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  1. ryanrc

    PECOTA and MOJO : why my Cubs projections are slightly higher

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Hey Cubs world, 
    I was happy to see the PECOTA projections, like most everyone else. The Cubs were ranked 3rd in the National League at 90.6 wins. However, I'm not a huge fan of PECOTA because it is a conservative projection system. I'll get into the simplest differences between mine and theirs. 
    Only 3 GREAT teams this year? Hmm. Nope. 
    PECOTA averages are....too averaged... because they are based too heavily on individual players as opposed to the special correlative effects between them. That bias tends to compress the dataset and soften the outliers- the best and worst teams are both consistently understated, and a few great organizations are "gut feel" expected to beat expectations every year, because they have "it". Let's take a look at the National League projections. In my opinion, PECOTA understates the records of the top 5 teams in the league and overstates the records of mediocre teams with weak chemistry.
    NL East
    Sim
    W Sim
    L Sim
    W % DC
    RS DC
    RA Div
    % WC
    % Playoff
    % PAdj
    % WS
    % D1
    % D7
    % Atlanta 92.4 69.6 .570 761 662 52.3 37.7 90.0 68.1 9.7 0.0 0.0 New York 88.9 73.1 .549 777 704 27.2 50.3 77.5 50.5 6.0 0.0 0.0 Philadelphia 87.5 74.5 .540 765 707 20.1 49.3 69.4 41.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 Washington 74.2 87.8 .458 667 732 0.4 5.2 5.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Miami 62.3 99.7 .385 616 789 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NL Central
    Sim
    W Sim
    L Sim
    W % DC
    RS DC
    RA Div
    % WC
    % Playoff
    % PAdj
    % WS
    % D1
    % D7
    % Chicago 90.6 71.4 .559 750 670 79.4 7.5 86.9 62.6 7.1 0.0 0.0 Milwaukee 80.2 81.8 .495 672 683 9.4 16.7 26.1 11.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 St. Louis 78.6 83.4 .485 698 724 7.4 11.2 18.6 8.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 Pittsburgh 75.1 86.9 .464 672 732 2.3 3.5 5.8 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cincinnati 73.5 88.5 .454 736 810 1.5 3.4 4.9 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 NL West
    Sim
    W Sim
    L Sim
    W % DC
    RS DC
    RA Div
    % WC
    % Playoff
    % PAdj
    % WS
    % D1
    % D7
    % Los Angeles 103.8 58.2 .641 834 625 97.7 2.3 100.0 98.1 20.7 0.0 0.0 Arizona 86.4 75.6 .533 778 721 1.6 60.5 62.1 31.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 San Diego 82.5 79.5 .509 729 715 0.6 37.5 38.1 17.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 San Francisco 78.0 84.0 .481 663 691 0.1 14.9 15.0 4.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 Colorado 55.5 106.5 .343 627 870 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   MOJO- My Own Unique Approach to Team Chemistry Adjustments 
    Chemistry is comprised of six elements which I call Total MOJO, for short.
    Total MOJO = Momentum + Organization +Job Role + Offering Diversity + Injury Risk + Slugging Bonus
    In my approach, I modify basic WAR projections with "bonus points" that capture the completeness of a team and its spirit: 
    Momentum - great teams, like the 2023 Braves, play their career best ball due to high team morale and charismatic stars leading the late season battle. These teams get hot and become unbeatable for stretches of time, particularly in September and October. As part of momentum, I also consider the value of having multiple young players on a confident trajectory to have breakout statistical performances. It is in this particular area where the Cubs shine, with PCA, Busch, and Shaw all with high upside potential on the same roster at once. That sort of exuberant youth energy tends to pay off- just like the 2016 Cubs. I Give these three players higher projections precisely because of the team chemistry we saw elements of last year. 
    Organization - some organizations are "winning organizations", with exceptional coaches and managers that fight for every win. Like the Brewers, Astros, and of course the Yankees- they seem to get the best out of healthy players. I don't give the Cubs any help in this category, but with Counsell and Hottovy on board, and with our new coaching hires helping with hitting, pitching, and running, I don't take points away from them either. If they find coaching magic, they can outperform projections. 
    Job Roles- a great roster has a "complete set" of role players for every key postseason role- a true closer, an electric leadoff hitter, a scary cleanup hitter, a worthy ace, and so on. The Cubs are one of the most complete teams in the National League (Finally), with the only question marks having to do with their mid-rotation (Can Boyd and Taillon both give us great seasons like last year?), missing a lefty in the bullpen (teams should have at least 2), and, of course, a rookie at our most cursed position since Bryant, 3rd Base. Still, I give them a slight edge for being nearly complete and hard to improve in any role - perhaps Bregman over Shaw, or snagging Danny Coulombe would work.    
    Offering Diversity - Finally, a great bullpen is a Swiss Army Knife of great pitches to handle every type of opponent. Similarly, a great hitting lineup has the right balance of bat skills to put together rallies, get game winning RBIs, and flexibility to shift between powerball and smallball as the situation requires. The Cubs have great balance overall, and can lean on elite fielding and baserunning skills for an edge, but aren't slugging quite high enough in homers to confidently win in the postseason. As far as starting pitching, they could still benefit from a true power pitching strikeout artist in their rotation to face Dodger-type lineups. 
    Injury Adjustments - Certain teams put too much faith in a healthy lineup. I deduct up to 3 WAR for teams with highest injury risk in key roles. Most of this risk is already picked up by other stats, such as Job Role and Offering Diversity, so I try not to double count those penalties. I do not award bonus WAR for teams with healthy profiles, thus I must be careful that injury deductions are overall offset by other positive MOJO team stats. 
    Slugging -  This is a very small bonus for regular season play but is a larger factor in the small sample, high pressure postseason situation. The top 2 or 3 teams per League receive +1 win bonus, and the bottom 2 or three are deducted 1 win. Slugging can also be an expected tiebreaker stat in close postseason matchups. This bonus structure clearly evolves over the history of baseball, but currently it's a homerun biased game with low batting averages. Even after recent rule adjustments to improve baserunning opportunities, low contact rates still favor power hitting. In the old days, the bonus went to hit tool instead. 
    Cubs Total MOJO = 1
    M +2; O 0; J +1; O +.5 Injury -2.5 Slugging 0 
    In prior articles, I projected the cubs at 95 wins; however, I was including all positive MOJO and not injury risk, which is a brand-new stat I'm experimenting with. Thus, after applying injury risk, I have Cubs at 92.5 wins. 
    Cubs got docked 2.5 injury wins for relying on Steele, Boyd, Swanson, Tucker, and Hoerner (-.5 points each) to all have healthy seasons despite struggles with injury in 2024.  I am giving them +1.5 momentum for their exciting young core of PCA, Busch, Shaw, all expecting breakout seasons, and .5 momentum for the morale boost for adding a true superstar (Tucker).  They get +1 for housing a very complete team, and +.5 for having a better-than-average balance between fielding, hitting, pitching styles.
    How much can MOJO affect projections?
    Overall, Total MOJO runs in the range of about +- 10 wins, but with most teams falling within a tight +- 2 WIN range.
    I give less weight to Offering Diversity overall than I do Momentum and Organization adjustments. Momentum and Organization can go up to an extreme of +-4 wins, whereas Job Roles and Offering Diversity are limited to +- 2 wins, and usually fall within +- 1. Bigger spreads are used to offset league-wide injury risks. A full suite of job roles and offering diversity both have the ability to diminish the overall importance of a marginal injury.   

