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The Chicago Cubs aren't messing around. Less than four full weeks into the season, they've changed the texture of their roster, shaking up the position-player mix in search of a better alignment of options. Image courtesy of © Patrick Gorski-USA TODAY Sports Going back to early in the spring, I’ve spent more time than I care to admit thinking about the Chicago Cubs’ roster construction at the infield corners and on the bench, as the two seemed inextricably linked. As the third base picture became clearer and Garrett Cooper earned a roster spot, I wondered how Craig Counsell would balance playing time for Cooper, Christopher Morel, Nick Madrigal, Patrick Wisdom, and (maybe, eventually) Matt Mervis. Not that the expectation was that they’d all be on the roster at the same time--especially with Mervis’s optionability. Even still, that’s five names for, functionally, three spots: third base, designated hitter, and first base (to whatever extent Michael Busch left room for someone to claim playing time). The rapid ascent of Busch compressed that down to only the former two spots, but also expedited the process of clarifying it. Morel gets the bulk of the starts at third (16 starts at third, only six appearances as DH). Madrigal fills in late in games (17 appearances, but only seven starts). Wisdom, now healthy, gets the odd start there or in an outfield corner. What it did, though, was leave something of a redundancy on the roster. Wisdom and Cooper are not dissimilar players at this point in their careers. Like, at all. Decent offensive upside (in between strikeouts) with the ability to make the odd appearance in an outfield corner. Having both of them on one bench unit felt unnecessary, but with so many regulars completely entrenched into everyday roles, it’s probably something that could be balanced over a short stretch. That stretch ended up being shorter than we expected. With the recall of Mervis, the Cubs would have had to find a way to balance two nearly identical righty bats with an eerily similar left-handed one, albeit with less positional flexibility. Optioning Alexander Canario to make room for Mervis was floated in certain spaces, but didn’t line up with any logic I can discern, given the redundancy. So the Cubs are now set to say goodbye to Cooper, in favor of Wisdom and of Mervis. In the most direct sense, it’s Wisdom over Cooper. With such similar profiles, it’s logical that the Cubs went with the familiarity of a guy who's done much for them over the last three-plus seasons. That's especially true given that Wisdom has at least made a handful of corner outfield appearances; Cooper’s two trips to left field this year were his first since 2021. However, while this is largely going to be depicted as something of a rearranging of the bench, it probably says more about the composition of the starting lineup than we might initially think. Morel’s tenure as the everyday designated hitter is over. The corners are more settled than we likely thought they’d be at this juncture, given Busch’s rise and Morel’s seemingly exponential improvement on the other side. That’s left something of a vacancy at the DH spot, though. Cooper spent six games there, against only three as a first-base fill-in. Ian Happ, Seiya Suzuki, and Mike Tauchman are the others (besides Morel) to assume that role multiple times. It’s interesting that while the direct bench comparison – and, just as likely, the ultimate decision – was Wisdom vs. Cooper, it’s Mervis’s arrival that directly impacts Cooper. There’s a world in which this move results in Mervis assuming a near-everyday DH role, with Wisdom continuing to ply his trade only on occasion. Mervis was excelling in Iowa against right-handed pitching. What we shouldn’t overlook, however, is that he was also holding his own against lefties. His line against southpaws went .300/.360/.650 in 25 plate appearances before his promotion. So not only do you get the boost against righties, but you don’t lose anything on the other side of the plate, given Cooper’s early struggles against pitchers of that handedness, where he was performing noticeably worse than against right-handers. While it’s not as if Cooper was performing poorly overall (118 wRC+), this winds up being the most logical move from a bench composition standpoint. Madrigal offers defense off the bench. Wisdom brings the same offensive profile and more in the “intangible” department. But as much as this seems like a bench-centric move, it presents significantly more big-picture ramifications for the Cubs’ roster moving forward. Can Mervis be a guy? Could he be the guy out of that DH spot? Not to mention the 40-man implications, which could bode well in attempting to add some relief help soon. Perhaps I’m blowing it out of proportion, but this reads as more than a simple April DFA of a fringe bat. It shakes things up in all the right ways, with the potential to have some longer-term effects in a way that you don’t typically see. View full article

The Cubs had a relatively successful west coast road trip but their plate discipline spiraled. What happened? Image courtesy of © David Banks-USA TODAY Sports The early reputation of the 2024 Chicago Cubs centered heavily around their plate discipline. It was covered here on multiple occasions in the early going, highlighted by growth from the likes of Ian Happ, Christopher Morel, and Dansby Swanson. The flashing upside of a low-turnover lineup under new leadership had our attention in the most complementary way, as they continually ran up pitch counts and chased opposing starters early in games. From here on out, the words are not meant to dismiss any of that as a mirage. Chicago went 5-4 on their nine-game West Coast road swing. It was a run that easily could have ended 7-2 if not for a pair of bullpen meltdowns in San Diego and Arizona. Nevertheless, given how these things tend to go for the Cubs – at least anecdotally – that record seems acceptable coming back to Wrigley Field on Thursday. Of course, the injuries and adjacent composition of the pitching staff are going to garner the most attention regarding any disappointment, especially given that that facet was almost directly responsible for the two most egregious losses of the trip. However, there’s a notable trend emerging on the other side of the ball, out of what was previously believed to be the strength of this squad. And it lies in that same plate discipline we were lauding only ten days ago. What the Cubs were able to do – specifically the likes of Happ & Morel – was avoid pitches outside the strike zone. Get pitches to come to the zone and make contact from there. Through April 7th, that’s absolutely what they were doing: O-Swing% Pre-4/7 Post-4/7 (Road Trip) Dansby Swanson 14.4 34.3 Nico Hoerner 22.4 30.8 Christopher Morel 18.8 30.4 Cody Bellinger 16.1 27.9 Ian Happ 21.6 19.4 Michael Busch 22.5 21.6 For the first four names listed, it’s not just that the discipline appeared to dip a bit. It tanked. Swanson – whose discipline was evincing itself in consistently hard contact – was hitting .310 and reaching base at a .432 clip before the Cubs set out on the trip. He comes back at just .235 & .303 in those categories. Morel was at .306 and .342. He’s now .217 and .267. Bellinger was at .229 and .341, only to return at .200 and .296. Swanson may be the most concerning of the three. We recently discussed his historic month-to-month variance, specifically noting that he needed to hone in on the fastball from a Swing% standpoint. And he had been early on, generating consistently hard contact. However, recent trends indicate that his fastball swinging has taken a backseat to other pitch types. It’s not as if pitchers have adjusted in the way they approach him, either. He’s still seeing a heavy share of fastballs (which is generally the case just due to the nature of pitcher approaches). If we’re looking for a concern level, Swanson’s history puts him on our watch list. Morel – who, as an aside, showcased some massive defensive growth on the road – is also someone we’re keeping our eye on. He was so patient coming out of the gate but gradually fell back into his free-swinging habits. Bellinger hasn’t found his footing, save for a few individual moments, so we’re kind of biding our time in following his trends for now. With those three specifically, you wonder about the nature of such a road trip and the mental aspect. While we can’t quantify it, these are all everyday players. You’re adjusting to late starts. You’ve got the travel. The team played multiple extra-inning games. Spare me the big-league paycheck spiel. There’s a mental factor here. Moving forward, the question will center around how much. of it is due to just that versus regression from the progress we saw earlier. In something of a contrast, Hoerner, Happ, and Busch each present different outcomes in their change in swing habits during their time out west. Hoerner became far more patient from the season's outset but without the results. In the years before that, he demonstrated what I might call measured aggression. He’ll swing, but never at any shocking rate