Matthew Trueblood
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Why I Won't Use WAR or WARP in Baseball Articles, Ever Again
Matthew Trueblood posted an article in Cubs
Someone pointed out to me, a few weeks ago, that I use wins above replacement (WAR) and its cousin, WARP, less often than most writers with whom they typically think of me as a kindred spirit. I was a little bit surprised, and a little bit alarmed. WAR is one of the fundamental concepts of much online baseball writing, and I hadn't noticed that I was neglecting it. It took me another week of writing to notice and confirm that that was true. The next step I tried to take, going into the following week, was mapping out how I might get back to making greater use of the framework for audiences. The more I tried to do so, though, the less enthusiasm I felt for it. In fact, at this point, I've come to the opposite conclusion. I don't think WAR is helpful or useful--or at least, I think it misleads as much as it informs, and I'm done using it, even to whatever limited extent I had been in previous months or years. I don't want to sound retrograde, or atavistic. Early in the era of WAR, some old-school writers hit back against the framework based on things like the existence of competing WARs, with differing fundamental assumptions and widely disparate numbers for the same players. Some rebuked it for the inexactitude of a replacement level, itself. I don't completely disagree with those arguments, but they're not my reason for leaving WAR behind, and I don't think they're especially problematic, really. Rather, I have a couple of other issues. WAR values have become blunt instruments, not for loosely estimating player value, but for ending conversations by assigning false certainty to player valuations. Runs, not wins, are the directly measurable contributions to a team made by individual players. Wins are fashioned from the interactions of players, managers, moments, and opponents, and players' contributions translate only very messily into wins. Counting runs produced and prevented is a far superior way to express player value than doing the same thing, then milling those runs into theoretical wins and roughening the estimate without showing the increased error. For my money, replacement levels aren't the right baseline to which to anchor player value, after all. The old heads were right about that, but for the wrong reasons. They were trying to cling to raw numbers, like pitcher wins, home runs, and RBIs; that was analytically untenable. WAR sought to anchor the world to the baseline of a replacement-level player, which is convenient for teams and from the perspective of management vis-a-vis labor, but what we need to anchor ourselves to, instead, is the league average. When you compare a player's batting, baserunning, and fielding to an average player's, you find out how many runs they really contribute to the project of reaching the postseason for a team. Taking the extra step of adding what amounts to padding--credit applied to a player relative to the replacement level, on the unexamined assumption that they were better than the possible replacements actually available to their team--valorizes below-average players and dampens the apparent value of above-average ones. The existing WAR metrics are too rigid; they adapt only too slowly, and thus sometimes retroactively. That doesn't make them useful to me in telling the story of a player or their value for readers. This season, first basemen are hitting at a historically lousy rate, relative to the rest of the league. In theory, according to WAR's underpinnings, that should make the offensive contributions of especially good first basemen especially valuable, and it should make the struggles of some of those players a bit less damaging than they seem. Alas, the first "should" there is only hypothetical, because the positional adjustment that is one key aspect of WAR doesn't flex the way you might think or like, at least in all cases. The second "should", meanwhile, is just an assumption I don't really agree with. There seems to me a logical inconsistency in the places where the various flavors of WAR do and don't elect to depart from observed reality--or, perhaps, in how they adjust it. This is most readily apparent in pitching WAR, which ranges from being rooted in runs allowed and only lightly bumped along the spectrum based on park factors and defensive support to being rooted almost solely in strikeouts, walks, and home run rates. But it's really everywhere within the framework. I don't like the opacity of the process, even though it's not left intentionally opaque by any of the sources who provide it and even though they're not opaque to me, personally. I think these layers of assumptions and adjustments, baked in neatly en route to a single-number estimate which fans then treat as something real and concrete and non-negotiable, end up doing more harm than good--even though most of them are immensely valuable, if kept separate and noticed along the way. I would rather continue to break down player performance using more telling indices, with either greater predictive or greater descriptive power, than try to speak the language of WAR again. Finding that I'm out of practice in that tongue turned out to be liberating. What WAR is trying to do, and it's admirable enough in a certain way, is to shrink the complexity and the difficulty of player evaluation and roster construction, until those abstract tasks become apparently concrete and easy to grasp. Unfortunately, as most attempts at such radical simplification do, it fails. I would rather live here, in the discomfort of uncertainty and abstraction, than seize upon the cozy but false sense of surety WAR offers. I'd rather continue to help interested readers learn more about players and how they come together to win games than invite them to continue conforming to a constructed reality I feel does a poor job of capturing the one on the field. -
There will be money to spend this winter, and a few players are sloughing naturally off the Cubs' books and roster roll. To get from where they are to where they really want to be, though, the team doesn't need a few more capable contributors; they need over a dozen. The Brewers are not a bad analog for the Cubs, and they're about to cruise to an NL Central title. The massive difference in the standings between the two this year hasn't come from Milwaukee having a superior set of core contributors, per se, but from the fact that of the 50 or so players around whom a team must plan a modern season, the Crew have a clear edge over the Cubs at 15 or 20 spots--most of them in the middle and lower parts of the respective roster hierarchies. Fixing that means getting aggressive, as soon as this season ends. The Cubs can't afford to be affectionate, patient, or indulgent. They need to be ruthless this fall. There are a small handful of players who will become free agents at the end of this campaign, including Kyle Hendricks, Jorge López and Drew Smyly, but there are also a whole lot of players with team control remaining whom they need to jettison. Let's take a tour. Marginal Veterans with Role Player Ceilings Patrick Wisdom has been a good Cub, all things considered. He's a pleasant clubhouse presence, and when he's in position to get regular playing time, he can get hot and run off barrages of home runs that give him real value. Durability and defensive utility have eluded him the last two seasons, though, and as the Cubs have shrunk his role, they've also found that he can't thrive as an occasional pinch-hitter. He has to be non-tendered in November. The same goes for Mike Tauchman, who has much more value in a part-time role but is older than Wisdom and starting to show his limitations. With only passable defense even in the outfield corners and no power left in his bat, Tauchman needs to be non-tendered, to open some roster room for a needed upgrade in the position-player mix. Of Julian Merryweather and Yency Almonte, the team probably needs to keep just one, and send out the other. Each can be dominant at their best, but each has a long track record of getting hurt or proving inconsistent, sometimes because of nagging physical issues not quite bad enough to shelve them. Letting both take up roster room all winter would be negligent, given the magnitude of change needed. Christian Bethancourt is a fine catch-and-throw backup backstop, but keeping him and offering him arbitration this winter would be malpractice. The Cubs need to be planning an attempt to acquire a higher-end catcher, pushing Miguel Amaya toward the role Bethancourt currently plays for the team. Young Players Who Are Never Going to Be Anything for the Cubs Much though it chagrins so many Cubs fans that he never got sustained playing time in the big leagues, Alexander Canario was denied that opportunity for a simple reason: he can't hit big-league pitching. The swing is too long, too grooved, and too inflexible. He's in the way. It's sad that it's come to this, but the Cubs can't wait around any longer to see if Brennen Davis magically stays healthy and demonstrates MLB-caliber skills over a prolonged sample next year--two things he's never really done before. Hopefully, there's still a chance out there somewhere for Davis. The Cubs shouldn't be in the business of trying to make it be with them. Matt Mervis was a great story for a bit, and with a bit better luck and some better adjustments, he might have blossomed into a credible big-leaguer--even if stardom was never on the cards. Instead, he's simply out of the picture for the Cubs. With Michael Busch in place and Cody Bellinger overwhelmingly likely to opt in at the end of the year and come back, there's no need for a third left-hitting first baseman on the 40-man roster. There could still be room for Mervis if he were ever likely to figure out big-league pitching, but he isn't. For a long, long time, the names Keegan Thompson, Ethan Roberts, and Caleb Kilian have carried varying levels of cachet with Cubs fans. There was some reason to believe in each of them, at certain times, but now is the time to stop believing in any of them. The team needs to produce better options than each from within, and they need to move on from each, to maximize their potential pitching depth. Obvious Jetsam Presumably, only the injury he suffered while in Iowa has even kept Nick Madrigal in the organization this long. He should be cut this fall, sad though it is that that experiment didn't work. You can sort of make the case that the Miles Mastrobuoni experiment did work, in that he cost virtually nothing to acquire; gave them inconsistent but nonzero value with his defense and speed; and was alaways flexible. Now, it's time to refresh that roster spot and try to do much, much better for the same role. Picked up for various flavors of free in recent months, Trey WIngenter, Shawn Armstrong and Colten Brewer all could theoretically be kept this winter. In practice, the team should probably spend the final few weeks evaluating each as best they can (If Brewer suffers a disadvantage because he's hurt, so be it; remember, he broke his hand in a tantrum) and then waive two of them at the first opportunity. Nico Hoerner Only one player gets his own category, and it's Nico Hoerner. He's not a bad player, but he is not currently a good one, either. Unlike some of the other players tethered to big contracts on the team, he's not tied down by a no-trade clause, and he's not producing at a level that makes you wary of losing him. The Cubs need to bring a lot of good players to camp in 2025, including putting some into uncomfortable spring competitions. Getting Hoerner out of the way would open up second base as one potential fallback position for one or more losers in those battles. His trade value might be limited, but it's not zero. None of these players need to be designated for assignment on the spot, or anything. Some are tradable, and others only need to go when certain offseason deadlines come. This winter needs to find the Cubs aggressively rearranging their roster, though, and that means cutting hard--to make room for free agents, and for trade arrivals stemming from the consolidation of their farm depth into MLB value, and for additions from within the organization both during the winter and entering next season. Nearly half their 40-man needs to change. Can Jed Hoyer do that?