    For 2025, my largest positive MOJO adjustments for the NL are for the Brewers (+6),  Dodgers (+5), and Phillies (+2.5), whereas on the negative side, the Rockies (-5)  are an incomplete team with terrible morale, especially regarding Kris Bryant and starting pitching woes. For comparison, the White Sox had a -10 MOJO for 2024, the worst MOJO score in the 21st century. 

    My method for assigning it is fairly subjective and speculative so far and needs fine tuning with clearer metrics. I use a fairly simple WAR approach for a base projection. Those base wins are really just a sum of net WAR adjustments from the last years' actual results at a player level. It turns out to be similar to PECOTA, but with a handful of teams getting more exaggerated win bonuses, with others docked additional loses for weak MOJO. 
    Those Damned Brewers
    The Brewers and the Devil Rays both have uncanny abilities to win above expectations They have several years in a row of greatly outperforming their raw stats, and winning tough, close games seems to be their mutual superpower.
    Unsurprisingly, they both rely on player momentum and an organizational gift for player development, rather than money. They deeply invest in finding the Upside to the players they understand. 

    Cubs, on the other hand, had quite negative MOJO in 2023 and 2024, suffering mostly in the bullpen and the corner infield positions. In raw WAR, I have the Brewers at 82, so I gave them 6 Total MOJO, especially for their outrageous fall momentum and organizational success: (M=+2, O=+3, J=+1 ...the rest zero ). They have had tremendous late season momentum for the past 5 years. They have a winning organization that routinely finds gems among retreads and prospects. they have a slight job role edge for having the most complete smallball roster in the National League, and they are average when it comes to pitch/hit offering diversity, having given up the best closer in the game. Compared to a 9 MOJO 2024, they are losing 1 J point, 1 O point, and 1 momentum point.

    I project the top five NL teams as follows: 
    TEAM        WINS   MOJO      MY BASE WAR     WINS VS PECOTA
    Dodgers   110         5                      105               +6.2
    Atlanta     94         2                       92                 +1.6
    Cubs         92.5      1                       91.5               +1.9
    Phillies     90       2.5                     87.5               +2.5 
            
    Brewers  88        6                        82               +8.8 

    Conclusion
    Everyone has their own "gut feel" for sports - usually for fans, that feel is unearned and undeserved. My base WAR projections are fairly vanilla- they tend to be within 3 wins of the consensus WAR and PECOTA systems. However, those systems are generally conservative and tend to disregard the recent history of extraordinary play coming from specific franchises. My gut tells me these six statistics are excellent for adjusting player-driven projections at a team level. Total MOJO is my attempt to capture common gaps between basic statistics and observed history. It's something I will be spending years toying with. Still, I hope to have a good enough statistical model worth promoting publicly in a year or two. 2025 is the "alpha test" for my MOJO approach, so for now, I'm not fully revealing my methods.

      
     
  2. ryanrc

    How's Jon Berti as a Cub?

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Hey folks, 

    let me clear my desk of the Tanner Scott issue first. 
    I'm none-too-happy about missing on Tanner Scott (and Kirby Yates, btw), but at least we "tried". I Think the Dodgers paid the right price. I had Scott as a 65 MM player on 3 years or 75 MM on four years (when you're in the bullpen, that extra guarantee is well worth a lower AAV). Dodgers went 4 years, 72 MM. Let' keep in mind, on a 4 year bullpen contract, you're paying for 1 year of injury time, whereas on a 3 year, you're betting on maybe half a year of injury, tops. Supposing Scott is a 3 WAR player, on 70 game appearances average, you're paying $8 mil/year for the closer WAR. Thus, I felt the Cubs should have paid $75 and won the bid, because of how hard it is to find convincingly reliable bullpen WAR. Tsk tsk. 

    Going forward, I like Kenley Jansen because I want a buy who will take a slightly diminished contract, has fairly balanced splits, and an incredible resume to step up. I'd give him a 2 year, 25 million deal to give us 1.5 WAR per year, splitting the closer role with Hodge. He aint a lefty but he can handle lefties ok. My next favorite option is David Robertson (1 year, 12 mil), who would be an elite setup guy if he stays healthy. He doesn't have the velocity i would want for a closer. I DONT like Estevez because his fundamentals are poor and he'll probably regress. 

    Ok, now back to Jon Berti. 

    Berti Versus the Pack 
    So, I like this signing, especially for the price. I have Berti as worth roughly 1 WAR off the bench, especially while filling in for Hoerner for at least 6 weeks full-time at 2nd. I value 1 WAR bench play at $5MM, a bit below the average value of WAR at $8MM, because a 1 WAR player rarely tips the scales positively in big games. Berti raises us from a 93 win team to 94, according to my projections, but has no significant effect on post-season success. He's also 1 WAR worse than my preferred player target, Paul DeJong, but I am ok with it as long as we still add a power hitting bat to the team. 