that proves a detriment to his overall output. An O-Swing% lingering around 30 percent isn’t a crazy figure for him because he compensates with regular contact. For Hoerner, it’s more a matter of whether we see him return to a more aggressive style, given that the patience hasn’t manifested in the results he might’ve been hoping for (even if the underlying stuff was encouraging). In the last two years, he’s gone for contact rates of 77.0 and 80.7 percent on pitches outside the strike zone. He also had almost twice as many hits on the road as he had notched all year to that point, including two multi-hit games. It is far too small a sample to declare any level of correlation, but it is an interesting development to monitor nonetheless. In contrast to Hoerner’s rising swing rates, the patience of Ian Happ didn’t yield…anything for him on the trip. Happ, whose evolution into a perfectly acceptable leadoff hitter was documented earlier this week, was hitting .361 and featured a .458 OBP after the Cubs’ last game at Wrigley. He returns at .247 and .353. Happ had a three-hit game in the 12-11 loss in Arizona but only recorded two hits otherwise. He struck out nine times on the road (more than he had the year before departing) against only five walks. There is such a thing as too patient at the plate. Is that what we’re seeing with Ian Happ? Interestingly, rookie Michael Busch is the only hitter emerging from the trip with fewer questions. He recorded hits in seven of the nine games, including his five-game home run streak. He was on base 17 times, with just about all counting stats coming in higher upon the team’s return to the North Side. As genuinely impressive as Busch had already been, the fact that he stands so far apart from his veteran counterparts speaks volumes about his ability to adjust so early in his big-league career. It’s not a surprise, as he showcased this ability at each level, but it does instill a level of comfort that his excellence at the plate thus far is at least remotely sustainable. Again, none of this is to say that the Cubs’ early plate discipline was an apparition. The team emphasized approach in the spring, and each of these hitters has demonstrated an ability to do just that. Engaging so heavily at the plate can also become exhausting over the long term. So we may see lapses as the season wears on, especially when the Cubs are enduring a stretch such as they have been for the last two-ish weeks. What it does, though, is raise some interesting points of emphasis to monitor. We’re watching Swanson, Morel, & Bellinger for their early-season variance. Hoerner to see if his approach reverts to a previous vintage. Happ will determine the line between patience being a virtue and vice. And Busch’s sustainability in the middle of all of it. Ultimately, we’re still playing in the sandbox of small samples. You can’t make declarations in April. But you can ask questions. View full article

How is a switch-hitting left fielder like a two-time Oscar winner? Image courtesy of © Orlando Ramirez-USA TODAY Sports There’s an episode of The Office where various members of the office staff discuss whether Hilary Swank is hot or not. The discussion spirals into a debate which results in a seemingly endless stalemate. This is where I find myself with Ian Happ, with whom I have a complicated relationship. Is he good? Is he not? Is his historically uneven bat the right one to lead the Cubs’ lineup in 2024? Despite being entrenched as the team’s leadoff man (against righty starters) for 2024, Happ doesn’t have the full skill set you’d expect to see from the prototypical player in that role. (There’s also the separate matter of his defense, which is probably not what it’s purported to be, despite a pair of Gold Glove awards that might attempt to say otherwise.) My assumption is that such a perspective isn’t a unique quality among those who follow the Chicago Cubs. The thinking itself – as to whether a player is “good” or “bad” – is black-and-white and, probably, asking the wrong question, in this case. Any level of dismissiveness about Happ undersells what the player has become and the intricacies of his evolution. This is what MLB Pipeline had to say about Happ when he graduated from the Cubs’ system back in 2017: That initial scouting report has proven itself to be varying shades of true over the course of Happ’s career. He’s hit 20 homers in three separate seasons, with 104 of his 124 total dingers coming as a lefty. While he hasn’t been a detriment to the Cubs on the basepaths, he also hasn’t reached anywhere near the 20-20 threshold. The closest he got was last year, when he went 21-14. What’s probably most notable is the variance we’ve seen from Happ in the roughly eight years we’ve watched him. He’s had those years of 20+ home runs. He’s also had seasons where he barely scratched 15. The power, by ISO, has also shrunk a bit, in a more gradual way. Happ has had walk rates touching 15 percent, but also below 10. He’s struck out at a rate over 30 percent on multiple occasions. There’s a lot at play that has both fed into the extremely volatile perception that the collective has of him, as well as his suitability for the leadoff role in which he now finds himself. In terms of the approach, early Ian Happ saw 4.09 pitches per plate appearance. From 2021 to 2023, he went 4.19, 4.00, and 4.15 in the P/PA game. Happ was initially more prone to swinging outside the strike zone, posting an O-Swing% over 30% in two of his first three years. Those coincided with far higher whiff rates than we’ve come to expect from the more modern Happ vintage. He averaged a Whiff% of 15.5% in those early years. This year, Happ has composed himself into a fixture of plate discipline. His P/PA is at 4.68. Only Colorado’s Nolan Jones is seeing more pitches, at 4.72. That’s fed directly into the lowest whiff rate of his career – a meager 10 percent in the early going – and the highest contact rate, at 78.1%. He’s also making hard contact at his highest rate since 2018 (36.2%, using FanGraphs's splits). From a discipline standpoint, Ian Happ is a logical fit atop the lineup, especially given the growth he's demonstrated. Would it be an oversimplification, though, to declare that he just refined his approach in order to fit the bill? Maybe. Pitchers have generally approached Happ the exact same way throughout his career. His Zone% has remained relatively constant, with only mild (and normal) fluctuation in the pitch type he’s seen. One trend that does exist within his approach, though, is his more recent avoidance of the offspeed pitch. Offspeed has represented an area of struggle for Happ throughout his career. It’s represented – by far – his lowest HardHit% output in every year at which he’s been a major-league hitter, while more occasionally serving as the pitch he whiffs at most. This year, however, he’s cut down his Swing% against offspeed pitches to just 39.5%. That would be his lowest total by a wide margin if it’s sustained. His ability to recognize and lay off that pitch certainly speaks to the significant growth we’ve seen in his overall plate discipline thus far. It’s a development not entirely dissimilar to Dansby Swanson, though for Happ, it’s more about pitch type avoidance rather than needing to hone in on one specific pitch. The “prototypical” leadoff man has become something of a rare breed at this level to begin with. Gone are the days of contact-oriented hitters who can get on and steal a bunch of bases. They still exist, but usually more as one-tool-or-the-other. Instead, you’re just looking for that consistent on-base presence that the other guys can drive in. Ian Happ has evolved into exactly that type of player. Again, the question of whether Happ is a strong, consistent bat probably isn’t the right question--especially within the context of him in the leadoff spot. The actual issue is just how his evolution led him to being in that position in the first place. A potential 20-20 guy with a high strikeout rate early on has instead become one of the most patient hitters in all of baseball, demonstrating recognition on specific types of pitches. The absence of power thus far (.130 ISO, even after his drought-busting first homer Tuesday night) is certainly worth pondering; in a general sense, though, the refinement evident in his approach makes him the ideal tone-setter for this group, especially given the early emphasis on quality plate appearances. View full article