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This season fell by the wayside, as the Cubs proved not to have the depth of quality in the top or middle sections of their roster to keep pace with other NL playoff contenders. To fix that for 2025, a fairly staggering roster overhaul is necessary. Image courtesy of © Kamil Krzaczynski-Imagn Images There will be money to spend this winter, and a few players are sloughing naturally off the Cubs' books and roster roll. To get from where they are to where they really want to be, though, the team doesn't need a few more capable contributors; they need over a dozen. The Brewers are not a bad analog for the Cubs, and they're about to cruise to an NL Central title. The massive difference in the standings between the two this year hasn't come from Milwaukee having a superior set of core contributors, per se, but from the fact that of the 50 or so players around whom a team must plan a modern season, the Crew have a clear edge over the Cubs at 15 or 20 spots--most of them in the middle and lower parts of the respective roster hierarchies. Fixing that means getting aggressive, as soon as this season ends. The Cubs can't afford to be affectionate, patient, or indulgent. They need to be ruthless this fall. There are a small handful of players who will become free agents at the end of this campaign, including Kyle Hendricks, Jorge López and Drew Smyly, but there are also a whole lot of players with team control remaining whom they need to jettison. Let's take a tour. Marginal Veterans with Role Player Ceilings Patrick Wisdom has been a good Cub, all things considered. He's a pleasant clubhouse presence, and when he's in position to get regular playing time, he can get hot and run off barrages of home runs that give him real value. Durability and defensive utility have eluded him the last two seasons, though, and as the Cubs have shrunk his role, they've also found that he can't thrive as an occasional pinch-hitter. He has to be non-tendered in November. The same goes for Mike Tauchman, who has much more value in a part-time role but is older than Wisdom and starting to show his limitations. With only passable defense even in the outfield corners and no power left in his bat, Tauchman needs to be non-tendered, to open some roster room for a needed upgrade in the position-player mix. Of Julian Merryweather and Yency Almonte, the team probably needs to keep just one, and send out the other. Each can be dominant at their best, but each has a long track record of getting hurt or proving inconsistent, sometimes because of nagging physical issues not quite bad enough to shelve them. Letting both take up roster room all winter would be negligent, given the magnitude of change needed. Christian Bethancourt is a fine catch-and-throw backup backstop, but keeping him and offering him arbitration this winter would be malpractice. The Cubs need to be planning an attempt to acquire a higher-end catcher, pushing Miguel Amaya toward the role Bethancourt currently plays for the team. Young Players Who Are Never Going to Be Anything for the Cubs Much though it chagrins so many Cubs fans that he never got sustained playing time in the big leagues, Alexander Canario was denied that opportunity for a simple reason: he can't hit big-league pitching. The swing is too long, too grooved, and too inflexible. He's in the way. It's sad that it's come to this, but the Cubs can't wait around any longer to see if Brennen Davis magically stays healthy and demonstrates MLB-caliber skills over a prolonged sample next year--two things he's never really done before. Hopefully, there's still a chance out there somewhere for Davis. The Cubs shouldn't be in the business of trying to make it be with them. Matt Mervis was a great story for a bit, and with a bit better luck and some better adjustments, he might have blossomed into a credible big-leaguer--even if stardom was never on the cards. Instead, he's simply out of the picture for the Cubs. With Michael Busch in place and Cody Bellinger overwhelmingly likely to opt in at the end of the year and come back, there's no need for a third left-hitting first baseman on the 40-man roster. There could still be room for Mervis if he were ever likely to figure out big-league pitching, but he isn't. For a long, long time, the names Keegan Thompson, Ethan Roberts, and Caleb Kilian have carried varying levels of cachet with Cubs fans. There was some reason to believe in each of them, at certain times, but now is the time to stop believing in any of them. The team needs to produce better options than each from within, and they need to move on from each, to maximize their potential pitching depth. Obvious Jetsam Presumably, only the injury he suffered while in Iowa has even kept Nick Madrigal in the organization this long. He should be cut this fall, sad though it is that that experiment didn't work. You can sort of make the case that the Miles Mastrobuoni experiment did work, in that he cost virtually nothing to acquire; gave them inconsistent but nonzero value with his defense and speed; and was alaways flexible. Now, it's time to refresh that roster spot and try to do much, much better for the same role. Picked up for various flavors of free in recent months, Trey WIngenter, Shawn Armstrong and Colten Brewer all could theoretically be kept this winter. In practice, the team should probably spend the final few weeks evaluating each as best they can (If Brewer suffers a disadvantage because he's hurt, so be it; remember, he broke his hand in a tantrum) and then waive two of them at the first opportunity. Nico Hoerner Only one player gets his own category, and it's Nico Hoerner. He's not a bad player, but he is not currently a good one, either. Unlike some of the other players tethered to big contracts on the team, he's not tied down by a no-trade clause, and he's not producing at a level that makes you wary of losing him. The Cubs need to bring a lot of good players to camp in 2025, including putting some into uncomfortable spring competitions. Getting Hoerner out of the way would open up second base as one potential fallback position for one or more losers in those battles. His trade value might be limited, but it's not zero. None of these players need to be designated for assignment on the spot, or anything. Some are tradable, and others only need to go when certain offseason deadlines come. This winter needs to find the Cubs aggressively rearranging their roster, though, and that means cutting hard--to make room for free agents, and for trade arrivals stemming from the consolidation of their farm depth into MLB value, and for additions from within the organization both during the winter and entering next season. Nearly half their 40-man needs to change. Can Jed Hoyer do that? View full article
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We live in much too strikeout- and walk-obsessed a world for Javier Assad to be a star. He's only fanned 19.6% of the batters he's faced this year, and he's walked 9.9% of them. Those numbers are both markedly worse than the league average. In strikeout rate minus walk rate (an increasingly popular oversimplification of the task of pitching), Assad ranks 110th of the 127 pitchers who have thrown at least 90 innings this year. He's gotten all 26 turns he's been healthy enough to take in the Cubs rotation this year, but part of that is just a product of other players getting hurt--from Jameson Taillon and Justin Steele to Ben Brown and top prospect Cade Horton. Last year, by contrast, only 10 of Assad's 32 appearances were starts. It took until this spring for the team to figure out that they should even stick with him as a starter, and had they been less afflicted with injuries, they might not have even given him an unfettered start then. Make no mistake, though: Assad is a legitimate, valuable fourth starter on a good team, or a third-best one on a more stretched unit. His numbers look unsustainable to the saber-trained casual observer, but three partial seasons into his big-league career, he's shown a number of ways to outperform those peripheral stats on an ongoing basis. How? In short, you could say that Assad is the embodiment of the effectively wild hurler--although in a way that defies stereotypes. When we think of that term, we tend to envision Nolan Ryan, and similar pitchers with so much power on their fastball that they couldn't reliably throw the ball over the plate. Hitters also couldn't figure out where or when to expect the ball, though, so their ample walks and hit batters didn't cost them much. In the modern game, it's hard to be that kind of effectively wild. To be sure, Assad isn't. He sits mostly in the low 90s with his fastball, though he certainly can touch higher. Rather, he's just an assiduous junkballer non pareil. He doesn't give in, and he doesn't throw anything over the middle unless he feels confident that the opponent is unprepared for it. He works the edges of the zone, and hitters are happy to wait him out, too. Of all pitchers with 60 or more innings pitched this year, Assad ranks second-lowest in opponent swing rate. Yet, when hitters do swing, they're not really squaring Assad up--at least not often enough to make up for the number of called strikes they're taking. They only swing at 42.2% of his pitches, but 35.3% of their takes go for strikes looking. The only other pitchers with opponent swing rates under 43.9% and above-average called strike rates are relievers Dylan Floro and David Robertson. Then, they swing, and hitters foul the ball off at a high rate, racking up even more strikes for Assad. Because he misses so few bats, Assad doesn't convert many of these called strikes or fouls into strikeouts. He does, however, take advantage of hitters' defensiveness once they get behind in the count. He also ratchets up the hitter's frustration. This is the third year in a row in which Assad is running an ERA just over 3.00 in MLB, albeit in samples of various sizes and in varying roles. Just as importantly, though, his ERA is telling a true tale about his run prevention. Teammates Steele and Shota Imanaga make instructive comparison points. Assad's unearned run average (UERA) is well below average, and has been throughout his career. Steele's is well above average, and has been throughout his career. Imanaga, too, has given up a lot of unearned runs in his first Stateside campaign. Obviously, the two things are not equal in their impact or predictive value, but if you just add them together and take run average per nine innings, Assad has been one of the 15 best pitchers in baseball this year. Again, his lack of a typical modern skill set makes everyone prone to doubting him. Assad's FIP is about 1.5 runs worse than his ERA, and many people dismiss him as a swingman or a nice-to-have extra arm, expecting him to come back to that level. Yet, he persistently avoids that. On Saturday, he handled the imposing stars in the Yankees lineup ably, without so much as a blink. It was the kind of start in which some fans keep waiting to see him implode... but he never does. Four starters who have made at least 15 starts this year have yet to have one in which they allow five runs in the first four innings. Assad has done it, but only once in his 26 starts, making him the fifth-least combustible starter in the game. Now, the chart above also serves as a reminder of one of the two reasons why Assad isn't a No. 1 or No. 2 starter, even if every bit of the hit and run prevention he does with runners on base and his other magic holds up: He doesn't dominate. There aren't days when Assad takes his team out of the game, but there also aren't many in which he takes control of the whole proceeding, getting at least 16 outs and allowing two or fewer runs. Yet, as the season has unfolded, Assad has earned more of his manager's trust, and begun working deeper into games. One reason is that, as it turns out, hitters don't gain very much from seeing Assad a second or third time. He's one of the best hurlers in the game, in fact, at getting outs with the same efficacy as the lineup card turns over. It's really a combination of stuff, command (occasionally at the expense of control; he emphasizes execution over location) and deception that hitters can't cope with. The depth of Assad's arsenal makes him hard to outguess, and his delivery has just enough unpredictability to it to mess with timing. It's why hitters don't swing as much as they should against him, and why they're still figuring him out the third time they see him. Then, he throws even more wrinkles at them. For most of the season, Assad started on the right side of the pitching rubber, from the pitcher's perspective--closer to third base. Assad 5.mp4 In his last five starts, though, he's slid all the way over to the other side, giving hitters a new look and himself a new angle with which to attack the zone. Assad 6.mp4 He's never going to run a FIP as good as his career ERA to date. His ERA, itself, might swell a bit if he's a full-time starter next year. As unorthodox as he is, though, Assad is a delightful throwback, and a very valuable arm for the Cubs. He's the kind of pitcher you can win with, as long as he's not an indispensable part of the starting plan. We should get, then, to the other reason why he can't be a frontline starter--and no, it's not the lack of a 26% strikeout rate. Rather, it's the same thing that holds Justin Steele back from the same status. The most important ability in pitching is availability. Assad has had to miss time two years in a row with a balky forearm. He has ways to sustain this seemingly improbable success across a full season of starting work, little though some might be inclined to buy into it. What he doesn't have is the durability to do it over 160 or 180 innings. Instead, he looks likely to consistently contribute 120-140 strong frames. That's helpful, and the Cubs should happily pencil him into their 2025 starting rotation, alongside Steele. However, they also have to figure out how they'll find a player capable of the same or better performances across an extra 50 innings. That's a tall order, and an expensive one to fill, but the team can take some solace in knowing that Assad's presence will compound the value of any ace-level newcomer, just as Steele's and Imanaga's do.