    We are paying him in the $2 - 3.2 MM range, so he's being paid to repeat his .6 WAR glove performance last year but with extra bat upside. First, let's compare him with Yoan Moncada and Josh Rojas, who the media originally felt would make a better Cub. Berti's health record isnt pefect but it surely beats Moncada, who has been beat up to hell recently. I wish Moncada the best but he needs to rehab in 2025 as a league minimum utility player or 3B injury sub on a bottom dweller. Berti beats Rojas in terms of positional flexibility. His best position is actually 2B, which means he's being hired to start at second and let Shaw have 3rd. He has plenty of 3B experience, but despite general quality play there, his error rate was quite high at the hot corner. 
    Berti was an elite base stealer just 2 years prior, and has the profile to repeat that performance. I DEMAND that utility infield players steal bases well above league average. Berti also is a high contact hitter with balanced splits, roughly .700 OPS, but with several up years with a combined WAR of 2.4 in both 2022 and 2023. This is a very good result, and such a result would make him a worthy 2B starter on 1/3rd of the teams. Berti can also cover all outfield positions with plenty of glove success - he's better out there than a Mastrobouni would be, for example. Overall, Berti is a true utility plus glove at 6 positions, and a league average WAR contributor overall when playing at 2nd. Overall, a guy you'd really want to sub for Hoerner and then drop into the background afterwards. His career hitting profile is overally eerily similar to Nico Hoerner's down year in 2024. Its not any worse than Josh Rojas, who landed with the White Sox. 
    Berti Versus Paul DeJong
    In my prior blogposts, I recommended DeJong as the best possible player for this job, on a 1 year $9MM contract. DeJong is a better 3B player than most - it appears to be his true strength position despite him mostly playing SS in the past. Berti is more of a true utility player, but as I said, his 3B performance was a bit sub-par (although steadily improving), but he's a stellar 2B with only 5 career errors at that position. Berti can steal, DeJong cannot. On the other hand, Berti has no power, which is the typical situation for utility players. DeJong has plus power, and would substantially raise the Cub's team slugging percentage with a projected HR rate of 30 per 162 games, and 26 HR last year. Basically, I wanted to pay DeJong to play more 3rd and actually start at the position there, and seriously raise the slugging profile of the Cubs.

    Berti, Summarized 
    By going with Berti and the "tried and true" speedy glove-first utility formula, Berti becomes a mere blip on the race to the NL pennant. He is being paid about 50% more than the average utility guy because of his experience and pattern of success at the role. He will rank among the top 5 infield utility guys in the NL in glove performance, and gives the upside potential of being a league average hitter and plus basestealer. I project him at 20 SB, 250 at bats, with 100 of those coming at the beginning of the season starting for Hoerner. That's worth 2-3 million, for sure - as I said, I value him at $5 million , but the market always exploits utility players a bit -  unless you're the Dodgers, who overpay to have the "best" teammate at that job.
    What Now?
     
    The last remaining 26 man roster role with a bat attached to it is 5th outfielder. We could be lazy and roll with Canario's ultra high strikeout rate and lack of experience or health profile, and expect nothing special. That sucks, frankly. 
    In my past blogpost, I argued for Randal Grichuck. I will now double-down on that argument and emphasize why it makes TWICE the sense, now that the Cubs went with speedster Berti over a power hitter. 

    Cubs desperately need to prove they can hit with the big boys. 33 y.o. Randal Grichuk is the perfect, and I mean perfect, answer to that problem. He's used to platooning his whole career. He's elite at it. He was the BEST lefty killer platoon bat in all of the majors last year and that wasnt a fluke. He profiles to hit in the .850-.950 OPS range vs LHP again this year, with very high batting average and some HR pop. He would be pinching every single day he isn't starting for PCA... I would sign him on a 2 year deal to secure his services as the 5th outfielder. Win now, wait until 2027 to worry about replacing Happ/Suzuki with young talent. 

    No, we don't need a glove first 5th outfielder. We already have 3 gold glover starters! All 3 are elite, guys. We now have Jon Berti who can play plus glove out there. He's already that glove guy. What we DONT have is an elite pinch hitter, which every great contending team has. 

    I projected Grichuk at 2 years, 25 mil for the cubs, plus incentives to reach 30 million... backloaded so his 2025 hit is 10 mil. If any team outbids us for his services, so be it, but at that price, Grichuk would be a monster addition alongside Berti. 
    Do I actually think we will land Grichuk? No, because Hoyer doesn't do bidding wars. Some team like the Pirates will overbid to get him for a 3 year 50 mil starting role, and he'll take it. I'm not sure where else we turn after Grichuk, but I hope for a player with at least SLG+ 120 and kills lefties. NO GLOVE FIRST GUYS on the OF bench, when we already have Berti!!!!

    WAR - where are we now?
    Had we signed DeJong, Scott, and Grichuk = 100 wins 
    signing Berti, Jansen, and Grichuk = 97.5 wins
    signing Berti and Jansen = 95.5 wins
    signing Berti and Kyle Finnegan = 95 wins
    signing just Berti = 94 wins

    One more thing: My WAR projections, which are admittedly a bit optimistic, don't include any major disasters, such as losing a starter all season rather than just for 15-60 day injury stints. 

    A more realistic approach factors in at least 1 lost starting pitcher and 1 lost starting player.

    Let's suppose we end up with Berti + Finnegan (95 wins scenario), and then Hoyer sits on the roster until mid-season - which is highly likely. Let's assume 3B is a bust this year again (0 WAR instead of my 1 WAR projection for Shaw + Berti) we lose Boyd AND Assad all season to injuries (1.5 WAR loss compared to next three starters splitting those two slots, Rea, Birdsell, and Poteet), and ... This takes us back to 92.5 Wins. 

    What was our need last year to beat the Brewers? 92 wins, with +1 additional victory over them in direct play.  See why this makes me nervous about running with Canario in the outfield? No way we let the Brewers sneak up on us again, man. We need that bonus bat to provide a cushion. Berti isnt enough cushion yet. Grichuk would make up for the loss of multiple players!

     
  3. ryanrc

    Is Ryan Pressly Enough to Tip the Scales?

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Howdy Cubs World- let's talk Pressly. [ Uh huh huh. ] 
    (Oh by the way- paid writers are mostly paid to edit. Unpaid writers give you a good enough draft.)

    Ok, first, the good news. we DID get a GOOD closer/setup veteran with a couple of elite pitches. Facts. And, he's got a resume of incredible work under pressure. He's a guy with a baller resume that you're glad to have in a post-season run.  

    The bad news: He's almost as risky as Hector Neris Last Year. 

    I hate to be a downer here, but I'm not convinced Ryan Pressly is quite the same level of player anymore, or was the best available option within their budget. His decline over the last year tracks with a decline in several fundamentals with no abrupt injury cause. He went from a marginal All Star closer in 2022 to an above-average setup guy in 2024, with no clear signs of recovery in August or September. He is mostly leaning on 3 pitches currently:  a plus 4 seamer with cut action, a really wide AND deep, plus-plus breaking curveball with insane spin rates, and a solid, plus controllable slider with unusually high velocity. These account for 87 percent of his offerings in 2024. He's also been largely healthy for many years- probably his best attribute. And, despite all the exceptional breaking action on his pitches, his walk rate is slightly below average.  

