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The Chicago Cubs' rotation didn't line up the way they might have preferred for this weekend's first showdown with the team with whom they're tussling for early control of the NL Central. It didn't matter. Image courtesy of © Matt Marton-USA TODAY Sports The Chicago Cubs pitching staff has had a rather cumbersome past couple of weeks. Already a team with a slim margin for error, injuries have conspired to remove that margin altogether. Without Cody Bellinger and Seiya Suzuki, it's an uphill battle on the offensive end. With multiple regulars seemingly entering a slump at once, things became more difficult. They've scored three or fewer runs seven times over the past two weeks, putting more pressure on a still-depleted pitching unit. While good news is on the horizon regarding the health of their two offensive catalysts, the bullpen has also had its share of woes. Whether it’s the immense struggles of Adbert Alzolay or the tightrope walking of Héctor Neris, late-game situations haven’t been super kind to the relief corps (or to our collective nerves). This has left a heavy onus on the starters to walk the proverbial tightrope. The cruel irony of that is that the rotation isn’t without its own issues. Justin Steele has been out since Opening Day, though he returns Monday. Kyle Hendricks struggled massively before winding up on the IL. In the interim, the Cubs have had to piece together a rotation with, essentially, a rebound candidate and some high-upside--but very inexperienced--arms in their place. Boy, did they deliver this weekend. The Cubs took two of three from Milwaukee in a series that felt as crucial as one in May can. The starters who made that possible? Hayden Wesneski, Jameson Taillon, and Javier Assad. And just like we all expected, the trio didn’t allow a run across any of their starts. Milwaukee had an opportunity to be a particularly infuriating opponent for this Cubs starting group. The Cubs’ starting arms are middle-tier in K% (22.4) and have given up the fifth-most contact in the league (79.7 percent). Where they thrive is in forcing soft contact. The group’s 26.2 HardHit% against trails only the New York Yankees. They’re able to do that while inducing the second-most swings, behind only Seattle (50.1%). In hosting the Brewers, they went up against a club that doesn’t make a ton of contact (75.7 percent), but also swings the bat as rarely as anyone in baseball (43.0 percent). Given that, it was a matchup that appeared to favor the Cubs at least slightly, as their typical approach would force the Brewers into swinging at a higher frequency. Yet, the Crew’s .315 collective BABIP had the chance to be an obnoxious component in the weekend’s activities, from the Cubs’ perspective. Thankfully, it turns out that when you maintain the type of approach we saw from the Cubs’ starting trio over the weekend, the BABIP monster works for you, rather than against you. The Brewers turned in a BABIP of just .214 against Wesneski on Friday. He scattered three hits and only walked two. He didn’t do anything overpowering or special: the most notable aspect of his 6 1/3 innings was going fastball- and sweeper-heavy. He limited contact more than his starting counterparts (albeit narrowly, at 78.4%), with that pitch combo working to keep Milwaukee off-balance throughout the start. He just had it working, even if the bullpen didn’t. Wesneski’s start stands in a bit of contrast to the Cubs’ other two starters over the weekend. Taillon threw six innings, only walked two, and struck out seven. Assad threw six of his own, walking three, and striking out four. Their approaches to the Milwaukee lineup, though, varied widely. In his start, the former recorded a Zone% of 47.5. He got the Brewers to swing 46.5 percent of the time, including 42.3% on pitches outside of the strike zone. That’s out of character and outside their comfort zone, given that the Brewers have swung at only 24.0 percent of pitches that weren’t inside the zone. While he surrendered a fair bit of contact (about 84%), only 7.1 percent of Milwaukee’s contact was hard. On top of that, they put the ball on the ground at an even 50% clip. Similarly, Assad worked in the zone with decent regularity (45.7%). He also gave up pretty consistent contact (89.5%), but had the Brewers driving the baseball into the ground. His GB% was an absurd 70.6 percent, with only 22.2% hard contact. Wesneski was able to generate more swing-and-miss, but the latter two found their own ways to minimize damage. The zone distribution also reflects what made each of the three so successful this weekend. Both Wesneski & Taillon worked fastball up, breaking stuff down. Assad worked more horizontally, keeping pitches down, regardless of type. Even if it feels mildly disappointing to miss out on a sweep that was well within reach, the starting pitching was beyond encouraging this weekend. Assad continued one of the more dominant stretches of any pitcher in the bigs. Taillon continued to bounce back from his abomination of a 2023 season. And Wesneski showed he has the chops to hang as a starter. None of these things are surprising, of course. We know the upside and/or history of each of the three. But it’s about the opponent. The Brewers have made a living off BABIP thus far. Their pitching has struggled, but their young group of bats put balls in play and generate runs they have no business generating. This weekend, the Cubs demonstrated that their starting group has the appropriate approach to mitigating that: get them to swing the bats and let the defense do the work. Considering they could remain the team’s top competition for a division title, the outcomes on the bump should bode well for their 10 remaining games this year. View full article

Despite a huge play Wednesday night that briefly rescued him from the bad books of Cubs fans, the team's backup third baseman is becoming almost unplayable. Is that role also becoming less important, anyway? Image courtesy of © Vincent Carchietta-USA TODAY Sports If you’ve followed this space for any length of time, you know the Chicago Cubs’ third base situation is something on which I’ve maintained a steady eye. That goes back to the spring, when the team decided to give Christopher Morel a more extended run there than we saw under the previous regime. While Morel has grabbed the bulk of the starts, we’ve continued to see a good amount of Nick Madrigal. Patrick Wisdom – late to the party due to a back injury in March – has only been used sparingly, at least at third base. Overall, this is how the position’s distribution looked through April: Morel: 22 appearances, 22 starts Madrigal: 22 appearances, 9 starts Wisdom: 2 appearances, 0 starts It’s at least slightly different than we may have anticipated. Instead of mixing in Morel on a more occasional basis, Craig Counsell has essentially handed over the reins of the position full-time from the jump. This has come primarily at Madrigal’s expense. He only has 39 plate appearances to date, being deployed mainly as a late-game defensive substitute. In the grand context of things, that certainly makes the most sense. It might just be a little sooner than we initially thought, given how much promise Madrigal did show with the glove in 2023. But Madrigal, of course, poses a very specific problem. As our friend Tommy Meyers (@FullCountTommy) pointed out, his offensive output as a Cub has not been anything resembling acceptable. And as unimpressive as the total body of work may be, 2024 specifically has been a rough stretch for our favorite small-in-stature Oregon State Beaver. Madrigal’s offensive profile has always been that of the slap hitter. He’s contact-oriented, but doesn’t offer a ton otherwise. This year – albeit in that very small 39-PA sample – has shown how far south things can go when you don’t compensate with any other tools as a hitter. His slash includes a .194 average & .256 on-base percentage. He’s carrying a wRC+ of 49, thanks largely to the fact that he’s putting the ball on the ground 58.8 percent of the time and making hard contact at a mere 20.6 percent rate. We shouldn't expect a ton from a bench bat--let alone Madrigal’s bat, specifically. Nor have we expected his offensive profile to fit that of a typical third baseman. But as Tommy pointed out as part of his Twitter discussion, it’s less a matter of him producing in a broad context and more a matter of if he’s even a rosterable player at this point. It’s a harsh question, but one with merit. There are 369 players who have at least 30 plate appearances to their name this season. Madrigal’s HardHit% is in the 40 lowest, while his GB% is in the 20 highest. His wRC+ ranks 322nd of that group. Given those data, we can't treat a .206 BABIP as a bad luck situation. Even with Madrigal’s impressive contact rate, he has to make better contact to be even moderately effective. His Soft% (20.6) is the highest it’s been since he made 109 plate appearances with the White Sox in 2020. While it’s by a slim margin, it's also notable that he’s making contact at the lowest rate of his career, while chasing at the highest. The defense hasn’t even been there to compensate. He’s at a -2 Fielding Run Value, while also coming in below average in the more familiar OAA & DRS metrics. It’s a small sample, especially in a defensive context, but everything we’re discussing here is. He's looked better than that, by the eye test, and he saved the game for the team Wednesday night, but he has to be great to hold onto any value with his bat where it's been so far. There’s obviously a world in which Nick Madrigal is a useful bench bat. Theoretically, his high-contact bat should be a boon for this group, given some of the whiff tendencies elsewhere on the roster. But his production has been even more absent than his previous injury-shortened seasons with the organization, and the trends don’t indicate a single thing that offers optimism. My original intention here wasn’t to go in on Madrigal quite to that extent (Tommy covered that well enough on his own). I love living in the abstract world where maybe, potentially, hopefully, Madrigal can be a useful bench player. That isn’t reality right now. A team with division title aspirations shouldn’t live in that abstract world. Instead, my intention here is to ponder exactly what the Cubs need out of Christopher Morel before they pivot to a more useful offensive player in a bench role. Unfortunately, the question is probably an unanswerable one. Morel’s defensive output this year doesn’t look terrific. His -3 FRV is tied as the league’s worst mark and Baseball Savant has him at a -5% success rate added. But Madrigal’s also at a -2 FRV & -8% success rate added. Our eyes tell us just how much improvement Morel has made in a short time. With that in mind, the Cubs could move on, like, tomorrow without their late-game third baseman and (probably) be just fine. In that case, they’d also have to be comfortable moving forward with Wisdom as the No. 2 man at the position. He was well below average in 2022, across 900+ innings (-9 FRV) and half as bad in half the time in 2023 (-4 FRV). But you’re not necessarily talking about an extended run, either. The odd off day for Morel isn’t going to present many opportunities for Wisdom’s lackluster defense to hurt you. Plus, there’s always the opportunity for his career .254 ISO to offer literally anything at the plate, against the entirely bereft profile of Madrigal. If Madrigal’s defense was at the level the metrics showed us last year, this becomes a tougher argument to make. It's important to acknowledge that such a move isn’t imminent. The Cubs are running on a shorter bench at present, given the injuries to Seiya Suzuki and Cody Bellinger. But their respective absences also illustrate the need for offensive depth. A lineup with Wisdom stepping in for Morel – even on the rarest of occasions – offers far more upside. My ultimate point here is this: when healthy, Morel’s defense is reaching a point where he’s the full-time guy at the position. It won’t be without hiccups, but he’s reaching the point where Counsell won’t need the safety net of a late-game substitute. And that should lead to more direct opportunities for Wisdom to find his way into the lineup over Madrigal. If those opportunities become reality and the Cubs become healthy, I think then we’re reaching a point where the Cubs can be comfortable with a third base picture – on both sides of the ball – that doesn’t involve Madrigal. And – perhaps unfortunately, given that alternate reality in which I’d prefer to live – the team will be better for it. View full article

With a densely packed early schedule, the Cubs have maintained an equitable timeshare at catcher so far. They're not alone in trying to keep backstops fresh this way. Still, the balance needs to keep tilting toward the younger half of their unit. Image courtesy of © Orlando Ramirez-USA TODAY Sports If you rewind the time continuum to the offseason, the catcher spot is not one you will find among the Cubs' uncertainties. From the end of the 2023 season until Opening Day 2024, we knew that the tandem of Yan Gomes & Miguel Amaya would be behind the plate--barring any unforeseen circumstances, of course. Gomes did a fine job, by all accounts, in each of the last two years. He provided stability for a precision-based pitching staff, while contributing only occasionally on offense. Amaya got his first taste of the bigs in '23, after several years of “catcher of the future" hype. While the pair didn’t offer a ton of long-term clarity – given Gomes’s age and Amaya’s inexperience – the organization knew they’d at least have stability at the spot heading into the new season. Through 30 games, Amaya has appeared 19 times (17 starts) to Gomes’s 16 (13 starts). A weighty distribution? Not particularly. It is, however, extremely intriguing, and might have more to say about the tandem moving forward than we’d expect in April. The reality is that there’s an option here that very obviously represents the superior catcher, and it’s a gap that only appears to be widening. That gap exists on both sides of the ball. It’s not as if one is exceeding the other on defense, even if the other option might offer a bit more offensively--or vice-versa--in the types of situations you tend to see around the league. In the case of Gomes & Amaya – or is it Amaya & Gomes? – it’s very clear in each facet. Let’s dive into the offense first. It’s a bit easier to digest as an appetizer, before the main course of catching metrics still in their relative infancy. Neither offers a ton at the plate, in a big-picture sense. Amaya is running a 71 OPS+ as of this writing; Gomes, though, is at 42. In other words, both are below-average bats, but Amaya is, at least, showing some upside. He’s making contact (76-ish percent) and striking out (25-ish percent) at roughly the same rates as last year, despite losing all sense of plate discipline. If he can rein that in, there’s an opportunity to realize his occasional power on a more consistent basis--especially given that his HardHit% is notably up (31.0 percent vs. 26.9 last year). With the higher end of his potential on the defensive side, such a trend would only solidify his status as an emerging higher-end player at the position. In contrast, Gomes has provided virtually nothing with the bat. His plate discipline has soured, as he’s made significantly less contact in each of his three seasons with the team than in the season before. His quality of contact is down, and Gomes has not taken a single walk in 