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The Chicago Cubs enter 2026 as a team that looks largely the same offensively. Some dynamics will shift, of course. Alex Bregman is replacing both Matt Shaw and Kyle Tucker, in two different ways. Moisés Ballesteros is likely to get the first shot as the team's designated hitter, and the platoon partner for both Ballesteros and first baseman Michael Busch is newcomer Tyler Austin. On a team with so little turnover, certain adjustments are going to need to be made on an individual level in order for this offense to ascend. What those adjustments look like, however, differs from hitter to hitter. Let's take a look at what the team's presumed starters at each position (sans Ballesteros, given uncertainty around his role) need to tweak ahead of the upcoming season. Carson Kelly: Sustain the Approach Few hitters were better than Carson Kelly last April, regardless of position. Kelly slashed .360/.507/.840, for a 257 wRC+. It was the kind of month that props up your numbers for the entire year. Unfortunately, things didn't really carry over into the subsequent months for the Cubs' starting catcher. Some of that is natural regression, but a lot of it is due to him losing his approach. Kelly's only two above-average months were April & July. It's not a coincidence that those two months featured his lowest chase rates (very impressive 17% marks). That rate increased steadily over the past two months of the year. The result? His walk rate was nearly cut in half and his strikeout rate spiked by nearly eight percentage points. Plate discipline erodes when players don't get enough time off, and Kelly took on a heavy workload after injuries sidelined Miguel Amaya. Regardless of how much he plays, though, Kelly needs to exercise more consistent patience. Michael Busch: Improve Bat Speed Busch had an excellent 2025. He continued to improve his approach and drove his power figure up, to the tune of 34 home runs and a .261 ISO that was nearly 70 points above what he posted as a rookie. However, Busch's swing is extraordinarily slow for a slugger. His 69.6 MPH average swing speed was ahead of only Nico Hoerner among Cubs hitters last season. He generates tons of squared-up contact (28.9 percent of swings), but didn't gain much traction in the blasts department, which links the ideal contact with a fast swing. While Busch's home run and ISO totals each landed in the top 15, his blast rate was just 76th in the league. There's a nearly unavoidable tradeoff between swing speed and barrel accuracy, and Busch favored the former last year, with stellar results. Still, he might need to rebalance those two objectives to have a similarly strong 2026. Nico Hoerner: Zone Awareness We recently profiled Hoerner, who saw a slight bump in his power output in the second half of 2025 after it was absent for most of the year. There's a bit of evidence that it was due to increased action on fastballs inside the strike zone, but there is more that indicates it was due to where in the zone Hoerner was swinging. Much of his power comes on the inner third of the plate. Even with the slowest swing on the current roster, it stands to reason that a fusion of the two ideas—wherein Hoerner concentrates on fastballs within that preferred zone—could yield more consistent power outcomes. They'd still be modest, but it would be a way for Hoerner to take a step forward. It might cost him plate coverage, though, so he'd need to be slightly more disciplined in order to make that shift in focus work. Dansby Swanson: Swap Power for Contact Swanson's .173 ISO in 2025 was his best since 2021. Despite just average bat speed, he finished in the 80th percentile in hard-hit rate (47.8%) and the 74th percentile in barrel rate (11.7%). A concentration on fastballs helped, as his 55.6% swing rate against them was not only his highest against any pitch group but the highest rate of his career. The issue is that he's not generating enough contact to make the power outcomes as impactful. His contact rate was down about two percentage points from the two previous years, and he whiffed at a higher frequency than at any point in his career (14.3% of all pitches seen). His contact rate on pitches outside the zone dropped by roughly 12 percentage points, too, which is indicative of a player selling out on a pitch type (fastballs) even if not totally selling out for power itself. That loss of out-of-zone contact is also part of the aging curve for most hitters, so he's unlikely to recover it. He'll have to be more focused on contact just to sustain his current level. There's still value in the bat, but more contact would help it to be realized with more regularity—even if it has to come at the expense of taking the occasional fastball. Alex Bregman: Sustain This is more of an incomplete case, as we haven't seen Alex Bregman suit up for the Cubs yet. In theory, Bregman's profile should play better at Wrigley Field than most right-handed hitters. He's not a pure pull-side guy, leaning on left-center for his power more than yanking it down the line like Isaac Paredes. Everything else about his profile screams success; he has a relentless approach with upper-tier contact skills. Given that he's not a barrel merchant, though, continuing to make the type of contact that he does will be crucial for him to avoid the pitfalls that ruined the Chicago stays of guys like Paredes and Trey Mancini. Ian Happ: Increased Aggression Much of Happ's value lies in his plate discipline, so it'd be foolhardy to suggest he overhaul his approach. Part of the nature of working deep counts, though, is that you miss out on fastballs earlier in at-bats and are prone to an above-average strikeout rate. He obviously compensates well with his walk rate, but there's something to be said for Happ trying to be more aggressive in certain instances. In five of the last six seasons, Happ's biggest slugging output came on fastballs. Generally, however, it's that pitch type against which he swings least often (something that is even more true inside the zone). While he shouldn't abandon his sense of the zone, being more selectively aggressive could lead to a more impactful presence wherever he lands in the 2026 lineup. Pete Crow-Armstrong: Make More Contact The upside—the superstar potential—for Crow-Armstrong is obvious. The issue is that neither his speed nor his power can show up if he's forever chasing, and missing. He swung at roughly the same rate of pitches in 2025 as the year before, with a nice bump in the in-zone rate against the chase rate. He also made significantly less contact when he did chase, though. It might be unreasonable to expect him to tamp down the swing rate itself, but more contact could beget more positive results, especially given that speed. He wouldn't be the first aggressive hitter to make that profile work, but it's going to require more competence in generating contact than we've seen to date. Of course, the surest path to more contact is better swing decisions. Seiya Suzuki: Work the Edges Seiya Suzuki is one of the game's most patient hitters, but his approach is highly specific—and the problematic aspects of his patience show up in one particular segment of the hitting zone. As such, Suzuki's situation isn't all that similar to Happ, who could stand to swing with more regularity in general. Suzuki needs to figure out how, on occasion, to anticipate and attack even well-executed pitches on the edges of the zone. His -21 run value on pitches on the shadow of the zone (within a ball's diameter of the edge of the zone, in either direction) was better than only Swanson's -25, among last year's Cubs. Only Busch and Tucker featured a better cumulative run value than Suzuki's 18, which speaks to the opportunities missed by being so precise with the approach. It's not about opening up the zone fully, but taking advantage of better preparation by not giving in to pitchers who locate well.