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Though he can't be a frontline hurler for a team with serious October aspirations, the Cubs' most unconventional starter is finishing his third big-league season with style, and he's carving himself a place in next year's rotation. Image courtesy of © Rafael Suanes-Imagn Images We live in much too strikeout- and walk-obsessed a world for Javier Assad to be a star. He's only fanned 19.6% of the batters he's faced this year, and he's walked 9.9% of them. Those numbers are both markedly worse than the league average. In strikeout rate minus walk rate (an increasingly popular oversimplification of the task of pitching), Assad ranks 110th of the 127 pitchers who have thrown at least 90 innings this year. He's gotten all 26 turns he's been healthy enough to take in the Cubs rotation this year, but part of that is just a product of other players getting hurt--from Jameson Taillon and Justin Steele to Ben Brown and top prospect Cade Horton. Last year, by contrast, only 10 of Assad's 32 appearances were starts. It took until this spring for the team to figure out that they should even stick with him as a starter, and had they been less afflicted with injuries, they might not have even given him an unfettered start then. Make no mistake, though: Assad is a legitimate, valuable fourth starter on a good team, or a third-best one on a more stretched unit. His numbers look unsustainable to the saber-trained casual observer, but three partial seasons into his big-league career, he's shown a number of ways to outperform those peripheral stats on an ongoing basis. How? In short, you could say that Assad is the embodiment of the effectively wild hurler--although in a way that defies stereotypes. When we think of that term, we tend to envision Nolan Ryan, and similar pitchers with so much power on their fastball that they couldn't reliably throw the ball over the plate. Hitters also couldn't figure out where or when to expect the ball, though, so their ample walks and hit batters didn't cost them much. In the modern game, it's hard to be that kind of effectively wild. To be sure, Assad isn't. He sits mostly in the low 90s with his fastball, though he certainly can touch higher. Rather, he's just an assiduous junkballer non pareil. He doesn't give in, and he doesn't throw anything over the middle unless he feels confident that the opponent is unprepared for it. He works the edges of the zone, and hitters are happy to wait him out, too. Of all pitchers with 60 or more innings pitched this year, Assad ranks second-lowest in opponent swing rate. Yet, when hitters do swing, they're not really squaring Assad up--at least not often enough to make up for the number of called strikes they're taking. They only swing at 42.2% of his pitches, but 35.3% of their takes go for strikes looking. The only other pitchers with opponent swing rates under 43.9% and above-average called strike rates are relievers Dylan Floro and David Robertson. Then, they swing, and hitters foul the ball off at a high rate, racking up even more strikes for Assad. Because he misses so few bats, Assad doesn't convert many of these called strikes or fouls into strikeouts. He does, however, take advantage of hitters' defensiveness once they get behind in the count. He also ratchets up the hitter's frustration. This is the third year in a row in which Assad is running an ERA just over 3.00 in MLB, albeit in samples of various sizes and in varying roles. Just as importantly, though, his ERA is telling a true tale about his run prevention. Teammates Steele and Shota Imanaga make instructive comparison points. Assad's unearned run average (UERA) is well below average, and has been throughout his career. Steele's is well above average, and has been throughout his career. Imanaga, too, has given up a lot of unearned runs in his first Stateside campaign. Obviously, the two things are not equal in their impact or predictive value, but if you just add them together and take run average per nine innings, Assad has been one of the 15 best pitchers in baseball this year. Again, his lack of a typical modern skill set makes everyone prone to doubting him. Assad's FIP is about 1.5 runs worse than his ERA, and many people dismiss him as a swingman or a nice-to-have extra arm, expecting him to come back to that level. Yet, he persistently avoids that. On Saturday, he handled the imposing stars in the Yankees lineup ably, without so much as a blink. It was the kind of start in which some fans keep waiting to see him implode... but he never does. Four starters who have made at least 15 starts this year have yet to have one in which they allow five runs in the first four innings. Assad has done it, but only once in his 26 starts, making him the fifth-least combustible starter in the game. Now, the chart above also serves as a reminder of one of the two reasons why Assad isn't a No. 1 or No. 2 starter, even if every bit of the hit and run prevention he does with runners on base and his other magic holds up: He doesn't dominate. There aren't days when Assad takes his team out of the game, but there also aren't many in which he takes control of the whole proceeding, getting at least 16 outs and allowing two or fewer runs. Yet, as the season has unfolded, Assad has earned more of his manager's trust, and begun working deeper into games. One reason is that, as it turns out, hitters don't gain very much from seeing Assad a second or third time. He's one of the best hurlers in the game, in fact, at getting outs with the same efficacy as the lineup card turns over. It's really a combination of stuff, command (occasionally at the expense of control; he emphasizes execution over location) and deception that hitters can't cope with. The depth of Assad's arsenal makes him hard to outguess, and his delivery has just enough unpredictability to it to mess with timing. It's why hitters don't swing as much as they should against him, and why they're still figuring him out the third time they see him. Then, he throws even more wrinkles at them. For most of the season, Assad started on the right side of the pitching rubber, from the pitcher's perspective--closer to third base. Assad 5.mp4 In his last five starts, though, he's slid all the way over to the other side, giving hitters a new look and himself a new angle with which to attack the zone. Assad 6.mp4 He's never going to run a FIP as good as his career ERA to date. His ERA, itself, might swell a bit if he's a full-time starter next year. As unorthodox as he is, though, Assad is a delightful throwback, and a very valuable arm for the Cubs. He's the kind of pitcher you can win with, as long as he's not an indispensable part of the starting plan. We should get, then, to the other reason why he can't be a frontline starter--and no, it's not the lack of a 26% strikeout rate. Rather, it's the same thing that holds Justin Steele back from the same status. The most important ability in pitching is availability. Assad has had to miss time two years in a row with a balky forearm. He has ways to sustain this seemingly improbable success across a full season of starting work, little though some might be inclined to buy into it. What he doesn't have is the durability to do it over 160 or 180 innings. Instead, he looks likely to consistently contribute 120-140 strong frames. That's helpful, and the Cubs should happily pencil him into their 2025 starting rotation, alongside Steele. However, they also have to figure out how they'll find a player capable of the same or better performances across an extra 50 innings. That's a tall order, and an expensive one to fill, but the team can take some solace in knowing that Assad's presence will compound the value of any ace-level newcomer, just as Steele's and Imanaga's do. View full article
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If you're the type to buy in heavily on second-half trends for one season when predicting the next, you might be somewhat down on Michael Busch right now. In his first full big-league season, Busch has had a tough run since the All-Star break, batting .206/.296/.348 in 152 plate appearances. Splits like those are dangerous, though, because they suggest a causal relationship and a staying power that rarely exist. That goes double for a rookie. Busch has gone through multiple phases of adjustment this season. First, he had to learn to hold something back for the breaking ball, to cut down on an unsustainably high strikeout rate in the spring. Next, it was patching the hole in his swing against fastballs at the top of the zone. Now, it's about getting the ball off the ground more and consistently creating high-value contact. Busch has dramatically reduced his whiff rate against breaking pitches over the last two months. His strikeout rate has continued to trend downward, and he's maintained a low chase rate. He's whiffing and getting beaten with weak contact a bit more often against high-velocity fastballs, but only a bit more often. For a guy struggling through the second half of a first campaign against the best pitchers in the world, his bad stretches haven't even been that bad. In his worst month so far, a .233/.303/.389 August, Busch also had his highest hard-hit rate, at 43.9%. He just needs to get more of that hard contact off the ground, and get a little bit more lucky. Meanwhile, his defense has been sensational--and more than at any other time in baseball's last 100 years, defense is a significant part of the value equation for first basemen. This season, first sackers are only hitting .246/.319/.413, good for a 105 OPS+. They're being outhit by shortstops. Multiple managers have made mention this year of a trend they perceive at work in the game, which they hope and expect to continue, toward defenses that include better athletes at the traditionally offense-first positions. With shifts outlawed and the game's baseline athleticism rising, that makes sense. With hitting a more difficult and athletically demanding endeavor than ever, it makes even more. Being the big, lumbering first baseman or corner outfielder isn't an advantage at the plate anymore, and so, the league is looking for less big, lumbering people at those positions. Busch is a perfect fit for this new world. A solid but slender 6-foot-1, he's spent this season proving he can hit at well beyond the level typical of the league's first basemen, and he's also been one of the best fielders in the league at the spot. Only Matt Olson has more Defensive Runs Saved. There was a brutal early learning curve, but since about mid-May, Busch has been the best defender of the cold corner in MLB. He's been 11 runs better than average on balls to his right, toward the hole between first and second base, easily the league's best. This weekend, the Yankees come to town, which gives Cubs fans a chance to celebrate their first reunion with Anthony Rizzo since he was dealt in 2021. Rizzo was as good as any first baseman in the league in his best Cubs seasons, and replacing him was difficult--but the job is now done, at least in the medium term. Busch looks like a three- to five-year solution at first base, a winning player who can provide value on both sides of the runs ledger. It takes a little bit of the bitterness out of the bittersweet moment that is Rizzo's return.
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The season has been long for the Cubs' rookie first baseman. The last two months have seen some difficult adjustments. Yet, everything in his profile tells us there's a star here. Image courtesy of © Patrick Gorski-Imagn Images If you're the type to buy in heavily on second-half trends for one season when predicting the next, you might be somewhat down on Michael Busch right now. In his first full big-league season, Busch has had a tough run since the All-Star break, batting .206/.296/.348 in 152 plate appearances. Splits like those are dangerous, though, because they suggest a causal relationship and a staying power that rarely exist. That goes double for a rookie. Busch has gone through multiple phases of adjustment this season. First, he had to learn to hold something back for the breaking ball, to cut down on an unsustainably high strikeout rate in the spring. Next, it was patching the hole in his swing against fastballs at the top of the zone. Now, it's about getting the ball off the ground more and consistently creating high-value contact. Busch has dramatically reduced his whiff rate against breaking pitches over the last two months. His strikeout rate has continued to trend downward, and he's maintained a low chase rate. He's whiffing and getting beaten with weak contact a bit more often against high-velocity fastballs, but only a bit more often. For a guy struggling through the second half of a first campaign against the best pitchers in the world, his bad stretches haven't even been that bad. In his worst month so far, a .233/.303/.389 August, Busch also had his highest hard-hit rate, at 43.9%. He just needs to get more of that hard contact off the ground, and get a little bit more lucky. Meanwhile, his defense has been sensational--and more than at any other time in baseball's last 100 years, defense is a significant part of the value equation for first basemen. This season, first sackers are only hitting .246/.319/.413, good for a 105 OPS+. They're being outhit by shortstops. Multiple managers have made mention this year of a trend they perceive at work in the game, which they hope and expect to continue, toward defenses that include better athletes at the traditionally offense-first positions. With shifts outlawed and the game's baseline athleticism rising, that makes sense. With hitting a more difficult and athletically demanding endeavor than ever, it makes even more. Being the big, lumbering first baseman or corner outfielder isn't an advantage at the plate anymore, and so, the league is looking for less big, lumbering people at those positions. Busch is a perfect fit for this new world. A solid but slender 6-foot-1, he's spent this season proving he can hit at well beyond the level typical of the league's first basemen, and he's also been one of the best fielders in the league at the spot. Only Matt Olson has more Defensive Runs Saved. There was a brutal early learning curve, but since about mid-May, Busch has been the best defender of the cold corner in MLB. He's been 11 runs better than average on balls to his right, toward the hole between first and second base, easily the league's best. This weekend, the Yankees come to town, which gives Cubs fans a chance to celebrate their first reunion with Anthony Rizzo since he was dealt in 2021. Rizzo was as good as any first baseman in the league in his best Cubs seasons, and replacing him was difficult--but the job is now done, at least in the medium term. Busch looks like a three- to five-year solution at first base, a winning player who can provide value on both sides of the runs ledger. It takes a little bit of the bitterness out of the bittersweet moment that is Rizzo's return. View full article
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The secret about no-hitters is that they were never the manly feats of strength crusty baseball writers told you they were. That world was phony and bigoted and never real. We all depend on each other. We succeed, or fail, by working together. Wednesday night, the Cubs succeeded together. Image courtesy of © Kamil Krzaczynski-Imagn Images It's bittersweet to see a pitcher pulled from a no-hitter. In a perfect world, where Tommy John surgery never had to be invented and where hurlers paid no price for the turn of the lineup card, we might never see it happen. Here in the real world, though, it's part of the game--and not a bad one. It's just how life is. So, after taking by far the longest leg in the relay, Shota Imanaga handed the baton to his bullpen for the final two innings Wednesday night. They sewed up a monumental achievement--one which can't belong to Imanaga, alone, but never should have, anyway. Outs aren't collected by lone wolves. Even a pitcher who plows through a lineup with strikeout after strikeout has to thank his coaches, and especially his catcher, for the support he got in that process: a pitch perfectly framed here, an unusual sequence the scouting report said would work there. Much mopre often, as on Wednesday night, it's not like that, anyway. The ball leaves the hurler's hand with plenty of life and terrific command, but it doesn't stop and disappear at home plate. It gets lined, grounded, and flied around the park, and if a team is working as one; if there's enough defensive talent behind the pitcher that night; and sometimes, if the official scorer can justify it, then a no-hitter grows out of it all. Had Isaac Paredes had a better night at third base, Imanaga might have gone another inning. Paredes committed three more errors, during a run in which his glovework at the hot corner has been a nightmare. Just as great defenses pick up the pitcher to preserve many a no-hitter, though, Imanaga picked up Paredes, over and over. He outwitted and overwhelmed the Pirates, and he continued his vital evolution as a big-league starter. For much of the season, Imanaga has been basically a two-pitch pitcher: four-seamer, splitter, four-seamer, splitter. It's a testament to the quality of those offerings that, more than a few times, he's looked this dominant in games using only that pairing. Increasingly, though, teams have come prepared for it, and they've made him pay for the elective shallowness of his arsenal. Lately, he's been adjusting. That was on full display Wednesday night. Imanaga threw a career-high eight sinkers, plus six changeups (a distinct pitch from his splitter and another relatively recent addition) and six sweepers, in addition to 42 fastballs and 33 splitters. Miguel Amaya deserves a healthy share of the credit for that, too. He coaxed Imanaga through a couple of jams, and got him dotting that sinker a couple of times for key strikes. It's a sign of Amaya's ongoing maturation behind the plate that he was able to catch his way to a no-hitter; that achievement belongs in equal share to the catcher, any time it happens. This might be the last great highlight of the Cubs' season. There is, too, still a minuscule but non-zero chance that it will be remembered as a galvanizing moment amid their late charge back into the playoff race. For tonight, none of that matters. Neither does Imanaga's departure from the contest. The game was a celebration and a triumph for a team that has done plenty of good things this year, especially in terms of run prevention. So far, the risky but fun acquisition of Nate Pearson has paid off gorgeously. Porter Hodge is having a rookie season to remember. It's wonderful that all three hurlers, and Amaya and some of the defenders, too, got to concelebrate this feat. They put themselves in the history books, where the purists can moan and derogate them but never erase them. It was a great night for Cubs baseball. View full article
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- nate pearson
- shota imanaga
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It's bittersweet to see a pitcher pulled from a no-hitter. In a perfect world, where Tommy John surgery never had to be invented and where hurlers paid no price for the turn of the lineup card, we might never see it happen. Here in the real world, though, it's part of the game--and not a bad one. It's just how life is. So, after taking by far the longest leg in the relay, Shota Imanaga handed the baton to his bullpen for the final two innings Wednesday night. They sewed up a monumental achievement--one which can't belong to Imanaga, alone, but never should have, anyway. Outs aren't collected by lone wolves. Even a pitcher who plows through a lineup with strikeout after strikeout has to thank his coaches, and especially his catcher, for the support he got in that process: a pitch perfectly framed here, an unusual sequence the scouting report said would work there. Much mopre often, as on Wednesday night, it's not like that, anyway. The ball leaves the hurler's hand with plenty of life and terrific command, but it doesn't stop and disappear at home plate. It gets lined, grounded, and flied around the park, and if a team is working as one; if there's enough defensive talent behind the pitcher that night; and sometimes, if the official scorer can justify it, then a no-hitter grows out of it all. Had Isaac Paredes had a better night at third base, Imanaga might have gone another inning. Paredes committed three more errors, during a run in which his glovework at the hot corner has been a nightmare. Just as great defenses pick up the pitcher to preserve many a no-hitter, though, Imanaga picked up Paredes, over and over. He outwitted and overwhelmed the Pirates, and he continued his vital evolution as a big-league starter. For much of the season, Imanaga has been basically a two-pitch pitcher: four-seamer, splitter, four-seamer, splitter. It's a testament to the quality of those offerings that, more than a few times, he's looked this dominant in games using only that pairing. Increasingly, though, teams have come prepared for it, and they've made him pay for the elective shallowness of his arsenal. Lately, he's been adjusting. That was on full display Wednesday night. Imanaga threw a career-high eight sinkers, plus six changeups (a distinct pitch from his splitter and another relatively recent addition) and six sweepers, in addition to 42 fastballs and 33 splitters. Miguel Amaya deserves a healthy share of the credit for that, too. He coaxed Imanaga through a couple of jams, and got him dotting that sinker a couple of times for key strikes. It's a sign of Amaya's ongoing maturation behind the plate that he was able to catch his way to a no-hitter; that achievement belongs in equal share to the catcher, any time it happens. This might be the last great highlight of the Cubs' season. There is, too, still a minuscule but non-zero chance that it will be remembered as a galvanizing moment amid their late charge back into the playoff race. For tonight, none of that matters. Neither does Imanaga's departure from the contest. The game was a celebration and a triumph for a team that has done plenty of good things this year, especially in terms of run prevention. So far, the risky but fun acquisition of Nate Pearson has paid off gorgeously. Porter Hodge is having a rookie season to remember. It's wonderful that all three hurlers, and Amaya and some of the defenders, too, got to concelebrate this feat. They put themselves in the history books, where the purists can moan and derogate them but never erase them. It was a great night for Cubs baseball.
