that (121 Stuff+), the fastball does not (84 Stuff+). Barring some massive development in the lab this winter, it almost becomes impossible to justify as a result. If the splits don't say so, the absence of a meaningful third pitch certainly does. View full article

Image courtesy of © Melissa Tamez-Imagn Images There are some areas on the roster where we could or will see turnover, but the Chicago Cubs enter the 2025-26 offseason with their middle infield as stable a position group as any. Under contract through 2029, Dansby Swanson will remain at shortstop, while Nico Hoerner will handle the keystone through at least through the end of 2026. The depth behind those two, however, is somewhat in question. Not that it's a major area of concern. Hoerner logged time at second base in 153 games, while Swanson was at short for 159. Beyond Hoerner, the Cubs deployed a mix of Jon Berti (13 games), Willi Castro (six games), Matt Shaw (four games), Vidal Bruján (three games), and Nicky Lopez (one game). Aside from Hoerner appearing in eight games in Swanson's stead at shortstop, each of Bruján, Lopez, and Gage Workman registered a pair of appearances. None of the names behind the incumbents are still with the organization. Some of them have been gone for months. Thus, as the Cubs build their roster for 2026, they're going to have to at least maintain an eye on who could serve as this year's depth, minimal as the need may be. Second Base Starter: Nico Hoerner (.297/.345/.394, 7 HR, 29 SB, 109 wRC+, 4.8 fWAR) Just about everything Hoerner did in 2025 was a career best. He posted his highest average, his best park-adjusted offense, and his largest Wins Above Replacement output (according to FanGraphs), while cutting his strikeout rate to just 7.6%. Meanwhile, he continued to ply his trade as one of the best defensive infielders in the sport. With a down-ballot MVP vote to his credit, it's hard to imagine we see his name floating around the trade ether in the way that we saw last winter. Depth: James Triantos, Pedro Ramirez Of the two middle infield spots, the Cubs at least have a little bit of security behind Hoerner (albeit no one with any top-level experience). The team added James Triantos to the 40-man roster ahead of last week's deadline, protecting him from the Rule 5 Draft. Should anything happen to Hoerner, it's likely he'd be first in line to get keystone reps. While he's cooled a bit as an offensive prospect (which could at least be partially attributed to a 70-point drop in his batting average on balls in play), he offers some of the same base stealing prowess we see from Hoerner (78 steals across all levels the last two years). Should it not be Triantos, another recent addition to the 40-man could supplement the middle infield as needed. Pedro Ramirez doesn't have experience above Double A yet, but has more recently demonstrated some offensive upside. He slashed .280/.346/.386 and swiped 28 bags in 2025. That's despite a BABIP regression of his own, compared to lower levels. Either way, the team is getting a somewhat similar skill set to that of their starting second baseman. But it's also possible we see the team address this with a versatile option off the bench that could push each one further down the depth chart. Shortstop Starter: Dansby Swanson (.244/.300/.417, 24 HR, 20 SB, 99 wRC+, 3.3 fWAR) It was a strange year for Swanson. On one hand, he demonstrated consistent power in a 20/20 campaign. On the other, his contact rate was his lowest over a full season in his career (71.3%) and his strikeout rate ballooned to 26.0%. His on-base percentage has continued to drop, but the power coming back (after a down year in that regard in 2024) was encouraging. Not that the inconsistency constitutes a big change; Swanson has always had some bewildering variance in his game. The Cubs love his presence in the clubhouse and the steadiness of his glove. He's likely the starter until that contract runs out. Depth: Hoerner This one doesn't merit nearly as deep a discussion. Unlike second base, which has a decent volume on the 40-man, the Cubs have no such presence behind Swanson. Names like Jefferson Rojas or Cristian Hernandez are still at least another year away. Should anything happen to Swanson—a difficult thing to anticipate, given that he's appeared in at least 147 games in each year since 2020—it would be an easy call for the team to flip Hoerner to the other side of the second-base bag. In that case, you're looking at an extended run for a bench bat to be named later, or one of Triantos or Ramirez. Either way, the depth behind Swanson exists almost exclusively in the form of his comrade on the middle infield. The Cubs don't have a great deal of depth at these positions, but the idea is that they shouldn't need any. View full article

Image courtesy of © Lily Smith/The Register / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images Among the developments that took shape for the 2025 Chicago Cubs was the establishment of long-term options on either side of the infield dirt. Coming off an impressive rookie campaign in 2024, Michael Busch further cemented himself as the team's first baseman of the future. His offensive output shot up all over the board while he continued capable of providing reliable defense. On the other side, it wasn't without its bumps (including an early demotion to Iowa), but Matt Shaw showed enough flashes to get another run as the team's starter at the hot corner in 2026. His glove is his primary asset (12 Defensive Runs Saved) with the bat showing out occasionally (130 wRC+ in the second half before an atrocious playoff run). What the Cubs possess in terms of contingencies for 2026, however, is anyone's guess. Justin Turner was the primary supplement for Busch at first. While Busch drew 155 appearances (131 starts), Turner's work against left-handed pitching got him in action for 39 games while Moisés Ballesteros drew in for a pair late in the year. Carlos Santana was in the mix for six games of his own. Third base was much more of a hodgepodge. While Shaw worked on his bat in Triple-A, Craig Counsell was