2024. Given his 35% strikeout rate, that's nearly unfathomable. Not that any of this is a surprise. Gomes was always a defense-first type behind the plate, favored because of his unquantifiable ability to handle the staff. Amaya was going to have more to offer on offense. I think the expectation was that the playing time distribution for the full season could reflect that, even if Amaya gradually stepped into a larger capacity as it wore on. But as the calendar page flips to May, that distribution – whose expected presence was initially wrought by the defensive “superiority” of the veteran – appears to be getting turned on its head by the younger of the two. Matt Trueblood wrote a fantastic piece about Miguel Amaya’s growth at the beginning of the month. Therein, he focused most heavily on the defensive strides made by Amaya, particularly in regard to framing and Amaya’s setup behind the plate. Now, a handful of weeks removed from that piece, the numbers are really starting to take shape between the two. Here’s where the two stack up against one another, courtesy of Baseball Prospectus’s catching metrics: CSAA FrmR EPAA SRAA CDA M. Amaya 0.005 1.0 -0.001 0.008 1.1 Y. Gomes -0.011 -1.7 0.001 0.004 -1.8 The only spot where Amaya doesn’t maintain a significant advantage over his counterpart is in blocking pitches in the dirt. Pitch framing and the arm behind the plate each favor Amaya heavily. In both Called Strikes Above Average & Framing Runs, Amaya not only far exceeds the performance of Gomes, but is outstanding among all backstops with at least 100 innings (of which there are 40 names). Amaya’s CSAA ranks eighth among that group, while his FrmR sits ninth. Gomes is 40th in the former and 39th in the latter. The blocking situation is marginal, given that the league leader in Errant Pitches Above Average is the Mets’ Francisco Alvarez at 0.002. Don’t get me wrong, it’s an important component, given the verticality of approach of the Cubs’ staff. But 38 of the 40 catchers on that list fall at either end of the Amaya-Gomes pairing. Then we flip to the arm, where Amaya’s Swipe Rate Above Average sits 11th (Gomes is 15th). Really, though, we don’t need to look too much farther than the comprehensive Catcher Defensive Adjustment. Amaya is eighth there. Gomes is 39th. This shouldn’t come as a shock. Amaya’s output far exceeded that of his veteran running mate even last year. His CDA was 2.3, to Gomes’s -7.2. But as Amaya continues to show growth reflected in the metrics, in addition to growing in comfort with the collective staff, this is a gap that is only going to get wider. Amaya still has improvements to make, mind you. On both sides of the ball. We know what Yan Gomes is at this point. And while he served admirably while the Cubs (presumably) waited for Amaya to reach this level, it’s high time he makes himself comfortable in the back seat. View full article

Injuries that have limited or removed all three of the Chicago Cubs' top outfielders should have dented their record more than it has so far. They're 18-11, atop the National League Central, and they owe a lot of that to a guy I didn't believe in at all. Image courtesy of © Brian Fluharty-USA TODAY Sports I spent the better part of 2023 refusing to accept Mike Tauchman as a legitimate part of the Chicago Cubs’ roster. A fringe player over 30 years old who hadn't made an appearance at the big-league level in 2022 wasn’t worthy of 400-plus plate appearances for a team with playoff aspirations, in my estimation. Obviously, that opinion isn’t unique, in itself. Although Craig Counsell reportedly locked Tauchman into a roster spot from the jump this spring, my initial assumption was that he wouldn’t be around to see 2024 all the way through. To keep pace with the other contenders in the National League, the team needs to deploy the best hitters in the organization. The outfield depth the Cubs have at the upper minors is close to a breakthrough, ready to supplant him. Yet, as the calendar prepares to flip to May, I’m dangerously close to not only accepting Tauchman as a fixture on this roster, but accepting it entirely as legitimate. Naturally, the striking moment was his three-run homer at Fenway on Sunday night. Even if the Cubs ultimately lost that game, that shot injected new life into one of the more monotonous viewing experiences of the year. And it’s not like it was an individual flash, either. Tauchman leads the team in fWAR (0.9). He leads the team in walk rate (17.1%). Nobody has a higher HardHit% than his 42.6%. As a result, his on-base percentage is pacing the group at .432. This is across 88 plate appearances--not enough to qualify, but only 30 or so behind the team’s full-time group. The deeper you drill, the more encouraging It gets. In addition to the hard contact, Tauchman is working counts with real depth. His 4.8 pitches per plate appearance represents a career high, and a notable jump over last year’s 4.3. It’s also well above league leader Mike Trout’s 4.6 P/PA. Among 210 hitters with at least 80 PAs this year, Tauchman’s 17.3 percent O-Swing% is one of the 10 lowest. Conversely, his Z-Swing%, at 73.7, is one of the 25 highest among that group. Even more encouraging is his contact distribution. Tauchman’s 40-ish percent Oppo% is a 10-point jump from last year. He’s been more active in swinging on the outer part of the strike zone, but is driving it from that spot, as well. He’s at a 42.9% hard-hit rate on opposite-field contact, which represents a 20-point jump from 2023. His eye for the zone is elite, even on a team where “professional at-bats” run deep. Even in working deep counts, he’s still managed to cut his strikeout rate down to a career-low 19.3%. What has driven me to an actual appreciation of Tauchman – beyond the exceptional discipline – is the timing in all of this. It’s not that he wasn’t getting run with Seiya Suzuki or Cody Bellinger in the lineup; he was. But with that pair on the IL, Tauchman’s approach in the lineup has been indispensable. Since Suzuki hit the IL on Apr. 15, Tauchman has reached base safely in 11 of 14 games. Eight of those 10 have featured multiple appearances on base. The sample isn’t large enough to showcase a genuine improvement in the approach. Nor are we sure about the composition of the lineup once everyone is healthy. While Tauchman may not be the most impactful bat on paper, the skill set he’s providing in 2024 remains crucial within this lineup, especially as contact wanes in certain sectors of the starting nine. He’ll remain a fixture in this lineup, even upon the return of the other two-thirds of the team’s starting outfield. And he should. Maybe David Ross was right all along. View full article