    For sure, he's an upgrade. He was a top 50 pen pitcher in 2024, meaning most teams don't have 3 guys better than him, but do have 1 or 2 guys better than him. And yowsa, I love his curveball and slider, still.

    But, I'm not sure his three pitch formula is playing well enough. He's gonna need to really resuscitate his changeup and sinker, both of which really fell off last year -- accordingly, he had cut back on their usage as they were landing randomly for mostly balls. Unfortunately, his fastball has also fallen off a bit, averaging only 93.8 mph, although he can still turn it up to 96 a couple times a game to get that punchout.  Pressly's fastball and slider remained solid in terms of vertical break, spin rate, and control, but neither quite has the ol' velocity to strike fear into the hearts of batters. Still, his wacky curveball soils drawers when hitting the edge of the zone.

    What to expect

    I really feel like Pressly can still work as a closer. He's also so darn consistent that he's never had a truly BAD season, ever. That's wonderful news and provides assurance he wont' explode as bad as Neris did.  However, not a top 10 closer, without some real pitch lab magic. He overperformed his fundamentals last year when he produced a 1.99 ERA in his last 32 appearances of 2024. Now, maybe he figured something out that I didn't see at first glance and I'm wrong about his secondary offerings being busted. Us fans never get to know the secret conversations regarding rescue missions of aging veteran offerings. Perhaps his stuff plays better than David Robertson will at 40, and I'm just ignorant. But its perturbing that we have to even have these high-risk comparison conversations, innit?

    And it is this realization that makes me feel extra annoyed that we lost the bidding war for Tanner Scott - indeed, we are still relying on coaching to reshape a player's natural trajectory! He's still got hopes of a breakout, Kirby Yates type season - but to get there, he and the boys are gonna need to pull off some surprises either in terms of velocity hacking or a shiny new sinker, or whatnot. I'd really like to see him fix that lost changeup, as that one move alone could drop his ERA by .5. 

    With a 3.0-3.5 ERA, he is slightly better than Kyle Finnegan at the moment, relying on bats to bail him out of jams sometimes. Both Finnegan and Pressly have WAR projections around 1 to 1.3, a small uptick in performance in 2025. David Robertson and Kenley Jansen, both of whom project as 1.3 to 1.8 range WAR, seemed to me slightly better options despite their advanced age. I think Hodge and Miller will both outpitch Pressly a tad while serving as the two setup guys. They both should have ERAs below 3. 

    I can't help like feeling the only reason we have Pressly and not the other guys was the price - and again, that annoys me. They are running out of ways to spend their remaining cash. 
    That being said: I hope Pressly proves me wrong, resets his strategy, and comes in looking like the All-star he was only 2 years ago! It's entirely possible. Surely we don't pay the full price of 14 Million for 1 to 2 WAR gamble? My guess is our cash responsibility in this deal is about 10 million. Let's hope he squeezes out a 2 WAR season against the odds and rescue's Hoyer's reputation of assembling mediocre, extra-volatile bullpens. 
     
    What about the War situation? 95 Wins under Healthy Conditions

    In closing, I currently project the Cubs to win 95 games - but that's with all the stars being relatively healthy all season, which is unlikely.  My injury-adjusted projection is 92.5 games, and for the Brewers, 89 games. Toooo close for comfort! If we really want to pad the theoretical win rate, we've only got 1 clear roster spot to do it with, and only a few high-slugging platoon lefty bats left to chase.  

    Other than Randal Grichuk, the next best option remaining seems to be Ramon Laureano. I price Grichuk at two years, 25 million floor, and Laureano as 1 year, 7 million. He's a career .800 OPS bat against lefties, and that's good enough to take 250 at bats against mostly left handed pitching for the otherwise lefty heavy Cubs outfield. Laureano is a low-to-mid-700s hitter against righties who can hold his own as full-day sub. He can also play smallball well, with plus contact rates and reliably stealing 10 bases off the bench. He's a non-liability corner outfielder. A bit better glove than Grichuk, he has an expected defensive value of .3, based on +2.4 defensive war over 8 seasons of MLB work. He's also young enough that he's not expected to fall off from age, whereas Grichuk at 33 may have already had his best season last year. Laureano is worth 1 to 1.5 total war above our current option Alexander Canario's 0 to .5 WAR projection, versus Grichuk's 2 to 2.5 WAR value range. Laureano doesn't quite have "it" to be a starting right fielder but he makes a valuable platoon bat. In short, he would raise the projection to 96 wins, and 93.5 after injury adjustments. That's a solid division victory, right there. 

    I'd be more than fine with Laureano if Hoyer intends to make a big mid-season splash with the remaining war chest of about 30 million, or if he uses half of it to extend Justin Steele, who increasingly has the look of a perennial down-ballot Cy Young guy for most of the next 8 seasons. As a side note, I'd be interested to see a 6 year Steele extension in the 130-145 million range, which would be both team-friendly and yet substantially increase Steele's earnings over the next two arbitration periods, and nearly equaling Max Fried's rate of pay.    
  4. ryanrc

    Assembling a Great Bullpen: Some Basics

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Hey Cubs world, 
    I've spent my initial time blogging here about the Cubs moves for 2025. However, sometimes its good to pause and reflect on general principles of baseball and how to build winning teams. 

    In this post, I discuss a few basics of bullpen construction that fans often overlook. 
    Beating Rival Teams: Targeted Bullpen Design
    Wins Above Replacement is a generic approach to roster construction, and for that reason, can't be precise. If this were all that was necessary, a general manager could ignore all fundamentals and simply bid on the "Best" pitchers in rank order of how cost effective their contract is for producing wins. For example, one can look at the Dodgers and say - gee, Tanner Scott is worth whatever the market pays for him, regardless of which team he plays for. If this were true, pitchers would be bid on in rank over of their intrinsic value, and all pitching fundamentals could be ignored during roster construction.

    There are several approaches to designing a roster that wins a division, which go above and beyond shopping for "wins". Ideally, a great team succeeds according to a more careful "fit" between the player and the rest of the 26 man roster, as well as the team's overall environment. In this short article, I'll outline these three main ways to improve past a simple "market rate" approach to assembling a winning bullpen. 
    The Environmental Approach

    One key task for the Cubs is to assemble a bullpen that plays well in the physical environment of their division, especially players who will succeed at Wrigley Field, but also at division rival fields. This analysis can involve digging into player statistics that indicate ballpark differences, day/night games, and so forth, to find out what independent variables predict wins against rivals. Typically, this approach is applied AFTER evaluating bullpen talent at market rates - in essence, looking for ways to beat the market price on the player because they play especially well in Cub-specific circumstances.  For example, Kyle Tucker is argued to be a near perfect fit to the Friendly Confines - his style of hitting and fielding both play exceptionally well there. However, he's also versatile enough as a player that he can win games at other divisional fields. 