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- nate pearson
- shota imanaga
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There's some real value in zigging where everyone else zags. When it comes to pitching, though, there's also real risk to consider. Image courtesy of © Lily Smith/The Register / USA TODAY NETWORK There might not be any organization in MLB who likes a cut-ride fastball more than the Cubs. That's so true that, even if you're a Cubs fan who isn't ordinarily inclined to a lot of granular nerdiness about the game, that turn of phrase--"cut-ride fastball"--is probably at least familiar. In short, it's the kind of fastball Justin Steele throws. In some cases, it can have good carry, like a typical four-seam fastball, but its defining and less variable characteristic is cutting action, relative to most four-seamers. A cut-ride fastball looks like a cutter to a hitter. It runs away from a same-handed batter, or in on the hands of an opposite-handed one, hard and with enough backspin to defy gravity more than the batter expects. Cut-ride fastballs can be excellent weak-contact generators. They can miss bats nearly as well as elite rising heaters, when well-located. The Cubs value them highly. You knew that, though. Here's something you might not know: at the top levels of the organization, at least, the team is assiduously attempting to give the same pitchers who throw those cut-ride heaters hard changeups with lots of armside run. In fact, no other team in the league is doing so anywhere near as aggressively as they are. Of the 843 pitchers who have thrown at least 50 fastballs (four-seamers and sinkers, for these purposes) and five changeups at the Triple-A and/or big-league levels this year, the one with the largest difference between the horizontal movement on his heaters and that on his changeup was Cade Horton. Horton is, of course, the Cubs' top pitching prospect, though he's been shut down for the year with a subscapularis strain. He came to them with a potentially devastating slider and a fastball shape they liked; they worked with him to create this hard, running changeup. It's not just Horton, though. Four of the six right-handed pitchers with the biggest gaps in horizontal movement between fastballs and changeup spent some time with the Iowa Cubs this year: Horton, Brandon Birdsell, Zac Leigh, and Carl Edwards Jr. That's to say nothing of Frankie Scalzo Jr., who ranks 22nd on that list; or Steele, who's fifth-highest on the list for left-handed pitchers. It's not necessarily the case that any of these guys are throwing changeups with crazy amounts of horizontal movement, on their own. It's just that, relative to their cut-ride fastball shapes, the changeup really changes lanes in an extreme way. You can see exactly why the Cubs are so dedicated to this project, too, when you glance at the hurlers' pitch break charts. Above was Horton's. Here's Birdsell's. Those two each have tight, angular breaking balls, designed to play off their natural fastballs. Scalzo and Leigh have a greater spread, with bigger breaking balls and bigger velocity differentials from the heater on them. Here's Scalzo: You can see some scant evidence of him trying to mix in a cutter to act as a bridge from his fastball to the breaking pitches, and in Leigh's plot, you can see an even more concerted effort to do the same: There's a theme, here. With all of these guys, the breaking balls are the natural secondaries. That makes sense, given the shape of their fastballs. They like to supinate, to use physiological jargon. They're most comfortable applying some spin and pressure to the outside of the ball at release. Their heaters and their breakers each come from a natural motion that moves the ball that direction--away from a same-handed batter. This is why Steele persists in calling his very cutterish fastball a four-seamer. It's his natural way of moving. Baseball people talk a lot, these days, about motor preference. A natural supinator will easily find feel for a breaking ball or two, and often, they'll have a cut-ride heater. A natural pronator will specialize in sinkers and changeups. The Cubs collect natural supinators. Each motor preference comes with problems that demand to be solved. For pronators, it's finding some version of a breaking ball that works. Remember the talk about the death ball during last year's postseason? That's one example of a version of the curveball that can work for a natural pronator. For supinators like the Cubs' collection of homegrown hurlers, though, the problem is getting something they can command on the outer half of the plate to opposite-handed batters. If you have anything less than peak Steele-caliber command of a cutting fastball, aiming it for the outside corner to an opposite-handed hitter is dangerous, because you're likely to miss right over the heart of the plate sometimes, with the ball moving right into the swing plane of the guy with the lumber. Breaking balls, as we all know, tend not to be as effective against opposite-handed batters--but that goes double for the kind that come most naturally to heavy supinators, because those breakers tend to have wide horizontal shapes, and it's vertical movement that best fools opposite-handed batters. The Cubs' answer to this has been to simply break motor preference, and get their supinating specialists to pronate hard on their changeups. Revisit the chart of all qualifying pitchers, above, to notice that all six of the hurlers highlighted have less of a velocity gap between their fastballs and their changeups than the average for the league. These are power changeups. They seem to have simply told these players to throw the hell out of the ball, albeit from a modified grip. They're trusting the fact that these guys' arms don't want to turn that way to slow them down through release, enough to create at least a modicum of velocity separation. The rest is just about having a pitch move the opposite of the direction that everything else does. It's an interesting experiment, and it's not without merit. Given the competence of each of these pitchers when it comes to fastball and breaking ball execution, they wouldn't even need to have exceptional command of their changeup in order to get value from it. Forcing opposite-handed batters to cover the whole plate, getting a good number of ground balls, and occasionally earning an extra strikeout along the way, each of these guys could benefit from having this pitch in their arsenal. However, there's noteworthy risk to the approach, too. and the team might be feeling the backlash of that risk right now. The only pitcher whose chart we haven't looked at, yet, among those named above who are still in the organization, is Steele. This chart looks subtly different than it did a year ago. In about 800 fewer pitches, Steele more than doubled the number of changeups he threw, from 28 to 66. Right now, though, Steele is unavailable, after elbow soreness scratched him from his latest start. That brings us full-circle, since Horton, too, had his season cut short. Sometimes, when you break motor preference, the body breaks back. It's not nearly time to say for certain that forcing running, power changeups into the arsenals of cut-ride fastball guys is leading to injuries on a patterned and persistent basis. The sample sizes here are much too small, and much too noisy. However, broadly speaking, there are reasons why other teams aren't developing pitchers with this massive gap in horizontal break, born of a supinator's fastball shape and a heavily pronated change. It's a valuable skill to add to a pitcher's résumé, but only if they can stay on the mound while doing it. A more common solution for the changeup problem in natural supinators is the splitter, which is on the rise throughout pro baseball, anyway. It comes with its own risks, in some cases, but a splitter doesn't necessarily break motor preference for a guy who favors cutting action on the heat. Commanding splitters can be difficult, though, and unlike high-run, power changeups, misplaced splitters often end up in the seats. The Cubs believe they can overcome the inherent risks of asking a pitcher whose arm naturally moves in one way to move in another, or at least that the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks. It's too early to tell whether they're right, but it's a fascinating position. View full article
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- justin steele
- zac leigh
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There might not be any organization in MLB who likes a cut-ride fastball more than the Cubs. That's so true that, even if you're a Cubs fan who isn't ordinarily inclined to a lot of granular nerdiness about the game, that turn of phrase--"cut-ride fastball"--is probably at least familiar. In short, it's the kind of fastball Justin Steele throws. In some cases, it can have good carry, like a typical four-seam fastball, but its defining and less variable characteristic is cutting action, relative to most four-seamers. A cut-ride fastball looks like a cutter to a hitter. It runs away from a same-handed batter, or in on the hands of an opposite-handed one, hard and with enough backspin to defy gravity more than the batter expects. Cut-ride fastballs can be excellent weak-contact generators. They can miss bats nearly as well as elite rising heaters, when well-located. The Cubs value them highly. You knew that, though. Here's something you might not know: at the top levels of the organization, at least, the team is assiduously attempting to give the same pitchers who throw those cut-ride heaters hard changeups with lots of armside run. In fact, no other team in the league is doing so anywhere near as aggressively as they are. Of the 843 pitchers who have thrown at least 50 fastballs (four-seamers and sinkers, for these purposes) and five changeups at the Triple-A and/or big-league levels this year, the one with the largest difference between the horizontal movement on his heaters and that on his changeup was Cade Horton. Horton is, of course, the Cubs' top pitching prospect, though he's been shut down for the year with a subscapularis strain. He came to them with a potentially devastating slider and a fastball shape they liked; they worked with him to create this hard, running changeup. It's not just Horton, though. Four of the six right-handed pitchers with the biggest gaps in horizontal movement between fastballs and changeup spent some time with the Iowa Cubs this year: Horton, Brandon Birdsell, Zac Leigh, and Carl Edwards Jr. That's to say nothing of Frankie Scalzo Jr., who ranks 22nd on that list; or Steele, who's fifth-highest on the list for left-handed pitchers. It's not necessarily the case that any of these guys are throwing changeups with crazy amounts of horizontal movement, on their own. It's just that, relative to their cut-ride fastball shapes, the changeup really changes lanes in an extreme way. You can see exactly why the Cubs are so dedicated to this project, too, when you glance at the hurlers' pitch break charts. Above was Horton's. Here's Birdsell's. Those two each have tight, angular breaking balls, designed to play off their natural fastballs. Scalzo and Leigh have a greater spread, with bigger breaking balls and bigger velocity differentials from the heater on them. Here's Scalzo: You can see some scant evidence of him trying to mix in a cutter to act as a bridge from his fastball to the breaking pitches, and in Leigh's plot, you can see an even more concerted effort to do the same: There's a theme, here. With all of these guys, the breaking balls are the natural secondaries. That makes sense, given the shape of their fastballs. They like to supinate, to use physiological jargon. They're most comfortable applying some spin and pressure to the outside of the ball at release. Their heaters and their breakers each come from a natural motion that moves the ball that direction--away from a same-handed batter. This is why Steele persists in calling his very cutterish fastball a four-seamer. It's his natural way of moving. Baseball people talk a lot, these days, about motor preference. A natural supinator will easily find feel for a breaking ball or two, and often, they'll have a cut-ride heater. A natural pronator will specialize in sinkers and changeups. The Cubs collect natural supinators. Each motor preference comes with problems that demand to be solved. For pronators, it's finding some version of a breaking ball that works. Remember the talk about the death ball during last year's postseason? That's one example of a version of the curveball that can work for a natural pronator. For supinators like the Cubs' collection of homegrown hurlers, though, the problem is getting something they can command on the outer half of the plate to opposite-handed batters. If you have anything less than peak Steele-caliber command of a cutting fastball, aiming it for the outside corner to an opposite-handed hitter is dangerous, because you're likely to miss right over the heart of the plate sometimes, with the ball moving right into the swing plane of the guy with the lumber. Breaking balls, as we all know, tend not to be as effective against opposite-handed batters--but that goes double for the kind that come most naturally to heavy supinators, because those breakers tend to have wide horizontal shapes, and it's vertical movement that best fools opposite-handed batters. The Cubs' answer to this has been to simply break motor preference, and get their supinating specialists to pronate hard on their changeups. Revisit the chart of all qualifying pitchers, above, to notice that all six of the hurlers highlighted have less of a velocity gap between their fastballs and their changeups than the average for the league. These are power changeups. They seem to have simply told these players to throw the hell out of the ball, albeit from a modified grip. They're trusting the fact that these guys' arms don't want to turn that way to slow them down through release, enough to create at least a modicum of velocity separation. The rest is just about having a pitch move the opposite of the direction that everything else does. It's an interesting experiment, and it's not without merit. Given the competence of each of these pitchers when it comes to fastball and breaking ball execution, they wouldn't even need to have exceptional command of their changeup in order to get value from it. Forcing opposite-handed batters to cover the whole plate, getting a good number of ground balls, and occasionally earning an extra strikeout along the way, each of these guys could benefit from having this pitch in their arsenal. However, there's noteworthy risk to the approach, too. and the team might be feeling the backlash of that risk right now. The only pitcher whose chart we haven't looked at, yet, among those named above who are still in the organization, is Steele. This chart looks subtly different than it did a year ago. In about 800 fewer pitches, Steele more than doubled the number of changeups he threw, from 28 to 66. Right now, though, Steele is unavailable, after elbow soreness scratched him from his latest start. That brings us full-circle, since Horton, too, had his season cut short. Sometimes, when you break motor preference, the body breaks back. It's not nearly time to say for certain that forcing running, power changeups into the arsenals of cut-ride fastball guys is leading to injuries on a patterned and persistent basis. The sample sizes here are much too small, and much too noisy. However, broadly speaking, there are reasons why other teams aren't developing pitchers with this massive gap in horizontal break, born of a supinator's fastball shape and a heavily pronated change. It's a valuable skill to add to a pitcher's résumé, but only if they can stay on the mound while doing it. A more common solution for the changeup problem in natural supinators is the splitter, which is on the rise throughout pro baseball, anyway. It comes with its own risks, in some cases, but a splitter doesn't necessarily break motor preference for a guy who favors cutting action on the heat. Commanding splitters can be difficult, though, and unlike high-run, power changeups, misplaced splitters often end up in the seats. The Cubs believe they can overcome the inherent risks of asking a pitcher whose arm naturally moves in one way to move in another, or at least that the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks. It's too early to tell whether they're right, but it's a fascinating position.