My favorite type of hitter is the patient one. I believe that hitters with strong plate discipline showcase demonstrate an intellectual component that I’m fascinated with. They’re calculated. At the same time, I can also appreciate the (seemingly rare) hitter who can swing at a majority of pitches but find himself on base with regularity all the same. Image courtesy of © David Banks-USA TODAY Sports Nico Hoerner has been both of these hitters in a single month. On April 13th, Hoerner was hitting .171. His wRC+ was only 77; his ISO was .024. In the broad way in which we typically evaluate hitters, it wasn’t getting off to the kind of start he might’ve aimed for. Especially given his revamped approach. While Hoerner was hitting only .171, his on-base percentage sat at .352. His walk rate (16.7 percent) exceeded his strikeout rate (13.0 percent). That was all intentional. Hoerner wanted to walk more. He wanted to work the count and find his way on base beyond hitting himself there. The results were part of that process. His Swing% was just 40.1, including a mere 23.1 on pitches outside the strike zone. He only whiffed at only 7.8 percent of pitches. That’s an important thing to note about his early-season output. The walk rate was a positive byproduct of limiting chase, even if the results in actually swinging the bat didn’t come along with it. Even with a Contact% lingering around 80, he was still able to contribute meaningfully. Since that point in the timeline, though, Hoerner has instead crept back toward his free-swinging ways. His Swing% has jumped up by a full 10 percent (50.3) over the past 10 or so days. Along with it, his O-Swing% crept up to 40.4. What’s absurd within that is that Hoerner hasn’t lost anything. In fact, he’s only gained traction. His Contact% is 89.7 over that stretch. His Whiff% is just 5.2 percent. It’s a stretch that’s brought his cumulative plate discipline figures closer in line with his career norms. As of this writing, his Swing% for the season sits at 44.8; his chase rate is 30.8, and his whiff rate is 6.6 percent. His contact rate is 85.1. There’s some further nuance here, too. Hoerner is demonstrating slightly less hard contact now that he’s making more of it. The walk rate is also down to just 2.2 percent. He is, however, hitting to all fields with more regularity. All three parts of the field come in at least 30 percent in his distribution. His strikeout rate is also lower than it was in the first half of April. This recent stretch probably isn’t a version of Nico Hoerner that we should grow accustomed to. A Swing% at or above 50 hasn’t been on his stat sheet since 2019. He’s always been able to maintain patience and limit whiffs while simultaneously offering high contact rates. If anything, perhaps the revamped approach was an overcorrection for him, hoping to drive up the walk rate. I suppose there’s merit in trying to enhance a specific element of your game, especially given the depth offered by simply being a hitter in baseball. It’s something of a pick-your-poison situation. Do you want the patient hitter who walks a bunch and doesn’t strike out but whose patience might be limiting balls in play? Or do you want the contact-oriented approach, with only occasional walks but sprays hits all over the field? I imagine that’s the case for the Cubs’ skipper, too. Craig Counsell has intermittently deployed Hoerner out of the leadoff spot throughout the year, even before Ian Happ’s recent hamstring issue. I’d be willing to bet there’s merit in leading off your more aggressive contact monster and your uber-patient walk machine, depending on the matchup. When that’s appropriate, though, is well above my paygrade. View full article

As a person who overreacts to everything, it sometimes becomes difficult to watch the Chicago Cubs play defense in a measured fashion. A failed pick at first by Michael Busch or the odd mistake from Dansby Swanson and I’m ready to sprint to conclusions. Image courtesy of © Orlando Ramirez-USA TODAY Sports It’s an interesting paradox in which to reside for someone so consumed by defense and recognizing the sample it requires to genuinely analyze as a result. But as we prepare to hit the end of April and guys have settled into spots accordingly, it now seems like a point at which to take a temperature check. What the numbers say might not have as much value at this early stage, but it’s at least worth exploring in comparison to last year. This is in addition to where certain players are performing in the larger context of Major League Baseball. The most obvious place to start – and probably, subconsciously, the basis for this article – is on the infield corners. After all, these were the only positions remotely in question throughout much of the winter. Even after the acquisition of Michael Busch for first and the decision to run with Christopher Morel at third, long-term stability was far from a given. And yet, the Cubs may have fallen into such luck at not one of those spots but each of them. The Cubs had seven players appear at first base last year, with Patrick Wisdom’s 77 innings representing the fewest among the group. They combined to rank 21st in the league in the very comprehensive Fielding Run Value (-4), 20th in Outs Above Average (-5), and 12th in Defensive Runs Saved (1). In that sense, Michael Busch has, thus far, represented an upgrade. He has a FRV of 0 and an OAA of 1. DRS is the only metric that doesn’t love him, at -3 to this point. Of course, metrics tend to collude against first base anyway, so there’s likely always going to be one naysayer among the trio. While Busch has had the occasional issue with a pick or a low throw, the overall results have been sound. Sometimes, they’re even more so. Like this one against the Dodgers. Or this one against Houston. A middle infield featuring Swanson & Nico Hoerner, combined with the rapid improvement of Morel, tends to make life pretty easy on a first baseman from the jump. Despite lacking a defensive home, the fact that he’s been as solid as he has speaks to a solid trajectory moving forward. On the other side, Morel came in with much more scrutiny. The Cubs forewent the opportunity to sign Matt Chapman, instead opting to place Morel there, despite the third base picture not looking unlike the one on the other side. The team had five players appear at the hot corner (four if we want to exclude Edwin Ríos’ eight innings), of which only Nick Madrigal emerged of good quality in the eyes of the metrics. Our favorite smaller-than-your-average-baseball-player posted an FRV of 8, an OAA of 10, and a DRS of 8. Not bad for his first full-time run at the spot, like, ever. Of course, offensive profiles matter to some extent, and Madrigal’s didn’t work as a full-time third sacker, which is why it’s been so welcome a development to see Morel’s early improvement there. Overall, FRV has him at -1. OAA has him at -2. DRS is -1. So, slightly below average to this point. Given some of the mistakes we saw in the spring and the first week of the season, those numbers actually appear…fine? Swaths of fans were ready to pull the plug after just a few games. The arm has played. The glove just needs to follow. Only then will Morel get a full nine innings there. But he’s well on his way. If there’s a concern to be expressed over the defense to date, it’s not on the corners. It’s certainly not on the middle infield, where Swanson & Hoerner continue to live among the league’s best metrics-wise. The outfield, however, is leaving something to be desired. The Cubs’ group of outfielders sits 26th in FRV (-3), 23rd in OAA (-3), and 13th in DRS (1). Ian Happ & Cody Bellinger have been below average by the metrics. Bellinger was already having a tough inning before a misread led to his current rib injury, as he appeared to lose a ball in the lights. Interestingly, that sort of represents the biggest concern for this group: light sources. While there isn’t a metric to place it, the Cubs have (anecdotally) appeared to lose more balls in the sun or stadium lights than any other team in baseball. More worrisome is that it largely comes from their three starters across the grass: Happ, Bellinger, and Seiya Suzuki. I suppose that’s a positive aspect of Pete Crow-Armstrong’s return to the top club. The bat may not be there yet, but you know you’re getting premium defense. Given injuries, with so many moving parts in the outfield, he should bring up-the-middle stability to the defensive picture out there. Here's a quick peek at the catching (something I’ll likely expand on later this week). I love what we’re getting from Miguel Amaya. He ranks fifth among backstops with at least 50 innings in Baseball Prospectus’ Catcher Defensive Adjustment (1.0) and eighth in Called Strikes Above Average (0.006). Yan Gomes ranks 52nd in CDA (-1.4) and CSAA (-0.011). It’s still early, but there may be a gap establishing between the two of them. Ultimately, we’re at the end of April. And I’m throwing out a bunch of metrics that need a significant sample to mean anything at all while also adjusting to a world of FRV against OAA & DRS. But it’s something to monitor, especially given the team’s continued roster construction and need for high-end defense. In short: middle infield good, corners improving, catchers just-okay-to-probably-quite-good, and outfield can’t field baseballs with light involved. Still a long way to go in the defensive game. View full article