Last year, the Cubs were a very good baserunning team. Will that success and aggressiveness carry over to 2024? Image courtesy of © Kevin Sousa-USA TODAY Sports The 2023 iteration of the Chicago Cubs was one of the best baserunning teams in Major League Baseball. FanGraphs’ Base Running metric (BsR) takes the following into account as part of its calculation: Ultimate Base Running (UBR – a measure of each baserunning event) Weighted Stolen Base Runs (wSB – the contributions of a player stealing bases measured by runs) Weighted Grounded into Double Play Runs (wGDP – essentially the ability of a player to stay out of double plays) Last year’s Cubs came in with a 7.8 BsR figure, which ranked ninth in the league. Narrowing the field to only National League counterparts, they ranked fifth. The team’s 140 steals ranked eighth among big league squads, with their eight-most caught stealing (34) easily attributable to that aggressiveness. They also hit into the second-fewest double plays (95), with only Pittsburgh’s 92 sitting lower. It made sense within the composition of last year’s roster. Nico Hoerner was a stolen base demon with 43 steals (fifth in the league), followed by Cody Bellinger’s 20 and Ian Happ’s 14. Miles Mastrobuoni (13) & Nick Madrigal (10) each hit double digits, with another host of players contributing a few swipes to the effort. With that group’s offensive contrast of on-base and contact ability against a lack of power and ending on the higher side of GB%, getting runners in motion was a reasonable tool for the team to generate offense. Despite minimal roster turnover, it’s a strategy that hasn’t carried over into the subsequent season. Not that that’s super unique to the Cubs. As of this writing, the Cubs have just a pair of steals. Mind you, they aren’t trailing the rest of the league by a wide margin. A few clubs have just three to date. But none of those teams were as active on the basepaths as the Cubs were last season. They also have only two caught stealing, leaving very little indication of any aggression in that facet of the game thus far. This brings us to one important point and one important question: The point is that just because the Cubs aren’t attempting to get runners moving at the same rate as 2023 doesn’t mean they aren’t demonstrating quality on the bases. Our friend, Brett Taylor, over at Bleacher Nation, aggregated a few details about their baserunning performance to date. Those details include the fact that the Cubs are moving runners from first to third at the highest rate in baseball, in addition to leading the field in Statcast’s XBR comprehensive baserunning metric by a fairly wide margin (a measure by which they were tied with Atlanta as the league’s fifth-best baserunning team in 2023). The question is whether the Cubs must be aggressive on the basepaths to generate sustainable offensive success. Given the overall lack of roster turnover, this seems a valid question based on last year’s stolen base output. At a quick glance, however, steals don’t necessarily equate to more production. Not directly, at least. The top five teams in steals last year were as follows: Cincinnati (190), Arizona (166), Kansas City (163), Tampa Bay (160), and Cleveland (151). Those teams ranked ninth, 15th, 23rd, fourth, and 27th in the league in runs scored, respectively. Only Tampa Bay (fourth again) and Cincinnati (10th) sat in the top 10 in on-base percentage. Only the Rays were in the top 10 in hitting with runners on, as well. For those teams, it would appear that speed on the bases didn’t correlate with an increase in productivity. The Cubs' offensive success in the current season is not solely dependent on steals. They are in the top five, with runners on in wRC+ (140), K% (16.5), and BB% (14.2). They’re seventh in average (.290) and ISO (.193). Their ability to provide quality plate appearances with runners on and subsequently move those runners, especially given the first-to-third note provided by Brett in the above article, suggests that steals are not a necessity for them. Their strategy of working counts and working deeper into the lineup allows them to generate runs even without incorporating the speed element. The fact that steals are down across the league only furthers the Cubs’ case for not demonstrating the same aggressiveness as last year. Without a genuinely comprehensive lineup, steals are almost a futile endeavor for some clubs. A peek at the team's stolen base leaders over the last few seasons doesn’t present any real correlation with run production. Many of the frontrunners in that category are much farther down the leaderboard in runs scored. However, a starting nine that runs deep in their ability to turn in quality PAs will see runs manifest in a much more organic way. This is what we’ve seen with the Cubs in the early going. Does this mean the Cubs are content not to demonstrate aggressiveness in the longer 2024 term? Perhaps not. After all, their real go-getter in the SB game, Nico Hoerner, is off to a wildly slow start. Maybe once he shows up on the bases at a higher frequency, there’ll be at least a marginal shift. In the interim, though, I think we continue to see the Cubs play it as conservatively as possible in that sense, which seems to be…just fine. View full article

The whole Chicago Cubs lineup seems to have a clear idea of what they want to do in each plate appearance. Their shortstop, highest-paid player, and steady leader might be the player thriving most on that intentional mentality. Image courtesy of © Orlando Ramirez-USA TODAY Sports Earlier this week, I raved about the Chicago Cubs’ offensive approach to start 2024. From top to bottom, the lineup looks like a group of professional hitters, ready to wear down opposing starters and chew through their bullpens. After doing it against the Los Angeles Dodgers throughout the weekend, they did it again to old friend Yu Darvish in San Diego on Monday night. The outcome of that game notwithstanding, Darvish threw 65 pitches across three innings as the Cubs notched as many hard-hit balls as whiffs (seven apiece). Fixed in the middle of that offensive battery is Dansby Swanson. The Cubs’ shortstop is off to a .270/.378/.514 start through 45 plate appearances, walking more than 15 percent of the time and hitting for considerable power. His walk rate and ISO put him in the top 30 among current qualifiers entering Tuesday's games; his Hard Hit% – at an even 50.0 – ranked sixth overall. It’s likely an unsustainable start, but it mirrors his strong April from last year fairly closely. After the season’s first month in ‘23, Swanson was hitting .286 and reaching base at a .412 clip, largely thanks to a walk rate near 18 percent. There was no power to speak of (.061 ISO), but he was making solid contact. At 9.9%, his soft contact rate in the first month was his second-lowest in any month-long stretch last season. That start ended up being unsustainable, not because he was doing anything outlandish from the jump, but because he got away from what makes Swanson such a threat at the plate: he was inconsistent in his aggressiveness against the fastball. Last September, I wrote at Pitcher List about the enigmatic month-to-month performance that has been a hallmark of Swanson's career. Many Atlanta fans felt the need to point out to me – in as condescending a fashion as possible – that Swanson’s offensive game is prone to variance. That variance is borne out of his inability to maintain a consistent approach. This is most notable in his insistence on hacking at non-hard stuff from opposing pitchers. We shouldn't expect opposing pitchers to approach Swanson with a majority of fastballs in every plate appearance, especially given his prowess against that pitch type. But his down months aligned with his swing tendencies; when Swing% against other pitch types far exceeded Swing% against hard stuff, the overall output went down. This fairly obvious element of Swanson’s offensive game is also what has me juiced about this start. Unsustainable? Sure. Encouraging, still? You bet. To date, Swanson is swinging at fastballs 43.4 percent of the time. The next-closest umbrella category is offspeed stuff, at 37.9 percent. That’s exactly what you want. His Hard Hit% against the former is an obscene 69.2 percent. Perhaps more importantly, though, he’s demonstrating a keener awareness of the strike zone. His overall Swing% sits at just 39.9 percent to date, including only 19.4 percent on pitches outside the strike zone. Fastballs are more likely to be in the strike zone than are breaking or offspeed pitches. In what is surely an oversimplification, this trend indicates to me that Swanson has been successful in identifying fastballs and prioritizing those in swings, more so than in previous years. Even better? That trend comes with opposing pitchers throwing him fewer fastballs. At 46.6 percent, it’s the lowest rate of fastballs seen in his career to date. With that in mind, nothing about Swanson’s start is surprising. He’s feasting on fastballs, as he’s set out to do for his entire career. The difference, at this point, is that he appears to be succeeding. We don’t know the source or whether that component is sustainable, especially given how much volatility has prevailed in his offensive output in his career. One imagines with the Cubs’ approach running this deep, though, the broader context of the lineup could offer him more opportunity at sustainability than he’s ever had. View full article