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- justin steele
- zac leigh
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It was, arguably, the cruelest hour in three years or more for the Cubs. Ahead 3-0 on Jared Jones and the Pirates after seven scintillating frames from Jameson Taillon on Labor Day, most of the team watched helplessly as Jorge López--a terrific story, a symbol of the team's resurgence, and a linchpin of their bullpen--blew the lead in a matter of moments in the top of the eighth inning. The team couldn't struggle back to level this time, the way they did against the lousy Pittsburgh bullpen last week on the road, and they suffered a crucial loss that looked like it would be a fairly easy win. That one hurt, and badly, but it's the kind of thing you know is coming. You can foresee it, accept it, and survive it. The Cubs weren't going to be undefeated the rest of the season, and while they need absolutely every win they can get, it's easy to make the case that they outplayed Pittsburgh Monday night--that they're still playing a good enough brand of baseball to flush that frustrating defeat and get another winning streak going. Besides, López was due for a bit of regression, and he'd been sidelined for a few days recently by a nagging injury, so it shouldn't have shocked anyone to see him stumble, even amid a sterling second half. No, the knockout punch came after the game. Right at the end of his postgame media availability, Craig Counsell revealed that Justin Steele will be scratched from his scheduled start Tuesday night against Paul Skenes, with elbow soreness. In his place, Kyle Hendricks will start opposite Skenes, for the third time this year. The baseball gods love their little, cruel jokes. There's no silver lining on that cloud--or even the promise of a brighter morning ahead. The dropoff from Steele to Hendricks as a member of the rotation is massive. So is the lost opportunity to expand the rotation to include six pitchers at times the rest of the way, to keep the fading Shota Imanaga fresh. The team needs to finish something like 18-6 from here to make the playoffs. Without their ace, that's simply not possible. Maybe Steele will bounce right back and make a start later this week. Early indications seem to be that the team isn't overwhelmingly concerned about this. On the other hand, this is a pitcher who was shelved with a lower back strain for the final month of 2022; spent a minimum stint on the injured list last summer with an elbow/forearm issue; and ran out of steam at the end of last season anyway. It's time to wonder whether he'll ever make it to the end of a season with his legs under him and his arm securely attached in all the right places. We have no reason to believe that this injury portends offseason surgery, or anything that severe, but the reality of the moment is sufficiently bleak: Steele isn't a true workhorse. That has big implications even beyond 2024. It means the Cubs need to be more aggressive in the winter pitching market. It means they're further from being the kind of team they expected to be this season than it appears--a gap that was already considerable. This loss, much more than the one that ticked into the standings table after the game, spells big trouble and big changes ahead for the Cubs. In the short term, though, it just affirms what most of us knew all along: they don't have it in them, this year. This team will finish just outside the postseason, for the second year in a row. They'll finish with a winning record in the second half for the third year in a row. All that means is that, for the third year in a row, they'll pick somewhere in the low teens in next year's Draft. That is a massive organizational failure, even in a season in which some very encouraging successes have also been in evidence.
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At this time of year, an MLB season becomes a war of attrition. It's about staying healthy, and about how well (if at all) the guys who aren't healthy can play through stuff. The Cubs suffered a brutal combo punch on Labor Day, from one guy struggling to play through something and one who no longer could. Image courtesy of © Patrick Gorski-USA TODAY Sports It was, arguably, the cruelest hour in three years or more for the Cubs. Ahead 3-0 on Jared Jones and the Pirates after seven scintillating frames from Jameson Taillon on Labor Day, most of the team watched helplessly as Jorge López--a terrific story, a symbol of the team's resurgence, and a linchpin of their bullpen--blew the lead in a matter of moments in the top of the eighth inning. The team couldn't struggle back to level this time, the way they did against the lousy Pittsburgh bullpen last week on the road, and they suffered a crucial loss that looked like it would be a fairly easy win. That one hurt, and badly, but it's the kind of thing you know is coming. You can foresee it, accept it, and survive it. The Cubs weren't going to be undefeated the rest of the season, and while they need absolutely every win they can get, it's easy to make the case that they outplayed Pittsburgh Monday night--that they're still playing a good enough brand of baseball to flush that frustrating defeat and get another winning streak going. Besides, López was due for a bit of regression, and he'd been sidelined for a few days recently by a nagging injury, so it shouldn't have shocked anyone to see him stumble, even amid a sterling second half. No, the knockout punch came after the game. Right at the end of his postgame media availability, Craig Counsell revealed that Justin Steele will be scratched from his scheduled start Tuesday night against Paul Skenes, with elbow soreness. In his place, Kyle Hendricks will start opposite Skenes, for the third time this year. The baseball gods love their little, cruel jokes. There's no silver lining on that cloud--or even the promise of a brighter morning ahead. The dropoff from Steele to Hendricks as a member of the rotation is massive. So is the lost opportunity to expand the rotation to include six pitchers at times the rest of the way, to keep the fading Shota Imanaga fresh. The team needs to finish something like 18-6 from here to make the playoffs. Without their ace, that's simply not possible. Maybe Steele will bounce right back and make a start later this week. Early indications seem to be that the team isn't overwhelmingly concerned about this. On the other hand, this is a pitcher who was shelved with a lower back strain for the final month of 2022; spent a minimum stint on the injured list last summer with an elbow/forearm issue; and ran out of steam at the end of last season anyway. It's time to wonder whether he'll ever make it to the end of a season with his legs under him and his arm securely attached in all the right places. We have no reason to believe that this injury portends offseason surgery, or anything that severe, but the reality of the moment is sufficiently bleak: Steele isn't a true workhorse. That has big implications even beyond 2024. It means the Cubs need to be more aggressive in the winter pitching market. It means they're further from being the kind of team they expected to be this season than it appears--a gap that was already considerable. This loss, much more than the one that ticked into the standings table after the game, spells big trouble and big changes ahead for the Cubs. In the short term, though, it just affirms what most of us knew all along: they don't have it in them, this year. This team will finish just outside the postseason, for the second year in a row. They'll finish with a winning record in the second half for the third year in a row. All that means is that, for the third year in a row, they'll pick somewhere in the low teens in next year's Draft. That is a massive organizational failure, even in a season in which some very encouraging successes have also been in evidence. View full article
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By now, the numbers might be familiar to you. Let's rehash them, though, because this turns out to be one of those times when selective endpoints are valuable tools, rather than red herrings. Through Jul. 26, Pete Crow-Armstrong was batting .180/.230/.292. For reference, in the years 2000 and 2001, Kerry Wood batted .216/.242/.261. From 1998 through 2001, then-Expos starter Javier Vázquez batted .235/.266/.281. There's an old tweet saying that the most vicious burn you can hurl at someone is, "Who is this clown?", because it not only calls the target a clown, but implies that they're not one of the better-known clowns. For his first 200 big-league trips to the plate, Crow-Armstrong not only hit like a pitcher, but hit like a fairly unremarkable offensive pitcher. The next day, everything changed. Rare--excruciatingly rare, almost unheard-of, and often only illusory--are cases in which everything changed for a hitter on one day, but it's hard to make any other case with Crow-Armstrong. Very visibly, that day, he went to a bigger, more rhythmic move with his lower half--a leg kick--in the load phase of his swing. Less obviously, but just as importantly, he debuted a slower but infinitely more controlled swing, with a much more on-plane bat path. New bat-tracking data made available to the public this spring via Statcast has allowed us, for the first time, to measure the efficiency of a player's swing. It's simple, though far from easy for us laypeople: given the observed speed of the incoming pitch and the player's bat, what is the maximum possible exit velocity, had the two met perfectly squarely? And what percentage of that theoretical maximum did the hitter achieve on a given swing? Here's a rolling chart showing the Squared Up% of Crow-Armstrong's swings, courtesy of Kyle Bland, a data whiz who works for PitcherList and ginned up a supremely useful app to digest bat-tracking data within a couple of days of the information becoming available. See if you can spot July 27. Again: baseball data just never tells you this neat a story. Transformations that radical do not happen that quickly. One day, Crow-Armstrong was limping along, struggling to square the ball up and create any real damage against big-league pitching. The next day, he began teeing off on almost everything. Since that day, Crow-Armstrong is hitting .330/.378/.551. He's become the heart and soul of the Cubs' offense, even as their everyday No. 8 hitter. In 121 plate appearances, he's only struck out 18 times, and he has 13 extra-base hits. Almost paradoxically, he started hitting it hard more often, hitting it harder on average, and reaching higher top-end exit velocities, all while both making more contact (which usually means accepting some weaker contact along the way) and swinging the bat slower. Wait, what? Yes. The above demonstrates the jump in Crow-Armstrong's contact efficiency. With this chart of his swing acceleration over time, we can see that that efficiency made up for a material sacrifice in terms of raw bat speed. Part of this is, simply, that Crow-Armstrong's adjustment both got more balls onto his barrel (rather than being mishits) and led to more contact, in general--as opposed to whiffs. During June and July, especially, his swing was very fast, but also steep and out of his careful controi. He had to guess at pitch type and location, fire, and hope to run into the ball. Even on hittable pitches, he often failed to do so. PCA Before.mp4 There's no question that adding a leg kick helped cue Crow-Armstrong to be more deliberate about seeing the ball. His swing now has phases and flow, and those things require a bit more reactivity, a bit more balance. It's why he's not missing hittable pitches much at all anymore, and why he can hit them with authority, even while lacking elite bat speed. PCA Now.mp4 Here, alas, is where I jerk the chain--just a little bit--to rein us all in. You didn't think this would be simplicity and sunshine beginning to end, did you? See, when he was going truly dreadfully, Crow-Armstrong's biggest problem was a lack of plate discipline so profound it could make Javier Báez (or Javy Vázquez, for that matter) blush. Crow-Armstrong chased almost half the pitches he saw outside the zone in June and July, trying to make things happen and to avoid falling behind in counts against pitchers whose polish, sequencing, and command he could not handle. Since making his mechanical change, he's also changed this--kind of. Here are his swing rates on pitches inside the zone, and beyond it, throughout the season. Seeing that blue line trending steadily downward will warm the cockles of any hitting coach's heart. That's pixelated job security, right there. That's a young hitter taking great instruction and screaming around a developmental corner at full speed. Only, look at the yellow line, too. That one is telling its own story. At his peak, in the first half of August when he was first starting to really feel his new superpower, Crow-Armstrong was swinging at fully 90% of the strikes he saw. I don't care if you're the secret grandchild of Ted Williams and Rod Carew: you can't sustain a high level of contact efficiency while swinging at over nine of every 10 pitches in the zone--let alone chasing barely a quarter of the time in the process. That bespeaks a hitter on a true, once-in-a-lifetime heater--but not one who has figured out the game in some semi-permanent way. Crow-Armstrong, in short, still needs to learn to swing less often, and this set of adjustments to his setup and swing hasn't much helped with that. I can buy that he's going to cut his chase rate into the 30s, rather than the mid-40s, and that's plenty valuable, but until he gets more selective across the board--even within the zone--there will be pitchers getting his report and nodding purposefully. At key moments, teams will start figuring out ways to retire Crow-Armstrong, by exploiting his hyper-aggressiveness. That does not, by any means, invalidate the huge changes he's made. They should continue to serve him well. The Cubs seem to have a credible big-league hitter on their hands, thanks to the way he's changed his usage of his. They just don't have a bona fide superstar, unless and until a very difficult--and, for many afflicted with such swing happiness, impossible--second layer of major changes is made.