As observers of the Chicago Cubs, we've all become accustomed to their standard process in building a bullpen. It's the waiver claims, the projects, and the last-chance veterans. Somehow, they've made it work. In the face of that success, though, Jed Hoyer and Carter Hawkins chose to revamp the approach this winter in creating more early certainty that (they hope) will yield some long-term stability. The Cubs' leaders in relief innings in 2025 were Brad Keller, Caleb Thielbar, and Drew Pomeranz. Chris Flexen was a bit further down the list, in sixth. Keller was a minor-league signing who'd last flashed upside nearly seven years prior. Thielbar was a 37-year-old coming off the worst year of his career with the only team for which he'd ever pitched. Pomeranz was in camp with Seattle on a minor-league deal prior to being acquired by the Cubs that April. Flexen was on a non-guaranteed pact of his own. That's four of the top-six arms in terms of volume bearing very little margin for error on a career-level scope. A last chance, if you will. Let's work back farther in the chronology. In 2024, the Cubs had the likes of Tyson Miller, Héctor Neris, Mark Leiter Jr. and Jorge López logging a good chunk of innings in relief. Miller had thrown for three teams the year prior, Neris went unsigned deep into the offseason due to some wildly concerning peripherals, Leiter was an active reclamation project for the team, and Lopez was a very public castoff from the New York Mets. Even the year prior, the Cubs were led in relief innings by waiver claim Julian Merryweather, Leiter on his second minor-league deal, and free-agent signee Michael Fulmer who was playing on a cheap one-year pact. It obviously doesn't account for all of said innings, but it speaks to what we've come to understand as a part of Jed Hoyer's process. Not that the results illustrate reason to be critical of such process. The Cubs ranked 11th in bullpen ERA in 2025 (3.78), 12th in 2024 (3.81), and 13th in 2023 (3.85). If anything, they've managed to improve the process every so slightly over the past handful of years. Results notwithstanding, though, the Cubs, simply, have not been a team that likes to invest heavy finances into their bullpen. They prefer to work it on the cheap via the development of their own arms, a waiver claim of an arm with upside, or hope they can catch fire with a buy-low free agent either past his prime or aimlessly searching for the upside they flashed earlier in their career. Given that, the 2025-26 offseason has represented a sharp deviation from the team's modus operandi in matters of the relief corps. At the onset of the winter, the Cubs lost a number of names to free agency. Keller, Pomeranz, Taylor Rogers, Ryan Brasier, and Aaron Civale were all among those who departed this offseason after logging time in relief for the 2025 Cubs. They also traded Andrew Kittredge back to Baltimore before things even really got moving. Ryan Pressly was gone before the season was. They did, however, re-sign Thielbar. Which means that, of the team's top 15 arms in terms of relief volume, only six remain in the organization: Thielbar, Daniel Palencia, Porter Hodge, Colin Rea, and Jordan Wicks. Only three of those are even likely to be guaranteed work (Thielbar, Palencia, and Rea). In replacing such volume, the team sought a new approach. The waiver claims and collection of minor-league signings are still there. But it may be difficult for them to log too many innings with the likes of Thielbar, Hoby Milner, Phil Maton, Jacob Webb, and Hunter Harvey in the mix. This means that five of the team's (likely) eight relief pitchers are not only established big league arms, but still working to enough effect to be on guaranteed contracts. Maton is coming off the best year of his career. Thielbar and Milner are extremely efficient against hitters of the same handedness. Although limited by injury, Harvey didn't allow a run across 12 appearances last year. Even Webb threw to a 3.00 ERA in 55 appearances. That's a robust group of arms that each feature a track record of sustained success. Sure, there might be a niche quality to some of them (Milner, most notably), but this group takes on an entirely different shape than previous bullpen iterations on the North Side of Chicago. Now, instead of requiring more inexperienced or erratic arms to shoulder innings loads, you're able to put them in more favorable spots and deploy them as supplemental pieces to the puzzle. It's not necessarily about getting a group that favors one result more than the other. Jed Hoyer didn't drive up the strikeout rates or the groundballs. He limited variance. That's the key here. Perhaps even more notably, the Cubs have built this group with an eye on 2027, too. Webb has a club option for the following year. Maton has a second year on his deal. Harvey and Thielbar each have mutual options, which stand as good a chance at being non-fiction entities as any other mutual option in the sport. Let's not overlook Shelby Miller in all of this, who was signed with the express purpose of being part of the year-after's group. Rather than waiting for the bullpen picture to take shape, Hoyer and Hawkins have been much more explicit in shaping it themselves. And while the multi-year factor may be significant, it's ultimately that decrease in variance that rings as the true victory for how the relief corps has been assembled this winter. In a division with a team like the Milwaukee Brewers, you want to force a degree of certainty on your opponents. Rather than let the natural happenings of a game unfold, a bullpen comprised of established guys helps to generate some stability and clearer outcomes, rather than letting a level of control escape your grasp. It won't all work, and the Ryan Rolisons and Trent Thorntons of the world may very well have their day. But the direction is encouraging for a team that hasn't sought to establish certainty in the bullpen this early in a calendar year in quite some time.

No starting pitcher has thrown more innings for the Chicago Cubs over the last three years than Jameson Taillon. In fact, his 445. 1/3 innings since 2023 lead the group by a healthy margin. The gap is due to a combination of injury and turnover, and while those mitigating forces constraining others' workloads is not ideal on its own, that it's led to such a high volume of work from Taillon also presents its share of issues. In general, Taillon's numbers look fine over that stretch. Since 2023, he's pitched to a 3.96 ERA (4.39 FIP) and a solid 5.5% walk rate. You can work with that. But that he doesn't lead the team in fWAR (despite making 22 more starts than the closest arm) speaks to some of the struggles we've begun to see within that timeframe. The 2025 season is indicative of how Taillon's game has regressed in certain respects in the last three years: Note the quality of the walk rate and the fact that his actual ERA fairly reflects his expected one. Each of those will work. Taillon also navigates his way around hard contact effectively. The issues lie in the fact that his fastball velocity has fallen from the 44th percentile in 2023 (93.7 MPH) to just the 20th in 2025 (92.3 MPH). When you combine waning velocity with a minuscule groundball rate, you get a home run rate that has become problematic. Taillon's homer rate on fly balls in 2025 was 13.6%. It was the highest of his career and, no doubt, the byproduct of allowing 23.4% of batted balls against him to be pulled in the air. That his fastball reliance was at its highest since 2021 might also have something to do with it: Taillon's four-seam heater is a fine pitch. It had a run value of 3, while his no. 2 pitch in usage (the sweeper) finished at -9. The four-seamer, though, is responsible for Taillon's highest rate of barrels allowed (10.8%) and his highest rate of flyballs (41.9%). You don't want your highest-volume arm to have a fastball that hittable. The good news is that Taillon's role is projected to shift quite a bit in 2026. Cade Horton emerged as the viable frontline arm that his upside indicated. Justin Steele is nearing his return from an internal brace procedure. The team acquired Edward Cabrera from Miami to fortify the front end of the rotation. If we're assuming full health (a risky proposition), Taillon is, at best, the team's no. 4 starter. In a No. 4—or even a No. 5 depending on the fortunes of Matthew Boyd and Shota Imanaga—you're not looking for the 2018 version of Taillon, when he posted his best ERA (3.20), his best strikeout rate (22.8%), and his highest fWAR (3.9). You're just looking for someone to eat innings while minimizing traffic on the basepaths and, subsequently, not making life difficult for your bullpen. Even with the recent home run issues, Taillon is very much that guy. Over this three-year stretch in Chicago, Taillon has averaged 5.6 innings per start. In 2025, that number was 5.8 innings. His walk rate topped out at 6.3% in 2023, before dropping to 4.9% and 5.2% in the last two years, respectively. He's also coming off a year in which he posted a career-best strand rate (80.3%). So while the fly balls do represent an issue, it's not as if the bases are packed when it's happening. If anything, his splits indicate that with runners on or in scoring, the usage shifts in a manner that stifles quality contact and balls over the fence. Whether that skill is sustainable, even with tailored usage, is a fair question, but he managed it last year. We can outline two important components of Taillon and his role in 2026. The first is that the homers may continue to be an issue, based on usage and underlying trends with his fastball. The second is that such a trend is mitigated, thanks to the fact that he's sitting closer to the back of the rotation than ever. An innings eater free of traffic and a normal transition from starter to reliever within the context of a typical start? The Cubs can work with that.