    Although this approach can work well for starting pitching or power hitting, it's not quite as important for bullpen construction. This is because pitchers who cover individual innings at a time have a more chaotic, fluctuating relationship to big environmental factors. Most importantly, bullpen pitchers are being systemically and methodically used by their coaching staff to deal with specific micro details, making it hard to tell exactly which environmental factors affect these small sample sizes. Put simply, a 10 or 20 pitch appearance doesn't produce enough data for us to distinguish environmental variables - did the player have sun in his eyes during Wrigley afternoons, or doesn't pitch well with grumpy coaches in April. Too many factors are at play simultaneously.  Therefore, the environmental approach can only "tweak" the expected player performance.   
    The Bullpen Role Approach  
    This is my favorite approach to fine tuning a bullpen: roles. It involves thinking of pitching and hitting as a complex game of scissors-rocks-paper, and each pitcher as a duelist deployed to duel with a few opponents at a time. Basically, each player's talents match up well in contests against a partial lineup of other players' styles of competition, while avoiding facing other players in the lineup that can exploit the pitchers' weaknesses. A bullpen is thus a giant Swiss army knife of tools, each designed to counterattack hitting styles of prominent rival players. A good bullpen has multiple answers to every problem, due to rest periods between pitching appearances. 
    This simple example is a fairly popular perspective of bullpen construction, although you will see minor variants from team to team. I am listing the in the order of how popular it is for a team to specify this precise role, as opposed to perhaps other alternative roles in roster construction. The best set of arms consists of the following roles being covered. I am placing a Cubs bullpen name as a candidate for each role, followed by their current understudy who has options in the minors. You will notice that we have two ENTRE bullpens covered. Jed Hoyer eliminated all risk of being shorthanded; however, hoarding some of his best talent in the minors until July or later also involves a risk that they are underutilized for fear of injury. 
    1) medium leverage swingman - every team knows who their workhorse bullpen arm is. Not necessarily their best player, but the one expected to get the most innings. A player with a high floor and a diverse skillset who can "handle" most styles of hitters better than average. 
    Colin Rea, Cody Poteet
    2) low leverage long reliever -usually a young, developmental starter who eats innings while playing from behind. Every team has at least one player who's being given a final shot to develop, and this is their last chance to win a bigger role. 
    Keegan Thompson, Jordan Wicks
    3) high leverage closer - proven veteran who is the best pitcher in the pen. Plays in close games. 
    Ryan Pressly, (Porter Hodge is in the MLB)
    4) low leverage closer - a pitcher with insane stuff but usually control problems. High risk to give up 1 run due to walks or solo dingers, low risk to give up more than 1 run due to high whiffs.  Plays in games with a larger victory margin than the main closer.  
    Nate Pearson, Ethan Roberts
    5) medium-to-high leverage right handed setup - a precision expert against most righties, and not expected to handle the toughest lefties
    Porter Hodge, Ben Brown
    6) medium-to-high leverage left handed setup - a precision expert against lefties, rarely allowed to face top right handed hitters
    Caleb Thielbar. Luke Little
    7)  medium leverage change of pace reliever - a unique pitcher who can disrupt and frustrate high-contact hitters with rare pitches, such as a submariner or knuckleballer. Most frequently plays the 7th inning and/or comes in early as a "plan b" to shut down opponent rallies.
    Tyson Miller (extreme ride sweeper), Eli Morgan (extremely slow changeup)
    8 ) high leverage power "hold" reliever - a high leverage early reliever who enters the game early to shut down power hitters. They lean on fastballs with elite velocity and strikeout rates. Basically, this is your top "hold" specialist against #3/#4/#5 power hitters in the order. 
    Julian Merryweather, Jack Neely 
    The Pitch Portfolio Approach
    The most detailed and painstaking approach to advanced bullpen design looks at the fundamentals of each pitch, and how a pitcher combines pitches to produce a set of offerings. From this perspective, roles aren't as important as a direct comparison of pitch types and styles to hitting types and styles. The pitch portfolio approach looks directly at the advanced pitch metrics to predict "pitches that produce outs", and only secondarily bothers with a players' pitching "Role". Craig Counsell and Tom Hottovy both come from this school of thought: they simply match up the best pitches, at any given moment, with the greatest chance of producing outs. Obviously, pitchers need rest, so the most important metric is the net present value of "using a premium pitch" now as opposed to saving it for the next important situation.

    This fine tuned approach to bullpen management is really only possible since the statcast era -- advanced pitching models/metrics and a reliance on obscure calculations. Every analytics driven team needs to balance pitch-to-bat matchups with less-than-perfect fit. This is where bottom dwelling baseball teams fall apart- they don't have enough diversity of pitches, or depth of players, to match up well and so they have to intentionally lose a certain number of games to win others. The main problem with the pitch-by-pitch approach is it under-emphasizes the human elements of the game, especially psychological makeup of particular players. This is a great approach to your "plan A" for each of the 162 games; however, the role of managers on a game day is to tweak and intervene and decide between plan b, c, d, etc, based on roles and environmental factors. 

    From this third perspective, the Cubs are well prepared to face their opponents. They excel at pitching analytics. The biggest question mark for the 2025 season has to do with their success at filling roles with the right guys - particularly, having enough power pitching, enough left handed pitching talent, and an elite enough closer. 
  5. ryanrc

    What stat is the Cubs' biggest need for improvement in 2025?

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Hello Cubs world, 
    in prior posts, I've made the argument that our pitching is gonna be fine, so long as we land another serious closer/setup player to split duties with Hodge. The Cubs were 10th in starter ERA, and 6th after the All-Star Break. Their bullpen was stellar in August and September as well. 