Facing as stern an early test as the season can offer, the Chicago Cubs answered with an awesome offensive display this weekend against the Dodgers. It was their approach at the plate that stood out most. Image courtesy of © Matt Marton-USA TODAY Sports You can’t glean a ton from a three-game series early in the year. You can glean even less when the series finale is plagued by the field conditions that the weather wrought on a Sunday afternoon at Wrigley Field. Nevertheless, it’s difficult to look at the outcomes of the weekend set against the Los Angeles Dodgers and not get excited about the prospects for this Chicago Cubs team. After all, this was the measuring stick at this point in the year. With all due respect to the defending champions down in Texas, it was the Dodgers who acquired seemingly everyone over the winter, started 7-2, and featured an early +15 run differential heading into the weekend. The Dodgers, with Mookie Betts looking like the best player in baseball and sporting massive stuff from their starters on the mound. You don’t put too much stock into a series at this juncture, but you also want to see how your team can hang. Early on, it didn’t look great. With only modest additions over the winter, nobody places the Cubs within the upper tier of the league. A potential NL Central division champion? Sure. But that’s kind of where it ends. That perception was compounded by the Dodgers tagging Kyle Hendricks for a pair of runs in the first inning on Friday, before Bobby Miller promptly struck out the side in the bottom half of the inning. The vibe at that point was, “Well, yeah, this is kind of how this will probably go.” Almost immediately, however, the Cubs shifted the flow of the game back in their favor (he said, trying to avoid using the word momentum at all costs). The offense kept putting in the work on Friday, even as the Dodgers kept banging at the door of a comeback. Even a loss on Saturday couldn’t dampen the home nine, so the rain tried to do so on Sunday. Still, the Cubs thumped Los Angeles up and down the box score. Taking two of three from the Dodgers – at any point in the year – adds a certain level of moral victory to the black-and-white one that goes into the standings. Stealing one would’ve done so. Taking two in the most assertive fashion possible feeds into an unquantifiable level of confidence. If we are to quantify it, though, and lean into the idea that the Cubs put on an auspicious display over the weekend, we can attribute that all almost directly to the quality of their plate appearances. Throughout the lineup, the team was an absolute nightmare for Dodger pitchers to deal with. On Friday, Miller ended up throwing 58 pitches in 1 2/3 innings. He didn’t escape the second, after the Cubs put it on him. Yoshinobu Yamamoto threw 80 pitches across five frames (though dazzling ones) on Saturday. To close out the weekend, they made Gavin Stone throw 77 in just three innings of work. In 9 2/3 innings – which, on its own merit, says something about the Cubs throughout the weekend – Dodgers starters threw 215 pitches. It wasn’t so much that the Cubs were able to cash in their high-level plate discipline for walks. Sure, they walked six times on Friday, but then only matched that in the final two games of the series combined. What they did, instead, was parlay that approach into consistent, high-quality contact. Their Hard Hit% in the three games went 37.0, 54.5, and 43.5. The rate in the second and third games far exceeded that of the Dodgers’ all-world lineup. Obviously, that’s impressive on its own. There’s a conversation to be had about the Cubs’ approach to pitching against the LA lineup on the other side, but zeroing in on the team’s own lineup really speaks to what this team is attempting to do at the plate. While that three-game sample demonstrated their commitment to patience, the broader picture thus far speaks to exactly the same concept. The Cubs lead the league in walk rate, with a 12.7% mark ahead of the second-place New York Yankees and their 12.1% clip. Their on-base percentage is tied with Texas for tops in the league. Only the Kansas City Royals (38.7) & Los Angeles Angels (37.9) are making hard contact at a higher rate than the Cubs (36.4), and that's on a per-batted ball basis, rather than a per-plate appearance one. The North Siders are seeing 3.94 pitches per plate appearance, which is above the league average. The individual standouts further this narrative. Ian Happ is at 4.6 pitches per trip to the dish, walking at a rate of 16.3%, and reaching base at a .442 clip. Dansby Swanson (4.5), Michael Busch (4.2), and Seiya Suzuki (4.1) are all well above the individual average mark for P/PA (3.9). All four are in the top 35 among 207 qualifying position players in Hard Hit%. Simply put, the respective approaches that we saw from Cubs hitters over the weekend were microcosms of what they’ve turned in through the first week-plus of regular season action. That’s exactly what they need to do on that side of the ball. We’ve (I’ve?) spilled a lot of digital ink discussing how the Cubs need to be excellent on defense, in order to support a largely soft-tossing pitching staff. Similarly, the offense needs to bring a “grind” approach to their plate appearances in order to generate offense for a group that isn’t as stocked with raw talent or star power as several others throughout the league. Such an approach is how this team is capable of hanging around with some of the very best in the league. That level of diligence manifesting as confidence in their plate appearances is a nightmare for opposing pitchers; the Dodgers are now keenly aware of this, and the Cubs have an opportunity to continue the trend against at least three or four additional contenders through the rest of the month. Whose at-bats have stood out to you most in the season's first 10 days? What do you still want to see the team do better or differently? Join the conversation below, as we await a late game for the Cubs on the West Coast. View full article

The Chicago Cubs just might have an infielder with 40-homer upside, but without the hulking physique of the game's other great sluggers. Sound familiar? Not so fast. Image courtesy of © Matt Marton-USA TODAY Sports Javier Báez is one of my favorite players to wear a Chicago Cubs uniform. I know I am not unique in that regard. With that in mind, it’s worth noting that nothing said herein about his output or skill set is meant to disparage the player. At some point, though, he locked in who he is, for better and worse In the field or on the basepaths, he created moments on a baseball diamond that you were sure you had never seen before. While the timing of his trade to New York aligned with the departures of much of the rest of the team’s championship core, the void he left just felt larger (save for Anthony Rizzo, whose trade left a different type of absence). There was a level of eagerness and anticipation that vanished from this lineup and has been difficult to replicate since. That's why the comparisons between Báez and Christopher Morel seemed at least mildly appropriate as they gained steam last season. A young, charismatic presence. A product of the Cubs’ own system. Intense swings. Loud contact. Genuine emotion on the field. It made a certain degree of sense at the time, as Morel completed his breakout in 2023. The more tangible components of their respective games reinforced the comparison. This specifically manifested in their free-swinging style. On three occasions, Báez has posted a strikeout rate over 30 percent. Morel has done it in each of the last two seasons. As a Cub, Báez posted an ISO of at least .250 twice. Morel did it last year. Big power, bigger whiffs. You could argue it’s natural that the two would be juxtaposed with one another in a Cubs context. Those comparisons seem less appropriate now, for two main reasons on opposite sides of the ball. Let’s knock out the defensive comparison first. Báez has largely always been a plus-defender. He’s never registered as a below-average glove by OAA, and only once fell on the wrong side of 0 according to DRS at shortstop. Morel hasn’t found a defensive home, and has struggled early on in adapting to a more permanent spot at third base. Of course, that aspect was never the reason for the comparison. It was always about the offense. At the plate, Báez never appeared to make the adjustment with regard to plate discipline. If anything, as his career has unfolded, his approach has gotten markedly worse.. His career strikeout rate sits at 27.9 percent. He’s walked at a clip south of 5 percent. After chasing more than 40 percent of pitches outside the zone early in his career, he’s exceeded 46 percent in that category each of the last four seasons. Early on in 2024, he’s over 55 percent in terms of chase rate. His inability to rein in the impulse to swing has resulted in steadily declining contact quality, as well. In 2022, Báez ranked 165th out of 207 hitters with at least 400 plate appearances in Hard Hit% (26.8). Last year, he was 183rd out of 212 (28.4). He posted identical groundball rates of 49.9% in each of the two seasons. While the Cubs were willing to allow Báez to compensate for his obscene power with the shortcomings of his game, those shortcomings have taken the wheel in the years that followed. It’s left very little value from the bat. Conversely, Morel’s offensive game is maturing into something almost entirely dissimilar to that of Báez (if it wasn’t already). Last year, Javy had the worst chase rate in MLB. He’s