With spring training games mere days away, the 2026 season is officially underway for the Chicago Cubs. Last year's group carried plenty of intrigue with Kyle Tucker in the mix and the emergence of Pete Crow-Armstrong among the storylines, but it was always a team that felt incomplete. This winter, however, Jed Hoyer and company took measures to ensure that the 2026 roster would look a bit more robust than its immediate predecessor. It wasn't a perfect offseason, of course; it still feels like one or two more moves could have really solidified things from the jump. Nevertheless, it's a roster whose prospects in the upcoming season offer something a little more encouraging than what came before it. Cubs' Offseason Free Agent Signings RHP Phil Maton (two-year, $14.5 million) LHP Hoby Milner (one-year, $3.75 million) LHP Caleb Thielbar (one-year, $4.5 million) 1B/OF Tyler Austin (one-year, $1.25 million) RHP Jacob Webb (one-year, $1.5 million with 2027 club option) RHP Hunter Harvey (one-year, $6 million with 2027 mutual option) 3B Alex Bregman (five-year, $175 million) RHP Shelby Miller (two-year, $2.25 million) There was a certain onus on the front office to be extremely active this winter. For a while, though, much of the action took place almost exclusively in relief. Hoyer and general manager Carter Hawkins were tasked with replenishing a pitching staff that lost Brad Keller, Taylor Rogers, Aaron Civale, Michael Soroka, Drew Pomeranz, and Ryan Brasier to free agency and traded Andrew Kittredge back to Baltimore early this winter. Rather than undergo the more typical process of building the relief corps out of reclamation types, the focus was on veteran arms. Each of Maton, Milner, Webb, and Harvey bring a veteran dynamic from both sides of the mound while Thielbar continues to be a reliable presence set forth by a strong showing with the Cubs in 2025. Miller's deal, however, puts an eye on 2027 considering he's set to miss the upcoming season while he recovers from Tommy John surgery. This updated collection of relief arms comes in addition to the typical smattering of minor-league deals and waiver claims. This talk of relievers buries the lede, however. The most impactful move of the winter was the team's signing of Alex Bregman to a five-year contract. A team that lost Kyle Tucker in free agency — and never really had any ambition of retaining his services for the long term — needed to produce impact offense from somewhere. In Bregman, they get a gap-to-gap hitter who doesn't strike out. To say nothing of the veteran presence he is reported to add to any clubhouse environment. He was one of only two major-league signings the team made to fortify their lineup this winter, as Tyler Austin returns from a lengthy stint in Japan to serve as a right-handed compliment to Michael Busch and, perhaps, occasional designated hitter. While not true free agents, it also seems worth noting here that the team re-signed Colin Rea to a one-year deal with a club option for 2027 while Shota Imanaga returned on the qualifying offer after both sides declined their respective 2026 options. Cubs' Offseason Trades Acquired cash from the Orioles for RHP Andrew Kittredge Acquired RHP Edward Cabrera from the Marlins for OF Owen Caissie, SS Cristian Hernandez, and IF Edgardo De Leon As busy as things might've been on the free agent front, the trade circuit had nary a whisper as to the team's intentions this winter. The Kittredge move happened early, as the team wasn't inclined to pay the $9 million owed to him for 2026. In Cabrera, however, the Cubs made as impactful a move as they could have hoped for. Long-rumored to have interest in a starting pitcher with frontline stuff, the Cubs brought in Cabrera to sit toward the front of the team's rotation. They lost some of their medium-term stability in doing so by trading Caissie (considering the impending free agent status of each of both Ian Happ and Seiya Suzuki), but acquired exactly the profile for which they'd been searching for at least a couple of years. Cubs' Offseason Grade Similar to the 2024-2025 offseason, the Cubs did not have a lot of questions on their roster in need of answers. Save Tucker, much of last year's starting lineup remained intact, while the rotation carried over plenty of the volume from 2025 into the winter, especially once each of Rea and Imanaga were retained in their respective ways. Nevertheless, the Cubs remained a team starved for impact. They needed some on offense to replace Tucker, and perhaps beyond. They lacked the sort of dynamic presence in their rotation outside of Cade Horton. While there's an argument to be made that they could have gone further (especially on the offensive side), the fact that they were finally willing to open the payroll to an addition like Bregman and invest in an arm like Cabrera — in addition to the dramatic shift in process on the bullpen front — signals a shift in the somewhat stagnant modus operandi we've seen from the organization over the last few years. A B+ feels more than earned. Verdict: B+

Through no fault of his own, Miguel Amaya was one of the Cubs' most disappointing stories of 2025. In theory, he showed some very encouraging things. In reality, it's hard to deliver much of anything across 28 games and 103 plate appearances. Injuries derailed his campaign. Amaya hit the injured list with an oblique strain in late May. He took a long time to get back to the active roster and, upon his return, was shut down for the year when he viciously sprained his ankle in mid-August. Such disappointment stems not only from a lost year, but the expectations that were set forth as a result of the second half of the 2024 campaign. Two years ago, Amaya got off to a brutal start. His first-half wRC+ was 59, while he hit just .211 and reached base at a paltry .266 clip. Somewhat famously, Amaya revamped his approach and his mechanics almost entirely. That yielded immediate results: a 112 wRC+, a .271 average, and a .316 OBP after the All-Star break. His slug came along with everything else; his slugging average leapt from .288 in that first half to .444 in the second. There was a great deal more elevated contact, and the overall quality of the contact improved. Given the small sample, though, the question persisted about whether the improvements Amaya demonstrated were sustainable. It turns out, they were, or at least might have been. Amaya's first 100 plate appearances bore a .280/.313/.505 line and a 125 wRC+. The catcher who was once considered an heir apparent to Willson Contreras behind the plate at Wrigley finally looked ready to do so, though he benefited from being in a true timeshare with Carson Kelly even while he was in the lineup. Amaya and Kelly are set to resume their duties as the team's catching tandem. The latter, however, was able to take advantage of Amaya's absence. Kelly (115 wRC+) turned in his first above-average offensive season since 2021, posting the highest average of his career (.249) and his best OBP (.333) and slugging (.428) since that 2021 campaign. Such an output from a position where offense is a secondary concern could impact the timeshare early in 2026. The assumption is that the total body of work will earn Kelly an early edge in playing time, despite the fact that he didn't sustain the numbers posted in a torrid April. It's a sentiment shared by FanGraphs & Baseball Prospectus, as each have Kelly at 55 percent of the playing time behind the plate and Amaya for 40 percent. FanGraphs threw each another 4 percent of the reps as the designated hitter, while BP offered percent for Kelly and none for Amaya in that role. Either way, the bigger piece of the work goes to Kelly. That feels somewhat logical. Kelly's coming off a fine season, even if the splits reveal that it was, perhaps, a career year. Amaya is off a pair of long-term injuries. For a couple of reasons, though, that might not turn out to be the case. Kelly is a free agent at season's end. Amaya is not under team control until 2030. Unless you believe in Moisés Ballesteros behind the plate, the Cubs don't have a long-term plan at the spot beyond Amaya. Craig Counsell and his staff would love to see Amaya win more playing time than third parties project in 2026. The offensive difference