    Long story short, this team needs to slug.  It can't play with the big boys without big bats. Let's take at look at last year's team slugging rankings. You will notice a clear pattern - the top 6 slugging teams were the 6 best teams overall. Furthermore, slugging has the largest correlation to wins. Pitching, fielding, or smallball stats are highly interdependent. This is why the highest paid players of all time are always the biggest bats. Oh, and: All the postseason teams outslugged the Cubs 
     
    Let's face it: in a league where strikeouts are hovering around 8.5 per nine innings, batting averages are down, and yet home runs remain on par with historical levels, you really can't dominate the regular season on pitching alone. Furthermore, smallball, although it pairs very well with great fielding and pitching, rarely beats super-teams. Your smallball strategy has to be ridiculously good in all dimensions to catch up to a 2023 Atlanta Braves or 2025 Dodgers lineup.
    How Far Off the Mark is the Cubs' Slugging?
    To be a serious contender last year, you needed a slugging of .415 or higher (Mets = .415, Dodgers, .446). Cubs were .393 - even with solid seasons from Suzuki, Happ, and Busch. Does Kyle Tucker get us there alone? Not quite, he doesn't - He brings the team up to about .410 if he's having an awesome year. We need Busch, PCA, and Swanson to all take a small step forward, too. However, to approach a competition with the Dodgers  -- lets say, .435 SLG --  the Cubs need all that, plus no regression from Suzuki or Happ, plus 2 out of 3 more miracles: 1) Shaw explodes and slugs well over .450 as a 23 year old rookie with no MLB experience; 2) Hoyer signs an elite bench platoon bat to be the 26th man, who brings a sky-high slugging percentage around .520+ ; 3) Both our catchers hit for power, averaging over .450+.  

    Cubs were 18th in slugging last year and 20th in home runs, and it made their post-season hopes nearly impossible. The best smallball team in the 2024 National League was arguably the Milwaukee Brewers (13th in slugging) - and they haven't been able to get past the pennant with that strategy either. A key smallball stat is stolen bases. The Cubs stole 143 bases, but the Brewers stole 217. We can expect a marked increase in 2025 due to a full season of PCA and the addition of Jon Berti. We are also a marginally top 5 fielding team in the MLB, but even still we have a ways to go to catch the Blue Jays' defensive runs saved. And how have those Blue Jay been doing lately, eh?  
     
    Team GP AVG AB R Runs H 2B 3B HR RBI SB CS BB SO OBP SLG OPS L.A. Dodgers 162 .258 5522 842 1423 291 26 233 815 136 23 602 1336 .335 .446 .781 Arizona 162 .263 5522 886 1452 271 37 211 845 119 30 569 1265 .337 .440 .777 Baltimore 162 .250 5567 786 1391 262 33 235 759 98 25 489 1359 .315 .435 .750 N.Y. Yankees 162 .248 5450 815 1352 243 15 237 782 88 26 672 1326 .333 .429 .762 Philadelphia 162 .257 5534 784 1423 285 24 198 750 148 30 515 1370 .325 .425 .750 Boston 162 .252 5577 751 1404 311 30 194 724 144 44 493 1570 .319 .423 .742 San Diego 162 .263 5526 760 1456 259 18 190 726 120 28 458 1077 .324 .420 .744 Houston 161 .262 5530 740 1448 264 16 190 701 93 24 448 1176 .322 .418 .740 Atlanta 162 .243 5481 704 1333 273 15 213 674 69 20 485 1461 .309 .415 .724 N.Y. Mets 162 .246 5510 768 1357 279 15 207 735 106 22 514 1382 .319 .415 .734 Minnesota 162 .246 5490 742 1352 309 23 183 702 65 23 473 1306 .315 .411 .726 Kansas City 162 .248 5421 735 1343 264 35 170 711 134 31 429 1161 .306 .403 .709 Milwaukee 162 .248 5472 777 1359 249 33 177 742 217 42 597 1459 .326 .403 .729 Colorado 162 .242 5454 682 1319 277 25 179 655 85 31 453 1617 .304 .400 .704 San Francisco 162 .239 5460 693 1303 266 30 177 661 68 22 492 1452 .305 .396 .701 Cleveland 161 .238 5310 708 1263 245 18 185 670 148 46 466 1196 .307 .395 .702 Athletics 162 .233 5432 643 1267 240 19 196 619 98 26 493 1502 .301 .393 .694 Chi. Cubs 162 .242 5441 736 1318 253 29 170 696 143 30 546 1362 .317 .393 .710   
    What is our team strategy for 2025?
    Hoyer prefers smallball/fielders over sluggers. Cub position players under Hoyer maintain are top 10 fielders, high on base percentages, high walk rates, and average power. In essence, Hoyer has refused to pay the premium for home runs with the apparent argument that the price per WAR goes through the roof for multi-tool position players who also hit homers.  However, these prices are fairly accurate to their true value. Teams that can slug, hit, field, AND run are generally paying the most per win, resulting in a fair amount of overkill - that is, wining by unnecessarily large margins within a particular game, and within the club's division. Basically, Hoyer is attempting to win "exactly" the number of games necessary, by "exactly" the margin of runs necessary. Teams that spend well over the luxury tax are padding their stats with lots of insurance runs - essentially brute forcing a win at a financial loss rather than winning profitably. Statistically, carrying "Excess inventory" is necessary - that is, paying for a few dozen insurance runs is easier than threading a neeedle every game, unless you've got the best bullpen in MLB. Well, the Dodgers just leapt up and took that chance, while the Cubs still under-emphasize relievers. I digress.... 
     Hoyer is committed to winning profitably somehow - a similar approach to today's Astros, Braves, Red Sox, Padres, and Rangers, but with a reverse strategy. Most of those teams are willing pay free agents for slugging and rely on internal coaching to develop smallball support players. Cubs have been paying for and trading for elite smallball/glove free agents and prospects, while snubbing the pricey bats and trying to develop their own slugging youngsters in -house. All of these 2nd tier spending teams, who like the 200-240 million dollar payroll range, aim for balanced rosters with above average results, but with a bias towards their unique division and home field situations; however, 4 of the 5 mentioned teams have outperformed the Cubs consistently since 2019. The lone exception is the Sox, who have been at about parity with the Hoyer strategy. 

    In essence, time is running out on Hoyer to prove that his rebuild approach has created a 2025-2030 dynasty. If this strategy has failed, then Hoyer himself is a colossal failure and a laughingstock for this tier of franchise. If it has succeeded, his form of backloaded success with a 7 year runway still seems to require the patience of a saint. I respect the need to "save for retirement", but I don't think retirement planning is the right model for a baseball team. 
    Hoyer Knows his Weaknesses  
    All indications suggest that Hoyer is aware of his rosters' weakest stats. Every off-season, he attempts to adjust and improve on his strengths first, and then attend to weaknesses second. This isn't stupid- if you have no strengths, you just plain suck. Now that he's got the fielding, starting rotation, and on base percentage, he's going to work on slugging and bullpen next. Let's see if he does enough...  