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The Cubs' firecracker of a center fielder came up swinging fast and free, and missing everything. Now, he's figured out how to square up the ball--but a key tweak must come next. Image courtesy of © Daniel Kucin Jr.-USA TODAY Sports By now, the numbers might be familiar to you. Let's rehash them, though, because this turns out to be one of those times when selective endpoints are valuable tools, rather than red herrings. Through Jul. 26, Pete Crow-Armstrong was batting .180/.230/.292. For reference, in the years 2000 and 2001, Kerry Wood batted .216/.242/.261. From 1998 through 2001, then-Expos starter Javier Vázquez batted .235/.266/.281. There's an old tweet saying that the most vicious burn you can hurl at someone is, "Who is this clown?", because it not only calls the target a clown, but implies that they're not one of the better-known clowns. For his first 200 big-league trips to the plate, Crow-Armstrong not only hit like a pitcher, but hit like a fairly unremarkable offensive pitcher. The next day, everything changed. Rare--excruciatingly rare, almost unheard-of, and often only illusory--are cases in which everything changed for a hitter on one day, but it's hard to make any other case with Crow-Armstrong. Very visibly, that day, he went to a bigger, more rhythmic move with his lower half--a leg kick--in the load phase of his swing. Less obviously, but just as importantly, he debuted a slower but infinitely more controlled swing, with a much more on-plane bat path. New bat-tracking data made available to the public this spring via Statcast has allowed us, for the first time, to measure the efficiency of a player's swing. It's simple, though far from easy for us laypeople: given the observed speed of the incoming pitch and the player's bat, what is the maximum possible exit velocity, had the two met perfectly squarely? And what percentage of that theoretical maximum did the hitter achieve on a given swing? Here's a rolling chart showing the Squared Up% of Crow-Armstrong's swings, courtesy of Kyle Bland, a data whiz who works for PitcherList and ginned up a supremely useful app to digest bat-tracking data within a couple of days of the information becoming available. See if you can spot July 27. Again: baseball data just never tells you this neat a story. Transformations that radical do not happen that quickly. One day, Crow-Armstrong was limping along, struggling to square the ball up and create any real damage against big-league pitching. The next day, he began teeing off on almost everything. Since that day, Crow-Armstrong is hitting .330/.378/.551. He's become the heart and soul of the Cubs' offense, even as their everyday No. 8 hitter. In 121 plate appearances, he's only struck out 18 times, and he has 13 extra-base hits. Almost paradoxically, he started hitting it hard more often, hitting it harder on average, and reaching higher top-end exit velocities, all while both making more contact (which usually means accepting some weaker contact along the way) and swinging the bat slower. Wait, what? Yes. The above demonstrates the jump in Crow-Armstrong's contact efficiency. With this chart of his swing acceleration over time, we can see that that efficiency made up for a material sacrifice in terms of raw bat speed. Part of this is, simply, that Crow-Armstrong's adjustment both got more balls onto his barrel (rather than being mishits) and led to more contact, in general--as opposed to whiffs. During June and July, especially, his swing was very fast, but also steep and out of his careful controi. He had to guess at pitch type and location, fire, and hope to run into the ball. Even on hittable pitches, he often failed to do so. PCA Before.mp4 There's no question that adding a leg kick helped cue Crow-Armstrong to be more deliberate about seeing the ball. His swing now has phases and flow, and those things require a bit more reactivity, a bit more balance. It's why he's not missing hittable pitches much at all anymore, and why he can hit them with authority, even while lacking elite bat speed. PCA Now.mp4 Here, alas, is where I jerk the chain--just a little bit--to rein us all in. You didn't think this would be simplicity and sunshine beginning to end, did you? See, when he was going truly dreadfully, Crow-Armstrong's biggest problem was a lack of plate discipline so profound it could make Javier Báez (or Javy Vázquez, for that matter) blush. Crow-Armstrong chased almost half the pitches he saw outside the zone in June and July, trying to make things happen and to avoid falling behind in counts against pitchers whose polish, sequencing, and command he could not handle. Since making his mechanical change, he's also changed this--kind of. Here are his swing rates on pitches inside the zone, and beyond it, throughout the season. Seeing that blue line trending steadily downward will warm the cockles of any hitting coach's heart. That's pixelated job security, right there. That's a young hitter taking great instruction and screaming around a developmental corner at full speed. Only, look at the yellow line, too. That one is telling its own story. At his peak, in the first half of August when he was first starting to really feel his new superpower, Crow-Armstrong was swinging at fully 90% of the strikes he saw. I don't care if you're the secret grandchild of Ted Williams and Rod Carew: you can't sustain a high level of contact efficiency while swinging at over nine of every 10 pitches in the zone--let alone chasing barely a quarter of the time in the process. That bespeaks a hitter on a true, once-in-a-lifetime heater--but not one who has figured out the game in some semi-permanent way. Crow-Armstrong, in short, still needs to learn to swing less often, and this set of adjustments to his setup and swing hasn't much helped with that. I can buy that he's going to cut his chase rate into the 30s, rather than the mid-40s, and that's plenty valuable, but until he gets more selective across the board--even within the zone--there will be pitchers getting his report and nodding purposefully. At key moments, teams will start figuring out ways to retire Crow-Armstrong, by exploiting his hyper-aggressiveness. That does not, by any means, invalidate the huge changes he's made. They should continue to serve him well. The Cubs seem to have a credible big-league hitter on their hands, thanks to the way he's changed his usage of his. They just don't have a bona fide superstar, unless and until a very difficult--and, for many afflicted with such swing happiness, impossible--second layer of major changes is made. View full article
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At long last, the 2024 Cubs have strung together some important wins, and when you glance at the scoreboard, they look impressive and earned. Over the last 30 days, in fact, no one else in MLB has as good a run differential as the North Siders'. That's the good news. The news of mixed valence is, of course, that they desperately needed to get this hot, if they wanted to revive and sustain any hope of reaching the postseason--and that they have to stay that way in order to get there. So here's the bad news: What they've done over the last two weeks is utterly unsustainable. Since Aug. 16, when they began a series against the Blue Jays that launched them into their current 12-3 heater, the Cubs are hitting .337/.430/.568 with runners in scoring position. That, itself, is far better than any team can keep up, but it's only the tip of the iceberg. Against five straight weak, sub-.500 opponents, the Cubs have taken advantage of a relentless parade of bad play by the other team. Errors have put them on the bases and helped them advance. They've even been bailed out on baserunning gaffes that should have resulted in outs. The Marlins, Pirates, and Nationals, especially, weren't ready to play serious baseball when the Cubs came to town in recent days. Miami traded as much of their roster as they possibly could in July. Pittsburgh and Washington are both showing the profound, problematic cracks in their depth, and their dreadful bullpens and defense almost forced the Cubs to win games this week. That doesn't diminish the value of the wins themselves. Though a team from a suburban county north of Atlanta holds the tiebreaker against them should both clubs end up with the same record, their losses to the Phillies this weekend reduced their edge over the Cubs in the standings to three games. Unbelievably, the Cubs are now within striking distance of a Wild Card berth. To claim it, though, they have to play much better over their final 25 games. They can't continue to count on getting a hit in a third of their at-bats when runners reach scoring position. They also can't continue getting middling starting pitching, as they have over these 15 contests. Cubs starters have a 4.12 ERA in that span, and while Kyle Hendricks's blowup in Pittsburgh is part of that problem, it can't explain away the team's strikeout rate (25th in MLB) or home-run rate (eighth-highest). Justin Steele, Shota Imanaga, Jameson Taillon, Javier Assad, Kyle Hendricks, and Jordan Wicks are capable of pitching better than that down the stretch, but they'll need to do so. The team is going to score many fewer runs from here on out than they have over their recent hot streak. They have to make up for that with better run prevention. Meanwhile, as Pete Crow-Armstrong and Miguel Amaya come back to Earth, the team is going to need to get more out of Cody Bellinger, MIchael Busch, and Isaac Paredes. Under Craig Counsell's able stewardship, the Cubs have shown more resilience, and frankly more sheer talent, than they evinced at any previous stage of this season. They have an outside shot at the postseason, which is better than they could say a fortnight ago. To convert their newfound possibility to reality, though, they have to maintain extraordinary focus and further improve upon their recent improvements. The Yankees, Dodgers, and Phillies won't give the team wins on a platter, the way their recent opponents have, and they can't afford to stop winning for a moment. This has been a fun bounceback, but it's not enough--unless they build upon it.