between the two players seems marginal. If the second half of 2024 and early 2025 are to be believed, Amaya may offer more consistency in the quality of contact. Kelly, meanwhile, has a more patient approach at the plate that begets a more consistent on-base presence. Both bring something to the context of the Cubs' lineup. The opportunity for Amaya to gain some traction in establishing himself as a viable option down the line likely lies in the glove work. The first thing we tend to look at with catchers is their ability to frame. Immediately, there's an advantage there, in Amaya's direction: Amaya grades as a better overall framer than Kelly over the last three seasons. Obviously, the rate of called strikes goes down the farther a pitch gets from the zone. But there's also an interesting quality to Amaya's game that Kelly lacks: Kelly can grab a strike that is, technically, already a strike more effectively than Amaya can. Amaya, however, is more adept at grabbing a few extra strikes that fail to hit the zone. That's the essence of framing, in a broad sense. The new ABS system could have a bearing on this, but the understanding has been that ABS will help to make good framers better and bad framers worse. The Cubs have a pair of average framers, but if we're to believe in that sentiment on a spectrum, it could play to Amaya's advantage. It's an advantage that Amaya carries into blocking, where his Blocks Above Average over the last three years totals 11 to Kelly's seven. Where Amaya does start to cede some ground, however, is in controlling the run game. Kelly not only boasts faster pop times, but features a Caught Stealing Above Average of 13 in that span, to Amaya's -4. Ultimately, though, this leads to a trend similar to the offensive side, where each does something well that compensates for the other's shortcomings. Each half of the Cubs' duo behind the plate complements the other. That just doesn't answer the question of how Amaya emerges as a long-term starter out of his time working with Kelly. The easy answer is that he might not have to. Kelly's an impending free agent. There may be an organic changing-of-the-guard at the end of 2026 that leads to Amaya's graduation into the bulk of the playing time, just by staying the course. In a logistical sense, that concept of "staying the course" might be the ticket for Amaya to start to shift the playing time distribution early. It's easy to forget about Kelly's struggles for the better part of last year's second half. It's easier still to forget what Amaya turned in on the stat sheet prior to his oblique injury. Factor in the areas where Amaya has the defensive advantages, and it isn't difficult to imagine a world where his own skill set does the work. Last year's volume for Kelly may play to his advantage early (as evidenced by the projections liking him for more playing time in 2026), but there's very much a path for Amaya to do the things he does well in a small sample early on, forcing his way into a more even distribution as it wears on.

Earlier this week, Matt Trueblood explored whether a pair of Chicago Cubs infielders can continue to thrive in a specific nuance within their offensive skill set. That was an analysis of squared-up contact off the bats of Nico Hoerner and Alex Bregman. Relatedly, today, let's dig into Hoerner, and how some of that clean contact translated into power production as last year wore on. In 2025, Nico Hoerner had his best offensive season to date. His wRC+, at 109, was a shade above the previous career mark set in 2022, while his strikeout (7.6%) and contact (89.8%) rates each checked in above anything else he'd turned in prior to last year. Such obscene contact rates aren't always indicative of quality offensive performance on their own (see Luis Arráez), but the combination of all-fields contact and the baserunning component helped him be one of the Cubs' most important bats despite the extremely limited power inherent to his skill set. It's that power aspect of his game that we're most interested in. Hoerner's .097 isolated power was his lowest output since 2021, and his 30.3% hard-hit rate checked in below his career average. However, looking at the full-season numbers might be hiding a small breakout. Hoerner's second half of the season was better than his first in almost every way. He went for a 122 wRC+, with an average that was nearly 30 points higher and a much better OBP than in the first half. His walk rate was one percentage point higher (6.6%), while his strikeout remained about the same. He also hit for slightly more power. First Half: .094 ISO, 27.5 Hard-Hit%, 17.6% Line Drives, 16.0% Fly Balls Second Half: .100, 34.3%, 24.3%, 30.0% The first thing worth noting there is the minimal gap in ISO figures. Isolated power shows only how many extra bases (beyond singles) a player produces per at-bat, but if we were to throw in slugging percentage to fold in his extra singles, we'd see a jump from .377 in the first half to .418 in the second. His expected slugging increased much more, though. Hoerner went from a .361 xSLG in the first half to a .432 in the second. As it was, he ended up with fewer doubles but more home runs than he had in the first half, all in roughly 100 fewer plate appearances. Hoerner was, objectively, a more powerful hitter in the second half of 2025 than he was in the first. That brings us to the natural question of whether or not we'll see any carryover early in 2026. The squared-up contact explored by Trueblood does not necessarily beget power outcomes. The mechanics of a swing are prone to too much nuance to simply declare a hitter who can square the ball up can also actually drive it. In Hoerner's case, there doesn't appear to be anything specific in those mechanics that enhanced his power as the season wore on. His bat speed changed only marginally throughout the months, while each of his attack direction and attack angle fluctuated in noisy ways that don't yield much of a narrative. If we're going to find evidence of real power development, we'll probably find it in his pitch selection. Hoerner's extra-base power comes mostly against fastballs. Fifteen of his doubles, three of his four triples, and three of his seven home runs came against that pitch type. However, there did not appear to be a concerted effort from Hoerner to swing at more fastballs as the year wore on: If there's anything in the fastball aspect, it's that Hoerner swung at more of them inside the zone in the last three months of the year. In July, he swung at 60.2% of fastballs in the zone, which increased to 63.8% in August and 66.4% in September. For a certified trend, however, we need to keep looking. The following is (first) where Hoerner's ISO came from in the first half of the season, and (second) his swing rate by location for that period: The minimal hot spots on his ISO chart are unsurprising, given how little we saw from that aspect of Hoerner's output in the first half. He needed to be able to drop the bat head on the ball and get around it, low and in, to produce power in that span. It's also not surprising that the range of hot spots in the swing rate is as expansive as it is; Hoerner is an aggressive hitter. He got more patient in the second half, though. When we shift each of these zones to the stretch after the All-Star Game, things get interesting. Potentially. While still a pretty wide set, Hoerner's swings became at least somewhat more concentrated on the middle and inner parts of the zone. Where has Hoerner been able to generate the most power in his career? You guessed it: Because of the small sample size, we can't say for sure that this is intentional, but it's a noteworthy change. If Hoerner is more committed to selectivity within the zone, emphasizing the locations where he can generate power but attacking in-zone fastballs, he could sustain a higher level of power production than he's shown for most of his time in the majors. We certainly shouldn't be expecting Hoerner to evolve into a 20-homer guy in 2026. Even his increased power output didn't put him on pace for anything like that. However, Hoerner seems to be honing an approach that can work in a more consistent way, with a balance of elite hitting for average and modest but measurable pop.