forced to run out a rotation of Jon Berti, Vidal Bruján, and Nicky Lopez. Gage Workman got a few appearances early while Willi Castro had a few starts thrown his way after his acquisition at the trade deadline. Turner garnered 14 appearances of his own at the hot corner. That's seven players logging time at third base, with only Shaw remaining in the organization. Shaw's bat remains imperfect. That means that, as the Cubs build their roster for '26, they may want to explore the addition of a bench bat capable of giving him a blow as needed. First base, though, has some depth to work with beyond its current starter. First Base Starter: Michael Busch (.261/.343/.523, 34 HR, 4 SB, 140 wRC+, 3.5 fWAR) Everywhere you look, you see improvement from Michael Busch in 2025. His approach continued its refinement and he raised his contact rates while cutting his strikeout rate by five percent. The power was perhaps the most significant development that took shape for him last season, providing something sustainable in a Cubs lineup that struggled to find it at times. Some of that was due to Counsell playing the matchups and hiding him against lefties. The rest is the upside that was already present when he was acquired from the Los Angeles Dodgers ahead of 2024. He certainly looks the part of a long-term option at the position. Depth: Moisés Ballesteros, Jonathon Long With the impending departure of Kyle Tucker, it certainly looks as if Seiya Suzuki will get his playing time back on the outfield grass. That will, in turn, free up some time for Ballesteros as the team's designated hitter. And if the team is apprehensive about putting him behind the plate — which seems likely considering the presence of Carson Kelly and Miguel Amaya — then Ballesteros could be on the roster as the team's designated hitter to start the year. That leaves him as an option to supplement Busch at first, though as a left-handed hitter, it's not as if he's going to steal starts. Even with limited experience, the fact that Counsell was willing to throw him a bit of time toward the end of the year indicates that we should expect to see him in Busch's stead at least on occasion, however. In the minor league ranks, Jonathon Long possesses some of the same skill set that makes Busch so intriguing. Long has an advanced approach at this stage (13.0 percent walk rate in Triple-A in '25) that feeds into his power upside (20 homers, .173 ISO). Initially a corner infielder, Long logged just nine games at third in 2025 against 115 at first base. Should the Cubs be in need of a longer term option for Busch at any point in 2025, he's likely the guy (barring any outside addition this winter). Third Base Starter: Matt Shaw (.226/.295/.394, 13 HR, 17 SB, 93 wRC+, 1.5 fWAR) It'll be interesting to see what shape Shaw's role will take for the 2026 Cubs considering the team is expected to be in on Alex Bregman again this winter. Would such a signing relegate Shaw to more utility duty on the infield? Would he become an immediate trade candidate? It's difficult to project. At this point, though, we have no reason to believe that the hot corner will belong to anyone other than Shaw next season, even as the offensive side of his game remains a work in progress. Depth: Pedro Ramirez Unlike first base, where you could see a path toward playing time for a couple of notable bats in the system, the Cubs have no such contingency currently in their organization. We've already noted the fact that Long hasn't played the position much recently. As such, Pedro Ramirez, who was just added to the 40-man roster, appears to be the most likely candidate to fill in. He's more of a light-hitting option on the power side (.106 ISO) but offers a solid approach and good on-base skills (28 steals). Where there are questions, though, is about how the glove will play, with reports citing his reaction time and arm. Ultimately, this is a clear area in need of a bench upgrade as the winter gets underway. The good news for the Cubs, at least, is that whatever outside depth they may pursue should provide at least a mild upgrade over what they ran out beyond Shaw last season. View full article

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images There are three components that make the infield collective of the Chicago Cubs perhaps the most stable aspect of their franchise ahead of 2026. The first is on the defensive side, where they succeeded at virtually every position in '25. As a collective, their work with the leather is some of the finest you'll see from the four spots on the dirt. Another is in each of their respective contract statuses, where each starting infielder is under contract through at least the end of next year, including another pre-arbitration offseason for Michael Busch and three more years of it for Matt Shaw. The third is their health. While we watched Kyle Tucker battle injuries in the second half of the season and Pete Crow-Armstrong maybe begin to burn out a bit in September, the Cubs got the full run of virtually all of their infielder defenders. Busch appeared in 155 games. Nico Hoerner was plugged in for 156 and Dansby Swanson for 159. Matt Shaw appeared most of the time when he wasn't in Iowa and reached 126 games in his rookie campaign. It's not all positive, of course. While there were numerous flashes of offensive competency from a couple of their starting infielders, the left side of the infield, in particular, was ravaged by inconsistent play and adjustments that came and went. It's a tough sell to necessarily want this to be the same group ahead of next season given that, but the aspects of defensive quality, financial certainty, and ability to stay on the field do help them to maintain their status as the most stable phase of the Chicago Cubs' operation. With all that being said, let's see how each starter and the *gulp* bench group grade out from their work in 2025. Michael Busch: A It's almost difficult to overstate the offensive value that Busch brought to the group in his second season on the North Side. We knew he was a certified stick when he was acquired from the