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All wins count, and at this time of year, no playoff hopeful (however remote their chances) will turn up their nose at one. As the Cubs return from a triumphant 8-1 road trip, though, they do so knowing they'll need to play much better to make their recent surge matter. Image courtesy of © Charles LeClaire-USA TODAY Sports At long last, the 2024 Cubs have strung together some important wins, and when you glance at the scoreboard, they look impressive and earned. Over the last 30 days, in fact, no one else in MLB has as good a run differential as the North Siders'. That's the good news. The news of mixed valence is, of course, that they desperately needed to get this hot, if they wanted to revive and sustain any hope of reaching the postseason--and that they have to stay that way in order to get there. So here's the bad news: What they've done over the last two weeks is utterly unsustainable. Since Aug. 16, when they began a series against the Blue Jays that launched them into their current 12-3 heater, the Cubs are hitting .337/.430/.568 with runners in scoring position. That, itself, is far better than any team can keep up, but it's only the tip of the iceberg. Against five straight weak, sub-.500 opponents, the Cubs have taken advantage of a relentless parade of bad play by the other team. Errors have put them on the bases and helped them advance. They've even been bailed out on baserunning gaffes that should have resulted in outs. The Marlins, Pirates, and Nationals, especially, weren't ready to play serious baseball when the Cubs came to town in recent days. Miami traded as much of their roster as they possibly could in July. Pittsburgh and Washington are both showing the profound, problematic cracks in their depth, and their dreadful bullpens and defense almost forced the Cubs to win games this week. That doesn't diminish the value of the wins themselves. Though a team from a suburban county north of Atlanta holds the tiebreaker against them should both clubs end up with the same record, their losses to the Phillies this weekend reduced their edge over the Cubs in the standings to three games. Unbelievably, the Cubs are now within striking distance of a Wild Card berth. To claim it, though, they have to play much better over their final 25 games. They can't continue to count on getting a hit in a third of their at-bats when runners reach scoring position. They also can't continue getting middling starting pitching, as they have over these 15 contests. Cubs starters have a 4.12 ERA in that span, and while Kyle Hendricks's blowup in Pittsburgh is part of that problem, it can't explain away the team's strikeout rate (25th in MLB) or home-run rate (eighth-highest). Justin Steele, Shota Imanaga, Jameson Taillon, Javier Assad, Kyle Hendricks, and Jordan Wicks are capable of pitching better than that down the stretch, but they'll need to do so. The team is going to score many fewer runs from here on out than they have over their recent hot streak. They have to make up for that with better run prevention. Meanwhile, as Pete Crow-Armstrong and Miguel Amaya come back to Earth, the team is going to need to get more out of Cody Bellinger, MIchael Busch, and Isaac Paredes. Under Craig Counsell's able stewardship, the Cubs have shown more resilience, and frankly more sheer talent, than they evinced at any previous stage of this season. They have an outside shot at the postseason, which is better than they could say a fortnight ago. To convert their newfound possibility to reality, though, they have to maintain extraordinary focus and further improve upon their recent improvements. The Yankees, Dodgers, and Phillies won't give the team wins on a platter, the way their recent opponents have, and they can't afford to stop winning for a moment. This has been a fun bounceback, but it's not enough--unless they build upon it. View full article
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The worry, if you were a Cubs fan long about mid-June, was that Craig Counsell's magic doesn't work without an elite bullpen--that the team's failure to build a great relief corps would doom them in their first season under their new $40-million skipper. They still might be doomed for 2024, but thanks to Porter Hodge, we have a fresh reminder that Counsell brings the magic with him wherever he goes. Hodge, 23, debuted on May 22. His first three appearances were all low-leverage affairs, and after a rough showing on Jun. 6, he made a brief sojourn back to Triple-A Iowa. Since returning, though, he has slowly established himself as one of the best relief pitchers in baseball--and the kind of bullpen catalyst Counsell specializes in developing and empowering. Now up to 31 appearances with the big-league team, Hodge has had 27 scoreless outings. That 87.1% rate is second-best in MLB, among hurlers with at least 15 relief appearances. Only the Guardians' Hunter Gaddis edges him out, and then only narrowly, at 87.7%. Hodge has fanned 33.6% of opposing batters and owns a 1.80 ERA. Since he made it back from Iowa on Jun. 21, opponents have a .433 OPS against him. He's become, if not the sole closer, an implicitly trusted relief weapon, and the linchpin of the league's best relief corps. Indeed, since Jun. 1, the Cubs lead MLB in Scoreless Appearance Rate (SAR) from relievers, at 75.4%. Through the end of May, their SAR of 63.7% was better only than those of the Rockies and White Sox. It took time for this bullpen to come together, and the story is about much more than just Hodge, but he's the most important piece of the puzzle--not just because he's performed so well, but because he's a walking affirmation of the staying power of Counsell's capacity for turning rookies into relief aces. Pitching in high-leverage relief in MLB is excruciatingly hard--both physically and mentally. Few pitchers can meet both types of challenge and succeed as closers or high-usage setup men right away when they arrive in the majors, but under Counsell, that miniature baseball miracle has happened numerous times. Josh Hader and Devin Williams are the famous examples, but not even the only ones. Now, he's demonstrating the same ability to manage a young pitcher through the minefield of a rookie campaign under the pressure of backend bullpen work, in a new place and without a coaching staff in which he had much say. Whether the Cubs can pull off the comeback from their dismal first half or not, Hodge's breakout season is a testament to the value of their manager, and to the mental toughness of the hurler himself. It's also a reinforcement of the organization's belief that they've come a long way in terms of pitching development. All of those things are important, but if the team can string together enough winning streaks to sneak into the postseason, they'll be doubly so, and much of the credit will belong to the pairing of veteran manager and inexperienced flamethrower.
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You can't spell 'Craigtember' without 'C-R-A'. Meet the Cubs' Counsell Relief Ace, and quake in fear, rest of the National League. Image courtesy of © Rafael Suanes-USA TODAY Sports The worry, if you were a Cubs fan long about mid-June, was that Craig Counsell's magic doesn't work without an elite bullpen--that the team's failure to build a great relief corps would doom them in their first season under their new $40-million skipper. They still might be doomed for 2024, but thanks to Porter Hodge, we have a fresh reminder that Counsell brings the magic with him wherever he goes. Hodge, 23, debuted on May 22. His first three appearances were all low-leverage affairs, and after a rough showing on Jun. 6, he made a brief sojourn back to Triple-A Iowa. Since returning, though, he has slowly established himself as one of the best relief pitchers in baseball--and the kind of bullpen catalyst Counsell specializes in developing and empowering. Now up to 31 appearances with the big-league team, Hodge has had 27 scoreless outings. That 87.1% rate is second-best in MLB, among hurlers with at least 15 relief appearances. Only the Guardians' Hunter Gaddis edges him out, and then only narrowly, at 87.7%. Hodge has fanned 33.6% of opposing batters and owns a 1.80 ERA. Since he made it back from Iowa on Jun. 21, opponents have a .433 OPS against him. He's become, if not the sole closer, an implicitly trusted relief weapon, and the linchpin of the league's best relief corps. Indeed, since Jun. 1, the Cubs lead MLB in Scoreless Appearance Rate (SAR) from relievers, at 75.4%. Through the end of May, their SAR of 63.7% was better only than those of the Rockies and White Sox. It took time for this bullpen to come together, and the story is about much more than just Hodge, but he's the most important piece of the puzzle--not just because he's performed so well, but because he's a walking affirmation of the staying power of Counsell's capacity for turning rookies into relief aces. Pitching in high-leverage relief in MLB is excruciatingly hard--both physically and mentally. Few pitchers can meet both types of challenge and succeed as closers or high-usage setup men right away when they arrive in the majors, but under Counsell, that miniature baseball miracle has happened numerous times. Josh Hader and Devin Williams are the famous examples, but not even the only ones. Now, he's demonstrating the same ability to manage a young pitcher through the minefield of a rookie campaign under the pressure of backend bullpen work, in a new place and without a coaching staff in which he had much say. Whether the Cubs can pull off the comeback from their dismal first half or not, Hodge's breakout season is a testament to the value of their manager, and to the mental toughness of the hurler himself. It's also a reinforcement of the organization's belief that they've come a long way in terms of pitching development. All of those things are important, but if the team can string together enough winning streaks to sneak into the postseason, they'll be doubly so, and much of the credit will belong to the pairing of veteran manager and inexperienced flamethrower. View full article
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There's a funny little freedom in the fact that this team already seems to be stuck paying the luxury tax. Image courtesy of © Robert Edwards-USA TODAY Sports The San Francisco Giants have placed left-handed reliever Taylor Rogers on outright waivers, making him available to teams to claim, if they're willing to take on the balance of his contract. Rogers, 33, is a somewhat complicated case, that way, because his contract is hefty. After signing a three-year, $33-million deal prior to 2023, the southpaw is still due about $14 million: $2 million for the rest of this year, and $12 million in 2025. That's more than most teams are willing to take on, at this time of year. Most teams aren't in the unique, uncomfortable position the Cubs are in, though. Already likely to pay competitive-balance taxes this year (by the reckoning of their own chief decision-maker) and now chasing a remote playoff chance with full knowledge that falling just short would be a worst-case scenario for their season, the team should be both highly motivated to improve and only lightly discouraged by the money attached to Rogers. If they feel he can help them, they should pounce. And they should feel he can help him. Rogers has pared down to become strictly a sinker-sweeper guy, in this later phase of his career. He's a good one, too. His 2.45 ERA overstates his excellence, cushioned as it is by the fact that he pitches at home in San Francisco, but he has a strong strikeout rate (28.2%) and limits walks (7.7%). He's very, very good at spin mirroring; hitters don't get a good chance to discern the difference between his two offerings. Yet, they move very differently. A former closer for the Twins and Padres, Rogers has settled into more of a middle relief role for the Giants. He's pretty expensive for that kind of arm, but he would represent a roughly cost-neutral upgrade from Drew Smyly as a left-handed relief weapon for the Cubs going into next season. In the meantime, he'd help them in September, too, because Smyly is the only lefty on whom the team can count in the bullpen right now. Snapping up Rogers right now is a no-brainer. It would save the team the trouble, uncertainty, and thorny market realities of the winter ahead, when they will have plenty of money to spend but could easily end up giving a multi-year deal to a pitcher just like Rogers, or another misbegotten deal for roughly the same amount on a one-year deal to a lesser hurler, like Héctor Neris. Shoring up the highly fluid relief corps a bit right now would make things easier as the team tries to build a more robust contender for 2025, and it would incrementally improve their odds of making an improbable run to October this year, too--at which point Rogers would also have huge value for them. If the team is going to pay the luxury tax this year, anyway, they should eagerly add the paltry remaining money for Rogers to their rolls, knowing that Smyly, Kyle Hendricks, Tucker Barnhart, Trey Mancini, and plenty of others are coming off their books going into the winter. They have money to spend. They have an immediate and a medium-term need for relief help. They have an opportunity to use their flexibility to fill their needs and make it easier to focus on more important things. They should seize this moment. View full article
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The San Francisco Giants have placed left-handed reliever Taylor Rogers on outright waivers, making him available to teams to claim, if they're willing to take on the balance of his contract. Rogers, 33, is a somewhat complicated case, that way, because his contract is hefty. After signing a three-year, $33-million deal prior to 2023, the southpaw is still due about $14 million: $2 million for the rest of this year, and $12 million in 2025. That's more than most teams are willing to take on, at this time of year. Most teams aren't in the unique, uncomfortable position the Cubs are in, though. Already likely to pay competitive-balance taxes this year (by the reckoning of their own chief decision-maker) and now chasing a remote playoff chance with full knowledge that falling just short would be a worst-case scenario for their season, the team should be both highly motivated to improve and only lightly discouraged by the money attached to Rogers. If they feel he can help them, they should pounce. And they should feel he can help him. Rogers has pared down to become strictly a sinker-sweeper guy, in this later phase of his career. He's a good one, too. His 2.45 ERA overstates his excellence, cushioned as it is by the fact that he pitches at home in San Francisco, but he has a strong strikeout rate (28.2%) and limits walks (7.7%). He's very, very good at spin mirroring; hitters don't get a good chance to discern the difference between his two offerings. Yet, they move very differently. A former closer for the Twins and Padres, Rogers has settled into more of a middle relief role for the Giants. He's pretty expensive for that kind of arm, but he would represent a roughly cost-neutral upgrade from Drew Smyly as a left-handed relief weapon for the Cubs going into next season. In the meantime, he'd help them in September, too, because Smyly is the only lefty on whom the team can count in the bullpen right now. Snapping up Rogers right now is a no-brainer. It would save the team the trouble, uncertainty, and thorny market realities of the winter ahead, when they will have plenty of money to spend but could easily end up giving a multi-year deal to a pitcher just like Rogers, or another misbegotten deal for roughly the same amount on a one-year deal to a lesser hurler, like Héctor Neris. Shoring up the highly fluid relief corps a bit right now would make things easier as the team tries to build a more robust contender for 2025, and it would incrementally improve their odds of making an improbable run to October this year, too--at which point Rogers would also have huge value for them. If the team is going to pay the luxury tax this year, anyway, they should eagerly add the paltry remaining money for Rogers to their rolls, knowing that Smyly, Kyle Hendricks, Tucker Barnhart, Trey Mancini, and plenty of others are coming off their books going into the winter. They have money to spend. They have an immediate and a medium-term need for relief help. They have an opportunity to use their flexibility to fill their needs and make it easier to focus on more important things. They should seize this moment.