also seen 3.66 pitches per plate appearance for his career, including figures of 3.55 and 3.60 in each of the last two seasons. Morel, meanwhile, sits 43rd percentile in chase rate (not great, but not Báez), and is at 3.86 P/PA appearance after two full seasons of big-league experience. Morel’s chase rate, at 32.4 percent in each of his two seasons, is miles lower than the 45.0 percent figure Báez has turned in for his career. There’s probably an argument to be made that the similarities in their strikeout rate are due more to Morel working deeper counts than Morel having a similar approach to Báez, especially when you consider that he’s striking out almost exactly half the time with a two-strike count. Ultimately, Morel is not only making more consistent contact, but also demonstrating a higher quality of it. He jumped his Hard Hit% up from 36.8 percent in 2022 to 41.9 percent in 2023. There’s growth there, but 2024 is showing early signs of being his true establishment as an upper-tier hitter. Through six games, Morel has struck out only twice. His chase rate is a mere 3.2 percent, with a 10 percent jump in his Z-Swing% (80.4). His contact rate is at 89.5 percent. Those are genuinely hilarious numbers. Obviously, this is too small a sample to verify anything, and pitchers are finding the zone almost 60 percent of the time against him – which will surely change – but it does speak to Morel’s intention in refining his plate approach. From Craig Counsell, via the Cubs’ official site: “Really, since the start of Spring Training, it’s just been hard-hit balls and a real controlled aggression, is the best way I can describe it. There hasn’t been chase … That’s just going to make him really dangerous.” Even with the inherent unsustainability of his early plate discipline, a demonstration of growth would be the final nail in the coffin of the comparison. Morel already had more of an awareness of the zone and control in taking pitches, but being able to drop the Chase% on any meaningful level would yield massive dividends in his counting stats and strikeout/walk rates. It’s interesting that our collective perception of their respective profiles is as similar as it is. “Big power, bigger whiffs” represents a massive oversimplification. Morel has always made better swing decisions. If the first week is any indication, that gap is going to grow into something to make us all feel silly for thinking it in the first place. View full article

Was that good for you? That was really good for me. Like, really good. During the Chicago Cubs’ home opener against Colorado on Monday, I came to a realization: There's a shortage of players who get me “razzed” about watching baseball on this team’s roster. The Cubs have a handful of solid baseball players, but it’s not as if they have a bunch of dudes for whom I absolutely have to tune in. While I can appreciate the smoothness of the infield defense or idealized efficiency from the starting staff, there isn’t that unquantifiable thing-you-have-to-see-live element that the stars on other rosters may feature. With the arrival of Shōta Imanaga at Wrigley Field, I think that might've changed. The Cubs’ most notable signing of the offseason (this side of Cody Bellinger’s return), Imanaga absolutely shoved against a miserable Rockies squad. He finished with six innings, a pair of hits allowed, and nine strikeouts against zero walks. But it wasn’t so much the line itself; it was the intensity and upside Imanaga flashed that have me as enthused about any individual Cub as I’ve been in the last few seasons. Over the course of his six frames, Imanaga threw 92 pitches, with four pitch types scattered across the total. Of those 92, 56 were fastballs (averaging 92.5 MPH), 24 were splitters, and 10 were sweepers. He mixed in a pair of curveballs, according to the distribution. Against righties, he went fastball 34 times, splitter 22 times, and a singular curve. Lefties saw 22 fastballs, 10 sweepers, a pair of splitters, and a curve. Here’s the mix itself, for the visual learners: Imanaga has unique movement working in his favor. His Vertical Approach Angle (VAA) – the angle at which pitches approach the plate – checked in at -4.15 degrees, which would put him well above average. His Induced Vertical Break (IVB) – the upward break from release to home plate, relative to what gravity would have dictated – was 18.6 inches. While these are very much concepts yours truly – and the baseball community at large – is working to get a better grasp on, it’s undeniable that Imanaga excelled in both facets in the home opener. Part of having a guy like him in the mix is not only that “tune in” factor, but the curiosity in expanding an understanding of the game, because he’s bringing about a certain fascination with the art of pitching. That art was a martial one Monday, as Imanaga deployed a deadly combination of mix and movement against Colorado. An aside: Interestingly, this helps to showcase a bit of Boston pitching coach Andrew Bailey’s recent remarks on the fastball. Essentially, it boils down to the idea that the fastball is your jab in a boxing match, and needs to be used strategically in setting up the more impactful weapons in a pitcher’s arsenal. It’s not necessarily a new concept, but the metaphor is apt in connecting to what we’ve seen from Imanaga thus far. He doesn’t have top-tier velocity, but he has plus movement. He deployed that moving four-seamer effectively, to the point where the splitter and occasional sweeper were much more devastating than their own raw characteristics would suggest. Another visual: We love pitchability--the capacity to not only be able to locate your pitches where you want them, but demonstrate an effective mix in conjunction with varied locations to keep hitters as off-balance as possible. The above is exactly what you’re looking for from someone nicknamed “The Throwing Philosopher.” Generating whiffs and weak fly balls up in the zone with the hard stuff. Inducing whiffs at the bottom with the splitter. The mix was excellent, and showcased exactly what it is that could make him such an effective starter in this year’s group. Of course, we knew about his stuff coming into the year. Reviews and expectations were mixed on his velocity and place in a rotation. But it was the stuff – combined with pitchability – that was so enthralling. And that’s exactly what we got. There’s a caveat here. On the contact he did surrender on Monday, three of every four batted balls against Imanaga were flies. All of that contact came against fastballs. It’s not surprising, given the intentional deployment of that pitch type in that location. On a cold April day at Wrigley, that’s something you can get away with, but in warmer weather or smaller parks, it's an apparent area of vulnerability. As the season wears on, it’ll be one of his shortcomings to evaluate against his evolution as a Major League pitcher. Ultimately, though, that's summertime’s problem. It can’t hurt me. For right now, I’m basking in one of the more exciting Cubs starters to come around since… Jake Arrieta’s torrid 2015-16? Again, not that the Cubs’ other starters aren’t of a certain quality, or that I’m declaring him any level of “elite.” But Imanaga’s approach and mix makes me want to invest more intellectually, and that’s possibly the highest compliment I can offer a player. Now, at the same time, let’s see what he does against (presumably) a formidable opponent in the Dodgers this weekend. View full article

The big bat the Cubs brought in this winter happens to be a 26-year-old who's not yet established in the big leagues. Can he still deliver like a bigger-name, bigger-money slugger? Image courtesy of © Joe Camporeale-USA TODAY Sports The contrasting reactions to the 2023-24 Chicago Cubs offseason are not mutually exclusive. While it’s true that the organization could have sought more impactful means by which to improve their club, it would also be accurate to note that the team is at least marginally better via those that were made. There’s some nuance to be explored, which will be compounded with subsequent moves made pre-trade deadline and beyond. Whichever way one leans, though, it's all about to go from exhibition to exhilaration--from nattering to mattering. We now have a firm idea as to the roster construction for the outset of 2024. Whatever decisions remain in play regarding lineup construction or defensive configuration, we can be sure that Michael Busch will be a centerpiece in all of it. Critics of the Cubs’ offseason will almost certainly point to the lack of offensive additions at clear areas of need. Above all, that included first and third base, both of which featured wavering performance and a lack of future clarity. Cherry-picking a few numbers, the team ranked 17th in ISO (.174) and 27th in on-base percentage (.299) at first base last year, while hanging 13th in ISO (.166) and 11th in OBP (.323) in the opposite corner, with the latter spot only walking 8.1 percent of the time (ranked 18th). They were also a middle-tier operation on both sides of the infield from a defensive standpoint. What’s notable about those spots, above all, is that they’re