Over the weekend, MLB Network announced their annual list of the Top 100 players in Major League Baseball. The Chicago Cubs were well-represented on the list, with their four names — Alex Bregman, Pete Crow-Armstrong, Michael Busch, and Seiya Suzuki — tied for the fourth-most on a given roster. Of course, the more notable aspect of the release of the list is the player that was not included: Nico Hoerner. It's not just the fact that Hoerner finished being only Crow-Armstrong as the Cubs' most valuable player by fWAR in 2025 (4.8). Nor is it that said fWAR finished 20th among all position players last year. Either one likely should have qualified him for inclusion, especially when one considers Hoerner's offensive skill set that featured a blend of a 99th percentile strikeout rate (7.6 percent) and whiff rate (11.2 percent), while he finished in the 98th percentile on the other side of the ball in Outs Above Average (14). It's not even that his omission disrespects his value within the broader scope of the sport. It's that it entirely disregards Hoerner's standing within his own position. MLB Networks' list featured just four players at the keystone: Ketel Marte (No. 19), Jazz Chisholm Jr. (No. 61), Brice Turang (No. 62), and Jose Altuve (No. 81). If not elite, Marte certainly lives in the second tier of positional performers. Chisholm finished with an even split of 31 home runs and 31 steals. Turang had an offensive breakout in his third year in the league, hitting more homers (18) than he did in his first two years combined while adding 24 swipes and playing exemplary defense. Jose Altuve continued to do the things he's always done. If you were to list the top five second basemen in the sport at present, it'd be a tough sell to exclude any of them. There's a reason Hoerner sat atop the WAR leaderboard for the position, though. He, quite obviously, lacks the power upside of the other four. His .097 isolated power was his lowest in a full season even by his modest standards. That shouldn't understate his value elsewhere, though. Hoerner's contact rate (89.9 percent) was more than seven percent better than Altuve's. His strikeout rate was more than seven percent better than Marte's. His comprehensive baserunning metric (BsR) checked in at 4.5, with Turang's 2.9 checking in second at the position.. And that doesn't include the defensive component. Hoerner's OAA (14) at second was miles ahead of each of the names included in the Top 100. Chisholm Jr is the next name on the list of this group at No. 4 (8 OAA). Marte (1) follows at No. 20, with Altuve (0) and Turang (0) bringing their precisely average figures to the table. It's also worth noting that Altuve spent nearly 400 innings in left field while Chisholm Jr was at third base for 238 frames. Not that splitting time at another position should be disqualifying in any way, but if there was any semblance of a positional spread on this list, then it becomes even more perplexing with that fact in mind. Regardless, when measuring Hoerner against his keystone counterparts, it starts to become clear what this particular list values. Those values do not, apparently, lie in contact, baserunning, or defense, but more likely power. From a positional standpoint, MLB Network wanted louder names on the list than a steady, reliable, contact-oriented hitter with an elite glove. Not that we're suggesting that compiling this list is easy. At a given time, there are 780 active players in Major League Baseball. Roughly 12 percent of the league is featured as a result, or roughly three players from every roster if it was evenly spread. Having to include a balance of position players and pitchers makes it all the more cumbersome. Even when you start to reduce some of the percentages as to how many players, on average, might be selected or the overall percentage of names on the list, it's wildly difficult to make a case against Hoerner's inclusion. And we've only discussed it within the context of his position. The good news is that a list such of this can be read as arbitrary enough, given the names and selection factors that may have been involved, to ultimately not matter. It's nice to have the loud skill sets on your roster, and the Cubs have some of that scattered throughout this group of players. Ideally, though, a list such as this doesn't lead to an under-appreciation of the stability offered by a player like Nico Hoerner, who is as worthy as any of those who were fortunate enough to be recognized.

Colin Rea was always meant to be a swingman with the Chicago Cubs. He possesses the ideal skill set and a modest history of amicably filling such a role. The issue is that the fortunes of the 2025 didn't allow it. If you recall, there was a battle for the fifth spot in the Cubs' rotation last spring training. That competition essential boiled down to Rea and Ben Brown, with the other four spots occupied by Justin Steele, Shota Imanaga, Matthew Boyd, and Jameson Taillon. The job, of course, went to Brown, while Rea was relegated to bulk relief and the occasional spot start. He ended up limited to a pair of multi-inning stints across three appearances prior to his first start on April 13. From there, though, he gained a role which he'd never relinquish. A combination of factors led to Rea making 27 starts in 32 appearances last year. Steele was injured and lost for the season early; each of Imanaga and Taillon struggled to stay healthy; and Brown's own unstable performance ran throughout the year regardless of his role. From that April point in the calendar onward, only two of Rea's appearances were in relief, and even those were both 5 1/3 inning jobs following Drew Pomeranz serving as an opener. It was a season that ended up nearly identical to Rea's work in the prior season in Milwaukee. His 27 starts in 32 appearances was the same as in 2024, while each of his 3.95 ERA, 19.2 K%, and 6.6 BB% were just a shade off his work with the Brewers. The most notable change came in the form of a 10.6 percent home run rate that was more than three percent better than his rate in the previous season. Now looking ahead to 2026, it looks as if Rea now has an opportunity to settle back into the role that was tailor-made for him. The Cubs will enter the season with Cade Horton firmly in the rotation mix, followed by fresh acquisition Edward Cabrera and holdovers in Boyd, Taillon, and Imanaga. Steele's return is imminent, as well. That's already six names for five spots. Recent track records of the six names atop the rotation depth chart aren't terrific on the health side, however. For Rea, starting opportunities will remain even with Javier Assad and Jordan Wicks each still floating around the 40-man roster. In the meantime, he'll ply his trade in the swingman role he was meant to serve in 2025. FanGraphs has Rea making just five percent of the starts in 2026 and comprising seven percent of innings in relief. Baseball Prospectus is similar, with six percent of starts and eight percent of the relief share. Either case represents a somewhat diminished capacity considering how crucial he was last season, but this is also the role Rea was made for. In his roughly 600 innings as a major-league pitcher, 544 have come as a starter and the other 62 have been in relief. The numbers between each read as follows: As Starter: 4.65 ERA, 4.66 FIP, 19.5 K%, 7.3 BB%, .326 wOBA against As Reliever: 2.32 ERA, 3.52 FIP, 16.3 K%, 5.6 BB%, .270 wOBA against While the splits read as somewhat jarring, particularly on the run prevention side, it's this that begins to paint the picture of why Colin Rea: Swingman is such an essential component on the 2026 Cubs' pitching staff. The ideal swingman isn't something that's necessarily quantifiable, but more of a broad skill set. It's an idea furthered by his Statcast percentile distribution: The platonic ideal swingman is someone whose distribution looks quite like this. You're not necessarily looking for an arm who absolutely thrives in a particular respect such as velocity or movement in a way that begets high strikeout tendencies. That's a toolbox better served for an inning or matchup-based deployment in relief and prone to much more variability. Further, starters like that are more difficult to find, as being able to stretch that impact across a five or six innings is reserved for a select few that live in the upper tier of performance. Instead, you're looking for something closer to what Rea offers: a dependable set of skills and a high floor. As such, these are precisely the type of metrics we're looking for out of someone in a relief and spot-start capacity. His walk rates are steady regardless of role. He's adept enough at avoiding quality contact that you know he can survive an inning or be run out there for a few at a time, as we saw in four of his five relief appearances last season. Even when accounting for his lack of strikeouts, his low walk and solid contact figures are indicative of the type of stability he brings to the equation, no matter the role. It was probably unrealistic to expect Rea to duplicate his 2025 numbers considering even a modest 1.9 fWAR was far above anything he'd posted in the years prior. But having him settle into a role as a true swingman is the ideal setup for the Cubs. Even six-deep in the rotation at present, it's a starting group with a sketchy past on the health side. Factor in a desire to give someone like Matthew Boyd a break or ease Justin Steele back in, and you have an easy plug-and-pitch option in Rea. As many logistical things are still to be determined with their staff, Craig Counsell and company have at least one certainty on their roster.