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It's easy to miss just how roughly big-league batters have treated Shota Imanaga lately. Because he put up such gaudy numbers prior to his first rough start at the end of May, his full-season stats still look good. Since May 29, Imanaga has made 15 starts, and while he's struck out 82 batters and walked just 13, he's also surrendered 19 home runs. Imanaga's ERA over that span is 4.47. His last start that didn't include surrendering a home run came Jul. 10 in Baltimore. This weekend, in nearby Washington, D.C., he'll try to demonstrate anew the abikity to keep the ball in the park. Simply put, the league has adjusted to Imanaga. That hasn't rendered him a bad pitcher, but he's been more like Jameson Taillon than Justin Steele. He's a control artist, right now, capable of missing some bats but not of avoiding the occasional ambush. Hitters have learned what to expect from him, and they're going to the plate ready to swing the bats. It's one thing to be a pitcher who fills up the zone and forces opponents to swing. It's quite another to be literally the pitcher against whom batters swing most often. That's probably not a good thing, in Imanaga's case. He throws too many flat-VAA fastballs, tough to square up but a boon to hitters when they do; and too many splitters, which miss bats like crazy when well-executed but have a higher error rate in terms of movement and location than most sliders or curveballs would. He's been a subtle, perpetual, and assiduous tinkerer, but Imanaga has stuck pretty closely to those two pitches this year. They're his bread and butter, and he insists upon being able to trust and lean on them. It's made him deleteriously predictable, though--or at least, it's made things too easy on the opponent, because they can craft a swing that handles both the fastball and the splitter. Familiarity has also caused trouble for Imanaga. Even as he's begun to diversify his arsenal, he's also begun seeing teams a second or third team within the season. Hitters have made adjustments upon getting an extra look at him, and not just from start to start. Here's a chart showing the times through the order penalty for all pitchers with at least 15 starts this year, with the increase in batters' production from the first to the second trip through the order on the x-axis and that from the second to the third time through on the y-axis. The extra lines on the grid are the league average for each stat, so players (like Steele) in the lower right quadrant suffer more the second time through, relative to their peers, but less the third time. Imanaga is in the upper right portion, seeing a greater loss of effectiveness with both turns of the lineup card than an average starter. Some of that might be management of fatigue, as he's spent the season adapting to a new schedule and pitching on a shorter average rotation than he did while he toiled in Japan. However, if you've watched Imanaga pitch this year, you know it also feels like the hitters are just seeing him better and more ready to combat that splitter as games unfold. His next adjustment needs to be bolder implementation of one of his tertiary weapons, to keep hitters a bit more off-balance and make them swing with less frequency or confidence after the first time through the order. Those adjustments will wait, at least in part, until the winter. The Philosopher and his coaching staff will need time to digest and reflect on his first year with the Cubs, and they can more readily make sweeping, baseline gameplan changes heading into spring training. However, some of it needs to start now. Remote though their chances are, the Cubs have some semblance of hope to climb back into the NL playoff hunt. Since one of their top priorities this September should be the development and further preparation of Imanaga for 2025, anyway, the team should be working with him to alter the plan of attack right away. Imanaga's not a true-talent 4.47 ERA pitcher. Then again, neither is he the guy whose ERA stayed south of 1.00 for two solid months to open the season. Down the stretch, the Cubs need him to find a productive place between those two figures, informed by the need to get hitters a little less trigger-happy when they step into the box--particularly in the middle and late innings. If they can get something more akin to April and May Imanaga over his final half-dozen starts of the season, they'll enjoy both improved chances to make something of this desperate season and greater confidence about their rotation picture heading into the offseason.
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The savvy southpaw's first Stateside summer has seen some ups and downs. Hitters see his stuff coming and swing wildly--although with very mixed results. Image courtesy of © Charles LeClaire-USA TODAY Sports It's easy to miss just how roughly big-league batters have treated Shota Imanaga lately. Because he put up such gaudy numbers prior to his first rough start at the end of May, his full-season stats still look good. Since May 29, Imanaga has made 15 starts, and while he's struck out 82 batters and walked just 13, he's also surrendered 19 home runs. Imanaga's ERA over that span is 4.47. His last start that didn't include surrendering a home run came Jul. 10 in Baltimore. This weekend, in nearby Washington, D.C., he'll try to demonstrate anew the abikity to keep the ball in the park. Simply put, the league has adjusted to Imanaga. That hasn't rendered him a bad pitcher, but he's been more like Jameson Taillon than Justin Steele. He's a control artist, right now, capable of missing some bats but not of avoiding the occasional ambush. Hitters have learned what to expect from him, and they're going to the plate ready to swing the bats. It's one thing to be a pitcher who fills up the zone and forces opponents to swing. It's quite another to be literally the pitcher against whom batters swing most often. That's probably not a good thing, in Imanaga's case. He throws too many flat-VAA fastballs, tough to square up but a boon to hitters when they do; and too many splitters, which miss bats like crazy when well-executed but have a higher error rate in terms of movement and location than most sliders or curveballs would. He's been a subtle, perpetual, and assiduous tinkerer, but Imanaga has stuck pretty closely to those two pitches this year. They're his bread and butter, and he insists upon being able to trust and lean on them. It's made him deleteriously predictable, though--or at least, it's made things too easy on the opponent, because they can craft a swing that handles both the fastball and the splitter. Familiarity has also caused trouble for Imanaga. Even as he's begun to diversify his arsenal, he's also begun seeing teams a second or third team within the season. Hitters have made adjustments upon getting an extra look at him, and not just from start to start. Here's a chart showing the times through the order penalty for all pitchers with at least 15 starts this year, with the increase in batters' production from the first to the second trip through the order on the x-axis and that from the second to the third time through on the y-axis. The extra lines on the grid are the league average for each stat, so players (like Steele) in the lower right quadrant suffer more the second time through, relative to their peers, but less the third time. Imanaga is in the upper right portion, seeing a greater loss of effectiveness with both turns of the lineup card than an average starter. Some of that might be management of fatigue, as he's spent the season adapting to a new schedule and pitching on a shorter average rotation than he did while he toiled in Japan. However, if you've watched Imanaga pitch this year, you know it also feels like the hitters are just seeing him better and more ready to combat that splitter as games unfold. His next adjustment needs to be bolder implementation of one of his tertiary weapons, to keep hitters a bit more off-balance and make them swing with less frequency or confidence after the first time through the order. Those adjustments will wait, at least in part, until the winter. The Philosopher and his coaching staff will need time to digest and reflect on his first year with the Cubs, and they can more readily make sweeping, baseline gameplan changes heading into spring training. However, some of it needs to start now. Remote though their chances are, the Cubs have some semblance of hope to climb back into the NL playoff hunt. Since one of their top priorities this September should be the development and further preparation of Imanaga for 2025, anyway, the team should be working with him to alter the plan of attack right away. Imanaga's not a true-talent 4.47 ERA pitcher. Then again, neither is he the guy whose ERA stayed south of 1.00 for two solid months to open the season. Down the stretch, the Cubs need him to find a productive place between those two figures, informed by the need to get hitters a little less trigger-happy when they step into the box--particularly in the middle and late innings. If they can get something more akin to April and May Imanaga over his final half-dozen starts of the season, they'll enjoy both improved chances to make something of this desperate season and greater confidence about their rotation picture heading into the offseason. View full article
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It comes down to this. The Cubs have left themselves a 28-game season, in which a merely winning record is not remotely good enough. They'll have to get scorching hot to redeem this season, but there's no turning back now. Image courtesy of © Charles LeClaire-USA TODAY Sports Winning series wasn't good enough. The Cubs needed a genuine hot streak, and a genuine hot streak means sweeping some people. With a scintillating comeback Wednesday afternoon, the team asserted itself, finishing off a three-game sweep in Pittsburgh that launches them into an off day on a surge of momentum. They've won four straight series, are 17-9 since the trade deadline, and have made much of this headway on the strength of strong performances from their young players. The odds against this late surge amounting to anything are long. The Cubs trail Atlanta by 5.5 games, and you can count it as 6.0, because Atlanta holds the tiebreaker. In that hot month of play, they've only gained a game on the Braves in the standings. If the team goes anything less than 20-8 the rest of the way, they have almost no chance to make the postseason--and crucially, finishing just outside the playoffs for a second straight season would be a worst-case scenario. Last year, the Cubs drafted 13th, after an ultimately unhelpful strong finish to 2022 and a bit of bad luck in the Draft Lottery. They picked 14th this July, after their late charge fell two games shy of the playoffs in 2023. Some better fortune or a truly nightmarish September could put them back in the top 10 next summer, but right now, they're angling toward another pick in the same range. For a team reluctant to spend the way big-market behemoths should and facing four division rivals who all get extra picks to bolster their Draft classes each year, that would be a disaster. The team is trending too much toward the recent patterns traced by the Bulls, in the NBA: be competitive, draw fans, settle into the unhappy medium of the league, and wallow perpetually in averageness. To break free of that bad cycle, they need to convert this year's fake rally to a playoff spot, and that's a very tall order. They've made these difficult circumstances for themselves, and have only themselves to blame, but that doesn't matter, now. They can't afford to think conservatively. For the next 28 games (or however many they play before cooling off again and tumbling out of the race), the Cubs are running for their lives, and they need to act like it. When the 2018 Cubs entered September, they held a reasonably comfortable lead over Craig Counsell's Brewers. They didn't collapse, either. From Sept. 1 through the end of the scheduled regular season, Joe Maddon's team went 16-12. Counsell's Crew went 19-7, though, to close the gap and force a Game 163--which, of course, they also won. Counsell led Milwaukee to a 20-7 record after the calendar turned to September again the next year, to seize a place in the Wild Card Game. They started calling it Craigtember, in Wisconsin. The Cubs' kick began in August, but it has to stay just as strong from here. The cruel facts are that even that kind of heater won't be enough this time. The Cubs need Counsell to work his magic, but they have to do it even better, and they'd still need more help than the Brewers got from the Cubs in catching them six years ago. Since they've locked themselves out of the cellar, though, the only place to go is forward. Two 20-7 months made Counsell famous. Pushing that to 21-7 on the third go-round might just get them across the line in time to qualify for the playoffs. We might as well see if he's capable of helping a team find that one more tick of greatness, when it really counts. View full article
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Winning series wasn't good enough. The Cubs needed a genuine hot streak, and a genuine hot streak means sweeping some people. With a scintillating comeback Wednesday afternoon, the team asserted itself, finishing off a three-game sweep in Pittsburgh that launches them into an off day on a surge of momentum. They've won four straight series, are 17-9 since the trade deadline, and have made much of this headway on the strength of strong performances from their young players. The odds against this late surge amounting to anything are long. The Cubs trail Atlanta by 5.5 games, and you can count it as 6.0, because Atlanta holds the tiebreaker. In that hot month of play, they've only gained a game on the Braves in the standings. If the team goes anything less than 20-8 the rest of the way, they have almost no chance to make the postseason--and crucially, finishing just outside the playoffs for a second straight season would be a worst-case scenario. Last year, the Cubs drafted 13th, after an ultimately unhelpful strong finish to 2022 and a bit of bad luck in the Draft Lottery. They picked 14th this July, after their late charge fell two games shy of the playoffs in 2023. Some better fortune or a truly nightmarish September could put them back in the top 10 next summer, but right now, they're angling toward another pick in the same range. For a team reluctant to spend the way big-market behemoths should and facing four division rivals who all get extra picks to bolster their Draft classes each year, that would be a disaster. The team is trending too much toward the recent patterns traced by the Bulls, in the NBA: be competitive, draw fans, settle into the unhappy medium of the league, and wallow perpetually in averageness. To break free of that bad cycle, they need to convert this year's fake rally to a playoff spot, and that's a very tall order. They've made these difficult circumstances for themselves, and have only themselves to blame, but that doesn't matter, now. They can't afford to think conservatively. For the next 28 games (or however many they play before cooling off again and tumbling out of the race), the Cubs are running for their lives, and they need to act like it. When the 2018 Cubs entered September, they held a reasonably comfortable lead over Craig Counsell's Brewers. They didn't collapse, either. From Sept. 1 through the end of the scheduled regular season, Joe Maddon's team went 16-12. Counsell's Crew went 19-7, though, to close the gap and force a Game 163--which, of course, they also won. Counsell led Milwaukee to a 20-7 record after the calendar turned to September again the next year, to seize a place in the Wild Card Game. They started calling it Craigtember, in Wisconsin. The Cubs' kick began in August, but it has to stay just as strong from here. The cruel facts are that even that kind of heater won't be enough this time. The Cubs need Counsell to work his magic, but they have to do it even better, and they'd still need more help than the Brewers got from the Cubs in catching them six years ago. Since they've locked themselves out of the cellar, though, the only place to go is forward. Two 20-7 months made Counsell famous. Pushing that to 21-7 on the third go-round might just get them across the line in time to qualify for the playoffs. We might as well see if he's capable of helping a team find that one more tick of greatness, when it really counts.