Los Angeles Dodgers two offseasons ago. But Craig Counsell found a sweet spot of where to deploy him against lefties and where to protect him, which led to some really strong results in '25. Busch's numbers landed at a .261/.343/.523 slash, with a 23.5 percent strikeout rate, a 9.5 walk rate, and a 140 wRC+. The walk rate was the only one of those numbers that (slightly) regressed, as he raised each of his average, on-base, and especially the slug from his first go-round with the Cubs. It all culminated in a wRC+ that sat 22 points higher than the number he posted in 2024. The power is, of course, the most notable element. Busch reached 34 homers and finished in the 90th percentile in average exit velocity (92.2 MPH) and 95th in barrel rate (17.1 percent). Despite questions elsewhere, there's little doubt that they have an impact first baseman in the mix moving forward. The only caveat for him this year was on defense, where he finished just below average (-1) in the eyes of Outs Above Average. It's close enough to the threshold considering the position, though, that there isn't any real reason to be concerned. especially when he's miles ahead of some of the other upper-tier bats at the spot with which he now finds himself in league. Nico Hoerner: A+ If you went by FanGraphs' Wins Above Replacement metric, then Nico Hoerner was a top-10 player in the National League in 2025. If you went by Baseball Reference's Wins Above Replacement metric, then Nico Hoerner was a top-10 player in Major League Baseball in 2025. It's kind of wild for a player we have likely perceived as a lighter-hitting second baseman that brings elite defense to finish with either kind of credential, but it also speaks to the balance that Hoerner was able to bring to each phase of his game this year. On the offensive side, it mostly boils down to Hoerner's contact ability. He was fourth in the league in contact rate (89.9 percent), seventh in whiff rate (4.9 percent), and third in strikeout rate (7.6 percent). His already-modest power regressed slightly (.097 ISO), but he was able to ride a slight uptick in his average on balls in play (.313) to post what would be the highest wRC+ mark of his career (109). He was his typical elite self on the defensive end, posting an OAA of 15 that ranked 11th among all qualifying defenders in the sport. Even sans power, there were simply very few players that had a better blend of offensive and defensive success than Hoerner in 2025. With that said, his future is the murkiest of the four starting infielders. With Busch and Shaw still pre-arb and Swanson locked into his hefty contract, Hoerner is the odd one out in that he's set to be a free agent after 2026. Will the Cubs extend him a second time, or are we in for another season of trade rumors? Dansby Swanson: D+ It's a harsh grade for the captain of the infield, but it's also a harsh reality that Swanson provides up against his contract. Offensively, Swanson's saving grace was his uptick in power. His .173 ISO came in roughly 30 points higher than the previous season. His barrel rate (11.7 percent) and hard-hit rate (47.7 percent) each represented career highs. When he wasn't finding the barrel, though, the results were simply not there. Swanson's strikeout rate (26.0 percent) was his highest in a Cubs uniform, while his walk rate (7.3 percent) was his lowest since 2022. His swing rate and whiff rate were each the highest of his career, too, including a 27.1 swing-and-miss percentage against fastballs that stands as a career-worst figure. As far as trends go, there was certainly a selling-out-for-power component to Swanson's game this year. While the occasional power is nice, the other elements of his game regressing made it too infrequent a contributor on a price tag approaching $30 million. That's especially true because he didn't have the elite defense on which to fall back this time around. While the glove spoke for a lot of his game in the last two years in Chicago (20 OAA in 2023 and 17 OAA in 2024), he posted an OAA of just two in '25. Neither is a particularly encouraging trend with another four years to go on his contract. Matt Shaw: C+ It's true that Matt Shaw was a below-average hitter in his rookie season—his wRC+ finished at 93. It's also true that he showcased growth in the second half, when that number jumped up to 130. While his strikeout rate was higher and his walk rate lower, he was able to generate more quality contact in the second half on his way to a .263 ISO, nearly 200 points higher than the mark he had in the first half of the year. Adjustments came fast and furious for Shaw that allowed him to take off in that respect. They didn't all stick, however, as the strikeout rate catapulted to over 30 percent in the postseason, with just a pair of hits in 23 plate appearances. There's still work to be done, even if the upside was apparent. Where Shaw did impress was with the glove. Despite questions about his ability to stick anywhere but the keystone long-term, he was a regular on the highlight reals and quite adept at run prevention. His 12 Defensive Runs Saved ranked third among big leaguers at the hot corner and earned him a spot as a Gold Glove finalist. So, while the bat remains a mixed bag (and the first half of '25 was truly dismal for him), the glove helps him to salvage a solid grade for this season. The Bench: F That the Cubs lacked positional depth heading into the year was not a secret. Names they rolled out on the infield at various points in 2025 included names (and wRC+ outputs) like Justin Turner (86), Vidal Bruján (42), Gage Workman (57), Nicky Lopez (1), Jon Berti (42), Carlos Santana (-36), and Willi Castro (40). It's a little bit paradoxical to both praise the health and stability of the infield while simultaneously criticizing the depth, since depth is a little bit less crucial when you don't have to ride them out as frequently as a team that didn't have either of the former. Still, with Shaw's early struggles and Swanson's inability to produce in the batter's box any sustained fashion, having some sort of supplement (particularly in October) might've done the Cubs some good. They failed to address the bench in any meaningful way last winter and during the season, leaving no other grade as an option. View full article