    Sampling from his past, we can see that Hoyer has a clear pitching strategy - he plays Moneyball and collects the best "deals" at pitching, with a focus on minimizing walks, pitch to weak contact, and control pitchers with many offerings. However, Hoyer's teams rarely fall into the top 5 in ANY statistic in baseball, except fielding - and even then, rarely top 3 in fielding. Overall, one can argue he has a moderate smallball bias to his roster construction.  
    Committing to glove-first stars at SS and 2B pretty much assures the Cubs struggle to slug with teams who have a Mookie Betts or Francisco Lindor. However, it is not a death sentence by any means. Being #1 in slugging isn't nearly as important as being top 5 while balancing other roster needs. Optimistically, the Cubs are VERY CLOSE to pulling off that optimization trick in 2025, after years of teasing it. With the current roster (including Jon Berti), Cubs have a ceiling of about #8 in slugging. Adding an elite platoon bat now or mid-season, they could max out at #6 and be a serious contender. Keep in mind the other teams are adding to their rosters. For example, the Braves just added Jurickson Profar and will be slugging monsters again. 
    My Recommendations
    I think the Cubs are striving for these team ranks in 2025, which are unlikely to all occur: 
    Type       Current Roster Ceiling Rank 
    Fielding            3
    Basestealing   3
    OBP                  6
    Slugging          8
    OPS                  7
    I think we will hit our fielding and basestealing goals, but fall short of the hitting goals by at least 2 ranks each. It should be enough to beat the Brewers by 3 wins, but that makes me nervous. It's unlikely enough to beat the Phillies, Braves, or Dodgers, who will all have slightly better hitting stats and markedly better pitching. 
    This is a very volatile projection relative to injuries, and could be much lower with the MOST unfortunate injuries to our best players, but I currently project the Cubs pitching (assuming they sign Kenley Jansen), as follows:
    Starting ERA  7th
    Starting walks  4th
    Starting Strikeouts 16th 
    Bullpen ERA 12th 
    Bullpen walks 10th
    Bullpen strikeouts 12th 
     
    However, if the Cubs make a couple of mid-season pitching acquisitions, those numbers will improve for the post-season. Overall, I give the Cubs a power rank of about #8. To increase that rank, they MUST pump up the pitching mid-season with at least 1 All-Star acquisition.  Ideally, improve the slugging NOW with one more bench piece - a lefty killer with at LEAST 25 HR per 162 games and a high batting average.  
  6. ryanrc

    How Good is Michael Busch?

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    I'm taking a sidestep from the roster construction discussion for a moment to reflect on the upside potential of the dynamic duo of Pete-Crow Armstrong and Michael Busch.  Although the media has fallen in love with PCA already, they have been strangely silent about Busch. 
    Well, there's at least one clear reason for it: baseball media has greatly devalued the first base position in recent years. I mean, look at Pete Alonso's struggle to land a 30 million dollar year. Advanced statistics really don't give much value to a first base glove, even if Gold Glove caliber. In essence, nobody wants a liability at the position, but nobody wants to pay a glove premium, especially if the guy lacks the elite bat. A big part of this is that few 1B are among the top 50 hitters in the league and aren't making up for it with enough circus catches. 
    Busch already ranks as approximately the 10th best glove at the position.... rare for a rookie year. The Cubs media didn't get jazzed about this. Strangely, we keep seeing articles everywhere that STILL Argue for the Cubs picking up Alonso and moving Busch to 2nd. Bizarre. 