With any semblance of protection from the rest of the lineup dwindling due to injury, the Chicago Cubs' rookie slugger has hit a rough patch this week. Why? And how can he get out of it? Image courtesy of © Kamil Krzaczynski-USA TODAY Sports A stretch like this was always inevitable. Of course, to even call this a stretch would be, in fact, a stretch. But Michael Busch has gone four consecutive games without recording a hit. He’s struck out nine times across those four games, including eight in this three-game set against Houston. Not that this is cause for any panic. As recently as Saturday, Busch was slashing .328/.405/.656. His streak of five straight games with a home run was just a week and a half ago. He was, arguably, the most exciting hitter in the Cubs’ lineup. It is worthwhile, however, to take a quick glance under the hood of this last set of games, to see if there’s anything that we should maybe (at the very least) monitor. There isn’t much you’re going to glean from such a small sample. Obviously. But there are at least a couple of things we can point to as interesting, given the lackluster outcomes. Fastballs have been, by a wide margin, the pitch type Busch has seen most often this year; he’s seen about 52% heaters, against roughly 30% and 18% breaking and offspeed, respectively. In the last four games, Busch has seen his lowest percentage of fastballs in consecutive games. He’s had individual games where opposing pitchers have avoided the hard stuff. This is the first instance of it happening over multiple games, though. The Marlins found a way to sequence and attack him; the Astros had one in advance. If this is an adjustment that opposing pitchers are making, it’s a logical one. Breaking pitches are the group against which Busch has generated the least hard contact (though a 36.4 HardHit% is still cromulent). It’s also the subset most likely to generate a strikeout from Busch. He’s whiffing at those pitches at a 36.4% clip. Busch has also expanded the zone more often than we had seen prior to the last few days. Impressively, his chase rate resisted the inflationary pressure of a long road trip, but after coming home and seeing teams switch up the mix against him, Busch's plate discipline has finally cracked a bit. His chase rate was 21.2% through Saturday, but since then, it's 33.3%. The overall Swing% is up only slightly, so the fact that he’s chasing and whiffing is at least notable. Overall, it’s not as if a four-game stretch – even in the ultimate small sample that April represents – is going to damage Busch’s output. His ISO (.280) still sits in the top 10 among qualifying position players. His 4.5 pitches per plate appearance is still a mark well above league average. The strikeout rate is up there, but not skyrocketing horrifically in the wake of his brief (to date) struggles. The stat sheet still looks good in more places than it doesn’t. What becomes important for Busch at this point, though, is the adjustment to be made. We’ve seen him adjust at each level. Those adjustments have also come after an extended run, however (2021 to 2022 in Double-A, 2022 to 2023 in Triple-A). If the “trends” over a four-game sample are indicative of a larger adjustment on the part of opposing pitchers, then Busch is going to have to demonstrate the ability to make quick counteradjustments. It’s not as if the Cubs have a wealth of thriving offensive talent at present. They might have had that on Opening Day, but now, too much of that talent is on the IL. Busch can (and likely will) adjust, if necessary. It just needs to happen fast, for this team. View full article

The Chicago Cubs aren't messing around. Less than four full weeks into the season, they've changed the texture of their roster, shaking up the position-player mix in search of a better alignment of options. Image courtesy of © Patrick Gorski-USA TODAY Sports Going back to early in the spring, I’ve spent more time than I care to admit thinking about the Chicago Cubs’ roster construction at the infield corners and on the bench, as the two seemed inextricably linked. As the third base picture became clearer and Garrett Cooper earned a roster spot, I wondered how Craig Counsell would balance playing time for Cooper, Christopher Morel, Nick Madrigal, Patrick Wisdom, and (maybe, eventually) Matt Mervis. Not that the expectation was that they’d all be on the roster at the same time--especially with Mervis’s optionability. Even still, that’s five names for, functionally, three spots: third base, designated hitter, and first base (to whatever extent Michael Busch left room for someone to claim playing time). The rapid ascent of Busch compressed that down to only the former two spots, but also expedited the process of clarifying it. Morel gets the bulk of the starts at third (16 starts at third, only six appearances as DH). Madrigal fills in late in games (17 appearances, but only seven starts). Wisdom, now healthy, gets the odd start there or in an outfield corner. What it did, though, was leave something of a redundancy on the roster. Wisdom and Cooper are not dissimilar players at this point in their careers. Like, at all. Decent offensive upside (in between strikeouts) with the ability to make the odd appearance in an outfield corner. Having both of them on one bench unit felt unnecessary, but with so many regulars completely entrenched into everyday roles, it’s probably something that could be balanced over a short stretch. That stretch ended up being shorter than we expected. With the recall of Mervis, the Cubs would have had to find a way to balance two nearly identical righty bats with an eerily similar left-handed one, albeit with less positional flexibility. Optioning Alexander Canario to make room for Mervis was floated in certain spaces, but didn’t line up with any logic I can discern, given the redundancy. So the Cubs are now set to say goodbye to Cooper, in favor of Wisdom and of Mervis. In the most direct sense, it’s Wisdom over Cooper. With such similar profiles, it’s logical that the Cubs went with the familiarity of a guy who's done much for them over the last three-plus seasons. That's especially true given that Wisdom has at least made a handful of corner outfield appearances; Cooper’s two trips to left field this year were his first since 2021. However, while this is largely going to be depicted as something of a rearranging of the bench, it probably says more about the composition of the starting lineup than we might initially think. Morel’s tenure as the everyday designated hitter is over. The corners are more settled than we likely thought they’d be at this juncture, given Busch’s rise and Morel’s seemingly exponential improvement on the other side. That’s left something of a vacancy at the DH spot, though. Cooper spent six games there, against only three as a first-base fill-in. Ian Happ, Seiya Suzuki, and Mike Tauchman are the others (besides Morel) to assume that role multiple times. It’s interesting that while the direct bench comparison – and, just as likely, the ultimate decision – was Wisdom vs. Cooper, it’s Mervis’s arrival that directly impacts Cooper. There’s a world in which this move results in Mervis assuming a near-everyday DH role, with Wisdom continuing to ply his trade only on occasion. Mervis