the two without any long-term certainty. Basically every other position is locked in for at least the next two years, or has a prospect at the upper levels ready to step in. As such, it was extremely logical to see names like Matt Chapman or Pete Alonso floated in connection with the team. The absence of a more impactful addition – given the lack of true standouts on the offensive side – left us ultimately disappointed that a marquee addition didn’t occur at either of what represented the team’s only legitimate openings for ’24. Enter Michael Busch. It’s not as if the Cubs didn’t do anything to address the corners. I’m excited to watch Christopher Morel at third base. And as far as Busch is concerned, when the team acquired him from the Los Angeles Dodgers, my immediate reaction was that he’d slot in at that spot. That was quickly dispelled, and we can fully anticipate him manning first base, instead. While the team has indicated they could “protect” him against lefties early on – something that was further solidified with the addition of Garrett Cooper – Busch will get ample opportunities to nab a long-term role for himself out of that position. With that, however, a pair of questions are left lingering: How much can the Cubs rely on a breakout from Michael Busch? and How much do they need a breakout from Michael Busch? As far as the former is concerned, it’s impossible to know when, or if, a prospect will realize their potential. In Busch’s case, though, things look good. He spent time in Double-A in both 2021 and 2022. He was at Triple-A in 2022 and 2023. Over each of those sets of years, he showed significant growth in adjusting to the level. With the Dodgers’ Tulsa affiliate, Busch’s 2021 slash was .267/.386/.484 across 495 plate appearances. He struck out 26.1 percent of the time and walked at a 14.1-percent clip. His ISO sat at .218. With the exception of the strikeout rate, there’s nothing there to be upset about. But he built on that in 2022, with an obscene .306/.445/.667 line in 137 PAs before being called up to the next level. The punchout rate remained about the same, but he bumped the walks up to 17.1 percent and the ISO to a hilarious .361. Smaller sample size, of course, but he demonstrated marked improvement almost across the board before heading up to Oklahoma City (‘up’ in level; I am uneducated as to the actual geography of the state of Oklahoma). [Ed. note: He went down and left; Oklahoma City is about 105 miles southwest of Tulsa. I was curious. You were curious. Yes, you were. You were curious. Admit it.] The trends in Triple-A were much the same, if not slightly more encouraging. In over 500 PAs, Busch secured a .266/.343/.480 line, a .214 ISO, 26.0 K%, and 9.9 BB%. He followed that up with .323/.431/.618, a .295 ISO, 18.8 K%, and 13.9 BB% in 469 trips to the plate in 2023. So while the sample size remained large, he showed an ability to not only generate more walks, just as he had in Double-A, but limit the punchouts, too. The bat, in multiple respects, has always been Busch’s primary tool, but he demonstrated a clear penchant for adjustments at each of the two levels. One imagines that trend leaves him set up for the coveted breakout, especially with the runway he’ll get with the Cubs (one which he was not afforded in LA). Which brings us to the latter query. A breakout from Michael Busch isn’t at all an unrealistic scenario, but how much do they need that breakout to occur to find success within the larger context of the National League? The Cubs didn’t have an issue manufacturing runs last year. Their 819 runs were third-most in the NL. They walked a fair bit (ranked fifth), didn’t strike out a ton (ninth-best K%), and were aggressive on the bases (fourth in steals). Where they came up short against their Senior Circuit counterparts was in the power game. The Cubs’ home run total (196) ranked eighth in the NL, their ISO was seventh (.167), and they were ahead of only Washington in Hard Hit% (30.7). While there may be some room for growth out of the other regulars (perhaps an uptick in power from someone like Cody Bellinger), the ISO side of things is fairly well-established for this group. There just isn’t a lot of true impact in the bats. With that offensive output, however, the Cubs fell a game out of a playoff spot. So it’s not as if they scratched every last bit out of the barrel and still fell short. A couple of bounces throughout the year, and they’re playing into October. At the same time, seven of the top 10 squads in ISO were playoff teams. Busch’s ability to get the ball into the gaps and over the outfield walls is going to be essential for this team. Power plays, and Busch has it. Given the lack of other genuinely impactful transactions on that side of the ball, his ability to stick and provide impact reads as imperative as this point in the calendar. The good news is that Busch does have the runway. He also has protection. The Cubs could field Cooper or Patrick Wisdom against certain lefties, to ensure Busch’s development at the top level stays on track. But their presence likely won’t inhibit his overall opportunity in the way that it would have under certain previous managers. Ultimately, as the season begins, the offensive output of Busch is something on which I’ll maintain a keen eye, both for his breakout potential and the Cubs’ 2024 fortunes at large. View full article

As we preview the coming season from a Cubs-colored lens, let's dig into the NL West. It's the home of the sport's top juggernaut, but there are also some legitimate secondary contenders who will be thorns in the Cubs' side this summer. Image courtesy of © Kim Hong-Ji/Reuters via USA TODAY Sports The 2024 iteration of the National League West figures to be less intriguing than past years'. The 2022 and 2023 seasons saw the San Diego Padres take massive swings to dethrone the Los Angeles Dodgers. Those ultimately failed, and the Padres took the all-too-familiar route of “scaling back" their payroll. The 2023 season did feature the arrival of the young Arizona Diamondbacks, but it remains to be seen just how competitive they can be in the larger context of their division. Ultimately, 2024 figures to be exactly what we’d expect. The Dodgers signed and acquired just about every superstar available. They’re the reigning champions, and they will be for the foreseeable future. The Diamondbacks are a playoff threat, sure. But they remain an around-the-margins type of squad. They can beat you in a short series, but they’re not scaring anyone in the 162-game regular season slate. Beyond those two, you’ve got a pair of middling teams in San Diego and San Francisco, as well as whatever is happening in Colorado. Big-picture, there are a wealth of fun players within the division. Some of them even play for teams that aren’t the Dodgers. But when it comes down to it, you’re probably not getting genuine title contention outside of Los Angeles. Despite the pessimistic outlook, here are some things to bear in mind for the NL West in 2024. Los Angeles Dodgers Projected Record: 93-69 (FanGraphs); 101-61 (Baseball Prospectus) Offseason Moves: Notable Additions: Shohei Ohtani, Tyler Glasnow, Teoscar Hernández, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, James Paxton Notable Subtractions: J.D. Martinez, Julio Urías, Lance Lynn Scouting Report Do we need to? At this point, you know the roster and you know the narratives, the latter of which ranged from “They’re the only team trying to win a title this side of Atlanta,” to “The Dodgers are bad for baseball!” Their offense features Shohei Ohtani, Freddie Freeman, and Mookie Betts. Their pitching staff will roll out Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Tyler Glasnow, and Walker Buehler. They’re going to score a ton of runs. They’re not going to allow very many. Anything less than 100 wins probably makes it a disappointing regular season. Big Question: How will Mookie Betts, Starting Shortstop play out? It’s a hilarious offensive setup. The pitching upside is in the stratosphere. It’s probably only on the defense where we see legitimate questions. Mookie Betts is now the starting shortstop. His handling of the spot merits some concern. Max Muncy was also one of the worst fielding third basemen in baseball. Last year, the Dodgers were able to compensate for some of Muncy’s shortcomings, because Miguel Rojas was adept at moving to his right. Betts hasn't yet demonstrated the ability to make that difficult play consistently, so you have to wonder what that side of their infield will look like from a performance standpoint. Arizona Diamondbacks Projected Record: 83-79 (FanGraphs); 85-77 (Baseball Prospectus) Offseason Moves: Notable Additions: Joc Pederson, Eugenio Suárez, Randal Grichuk, Eduardo Rodríguez Notable Subtractions: Evan Longoria, Tommy Pham Scouting Report The Snakes were a middle-tier offensive operation last year. They didn’t strike out, but nor did they get on base at an elite clip or showcase much power. Their pitching was equally competent, but shy of dominant. They were active this winter, in a scattershot kind of way, in pursuit of a more legitimate playoff posture for 2024. Rodríguez