Image courtesy of © Rick Scuteri-Imagn Images That the Chicago Cubs ended up with one of the best catching groups in all of baseball in 2025 isn't a surprise. How they got there, however, certainly qualifies as one. Despite very mild rumblings about the team seeking to upgrade the position in 2024 and into the subsequent offseason, last year's second-half emergence of Miguel Amaya as a hitter changed the calculus a bit. Rather than seek a pure upgrade, the Cubs shifted their attention to acquiring an effective supplement to Amaya, both in terms of the bat and the glove. That supplement arrived in the form of stable veteran Carson Kelly. Kelly's shocking output in April brought far more than expected, of course. What begin as something of a timeshare graduated to more playing time his way, though Amaya was able to cycle in roughly every two or three days. Distribution of playing time wound up as a moot discussion, however, as an oblique injury sent Amaya to the injured list before May reached its close. He'd return later in the year, but headed back to the IL almost immediately after an ankle injury running through first base would prove to be the ultimate end to his campaign. In his stead, the Cubs called up veteran backstop Reese McGuire. Something of a journeyman over the last couple of years, McGuire went from spring training invitee to crucial backup to Kelly in Amaya's absence. His combination of defense and occasional power proved to be the right balance as a No. 2 backstop, with the Cubs choosing to hold onto him even upon Amaya's one-day return from the IL. The trio were effective enough at various points that the team didn't appear inclined to give even a shred of time behind the plate to Moisés Ballesteros, who appeared in just six innings as a defender. All told, the Cubs finished with three of the top 38 catchers in wRC+ (minimum of 100 plate appearances, to account for Amaya), while Carson Kelly (2.6) landed as the No. 13 catcher in terms of fWAR (minimum of 400 plate appearances). As a collective, their fWAR (4.2) ended the year as the No. 7 catching group in the sport. Let's take a look at how everything broke down for the team's main trio behind the plate. Carson Kelly: B+ It would be really easy to over-grade a player like Kelly, who completely outperformed any expectations that the baseball world might've had for him. His 115 wRC+ was a new career best, while he also maintained the steady strikeout (19.0 percent) and walk (10.7 percent) rates that he reset with Detroit and Texas in 2024. The most notable aspect of Kelly's season, though, lived on the power side. His .179 ISO and 17 home runs were each his best since 2019. At the same time, any conversation about Kelly's offensive success needs to note how much his March & April output buoyed his end-of-season numbers. He wRC+'d 257, checked in at a .480 ISO, and struck out just 9.0 percent of the time against a 22.4 percent walk rate in that first month. He had other flashes throughout the year, but was never able to replicate anything close to what he turned in out of the starting gates. Still, when factoring in the defense — where he was above average everywhere except framing — Kelly was able to provide a healthy bit of stability, even with bouts of inconsistency at the plate throughout the year. Miguel Amaya: C Conversely, attaching a grade to Amaya at all feels unfair given the volume of games lost due to injury. The amount of growth he demonstrated (on both sides of the ball) in 2024 warranted an opportunity to run as the top backstop for the Cubs in '25. And while that was unable to come to fruition given his two injuries, many of the signs of a breakout that he'd flashed last year were still present, primarily on the offensive side. He struck out slightly more and walked slightly less, but the results were there otherwise. Though it was only 103 plate appearances, Amaya's 124 wRC+ indicated continued growth at the plate, while a .219 ISO showed that there's plenty of power to tap into. As far as his defense goes, the small sample wrought by injury left things fairly inconclusive, but he did wind up at least average in just about every regard. Assuming he's healthy from the jump in '26, it'll be interesting to see what the distribution looks like between Kelly & Amaya, given the former's strong performance in the latter's absence. Reese McGuire: B For what the Cubs needed out of their No. 2 spot sans Amaya (and visibly unwilling to hand legitimate time behind the plate to Moises Ballesteros), McGuire was just fine. His .226/.245/.444 slash line and 86 wRC+ don't read as particularly impressive, nor does his mere 2.9 percent walk rate. But he provided plenty of occasional power, indicated by his slugging percentage and a .218 ISO, which he did while grading out as an 80th-percentile pitch framer and above-average blocker behind the plate. And that's really the exact type of profile you'd want to get out of a position that doesn't run deep in offensive talent throughout the league: an occasional contributor on offense who provides stability with the glove. It's not a lot that you're going to get, but considering the injury context and what's needed in that type of role, McGuire was perfectly fine. The context helps his grade here. Moisés Ballesteros: Inconclusive The Cubs' No. 2 offensive prospect behind Owen Caissie, it's tough to justify incorporating Ballesteros as a part of this discussion. From an offensive standpoint, he came on strong to close the year after two brief stints with the team earlier in the season. A final output of .298/.394/.474 with a 143 wRC+ in 66 plate appearances will certainly work. But he also logged only six innings of playing time behind the plate, meaning that we can't really offer a grade from a positional standpoint. Nevertheless, with McGuire now a free agent and Kelly a year away from joining him (to say nothing of the unlikelihood of a Kyle Tucker return), Ballesteros' role in 2026 will be fascinating to watch. Not only in terms of his own distribution between serving as a catcher and designated hitter, but how much he could factor in behind the plate with McGuire likely joining a new club ahead of next year. View full article