Ahead of every spring exhibition season, a large number of non-roster invitees are announced. While the Chicago Cubs have yet to announce their full group, we can already spot some differences from the 2025 assemblage. Last year's Cubs brought 20 players into camp as non-roster invitees. It was a relatively productive group: Brad Keller was an essential bullpen contributor, and Reese McGuire provided key coverage behind the plate in Miguel Amaya's absence. But the context of that roster left that group little room to make an impact, particularly with respect to the positional depth. Generally, the non-roster path is an effective way to build out the back end of a bullpen and (as we'll discuss today) a bench. However, the 2025 Cubs had Gage Workman in camp as a Rule 5 draft pick; Jon Berti in on a guaranteed contract; and Vidal Bruján and Ben Cowles each also occupying spots on the 40-man roster. That meant the Cubs were, on some level, locked into evaluating those specific players for spots on the bench to start the year. Save McGuire, Nicky Lopez would be the lone non-roster invitee (who wasn't already an organizational prospect) to spend any amount of time at the major-league level with Chicago in 2025. It's hard to argue that the guys who clogged the 40-man in camp last spring helped the Cubs. None of Workman, Bruján, Berti, or Lopez made it through the summer. McGuire hung around given the need for catching depth, but there's also an inflexibility wrought by a third catcher on the roster. Had Amaya returned for more than one day between injuries, even McGuire probably would have been bumped. As such, it comes as no surprise that the team has adopted a different style of building a bench for 2026. As things stand, the Cubs have a full 40-man roster. At least five of those names could offer support in a reserve role in a way that we didn't see last year: Matt Shaw, Tyler Austin, Justin Dean, Kevin Alcántara, and, once again, Cowles. Unlike last year's set occupying the 40-man, you're not looking at a handful of players whose value lies purely in versatility (Bruján, Berti) or clinging to hope that some upside may actually still exist, despite all evidence to the contrary (Lopez). There's actual value for the team to deploy these guys in a reserve capacity this season. Shaw is the most obvious, given the upside flashed with both the bat and the glove in his rookie season. Barring a trade, the Alex Bregman signing pushes him into a role where he could see action four or five days a week, depending on positional rotation. If he's able to competently play the outfield, that only enhances his utility. On paper, he's a massive upgrade to the bench. While Austin has some much less versatility—he's on the roster to hit lefties and play a little first base—he's a younger and higher-upside version of Justin Turner, who filled that role last year. Dean brings speed (27 steals in 90 games in Triple A last year) on a level that the team was unable to find on their bench last season, which could push Alcántara into a full-time gig in Iowa. If not, Alcántara's theoretical upside is more than any reserve player from 2025. If the depth chart reaches Cowles, you're looking at a power bump from Bruján and decent speed lying within the versatility he adds. The team also has three non-roster invitees coming in on the positional side, in Scott Kingery, Christian Bethancourt, and Chas McCormick. While Kingery is no more or less than this year's Lopez, Bethancourt performed well in a short stint with the Cubs in 2024, and McCormick is two years removed from being a really promising outfielder. There's still coverage at catcher and the potential for an impactful fourth outfielder, if McCormick can regain any semblance of his old form. In short, while there is a certain level of rigidity inherent in a full 40-man roster, the Cubs haven't backed themselves into a corner. There might only be faint hope for real value from McCormick, but you can afford to roll the dice on a player like that when there's more certainty elsewhere on the bench. Being able to move Shaw to the bench gives the team better positional depth than it had last year. After the struggle to find any semblance of stability in that unit last season, Jed Hoyer and company have worked their way toward establishing something much more helpful for 2026.