was excelling in Iowa against right-handed pitching. What we shouldn’t overlook, however, is that he was also holding his own against lefties. His line against southpaws went .300/.360/.650 in 25 plate appearances before his promotion. So not only do you get the boost against righties, but you don’t lose anything on the other side of the plate, given Cooper’s early struggles against pitchers of that handedness, where he was performing noticeably worse than against right-handers. While it’s not as if Cooper was performing poorly overall (118 wRC+), this winds up being the most logical move from a bench composition standpoint. Madrigal offers defense off the bench. Wisdom brings the same offensive profile and more in the “intangible” department. But as much as this seems like a bench-centric move, it presents significantly more big-picture ramifications for the Cubs’ roster moving forward. Can Mervis be a guy? Could he be the guy out of that DH spot? Not to mention the 40-man implications, which could bode well in attempting to add some relief help soon. Perhaps I’m blowing it out of proportion, but this reads as more than a simple April DFA of a fringe bat. It shakes things up in all the right ways, with the potential to have some longer-term effects in a way that you don’t typically see. View full article

The Cubs had a relatively successful west coast road trip but their plate discipline spiraled. What happened? Image courtesy of © David Banks-USA TODAY Sports The early reputation of the 2024 Chicago Cubs centered heavily around their plate discipline. It was covered here on multiple occasions in the early going, highlighted by growth from the likes of Ian Happ, Christopher Morel, and Dansby Swanson. The flashing upside of a low-turnover lineup under new leadership had our attention in the most complementary way, as they continually ran up pitch counts and chased opposing starters early in games. From here on out, the words are not meant to dismiss any of that as a mirage. Chicago went 5-4 on their nine-game West Coast road swing. It was a run that easily could have ended 7-2 if not for a pair of bullpen meltdowns in San Diego and Arizona. Nevertheless, given how these things tend to go for the Cubs – at least anecdotally – that record seems acceptable coming back to Wrigley Field on Thursday. Of course, the injuries and adjacent composition of the pitching staff are going to garner the most attention regarding any disappointment, especially given that that facet was almost directly responsible for the two most egregious losses of the trip. However, there’s a notable trend emerging on the other side of the ball, out of what was previously believed to be the strength of this squad. And it lies in that same plate discipline we were lauding only ten days ago. What the Cubs were able to do – specifically the likes of Happ & Morel – was avoid pitches outside the strike zone. Get pitches to come to the zone and make contact from there. Through April 7th, that’s absolutely what they were doing: O-Swing% Pre-4/7 Post-4/7 (Road Trip) Dansby Swanson 14.4 34.3 Nico Hoerner 22.4 30.8 Christopher Morel 18.8 30.4 Cody Bellinger 16.1 27.9 Ian Happ 21.6 19.4 Michael Busch 22.5 21.6 For the first four names listed, it’s not just that the discipline appeared to dip a bit. It tanked. Swanson – whose discipline was evincing itself in consistently hard contact – was hitting .310 and reaching base at a .432 clip before the Cubs set out on the trip. He comes back at just .235 & .303 in those categories. Morel was at .306 and .342. He’s now .217 and .267. Bellinger was at .229 and .341, only to return at .200 and .296. Swanson may be the most concerning of the three. We recently discussed his historic month-to-month variance, specifically noting that he needed to hone in on the fastball from a Swing% standpoint. And he had been early on, generating consistently hard contact. However, recent trends indicate that his fastball swinging has taken a backseat to other pitch types. It’s not as if pitchers have adjusted in the way they approach him, either. He’s still seeing a heavy share of fastballs (which is generally the case just due to the nature of pitcher approaches). If we’re looking for a concern level, Swanson’s history puts him on our watch list. Morel – who, as an aside, showcased some massive defensive growth on the road – is also someone we’re keeping our eye on. He was so patient coming out of the gate but gradually fell back into his free-swinging habits. Bellinger hasn’t found his footing, save for a few individual moments, so we’re kind of biding our time in following his trends for now. With those three specifically, you wonder about the nature of such a road trip and the mental aspect. While we can’t quantify it, these are all everyday players. You’re adjusting to late starts. You’ve got the travel. The team played multiple extra-inning games. Spare me the big-league paycheck spiel. There’s a mental factor here. Moving forward, the question will center around how much. of it is due to just that versus regression from the progress we saw earlier. In something of a contrast, Hoerner, Happ, and Busch each present different outcomes in their change in swing habits during their time out west. Hoerner became far more patient from the season's outset but without the results. In the years before that, he demonstrated what I might call measured aggression. He’ll swing, but never at any shocking rate that proves a detriment to his overall output. An O-Swing% lingering around 30 percent isn’t a crazy figure for him because he compensates with regular contact. For Hoerner, it’s more a matter of whether we see him return to a more aggressive style, given that the patience hasn’t manifested in the results he might’ve been hoping for (even if the underlying stuff was encouraging). In the last two years, he’s gone for contact rates of 77.0 and 80.7 percent on pitches outside the strike zone. He also had almost twice as many hits on the road as he had notched all year to that point, including two multi-hit games. It is far too small a sample to declare any level of correlation, but it is an interesting development to monitor nonetheless. In contrast to Hoerner’s rising swing rates, the patience of Ian Happ didn’t yield…anything for him on the trip. Happ, whose evolution into a perfectly acceptable leadoff hitter was documented earlier this week, was hitting .361 and featured a .458 OBP after the Cubs’ last game at Wrigley. He returns at .247 and .353. Happ had a three-hit game in the 12-11 loss in Arizona but only recorded two hits otherwise. He struck out nine times on the road (more than he had the year before departing) against only five walks. There is such a thing as too patient at the plate. Is that what we’re seeing with Ian Happ? Interestingly, rookie Michael Busch is the only hitter emerging from the trip with fewer questions. He recorded hits in seven of the nine games, including his five-game home run streak. He was on base 17 times, with just about all counting stats coming in higher upon the team’s return to the North Side. As genuinely impressive as Busch had already been, the fact that he stands so far apart from his veteran counterparts speaks volumes about his ability to adjust so early in his big-league career. It’s not a surprise, as he showcased this ability at each level, but it does instill a level of comfort that his excellence at the plate thus far is at least remotely sustainable. Again, none of this is to say that the Cubs’ early plate discipline was an apparition. The team emphasized approach in the spring, and each of these hitters has demonstrated an ability to do just that. Engaging so heavily at the plate can also become exhausting over the long term. So we may see lapses as the season wears on, especially when the Cubs are enduring a stretch such as they have been for the last two-ish weeks. What it does, though, is raise some interesting points of emphasis to monitor. We’re watching Swanson, Morel, & Bellinger for their early-season variance. Hoerner to see if his approach reverts to a previous vintage. Happ will determine the line between patience being a virtue and vice. And Busch’s sustainability in the middle of all of it. Ultimately, we’re still playing in the sandbox of small samples. You can’t make declarations in April. But you can ask questions. View full article