gives them stability in the rotation, while each of Suárez and Pederson gives them some thump at the plate. They also re-signed Lourdes Gurriel, Jr. Speed and defense remain their trademarks. Their 166 steals trailed only Cincinnati for the highest mark in the league last year. Their 31 Outs Above Average ranked second in the bigs, and their 46 Defensive Runs Saved ranked fourth. Their offseason shuffling makes them better, but they’re still built to succeed through the chaos on the bases and the quality of their gloves, and bringing in Suárez to play third could actually weaken their team defense. Big Question: To what extent can the gloves cover for the bats? A rather shocking World Series run made the Diamondbacks the buzzy contenders for LA's title, and they have a right to feel that way even after the late-winter additions the Padres and Giants each made. They probably still won’t be able to keep up with the Hollywood stars over 162, but it'll be interesting to watch the difference in the defense. Arizona was an elite defensive squad last year. The Dodgers’ glovework could be what ultimately leads to their demise (if anything does). How much that bridges the gap between the two, though, remains a question. San Francisco Giants Projected Record: 81-81 (FanGraphs); 83-79 (Baseball Prospectus) Offseason Moves: Notable Additions: Matt Chapman, Jung Hoo Lee, Jorge Soler, Jordan Hicks, Blake Snell Notable Subtractions: Joc Pederson, Brandon Crawford, Mitch Haniger, Alex Wood, Anthony DeSclafani Scouting Report The Giants’ pitching ranked 11th in the league in ERA (3.91) and fourth in FIP (3.98). They featured the league’s highest ground-ball rate by a fairly wide margin (48.7%) and a defensive infrastructure competent enough to support it. Jordan Hicks should add more punch to the former (though it remains to be seen how he’ll succeed in a starting capacity; we've seen him struggle in previous attempts to claim that role), and Matt Chapman will further solidify their defense. Of course, they were also 24th in runs scored (674), 23rd in ISO (.149), and struck out at the league’s sixth-highest rate (24.5 percent). Any hope for contention from this club is probably going to rely heavily on that side of the ball. Chapman and Soler should help in terms of power production, at least (especially as right-handed hitters). Lee gives them a dynamic table-setter, as well. Big Question: Will the offensive additions help, given their home ballpark? San Francisco’s 30-homer drought isn’t a secret at this point. The last Giant to hit that many in one season was Barry Bonds, in 2004. The last righty to do it was Jeff Kent, in 2002. Soler’s done it twice in his career. Chapman’s done it once, but has two seasons of 27. Oracle Park has one of the lowest three-year park factors for home runs in the league, depressing them by 16 percent, but Soler and Chapman have the kind of prodigious power to test its confinement. San Diego Padres Projected Record: 81-81 (FanGraphs); 80-82 (Baseball Prospectus) Offseason Moves: Notable Additions: Yuki Matsui, Woo-Suk Go, Michael King, Jhony Brito, Randy Vásquez, Enyel De Los Santos, Dylan Cease Notable Subtractions: Juan Soto, Blake Snell, Michael Wacha, Seth Lugo, Josh Hader Scouting Report The 2023 season for the Padres made very little sense. They featured Cy Young winner Blake Snell in their rotation. Their staff, as a whole, was tied for the best ERA in the National League (3.73). They scored 752 runs, which left them sixth in the NL and fed into a +104 run differential. Yet, they finished 82-80, needing a late run to even scratch above .500. The two phases of the game were just never on the same page. When the pitching held up, the offense couldn’t score. When the offense came through, the pitching faltered. They still boast Manny Machado, Fernando Tatis Jr., and Xander Bogaerts in the lineup. Their No. 2 prospect, Jackson Merrill, had an outstanding spring and made the roster as the starting center fielder. They just added Dylan Cease to a rotation that has plenty of upside following the trade of Juan Soto. But it remains to be seen whether they can find the balance that eluded them all year in 2023. Big Question: Can the starting staff support the bullpen? San Diego lost Snell, Michael Wacha, and Seth Lugo to free agency over the winter. Snell led the starting group in innings last year, with Lugo second and Wacha fourth. That’s a lot of innings for which to compensate. Cease averaged a shade over five innings per start last year. Michael King is converting to a sustained starting role for the first time, and none of Vásquez, Brito, or Matt Waldon were full-time starters last year. It’s an interesting group with massive upside, and the Friars do have a very deep bullpen, too. Many of their relief pieces are funky or untested, though, which will make it important that the starters chew up some innings and keep pressure off them. Colorado Rockies Projected Record: 59-103 (FanGraphs); 57-105 (Baseball Prospectus) Offseason Moves: Notable Additions: Dakota Hudson, Cal Quantrill Notable Subtractions: Brent Suter Scouting Report The Rockies had the worst pitching staff in baseball by ERA (5.68) last year. They were 18th in runs scored. They’re projected to be the worst team in the NL, according to multiple outlets. There just isn’t a lot of hope here. Nolan Jones is good, probably. Brenton Doyle is a fun defender in center. Kris Bryant could maybe be healthy as a full-time first baseman. But what are we doing here? Big Question: Will they ever be even a little bit interesting? I am simply begging the Rockies to give me a reason to remember that they exist. In addition to the presumptive division champions, there are three viable Wild Card hopefuls here. While the teams of the West need not be the Cubs' primary concern this season, they're relevant to them, because the Padres, Giants, and Diamondbacks have left the path to a non-NL Central championship playoff berth feeling pretty narrow. View full article

Much will be asked of the 2024 Chicago Cubs bullpen, especially the firemen at the end of the game. This group has never before met the challenge of locking down leads for a contender all the way through to October. Can they do it? Image courtesy of © Matt Kartozian-USA TODAY Sports Like the starting rotation, the relief corps for the Chicago Cubs saw only light turnover this winter. Of the 10 arms who logged the most innings out of the bullpen in 2023, only Michael Fulmer and Michael Rucker did not return. Otherwise, it’s a host of re-tooled veterans and high-upside arms comprising the group. This is even more true of the back end. While names like Yency Almonte or Edwin Escobar could be effective as situational arms, those that made up the late innings last year are poised to return in similar capacities for 2024. Only Héctor Neris brings new blood to the eighth and ninth frames of close games. There was some buzz about an established closer, but the organization’s reluctance to pay heavily for relief arms – especially on multi-year deals – quickly ruled them out. Nonetheless, we’re still looking at a fairly stable foursome to round things out. The Locks: Adbert Alzolay, Julian Merryweather, Mark Leiter Jr., Héctor Neris 2023 Stats Alzolay: 58 G, 64.0 IP, 9.42 K/9, 1.83 BB/9, 2.67 ERA, 3.02 FIP Merryweather: 69 G, 72.0 IP, 12.25 K/9, 4.50 BB/9, 3.38 ERA, 3.52 FIP Leiter Jr: 69 G, 64.1 IP, 10.77 K/9, 3.36 BB/9, 3.50 ERA, 3.77 FIP Neris (with HOU): 71 G, 68.1 IP, 10.14 K/9, 4.08 BB/9, 1.71 ERA, 3.83 FIP 2024 Projections (ZiPS) Alzolay: 42 G, 74 IP, 9.40 K/9, 2.41 BB/9, 3.73 ERA, 3.91 FIP Merryweather: 56 G, 56 IP, 11.90 K/9, 3.81 BB/9, 3.97 ERA, 3.82 FIP Leiter Jr: 45 G, 73 IP, 9.25 K/9, 3.58 BB/9, 4.32 ERA, 4.46 FIP Neris: 62 G, 57 IP, 10.29 K/9, 3.43 BB/9, 3.90 ERA, 4.12 FIP Scouting Report While previous starting experience isn’t a rarity among the Cubs’ relief arms, the full-time conversion of Adbert Alzolay to the pen was one of the more enjoyable storylines in 2023. Having struggled as a starter – predominantly with health issues – the Cubs rode him out in relief full-time last year. His four-seam/sinker/slider mix played exceptionally well in that role, as his 22 saves paced the team’s relievers by a wide margin. He struggled a bit in the second half, with contact trends indicating far more line drives than in the season’s first half, in particular. But, by all accounts, he’s the guy in the ninth again for 2024. Merryweather was the poster boy for the type of success the Cubs want to have with their relievers. He had previously struggled to hang on to opportunities in Toronto, ending up as a waiver claim by the team in January of last year. After getting in the lab, he picked up just a little bit of velocity and went super slider-heavy. The slide piece accounted for almost half of his pitches thrown, up from about 20 percent in 2022. That pitch generated whiffs at a 45-percent clip, with virtually everything in the swing-and-miss game representing a career-best for Merryweather. Leiter represents a similar trend to each, in that he’s spun from the same reclamation web as Merryweather while also coming off a shaky second half