For the first time in a handful of years, the Chicago Cubs entered an offseason with year-over-year certainty behind the plate. While there are still some questions about the long-term projectability of the catcher spot, the team knew that they'd have a tandem of Carson Kelly and Miguel Amaya holding down the position in 2026. Such certainty is largely due to the late-stage breakout from the former. Kelly's career-high 421 plate appearances did stem largely from Amaya working his way through multiple injuries. He was also able to spin such heavy work into career marks just about everywhere you look on the stat sheet, if not something very close to resembling one. Each of his .249 average and 9.6 percent barrel rate sat atop his output in each, while his .179 isolated power and 40.3 percent hard-hit rate each checked in as his best work since 2019. His .333 on-base percentage was his best since 2021. At no point over a full season has Kelly's fWAR been higher than the 2.6 figure he posted in his debut with the Cubs. That 2025 output from Kelly has him firmly in the driver's seat to get the majority of the timeshare over Amaya, even with the latter's growth over the last couple of years. Each of FanGraphs and Baseball Prospectus project him for 55 percent of the time at catcher to Amaya's 40. Projections thus far, however, don't love him. Each available model bears some level of regression virtually everywhere. Which leads to questions as to what Kelly did that made him so successful as a hitter in 2025 and whether it's something he can duplicate throughout the 2026 campaign. There were a few factors at play that allowed Kelly to discover the offensive success he had in 2025. The first was in his discipline. His 21.9 percent chase rate was his lowest in six years, while his 20.6 percent whiff rate was his best in seven. He also zeroed in on breaking and off-speed pitches, both of which represented his two highest rates of hard contact (42.2 percent for breaking pitches & 40.0 percent for off-speed). In addition, there weren't necessarily mechanical changes at play, but there was at least one notable timing development: The negative indicator before the number indicates the pull side. Kelly leaned heavily into pull-side tendencies, which is logical considering the lower velocity at which those pitch types are approaching the plate. His Pull% grew from 41.4 percent in 2024 to 45.4 percent in 2025. As a timing mechanism, it's not something that's always going to be in a hitter's control. But if Kelly can continue to maintain the approach that allows him to turn around on pitches that are easier to pull as a general operating standard, then there's reason to believe in some carryover, especially given the fly-ball tendencies that increased along with his newfound love for pulling the ball. Kelly's Pull% and fly-ball rate didn't necessarily grow in step with one another. But he did bump the fly-ball rate up about three percent (42.7). Those two factors resulted in a PullAIR% of 23.9, a figure that ranked 47th among 251 qualifying position players. The lead-up to it makes it repeatable; Kelly attacked breaking and off-speed pitches rather than relying on fastball contact that more so begets hard contact. That he's attacking those types of pitches lends itself to the notion of being replicable, even if you're worried about the bat slowing down from catcher that'll be 32 in July and is coming off his highest volume of work at the plate. The other things that Kelly did well are things he's always done. His 19.0 percent strikeout rate was a notch below the 20.2 percent mark for his career. His walk rate, at 10.7 percent, was in the neighborhood of a career 9.9 percent one. He's always been a relatively disciplined hitter relative to the position he plays. The difference is that he was able to parlay that discipline into something of actual value. And given that we're not talking about a hitter jumping all over fastballs or doing something vastly different on the mechanical side, it doesn't seem at all unrealistic for him to do it again in 2026.

In July 2024, the Chicago Cubs acquired third baseman Isaac Paredes from the Tampa Bay Rays in return for an increasingly position-less Christopher Morel. The thinking was that Paredes would provide them with a controllable option at third base. Instead, Paredes didn't even make it to 2025 as part of the organization. He was part of the Kyle Tucker deal with the Houston Astros, following a .223/.325/.307 stint with the Cubs in 2024. Houston, of course, offered a much more appealing park for a right-handed hitter such as Paredes. While Paredes struggled overall in his brief Cubs tenure, games at Wrigley Field proved to be a particular problem. He hit an execrable .105/.177/.140 when staring down the ivy on the outfield wall, across 96 plate appearances. In his first year with the Astros in 2025, he posted a ..249/.354/.481 line at home. That's hardly surprising, of course. The Crawford Boxes in Houston have long been considered one of the more appealing stadium features for right-handed hitters with any semblance of power. Statcast's Park Factors have it as the 12th-most conducive venue for righties to homer. This, naturally, leads to some questions about how the newly signed Alex Bregman will handle the conditions of Wrigley Field over the course of his five-year deal. Bregman is, in a way, Paredes turned inside-out: a player that has already spent years hitting in Houston, followed by a season in Boston. Each venue is particularly favorable for righty pull hitters. While the Green Monster makes Fenway a tough park for home runs (22nd), it ranks ninth for doubles and seventh for right-handed hitters overall. So how should we view the impending transition for a hitter without elite bat speed or exit velocities and who depends on hitting for power to the pull field, considering that we're not even two years removed from watching Paredes struggle so mightily? As it turns out, any concern wrought by that comparison might be a bit overblown. Let's talk about the shape of each stadium first. Here's Houston's Daikin Park, where Paredes eventually landed and where Bregman spent the majority of his career prior to last year at Fenway: Note the presence of the Crawford boxes and how the wall plays for right-handed hitters with extreme pull tendencies. And here's Wrigley: The Cubs' home park actually juts out in the opposite direction. Toss in the wind on a particular day, and it isn't difficult to understand why this park has represented such a challenge for certain righties. Based on the two players' subtle differences in tendencies, though, we should expect very different outcomes from them. This is Paredes's doubles and homers spray chart overlaid onto Wrigley's dimensions: That's an extreme pull tendency. Contrast that with Bregman: Bregman's ability to find the gap is a big separator between him and his predecessors at the position. When we examine hitters' pull rates, we sometimes fall into the trap of imagining that all pull hitters are created equal; they aren't. Paredes lives down the left-field line. Bregman uses left-center just as often. Because the default is to divide the field into three clusters, he and Paredes both get classified as pull hitters, but if we divided it into five bins, they would be in two different categories. The other big means of differentiation here is in the quality of contact. Paredes's 27.1% Hard-Hit rate in 2024 left him little margin for error if the pulled fly balls weren't scraping over the walls. While his thump increased in 2025, he's still at just 30.6% for his career. Bregman, however, is coming off a season in which he sat at a Hard-Hit rate of 44.4% (admittedly, a career high) and is at 38.5% for his career. He produces more hard contact, and that hard contact goes more often to the part of the park (left-center) where Wrigley is very hitter-friendly. That doesn't mean we should dismiss the notion of the park's impact entirely. There are going to be some swings where Bregman doesn't get the desired outcome because of Wrigley's general deflation of offense, a three-year trend we shouldn't assume will abate in 2026. However, there's much less risk that Bregman's production is diminished by his new home park than there was with Paredes, or even with recent major investments in lefty sluggers like Tucker and Cody Bellinger.