How is a switch-hitting left fielder like a two-time Oscar winner? Image courtesy of © Orlando Ramirez-USA TODAY Sports There’s an episode of The Office where various members of the office staff discuss whether Hilary Swank is hot or not. The discussion spirals into a debate which results in a seemingly endless stalemate. This is where I find myself with Ian Happ, with whom I have a complicated relationship. Is he good? Is he not? Is his historically uneven bat the right one to lead the Cubs’ lineup in 2024? Despite being entrenched as the team’s leadoff man (against righty starters) for 2024, Happ doesn’t have the full skill set you’d expect to see from the prototypical player in that role. (There’s also the separate matter of his defense, which is probably not what it’s purported to be, despite a pair of Gold Glove awards that might attempt to say otherwise.) My assumption is that such a perspective isn’t a unique quality among those who follow the Chicago Cubs. The thinking itself – as to whether a player is “good” or “bad” – is black-and-white and, probably, asking the wrong question, in this case. Any level of dismissiveness about Happ undersells what the player has become and the intricacies of his evolution. This is what MLB Pipeline had to say about Happ when he graduated from the Cubs’ system back in 2017: That initial scouting report has proven itself to be varying shades of true over the course of Happ’s career. He’s hit 20 homers in three separate seasons, with 104 of his 124 total dingers coming as a lefty. While he hasn’t been a detriment to the Cubs on the basepaths, he also hasn’t reached anywhere near the 20-20 threshold. The closest he got was last year, when he went 21-14. What’s probably most notable is the variance we’ve seen from Happ in the roughly eight years we’ve watched him. He’s had those years of 20+ home runs. He’s also had seasons where he barely scratched 15. The power, by ISO, has also shrunk a bit, in a more gradual way. Happ has had walk rates touching 15 percent, but also below 10. He’s struck out at a rate over 30 percent on multiple occasions. There’s a lot at play that has both fed into the extremely volatile perception that the collective has of him, as well as his suitability for the leadoff role in which he now finds himself. In terms of the approach, early Ian Happ saw 4.09 pitches per plate appearance. From 2021 to 2023, he went 4.19, 4.00, and 4.15 in the P/PA game. Happ was initially more prone to swinging outside the strike zone, posting an O-Swing% over 30% in two of his first three years. Those coincided with far higher whiff rates than we’ve come to expect from the more modern Happ vintage. He averaged a Whiff% of 15.5% in those early years. This year, Happ has composed himself into a fixture of plate discipline. His P/PA is at 4.68. Only Colorado’s Nolan Jones is seeing more pitches, at 4.72. That’s fed directly into the lowest whiff rate of his career – a meager 10 percent in the early going – and the highest contact rate, at 78.1%. He’s also making hard contact at his highest rate since 2018 (36.2%, using FanGraphs's splits). From a discipline standpoint, Ian Happ is a logical fit atop the lineup, especially given the growth he's demonstrated. Would it be an oversimplification, though, to declare that he just refined his approach in order to fit the bill? Maybe. Pitchers have generally approached Happ the exact same way throughout his career. His Zone% has remained relatively constant, with only mild (and normal) fluctuation in the pitch type he’s seen. One trend that does exist within his approach, though, is his more recent avoidance of the offspeed pitch. Offspeed has represented an area of struggle for Happ throughout his career. It’s represented – by far – his lowest HardHit% output in every year at which he’s been a major-league hitter, while more occasionally serving as the pitch he whiffs at most. This year, however, he’s cut down his Swing% against offspeed pitches to just 39.5%. That would be his lowest total by a wide margin if it’s sustained. His ability to recognize and lay off that pitch certainly speaks to the significant growth we’ve seen in his overall plate discipline thus far. It’s a development not entirely dissimilar to Dansby Swanson, though for Happ, it’s more about pitch type avoidance rather than needing to hone in on one specific pitch. The “prototypical” leadoff man has become something of a rare breed at this level to begin with. Gone are the days of contact-oriented hitters who can get on and steal a bunch of bases. They still exist, but usually more as one-tool-or-the-other. Instead, you’re just looking for that consistent on-base presence that the other guys can drive in. Ian Happ has evolved into exactly that type of player. Again, the question of whether Happ is a strong, consistent bat probably isn’t the right question--especially within the context of him in the leadoff spot. The actual issue is just how his evolution led him to being in that position in the first place. A potential 20-20 guy with a high strikeout rate early on has instead become one of the most patient hitters in all of baseball, demonstrating recognition on specific types of pitches. The absence of power thus far (.130 ISO, even after his drought-busting first homer Tuesday night) is certainly worth pondering; in a general sense, though, the refinement evident in his approach makes him the ideal tone-setter for this group, especially given the early emphasis on quality plate appearances. View full article

Last year, the Cubs were a very good baserunning team. Will that success and aggressiveness carry over to 2024? Image courtesy of © Kevin Sousa-USA TODAY Sports The 2023 iteration of the Chicago Cubs was one of the best baserunning teams in Major League Baseball. FanGraphs’ Base Running metric (BsR) takes the following into account as part of its calculation: Ultimate Base Running (UBR – a measure of each baserunning event) Weighted Stolen Base Runs (wSB – the contributions of a player stealing bases measured by runs) Weighted Grounded into Double Play Runs (wGDP – essentially the ability of a player to stay out of double plays) Last year’s Cubs came in with a 7.8 BsR figure, which ranked ninth in the league. Narrowing the field to only National League counterparts, they ranked fifth. The team’s 140 steals ranked eighth among big league squads, with their eight-most caught stealing (34) easily attributable to that aggressiveness. They also hit into the second-fewest double plays (95), with only Pittsburgh’s 92 sitting lower. It made sense within the composition of last year’s roster. Nico Hoerner was a stolen base demon with 43 steals (fifth in the league), followed by Cody Bellinger’s 20 and Ian Happ’s 14. Miles Mastrobuoni (13) & Nick Madrigal (10) each hit double digits, with another host of players contributing a few swipes to the effort. With that group’s offensive contrast of on-base and contact ability against a lack of power and ending on the higher side of GB%, getting runners in motion was a reasonable tool for the team to generate offense. Despite minimal roster turnover, it’s a strategy that hasn’t carried over into the subsequent season. Not that that’s