An October Game Lost in Early September: Cubs' Failure to Lay Groundwork Cost Them Only Game 2 Chance

[Matthew Trueblood]

Image courtesy of © Matt Marton-Imagn Images

 

The Cubs fell behind 1-0 early in Game 2 of the National League Wild Card Series Wednesday, but that's not a major problem. It was still a placid 1-0 in the bottom of the fourth, when with two outs, Seiya Suzuki again awakened the Cubs offense a bit. He slashed a double into the left-field corner, applying real pressure to Padres starter Dylan Cease for the first time. Carson Kelly was due to bat next, and he's not a great matchup for Cease—but he wasn't a great matchup for Nick Pivetta, either, and that didn't stop him from coming up with the game-winning homer in the fifth inning Tuesday.

Mike Shildt was not going to get burned that way again. He ordered an intentional walk of Kelly by Cease, and then replaced Cease with left-handed reliever Adrián Morejón. It was a bold move—and an extremely risky one. Shildt set himself up to ask for 16 outs from his relief corps, knowing he would also need to win a game Thursday if they could hold the lead. He also exposed himself, theoretically, to a real risk of being matchup-baited. Morejón was coming in to face Pete Crow-Armstrong, who has batted .188/.217/.376 against southpaws this season. In 188 plate appearances, Crow-Armstrong struck out 55 times. 

In theory, though, Craig Counsell could have countered that move with one of his own. Justin Turner is on the team to do just two things: keep the vibes strong, and hit lefties. Despite an ugly overall line, he did the latter quite well this year. Turner got 109 plate appearances against southpaws, and batted .276/.330/.429 in them. He's no longer much of a power threat, but even a single would have tied the game in that moment. Then, Counsell could have pinch-run with Kevin Alcántara, who would have taken over in center field the rest of the way. That choice was right there to be made. Counsell didn't make it, though, and the truth is, that's because he'd already missed his chance.

Because Counsell values Crow-Armstrong's defense so highly, the Cubs went almost three months without playing so much as an inning without him. Crow-Armstrong's offensive breakout made him indispensable to their humming offense, too, but it was the glove that made the difference. Even before the sophomore center fielder unlocked his offense beginning a few weeks into the season, he had the run of center field.

The club traded Cody Bellinger over the winter, thinking (after acquiring Kyle Tucker) that they would have better ways to spend the money owed to him and insufficient playing time to offer him. However, minor pickup Vidal Bruján failed to acquit himself as a backup center fielder, and the team chose not to carry Alcántara in what would have been a fairly small role as a platoon partner to Crow-Armstrong. They didn't have a backup at the position at which Crow-Armstrong excelled, so his offensive output became irrelevant—at least to the question of whether he'd play on a given day. He would. The team needed him. If he got a hit, great. If not, he'd help them merely by running down everything hit to the gaps. It was an easier bar to clear, of course, because there was no qualified alternative within the state of Illinois.

Crow-Armstrong left games that he had started just five times all season:

• June 23 in St. Louis, in a blowout
• July 11 in New York, in a blowout
• August 10 in St. Louis, pinch-hit for by Turner in the Cubs' last at-bat with a lefty on the mound and the team trailing
• August 23 in Anaheim, in a blowout
• September 6 against the Nationals, due to injury

Again, for much of the year, that was because he didn't have anyone behind him. If the Cubs had to play any more defense in a given game, they would do anything in their power to avoid taking Crow-Armstrong and his premium leather out of action. Late in the campaign, though, that changed. Alcántara came up and spent most of the final month with the club. He was available.

Still, Counsell ignored him. He (or the organization, or both) simply doesn't trust the rookie outfielder. Alcántara did fine in the limited chances he did receive, batting .364 and drawing a walk in 12 plate appearances spangled across 10 games. It made no difference. His bosses didn't see him as a viable center field option.

Ditto, as it turned out, for utility man Willi Castro, whose stint with the team has turned out to be fairly abortive. Injuries forced Castro into the lineup for stretches after he was acquired at the trade deadline, but he never found his rhythm at the plate, and the team barely bothered glancing at him as a center fielder. Thus, they got to this point—to that fourth inning at the onset of October—having squandered any chance to lay the groundwork and prepare themselves for a pivotal substitution. There was no way Counsell was going to thrust Alcántara or Castro into center field for five innings, so Crow-Armstrong was effectively stuck in.

He grounded out to end the inning, and the Cubs' best threat of the day dissolved into nothing. They lost 3-0, after a tornado of fire emerged from the San Diego bullpen and blazed across the field. Morejón, Mason Miller and Robert Suarez each got more than three outs, and the Cubs did gently pressure each, enough that they'll be tired if called upon Thursday. Nonetheless, Thursday will come, for Shildt. His gambit worked. He knew Counsell was in no position to remove his lefty batter, despite the utter hopelessness of the matchup thrust upon him, and he took advantage of that. The Cubs blew the game, not by giving up a homer to Manny Machado or by not converting several three-ball counts into more baserunners (though those failures didn't help), but by not using their time wisely in August and September. Lifting Crow-Armstrong in that situation should have been doable, and rehearsed. Instead, it felt impossible. The game turned on a weeks-long anti-decision, made before the Cubs even clinched their place in this series.

 

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