The Chicago Cubs' signing of Alex Bregman represented a significant deviation from the norm, on a couple different levels. Given the team's unwillingness to dabble in the deep end of free agent waters in recent years, it was surprising in the simplest way: they made the splash this time. They also made some unusual concessions. Not only did they hand out the largest average annual value in the franchise's history (even after accounting for deferrals), but they agreed to deferrals to structure the deal the way Bregman and agent Scott Boras preferred it. As it relates to the 2026 club, though, the most eye-opening change of direction might be the way it alters the future of third base—and the future of the team's incumbent at that spot. When the Cubs were attached to Bregman in the winter of 2024-25, part of the thinking was that signing him would give top prospect Matt Shaw a safety net. Perhaps he would eventually come up in response to an injury or supplement the lineup in a utility capacity, but Chicago wouldn't have to force him into the lineup if either phase of the game wasn't quite ready for the top level. After Bregman signed with Boston instead, Shaw assumed starting duties at the hot corner. The results were uneven. Shaw checked in with a .226/.295/.394 line at the end of 2025, wrapping up the year with a wRC+ of 93 and a fWAR of 1.5. His second half was better than his first; he posted a 130 wRC+ against a mark of 60 in the first half. The power also manifested more frequently, with a .258 ISO in the second half coming after a paltry .082 figure in the first. Even within that, though, there was cause for concern. After recording a 127 wRC+ and .307 ISO in August, Shaw's September figures were 95 and .153 in the two metrics, respectively. His 27.7% September strikeout rate was his highest in an individual month, and he notched only two hits in 23 postseason plate appearances. The flashes, in conjunction with the team's aforementioned hesitation of big contracts, left at least a feeling that it'd once again be Shaw's job to lose. Instead, the youngster's future is now very much in question. The wide assumption is that he'll remain on the major-league roster, but in more of a utility capacity. Defensively, Shaw was quite good for the better part of last year. Even if the metrics may not have loved him over a full season, the eye test revealed a player capable of soft hands at a quick-twitch position. Originally drafted as a shortstop, Shaw had experience at each of second base, short, and third across his time in the farm system. Considering the growth on that side of his game, it stands to reason that he could be deployed at any of the three spots on a given day. That's the most likely route, on paper. Have your three veterans entrenched around the horn and insert Shaw for off days or to rotate someone in as the designated hitter. You then have him as a rotation piece in the event of an injury to one of the other starters. Considering the offensive upside and evident defensive development, it's a way to deepen the bench in a way that the team did not see from the hodgepodge of reserve players last season. There is a contractual component at play, as well. Shaw still has another six years of team control while second baseman Nico Hoerner is set to hit free agency after the 2026 campaign. Considering each of their situations, keeping Shaw as the backup infielder in a market bereft of other options makes sense—but it's not the only option. Trading an infielder from the current roster could also help them round out the roster. It's a harder world to envision following the Edward Cabrera trade, but a surplus of viable infielders ignites the trade rumor instincts all the same. Hoerner has been the more oft-discussed trade chip. His impending free agency and the fact that his name has surfaced before ensure that. That doesn't mean Shaw could be completely immune, however. In his discussion of the Cubs' deal with Bregman, The Athletic's Keith Law noted the following (paid subscription required): We have no way of knowing what the inner workings of the team's clubhouse might look like, last year or in the upcoming season. When you add resistance to coaching, though, you run into some issues that a front office may be more unwilling to tolerate. A Shaw trade is more likely than a Hoerner one. Ultimately, though, the most likely outcome remains the one directly in front of them: Bregman takes over at third, Hoerner plays out his final year of his contract, and Shaw spends the interim bouncing around the infield. Perhaps he gets a stint in Iowa at some point just to work on his offense in a full-time capacity, but a secondary benefit of the Bregman deal was its lengthening of the bench. Keeping Shaw does that in the lowest-friction way possible.

Jed Hoyer and the Chicago Cubs might've taken a long time to get it done — with rumors that go back to the 2025 trade deadline depending on who you ask — but they were, finally, able to acquire a cost-controlled starting pitcher with top-of-the-rotation upside in Miami's Edward Cabrera. He and his changeup/curveball-driven arsenal will slot in near the top of the team's rotation alongside the likes of Cade Horton and, eventually, Justin Steele. What Cabrera brings to the Cubs has been well-documented here by each of Matt Trueblood & Jason Ross. He's a still-evolving pitcher who broke out in 2025 and adds the type of swing-and-miss that the Cubs were lacking in their starting five outside of Horton. It's obviously a worthwhile deal for the Cubs given their need for such a presence in the starting mix, and it represents a long-awaited impact move for the franchise this winter. That doesn't mean it's without risk, however. Whenever a trade of above-average magnitude is made, one automatically shifts focus to the players that were given up in the deal. It was an immediate realization upon the departures of Hayden Wesneski, Cam Smith, and Isaac Paredes in last offseason's deal to bring Kyle Tucker to Chicago. Of course, the context here differs dramatically both in terms of positional value, team control, and the immediate impact from an organizational standpoint. Unlike the trio sent to Houston in December 2024, Owen Caissie was the only one of the three players sent to Miami sent to contribute this year. Caissie's departure leaves the Cubs with even less power than they had in the mix following Tucker's own goodbye in free agency. But it also clears up what was sort of a murky picture between right field and designated hitter, with space now free for Seiya Suzuki and Moisés Ballesteros to operate in those two positions, respectively, and room for Kevin Alcántara to supplement them either way. The power component, though, is where the risk starts to manifest. The team lost Tucker's .218 first half ISO from 2025; now, they've let Caissie's .265 figure from Iowa head down to sunny Florida. Those are two very abstract concepts in one sentence. Tucker struggled down the stretch (primarily due to health), and we don't know for sure how Caissie's power would've translated to full-time big-league work. This is also a team that saw a more than 20-point drop on the ISO side in the second half of the season. Between the second departure of what could have been a reliable power bat and the trends with which we left 2025, there's a lot of uncertainty in terms of power-related impact in the team's lineup. Caissie's involvement in the trade only enhances it. There's always the possibility that one or both of Cristian Hernández or Edgardo De Leon turn into legitimate players at the major-league level, too. Those timelines, however, are much further down the road due to the fact that the former's bat still has a ways to go and the latter is only 18 years old. If the Cubs regret moving either player, we probably won't know for a handful of seasons. So, in terms of the risk on the Cubs' end, as far as outgoing players, it's all about the power potential they lost in Caissie and may or may not replace this winter. The much larger risk component here lies within the player they acquired himself. The knock against Edward Cabrera is that he's coming off one year of established success largely due to his inability to stay on the mound. Cabrera has been on the injured list eight times(!) since 2022, primarily due to elbow and shoulder issues. In 2025, he started the year late due to a blister, left a start in July after experiencing elbow discomfort, and landed on the IL to start September following a right elbow sprain. His 137 2/3 innings covered last season were the most in his career by a wide margin. Can the Cubs reasonably expect him to throw much more than that considering the history? There's a performance factor here, too. As good as Cabrera's stuff can be, there's also a quality-of-contact issue. He sat in the 45th percentile in barrel rate (8.8 percent) and the eighth percentile in hard-hit rate against (46.4 percent). His walk rate was only in the 43rd percentile (8.3 percent). So, while he may generate plenty on the whiff and strikeout side of things, performance concerns still abound given some of the outcomes we saw in his breakout year. It may be somewhat paradoxical to clamor for Jed Hoyer and the team's front office to make a substantial move and then voice concerns when it finally happens. That isn't what's happening here, however. These are, objectively, concerning things. A high-velocity pitcher — even utilizing it less than he once did — with a history of shoulder and elbow trouble is a worrisome addition. On the other side, one hopes the team's pitching infrastructure can, at least, help him to get some of the contact issues in order. Perhaps the most important thing to note is that while this move is an actual risk, it's a worthwhile one for the Cubs. Yes, they dealt their No. 1 prospect and some additional upside to get him. But he's also an arm that presents as much upside in his own right as anyone on this staff not named Cade Horton. To say nothing of the three years the team will get to have him inside the organization, at minimum. It's a whole lot of abstract things to tangle with, both in terms of prospects and the health of the player they acquired. At the end of the day, though, we're really not looking at a situation that would be all that different had they taken the same path to acquire the McKenzie Gore's or Kris Bubic's of the baseball world.