in the way that Alzolay was perceived to be. In Leiter’s case, his strikeout rate dipped, his walk rate rose, and he gave up a touch harder contact that was more likely to be in the air than the first half. Regardless, he and his splitters and his reverse splits will be heavily featured once again. Neris will be tasked with bringing some stability to the group. He has experience pitching in high-leverage situations, especially coming off a two-year run with Houston. He does tend to let command get away from him on occasion, but brings more punchout potential than many of the other options, both in this portion of the bullpen and elsewhere. The challenge for the late-inning guys is going to be remaining fresh for a full year. The onus is probably more on Craig Counsell in that respect, but given that Alzolay and (especially) Leiter were at varying levels of “cooked” by September, the organization will want to set up this group for more longevity, in the absence of more impactful bullpen additions. Other Options We’ll circle back to the rest of the relief arms in the near future, but it’ll be interesting to see if any of the fringe arms or swing guys work their way into higher-leverage situations as the season progresses. José Cuas looked decent in a small sample. Daniel Palencia and Luke Little are high-upside power arms. Maybe Carl Edwards Jr. works his way back into the fold on a level we didn’t expect. There are bodies there, but their reliability in those late innings remains to be seen. The Big Question: Is there enough late-inning volume? There are questions as to the reliability of Alzolay in a ninth-inning role. I don’t necessarily have those questions. He didn’t take over the gig until the summer; minor performance setbacks were inevitable. ZiPS likes him as the closer again, to the tune of 28 saves. His arsenal plays well. He’s the guy. Beyond him, though, you have to wonder how many arms can step onto the bump in those “clutch” situations. Not that teams load up their bullpen with arms they deem “late-inning guys” necessarily. But even within those four, you do have to wonder about the sustainability. Two reclamation projects and a 34-year-old arm who outpitched his peripherals to an extent don’t engender ironclad confidence at a position with a high rate of volatility to begin with. Again, it’s not necessarily something teams can prepare for, but it’s at least something to be aware of. Of course, that’s also why they’re paying Craig Counsell the big bucks. View full article

We've all spent much of the spring trying to get ahold of out-of-context, odd-angle videos of Christopher Morel playing third base. Maybe we'd get a better perspective by zooming out--way out. Image courtesy of © Rick Scuteri-USA TODAY Sports At this point in the timeline, it appears that Christopher Morel will be the Chicago Cubs Opening Day starter at third base. The previously nomadic defender should have a permanent spot, at least from the jump. It’s a logical way for things to play out, given a couple of factors. The most obvious is that Morel becoming a mainstay there would present the additional benefit of circulating other players in the designated hitter slot, which could ultimately wind up a boon for the offense. The more crucial one, though, is Morel’s skill set in comparison with other options. We’ve discussed the team’s options at the position extensively. Patrick Wisdom offers a decent offensive profile for the spot, but is very much a below-average defender. Nick Madrigal gives you defensive efficiency but is nowhere close to the bat you’d want at the hot corner. The player health variable clarifies this further. Wisdom was limited early in the spring with a quad issue. Madrigal remains out with the latest in what seem to be perpetual hamstring issues. By the time we reach the end of March, Morel will likely be the only candidate to get a full spring's worth of preparation. Even beyond that, though, it stands to reason that Morel merely has to be average in order to maintain his grip on the spot. His offensive upside is such that he can compensate for a lot, especially given some of his comps on that side of the ball in a defensive context. So he’s the guy, basically, until he’s not--even if a couple of early spring errors give us the slightest bit of apprehension. With that, though, we need to consider an important shift in the line of questioning. Not necessarily “Can he hang at third base?” but rather “Can he keep up enough to hang at third base?” Can he grow into the position efficiently enough, even if the early returns aren’t terrific? The distinction lies in the broader context of the position itself. It’s insufficiently specific to say that Morel can start and remain at third base with simply passable defense. What classifies as passable defense at third base is continually evolving. This adds another layer to Morel’s specific situation. Defense – as a whole – has improved across Major League Baseball over the parade of decades. There are a few theories as to why, none of which I have the space to explore right now (but stay tuned). Twenty years ago, teams were committing 0.66 errors per game. Ten years ago, that figure was at 0.60. Last season, errors were committed at a 0.52-per-game clip. Average fielding percentage has gone .983, .984, and .986 over those same leaps in time. Now, obviously, it’s oversimplified in the face of positional context, in addition to the fact that neither represents an effective measure of a player’s defensive skill. Nonetheless, they do provide a snapshot to showcase the simple idea that defense has improved. Among qualifiers at third base specifically, the average Outs Above Average (OAA) figure was 1.1 in 2016 (the earliest point at which we have that data) but rose to 1.7 in 2023. Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) in 2016 was 1.6. In 2023, that figure was 2.8. Fielding Run Value (FRV) – a more comprehensive metric than either of the other two – rose from 1.6 in 2016 to 2.8 in 2023. It’s an imperfect science. The “average” alone takes into account the entire range of defenders, and the individual years do feature some fluctuation. The leaders at the position from 2023 also aren’t on the other side of a massive gap from the leaders in 2016 (OAA leaders went for 18, 12, and 11, respectively in 2016 and were at 17, 13, and 11 in 2023). But the big picture does speak to the idea that defense has steadily gotten better. With expansion more than a quarter-century in our rearview, teams don't have to choose between players who can hit and those who can field as often. It's much easier to find players who can do both, which makes every weakness more glaring than it would have been 20, 30, or 40 years ago. With better positioning and better coaching, too, the conversion rate on balls a fielder reaches just keep rising. In the 1960s, or even in the early 1990s, it might have been possible to get by with a mistake-prone hot corner defender who uses good range to make up for mishaps. In 2024, that's not a viable strategy. The other team's not going to make the mistake that evens the scales. You have to find ways to minimize them in an absolute sense, because the relative cost of each has sharply risen. This question of Morel’s ability to keep up with defensive growth around the league feeds directly into another query. How are we measuring his growth? Should we be looking at fielding percentage and errors while the sample remains small? It would, at least, be indicative of Morel’s individual ability to keep traffic off the basepath, even if we’re not measuring his true skill at the position. We can also look to DRS in examining Morel’s ability to prevent runs as a defender. Ultimately, that’s what it’s about for him at this stage. It’s not so much about converting outs as it is preventing runs. It's a philosophical and complex idea, but also makes Morel’s adjustment far more fascinating as a result. Defensive metrics, on their own, measure different things. That nuance could be essential in evaluating Morel’s first legitimate entry into the defensive world. And maybe that’s where we look for his growth as the season progresses. Is he making the plays he needs to make and preventing runs? Yes? Then the Cubs are fine to keep rolling with him there. The defensive stature of the position itself hasn’t grown by leaps and bounds in a year-to-year context. The growth is essential, but it doesn’t have to be exponential. As the sample grows, the measurement can change. The purpose of this isn’t to oppose or undermine my previous notion that Morel doesn’t have to be great on defense in order to be effective. That still rings true. While the Cubs have built themselves in such a way that success on the margins is essential, they are solidified elsewhere to the point where they can compensate for the occasional third-base flub. For Morel, it’s about the growth. Defense has improved quite steadily over the last few decades. But it hasn’t experienced any sizable jump between years that proved to be permanent. So for now, Morel’s aim should be preventing runs. Maybe later on, we can worry about converting outs. View full article