super unique to the Cubs. As of this writing, the Cubs have just a pair of steals. Mind you, they aren’t trailing the rest of the league by a wide margin. A few clubs have just three to date. But none of those teams were as active on the basepaths as the Cubs were last season. They also have only two caught stealing, leaving very little indication of any aggression in that facet of the game thus far. This brings us to one important point and one important question: The point is that just because the Cubs aren’t attempting to get runners moving at the same rate as 2023 doesn’t mean they aren’t demonstrating quality on the bases. Our friend, Brett Taylor, over at Bleacher Nation, aggregated a few details about their baserunning performance to date. Those details include the fact that the Cubs are moving runners from first to third at the highest rate in baseball, in addition to leading the field in Statcast’s XBR comprehensive baserunning metric by a fairly wide margin (a measure by which they were tied with Atlanta as the league’s fifth-best baserunning team in 2023). The question is whether the Cubs must be aggressive on the basepaths to generate sustainable offensive success. Given the overall lack of roster turnover, this seems a valid question based on last year’s stolen base output. At a quick glance, however, steals don’t necessarily equate to more production. Not directly, at least. The top five teams in steals last year were as follows: Cincinnati (190), Arizona (166), Kansas City (163), Tampa Bay (160), and Cleveland (151). Those teams ranked ninth, 15th, 23rd, fourth, and 27th in the league in runs scored, respectively. Only Tampa Bay (fourth again) and Cincinnati (10th) sat in the top 10 in on-base percentage. Only the Rays were in the top 10 in hitting with runners on, as well. For those teams, it would appear that speed on the bases didn’t correlate with an increase in productivity. The Cubs' offensive success in the current season is not solely dependent on steals. They are in the top five, with runners on in wRC+ (140), K% (16.5), and BB% (14.2). They’re seventh in average (.290) and ISO (.193). Their ability to provide quality plate appearances with runners on and subsequently move those runners, especially given the first-to-third note provided by Brett in the above article, suggests that steals are not a necessity for them. Their strategy of working counts and working deeper into the lineup allows them to generate runs even without incorporating the speed element. The fact that steals are down across the league only furthers the Cubs’ case for not demonstrating the same aggressiveness as last year. Without a genuinely comprehensive lineup, steals are almost a futile endeavor for some clubs. A peek at the team's stolen base leaders over the last few seasons doesn’t present any real correlation with run production. Many of the frontrunners in that category are much farther down the leaderboard in runs scored. However, a starting nine that runs deep in their ability to turn in quality PAs will see runs manifest in a much more organic way. This is what we’ve seen with the Cubs in the early going. Does this mean the Cubs are content not to demonstrate aggressiveness in the longer 2024 term? Perhaps not. After all, their real go-getter in the SB game, Nico Hoerner, is off to a wildly slow start. Maybe once he shows up on the bases at a higher frequency, there’ll be at least a marginal shift. In the interim, though, I think we continue to see the Cubs play it as conservatively as possible in that sense, which seems to be…just fine. View full article

The whole Chicago Cubs lineup seems to have a clear idea of what they want to do in each plate appearance. Their shortstop, highest-paid player, and steady leader might be the player thriving most on that intentional mentality. Image courtesy of © Orlando Ramirez-USA TODAY Sports Earlier this week, I raved about the Chicago Cubs’ offensive approach to start 2024. From top to bottom, the lineup looks like a group of professional hitters, ready to wear down opposing starters and chew through their bullpens. After doing it against the Los Angeles Dodgers throughout the weekend, they did it again to old friend Yu Darvish in San Diego on Monday night. The outcome of that game notwithstanding, Darvish threw 65 pitches across three innings as the Cubs notched as many hard-hit balls as whiffs (seven apiece). Fixed in the middle of that offensive battery is Dansby Swanson. The Cubs’ shortstop is off to a .270/.378/.514 start through 45 plate appearances, walking more than 15 percent of the time and hitting for considerable power. His walk rate and ISO put him in the top 30 among current qualifiers entering Tuesday's games; his Hard Hit% – at an even 50.0 – ranked sixth overall. It’s likely an unsustainable start, but it mirrors his strong April from last year fairly closely. After the season’s first month in ‘23, Swanson was hitting .286 and reaching base at a .412 clip, largely thanks to a walk rate near 18 percent. There was no power to speak of (.061 ISO), but he was making solid contact. At 9.9%, his soft contact rate in the first month was his second-lowest in any month-long stretch last season. That start ended up being unsustainable, not because he was doing anything outlandish from the jump, but because he got away from what makes Swanson such a threat at the plate: he was inconsistent in his aggressiveness against the fastball. Last September, I wrote at Pitcher List about the enigmatic month-to-month performance that has been a hallmark of Swanson's career. Many Atlanta fans felt the need to point out to me – in as condescending a fashion as possible – that Swanson’s offensive game is prone to variance. That variance is borne out of his inability to maintain a consistent approach. This is most notable in his insistence on hacking at non-hard stuff from opposing pitchers. We shouldn't expect opposing pitchers to approach Swanson with a majority of fastballs in every plate appearance, especially given his prowess against that pitch type. But his down months aligned with his swing tendencies; when Swing% against other pitch types far exceeded Swing% against hard stuff, the overall output went down. This fairly obvious element of Swanson’s offensive game is also what has me juiced about this start. Unsustainable? Sure. Encouraging, still? You bet. To date, Swanson is swinging at fastballs 43.4 percent of the time. The next-closest umbrella category is offspeed stuff, at 37.9 percent. That’s exactly what you want. His Hard Hit% against the former is an obscene 69.2 percent. Perhaps more importantly, though, he’s demonstrating a keener awareness of the strike zone. His overall Swing% sits at just 39.9 percent to date, including only 19.4 percent on pitches outside the strike zone. Fastballs are more likely to be in the strike zone than are breaking or offspeed pitches. In what is surely an oversimplification, this trend indicates to me that Swanson has been successful in identifying fastballs and prioritizing those in swings, more so than in previous years. Even better? That trend comes with opposing pitchers throwing him fewer fastballs. At 46.6 percent, it’s the lowest rate of fastballs seen in his career to date. With that in mind, nothing about Swanson’s start is surprising. He’s feasting on fastballs, as he’s set out to do for his entire career. The difference, at this point, is that he appears to be succeeding. We don’t know the source or whether that component is sustainable, especially given how much volatility has prevailed in his offensive output in his career. One imagines with the Cubs’ approach running this deep, though, the broader context of the lineup could offer him more opportunity at sustainability than he’s ever had. View full article