Image courtesy of © Mark Hoffman-USA TODAY Network v Don't look now, but it appears the Chicago Cubs are capable of scoring beyond the first inning of a baseball game. After scattering their three runs through the game (solo home runs like burps all night after a garlicky dinner) in Game 1, the Cubs did all of their scoring in the first innings of Games 2 and 3. The fourth game of their NLDS matchup against the Milwaukee Brewers, though, saw the Cubs score across the final three innings after a first-inning bombardment. After a few games of woes between the second and ninth innings, some crucial signs of life began to emerge for the Cubs in Game 4. Those developments could make the difference between the frustration of the series' first two games and something more akin to what we saw in Game 4, when they lay their season on the line on Saturday night. No sign, however, is more important than what we've begun to see from Kyle Tucker. Tucker's second half of the season wasn't what you wanted to see, for a team that squandered a lead in the National League Central and limped their way into the Wild Card round. Slowed by a hand fracture and a calf injury, Tucker batted just .231/.360/.378 after the All-Star break, for a good-not-great, OBP-driven wRC+ of 115. Those numbers fell well off his .280/.384/.499 and 145 wRC+ pace in the first half. You'll note, however, that Tucker—even amid such health-driven struggles to produce—continued to reach base and remained an above average hitter. The approach remained intact, with Tucker simply lacking the health to make it matter. Given that, it was unclear what the Cubs would get out of Tucker heading into the postseason. He was activated ahead of their September 26 contest and appeared as a designated hitter for three games to close out the regular season. Therein, however, he notched just one hit in a dozen plate appearances, with one walk. He looked a bit better in the Wild Card Series, going 3-for-11, and our Matt Trueblood predicted that we would see him complete a turn of the corner during the Division Series, based on the trends in his swing metrics that showed up against San Diego. That hoped-for spike in production didn't manifest in Game 1, when Tucker went 0-for-3 with a walk and was only able to muster an average exit velocity of 86.9 MPH. Game 2 didn't offer much room for optimism, either. Tucker, again, went 0-for-3 with a walk, and the contact quality was still lackluster. He put only two balls in play across those four plate appearances: a 72.9-MPH grounder off a fastball, and a 64.1-MPH popout on a curveball. That Tucker averaged 94.5 MPH against fastballs during the regular season speaks to the gap that remained. As such, considering where things stood results-wise, it was really difficult to drum up optimism around the Cubs' most important bat heading into the elimination games. Happily, that's where we've started to see a shift. Tucker was 2-for-3 with a walk in Game 3. The most important component of that game was in the velocity trends. After a walk in his first plate appearance, he went 100.1 MPH on a groundout, 100.2 MPH on a single, and 89.4 MPH on another single. It was a 96.6 MPH average exit velocity on a trio of balls in play, including a 100.2 MPH average against fastballs. It was the kind of trend you needed to see ahead of Thursday's game. The fourth game of the series was where Tucker was, finally, able to make his presence known, for (really) the first time since the end of August, when he homered thrice in two games in Anaheim. In Thursday's tussle, Tucker turned in another 2-for-3 night, with a seventh-inning homer that was mashed and another two walks. His 107.5 MPH on the homer trailed only Michael Busch's 108.1 on his eighth-inning blast. All of Tucker's balls in play came on fastballs, averaging 97.3 MPH; the lowest exit velocity he produced was 90.3. The last two games have helped Tucker run his stat line in this series up to the following: .333/.529/.583; a 5.9% strikeout rate, a 29.4% walk rate, and a wRC+ of 215 in 17 plate appearances. It's obviously only four games, but the balance there is important. We've seen Tucker prop up his overall production while physically compromised, on the strength of the patience within his approach. But for the first time since dealing with his various injuries in the second half, he's starting to turn that patience and plate coverage into exit velocity. It's nearly impossible to overstate the value of such a development. On its own, you have Tucker returning to form as one of the most dangerous hitters in Major League Baseball, ahead of the single most important game of the 2025 season. To understand why that matters, remember: the first-half version of Tucker had a sort of trickle-down effect on the rest of the Cubs lineup, where his patience and subsequent output were (somewhat unquantifiably) leading a number of teammates to follow suit. If the Cubs are about to get a returned-to-form Tucker and the extra pop that comes with it, there is suddenly much more reason to believe they can hang around in a decisive Game 5. View full article

Image courtesy of © David Banks-Imagn Images Ahead of Thursday night's Game 4, it wasn't unreasonable to think that Matthew Boyd should have made his last start in the Chicago Cubs' NLDS matchup against the Milwaukee Brewers. Not only was it an opponent he'd struggled with in the regular season, but he found himself absolutely punked by the division rivals in Game 1: two outs, six runs. In the regular season, Boyd drew two starts against Milwaukee. He threw 10 1/3 innings across those two outings, allowing nine earned runs on 12 hits. Those regular-season struggles were compounded in Game 1. He threw 30 pitches and served up a 90.2-MPH exit velocity on the high volume of contact he allowed in a brief stay on the bump. Such context made it difficult to trust Boyd for another start in this particular series (assuming things went that far). Thursday, however, represented a stark contrast, and instead left us with the iteration of Boyd we'd seen for the bulk of 2025. In the Cubs' 6-0 Game 4 win at a raucous Wrigley Field, Boyd hung around for 4 2/3 innings; allowed just a pair of hits; walked three; and held the Brewers scoreless, before the bullpen took it the rest of the way. It reignited not only hope of a series victory, but faith in Boyd specifically. And it wasn't complicated, coming down to usage and command. The following is the breakdown of Boyd's start in Game 1: Boyd isn't a pitcher who's going to generate a huge number of whiffs, so that the swing-and-miss column reads as underwhelming is deceiving. He induced whiffs on only 23.4% of opponents' swings throughout the 2025 regular season. Instead, Boyd's strength is in command and, subsequently, managing contact quality. He was well above average in both average opponent exit velocity and opponent hard-hit rate. Not so in Game 1, though. Each pitch he threw, with the exception of the sinker, was touched for an average exit velocity at least 4 MPH higher than what he turned in during the regular season. The changeup was also a source of woe in the small sample, as its absence of whiff and poor results defied what that pitch had been for him all season. So while punked is not a technical term, it does speak to what the Brewers were able to do in taking advantage of lackluster command and getting a reliable pitch to handle against him. Those issues were completely dialed in by his next start, however. The breakdown looked like this: The first thing you'll notice is that the average exit velocity fell by 10 miles per hour. The second thing you may notice is that Boyd, pitching in a much more expanded sample than Game 1, put his changeup firmly in the back seat in favor of the curveball. It was something that visibly caught Milwaukee off-guard, as he only got four swings against it but earned called or swinging strikes on 40% of the hooks he threw. He had that pitch locked in, and it created an issue for a Milwaukee lineup that didn't have any the first time they saw him. What makes the Boyd turnaround so enjoyable between starts isn't solely the outcome. It's that the underlying factor contributing to it falls squarely on the craft. Command can be honed in with an evaluation of mechanics or simply clearing out a poor start ahead of the next one. But the foresight to change the usage just enough to make it play in your favor against an opponent who has had your number throughout the season speaks to a nuance that makes this game so fascinating. In each of those two regular season starts, it was the changeup serving as Boyd's most-used secondary offering (thrown 26 percent of the time on July 28 and 20 percent of the time on August 19). The Brewers had no reason to expect the hook would be there in lieu of it, and were unable to adjust. It ultimately may not mean anything, in the final result of this series. Maybe it will. But it certainly dispels a certain level of concern about Boyd's ability to pitch at this point in the year, given the volume he's thrown in comparison to the last handful of seasons. It was an impressive performance under pressure, from a veteran the team needs for the balance of this season and in 2026. In that sense, its meaning and value are impossible to erase. View full article

Image courtesy of © Matt Marton-Imagn Images It would be a tough ask for one to create a robust list of offensive contributors in the 2025 postseason for the Chicago Cubs. Such is the nature of a team that has scored 16 runs across six games, or 2.7 per game. But even if you made a top-10 list of the top hitters in a nine-man group, Matt Shaw wouldn't make it. As he did 114 times during the regular season, Shaw has drawn a start at the hot corner for each of the Cubs' six games during these playoffs. Thus far, he's contributed zero hits across 17 plate appearances, with four walks and seven strikeouts to his name. It's not so much the absence of hits as it is both the context around such a void and the fact that he hasn't been particularly close to generating any semblance of value by way of a swing. Despite coming out of the wild card round against San Diego, the following has been a familiar sight out of Shaw through the six games he's played: We've watched Shaw battle against his mechanics at various points throughout the 2025 season. It's likely we're witnessing yet another manifestation thereof right now. The goal here isn't to identify the specific source of Shaw's postseason woes, however. It's to examine the repercussions, and discuss whether a justification exists to drop him into the starting lineup again for Thursday's Game 4. Whatever issues are plaguing Shaw this stage are leading to a couple notable outcomes, both for the player himself and the team as a collective. In terms of his own performance, Shaw has rarely swung the bat throughout these playoffs, with a 41.2% swing rate. Only Ian Happ has a lower rate thus far. The difference is that when Shaw does swing the bat, the outcome is the third-worst contact rate of anyone who has swung a bat for the Cubs this October (65.7%), with a whiff rate five percent higher than he turned in during the regular season. Even the walks have lacked impact, as all four have been isolated to the first two games against Milwaukee, one of which was a blowout loss and the other where the offense proved incapable of supplementing that on-base with any meaningful approach. Besides, just watch him up there. He tried a couple of poking bunts Wednesday, hoping to figure out some way to create an offensive threat, because he's that profoundly lost. Worse yet is that on those instances where Shaw has made contact, he's created exactly no true threat. He's not alone in a 0.0% barrel rate within this lineup, but he is solo in the 0.0% Hard-Hit% game. It's a mess for Shaw at this point. He's unable to compensate for minimal contact with, at least, impactful contact. Factor in the strikeout woes (41.2%) and the runners he's stranded this postseason (10 of them), and this is simply a player unable to contribute to the collective. Six of his seven strikeouts this postseason have also come against right-handed pitching. If it's to be Freddy Peralta in Game 4, it becomes even more difficult to justify another start for Shaw. The issue beyond this specific performance, however, is that the options beyond Shaw don't run deep. Justin Turner has one game and two plate appearances to his credit, though he hit much better in that minuscule set of chances than Shaw has. Do you toss the veteran a start at a position at which he logged just 35 innings in 2025, in hopes that there's a certain stabilizing of the lineup that happens as a result? Shaw's chances to have an impact on defense in these playoffs have been limited, anyway. He made a tremendous play to help finish off the Padres, but the Cubs staff is mostly yielding fly balls, and Shaw couldn't do anything about the few hot shots the Brewers sent past him in Game 1. The only other option at present would be Willi Castro, who hasn't garnered an appearance at the plate and has only been inserted once this postseason overall. He walked at more than a 16% clip in September, but was woeful pretty much everywhere else. The tradeoff there seems negligible. That's the issue Counsell now faces. It's hard to justify another start for Shaw, considering the total non-factor he's been at the plate—not just against Milwaukee, but for all six games this postseason. The options behind him, however, also don't inspire much confidence. Do you take the defensive tradeoff and insert a veteran with an extensive run of postseason play? Do you hope that Castro can parlay his own patience into some level of production in the way that Shaw has not? The answer to both questions is probably no at this juncture, leading to the unfortunate outcome of simply requiring Matt Shaw to occupy his usual spot in the lineup and hope for the best. It's malpractice, though, that the team didn't better prepare to plug someone else in there. Their rookie at the hot corner is kaput, for 2025. View full article

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images After another loss to the Milwaukee Brewers on Monday, the Chicago Cubs stand with the classic Avengers: Endgame protagonists; it feels like they have a 1-in-roughly-14-million chance of claiming victory. Such dire odds are not the result of being down 2-0 in a best-of-five series. They're also not due solely to the idea that the Brewers are simply a better ballclub. While both of those things may (objectively) be true, there's also an alignment issue within the roster. And while we're at it, here's another, less lazy pop culture reference. As far as partnerships go, Cubs hitters and Cubs pitchers feature the type of ill-gotten, questionable-decision-leading-to-disastrous-result structure that would make even our best horror directors squirm. Not in a darkly fun and chaotic John Carpenter sort of way, mind you, where the vibes and atmosphere don't leave you wanting for an ultimate outcome. You're just happy to be along for the ride. But rather in an Ari Aster sort of way, where you're unsure why you're consuming it in the first place and feel sort of gross afterward. This is all a fairly dramatic way of stating that the composition of this roster was never going to work in anything resembling a pleasant fashion, against a team like Milwaukee. On one hand, you have the Cubs pitching staff. They've been a fine group in 2025, composed of middle-to-low-tier velocity and reclamation arms. As a collective, they sat ninth in ERA (3.81) and paced the league with a 6.9% walk rate. The results were there, regardless of their own composition. Ahead of the National League Division Series, concern permeated two primary areas: their ability to perform at a high level while missing Cade Horton, combined with the need to feature a potentially burning-out Matthew Boyd; and their broader, further-reaching dearth of both velocity and swing-and-miss ability. The Brewers absolutely feast on teams with that combination of weaknesses. This is a team with the third-highest contact rate (79.6%) on swings, and when they don't have to battle high-end raw stuff, that contact can be authoritative. Against finesse pitchers (those with a low combined strikeout and walk rate, relative to the league average), the Brewers had a .274/.336/.417 line and a 105 OPS+, meaning they're substantially above-average. Their ability to generate runs via contact against the specific profile of the bulk of the Cubs staff was always going to lead to run production on their end. It wasn't about shutting down the opposition on the Cubs' end, but merely minimizing damage. In short, the Cubs were going to be trailing, probably at many points, in this series. That left a certain onus on the hitters to be able to work their way back into games. That's where we begin to confront the issue we've seen unfold in the first two games of this series. Whether or not the Cubs are a team capable of coming back in games where they find themselves trailing is almost irrelevant—because whether they are constructed that way or not, it's not something they have done particularly well in 2025. One factor in establishing this idea about this year's group is in their splits when trailing in games. When behind, the Cubs lineup features a slash of .241/.321/.409. When ahead, they have an average 20 points higher and a slugging percentage almost 50 points above the trailing rate. Primary culprits in the shortfall of production when the team is behind include Pete Crow-Armstrong (.202/.270/.405), Seiya Suzuki (.236/.322/.433), Michael Busch (.207/.333/.377), Carson Kelly (.205/.302/.369) and Matt Shaw (.232/.279/.416). That's over half your lineup that scuffles significantly in a trailing situation. Then you toss in the leverage component: The most notable column here is in the runs added or subtracted due to leverage. Suzuki leads the way, but that's also on the strength of either his patience or a pitch over the heart of the plate. Ian Happ's is almost exclusively due to patience in his own right, as is Kyle Tucker's. Only Nico Hoerner offers something even remotely balanced in creating value in the leverage game. Everyone else is obviously on the wrong end of the spectrum in that regard. Nuance in this discussion runs incredibly deep—deeper than even these couple of factors, for sure. It's a team that has struggled against velocity, too. But as many different additional elements that we could include as part of this discussion, many of them lead to the same (relatively simple) idea: the Cubs were always going to be trailing at points during this series, and they lack the ability to overcome those scenarios. Whether that's a failure of construction or of execution remains to be seen. Either way, though, it's certainly something with which the Cubs' front office will have to reckon as they begin to turn their attention toward the 2026 roster. View full article

Image courtesy of © Benny Sieu-Imagn Images It was evident from just about the first pitch of Saturday's Game 1 against the Milwaukee Brewers that Matthew Boyd did not have "it." His sequence—double, double, double, groundout, walk, error, strikeout, single—was perhaps the worst way things could have started for the Chicago Cubs in the five-game series. Even with the important acknowledgement that it's only one game and the work of the bullpen (particularly Aaron Civale) mitigated the consequences of running too deep off such a short start start, questions are sure to emerge regarding Boyd's short-term role. That Boyd struggled so mightily against the Brewers did not, unfortunately, come as a surprise. A couple of factors could have predicted as much, in fact. One is the two-game sample we have from Boyd against Milwaukee in 2025. In those two starts, he allowed nine earned runs on 12 hits in 10 1/3 innings. It seems inarguable to say that his skill set is ill-suited to take on a lineup that makes as much contact as the Brewers do. Compound that with short rest, even off of a 58-pitch start, and you have the outcome the Cubs received on Saturday afternoon. Where they go from here, though, is certainly a matter for debate as it relates to Boyd. We do know that the Cubs will roll out Shota Imanaga for Game 2, ideally in a more trustworthy fashion than they did against San Diego in deploying an opener. But he also has a 5.73 ERA against Milwaukee in four career starts, so it may end up being a quick hook if he gets into some trouble. Regardless of how that all transpires, you're probably looking at a Jameson Taillon or Colin Rea start in Game 3, assuming the latter isn't involved in some sort of piggyback with Imanaga. Ultimately, Game 4 (should the Cubs get there) lines back up for Boyd to take the ball. But should he? It's not as if Boyd's start, brutal as it was, was any kind of outlier for his late-season performance. Just about everywhere, September offered some of the worst numbers we'd seen from him in an otherwise strong campaign. At 5.31, his September ERA was his worst an in individual month. The same was true regarding his FIP (5.69), strikeout rate (14.0 percent), and wOBA against (.343). That latter figure was concerning on its own, but the expected value produced by opposing hitters is particularly jarring: If you want to go back to a start where Boyd did not allow a run, you'd have to go back to August 2. In the nine subsequent starts from that point (49 innings), he allowed at least two earned runs in all of them (5.51 ERA). So, not only do you have a guy who has struggled against the Cubs' specific opponent in the National League Division Series, but one who is coming off more than a month where he turned in some of his poorest work across 31 total starts. That his arm angle dropped to its lowest point since the first month of the season (24.4 degrees) in September speaks to a potential cause of all of this: fatigue. That's kind of an important notion here, too. You can hardly fault a guy who last crossed the 170 inning threshold in 2019 for burning out to an extent (if that is, indeed, what's happening). Boyd's workload this year has, essentially, been of the same total of his last four seasons combined in terms of volume. If the arm angle drop-off is indicative of some fatigue, even if the velocity and movement have maintained, it's a logical explanation. But it also speaks to the danger of having Boyd run out there for a potential Game 4 start where the team may be facing elimination. It's possible that the Cubs turn to Boyd as a pseudo-opener in Game 4 and see how it goes. From there—and depending on how things transpire in Game 3—perhaps you've got Colin Rea to assume some of the bulk work in that one. Or Counsell could lean heavily into Aaron Civale considering how sharp he looked amid the disaster of Game 1 (4 1/3 innings, three hits, no walks, 37 strikes on 55 pitches). But there's another caveat even to minimizing his presence later in this series. Boyd has been woeful in the first inning since the start of August. In first innings going back 10 starts, he has a 6.30 ERA and a walk rate (6.8 percent) that exceeds his total figure for the season. Sure, he's been a bit unlucky with a groundball rate approaching 47 percent in those innings (.333 BABIP), but this is also an opponent that feasts on batted ball fortune. Even the opener solution isn't foolproof. As such, the unfortunate reality is that Counsell probably shouldn't trust Matthew Boyd with another start in this series, though his alternative options are practically nonexistent. The results weren't there in September. They weren't there at any point against the Brewers in his three starts against them to date in 2025. It'd be unreasonable to expect a sudden turnaround when the evidence points firmly in the other direction. It might be an impossible scenario to avoid depending on what kind of volume the Cubs get between now and then, but it'd be a really tough sell to see Boyd pitching with the Cubs' backs up against the wall. View full article