    So let's look at hitting numbers. Here's the top 1B hitting list. Guess who is #8 in wOBA? The rookie Busch! Also note his .322 BABIP and 11.1 BB%. #6 Alonso barely outhit Busch, mainly in slugging. Alonso was a bottom-half starter in terms of glove.  
    # Name Team PA BB% K% BB/K AVG OBP SLG OPS ISO Spd BABIP UBR wGDP wSB wRC wRAA wOBA wRC+   1 Vladimir Guerrero Jr. TOR 697 10.3% 13.8% 0.75 .323 .396 .544 .940 .221 2.2 .342 -5.4 -1.1 -1.9 131 49.2 .398 165 2 Bryce Harper PHI 631 12.0% 21.9% 0.55 .285 .373 .525 .898 .240 2.8 .331     -1.4 109 35.6 .380 145 3 Freddie Freeman LAD 638 12.2% 15.7% 0.78 .282 .378 .476 .854 .194 4.1 .306     -0.4 103 28.3 .365 137 4 Christian Walker ARI 552 10.0% 24.1% 0.41 .251 .335 .468 .803 .217 2.2 .287 1.2 -0.2 -1.4 79 14.8 .343 119 5 Pete Alonso NYM 695 10.1% 24.7% 0.41 .240 .329 .459 .788 .219 2.8 .276 -1.6 -0.1 -0.7 98 16.6 .340 122 6 Matt Olson ATL 685 10.4% 24.8% 0.42 .247 .333 .457 .790 .210 1.6 .293 -4.0 0.0 -1.2 96 16.1 .339 117 7 Nathaniel Lowe TEX 565 12.6% 22.1% 0.57 .265 .361 .401 .762 .136 2.6 .324 -0.4 0.5 -0.9 78 12.3 .337 121 8 Michael Busch CHC 567 11.1% 28.6% 0.39 .248 .335 .440 .775 .192 3.4 .322 -0.5 0.5 -1.1 78 12.0 .336 119 9 Salvador Perez KCR 652 6.7% 19.8% 0.34 .271 .330 .456 .786 .185 0.6 .302     -1.2 89 13.0 .335 115 10 Josh Naylor CLE 633 9.2% 16.6% 0.55 .243 .320 .456 .776 .213 3.2 .246 -2.3 -2.1 -0.7 85 10.9 .332 118 11 Yandy Diaz TBR 621 8.1% 15.3% 0.53 .281 .341 .414 .755 .133 1.1 .314 -2.2 -1.4 -1.3 83 10.2 .331 120 12 Justin Turner - - - 539 10.9% 17.6% 0.62 .259 .354 .383 .737 .124 1.6 .299     -2.0 70 7.1 .327 117 13 Carlos Santana MIN 594 10.9% 16.7% 0.66 .238 .328 .420 .749 .182 2.7 .252     -0.3 77 7.8 .326 114 14 Jake Burger MIA 579 5.4% 25.9% 0.21 .250 .301 .460 .760 .209 2.4 .292 -0.2 0.1 -1.1 75 7.1 .325 106 15 Vinnie Pasquantino KCR 554 7.2% 12.8% 0.56 .262 .315 .446 .760 .183 2.8 .265 -1.6 -0.6 -0.8 71 6.4 .325 108   
    In 2024, only 4 first basemen had an OPS that exceeded .800. This is quite bad for a position that historically was your first or second best hitter. We can see this also in the projected annual value of these players based on WAR. only 6 players had 3 or higher WAR value!!! That's terrible.  
    # Name Team Batting Base Running Fielding Positional Offense Defense League Replacement RAR WAR Dollars   1 Vladimir Guerrero Jr. TOR 51.9 -5.6 -4.9 -11.8 46.3 -16.7 2.2 21.1 52.9 5.5 $43.7 2 Bryce Harper PHI 33.9 -0.5 6.6 -10.9 33.5 -4.3 1.9 19.1 50.2 5.2 $41.5 3 Freddie Freeman LAD 28.4 -1.4 1.8 -10.9 27.0 -9.0 2.0 19.3 39.2 4.0 $32.4 4 Salvador Perez KCR 11.2 -5.6 2.8 0.7 5.6 3.5 2.0 19.7 30.8 3.2 $25.4 5 Carlos Santana MIN 9.6 -0.9 11.8 -11.0 8.6 0.8 1.8 18.0 29.2 3.0 $24.2 6 Christian Walker ARI 12.7 -3.2 10.8 -9.5 9.4 1.3 1.7 16.7 29.1 3.0 $24.1 7 Nathaniel Lowe TEX 13.6 -0.8 6.1 -10.4 12.8 -4.4 1.8 17.1 27.2 2.8 $22.5 8 Matt Olson ATL 13.9 -3.6 4.0 -12.4 10.3 -8.3 2.1 20.7 24.8 2.6 $20.5 9 Luke Raley SEA 14.9 0.4 -2.5 -5.9 15.3 -8.4 1.4 13.8 22.1 2.3 $18.2 10 Michael Busch CHC 12.7 -1.6 2.0 -10.0 11.1 -8.0 1.7 17.1 21.9 2.3 $18.1 11 Josh Naylor CLE 13.2 -2.5 1.9 -11.8 10.7 -9.9 2.0 19.1 21.9 2.3 $18.1 12 Pete Alonso NYM 18.2 -4.3 -4.6 -12.2 14.0 -16.9 2.1 21.0 20.2 2.1 $16.7 13 Jake Cronenworth SDP 4.1 0.1 -0.2 -5.7 4.2 -5.9 2.0 19.8 20.2 2.1 $16.7  
    Busch projects as three-way tied as the 6th best first Baseman in 2025. 
    It's rare for a 26 year old to plateau in their Rookie year. Based on age and other factors, here's my projected 1B rankings for 2025,: 
    1) Guerrero  2) Freeman  3)  Harper  4)  Olson  5) Walker 6) Busch/Perez/Naylor.
    Alonso will likely outhit him with a worse glove, whereas Santana and Lowe will outfield him but not outhit. Perez is close to a dead tie because his "positional" score is kind of a statistical fluke that inflates his value over other first basemen, and I don't expect it to recur. 
    Things get really interesting when we compare Busch to Walker, Olson and Lowe, each who barely bested his wOBA in 2024.  First, Walker is already facing a plateau at his age, as he's turning 34. Second, by many measures, Olson is arguably the 3rd best 1B after Guererro and Freeman; still, in a down 2024 year, his numbers were virtually identical to the rookie Busch. Third, Nethaniel Lowe is being treated by the market more like a risky leadoff hitter than a real deal slugger. He relied mainly on a 12.6% walk rate and brisk .265 BA to outhit Busch. His OPS was just .762 since he lacks the fundamental slugging you want from the position. Finally about Naylor: he's practically Busch's twin thus far, but I see more upside in Busch's power fundamentals.  
    Keep in mind, Busch will likely be hitting behind the killer duo of Tucker and Suzuki. That should help raise his batting average a notch. 
    What is holding him back, if anything?  
    Strikeouts, pure and simple. His was the highest K% on the entire leaderboard. However, I forgive this from a rookie who can really take a walk and work a count. I expect him to be basically the same player next year but with a reduction from 28.6% to about 24% in strikeouts, translating into more roundtrips on the diamond and more RBI. 
    I project a healthy Busch at .260/.345/.470 with about 30 HR (per 162 games), 100 RBI, and .815 OPS. 
    Conclusion: Is there a guy we would rather have?
    Only Guerrero would be worth a roster shakeup - and even then, not with the $500MM price tag he will be commanding (Personally I think he's going to outhit Soto across his career!). So the answer is no -Busch is OUR GUY and the closest thing to a Matt Olson out there. No, I would not rather have Alonso. Yes, I think Busch rounds out the list of seven true multi-tool stars at the position for 2025-2027. while under team control. Alonso, Perez, Naylor, and Lowe are scratching at his back, but in terms of contract status, I'd not trade Busch 1-for-1 for any of them. 
    So, Cubs fans, please get pumped for a perennial "All-Star alternate" type hitter with the occasional NL gold glove. He'll have a 2.5 to 3.5 WAR range year with many "no doubters"!
     
  7. ryanrc

    Finishing the roster: The Ideal Cubs for 2025/2026

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Okay folks, we're closing in on a finished roster.
    This article effectively ties together and concludes my first 4 blogposts here at northsidebaseball.com. Here I'll sum up my ideal roster moves remaining for Jed Hoyer, and how/why it leads to sustained dominance for 2026 and perhaps 2027.  
    First, Let's summarize the remaining contracts that I endorse to maximize the WAR of the 2025 Cubs. 
    1)  Sign Tanner Scott, LH Closer, 3/5 year contract, somewhat backloaded... 20 mil in 2025. +3 WAR (compared to the player we cut)
    2) Sign Randal Grichuk OF bench, 2 year contract, slightly backloaded, 12 mil in 2025. +2 WAR as elite platoon bat
    3) Sign Paul DeJong for 3B/utility infield. 1 year contract, 9 mil in 2025. +2 WAR (compared to a -.5 WAR utility guy in his spot)
    4) Roll with Gage Workman as the opening day LH utility bat, and replace him as needed. 0 WAR. 
    With this roster construction, this guy will see fewer than 50 at bats and mostly be a late-inning glove substitute for dinged-up starters. For any player with a stint on the injured list, he would be bypassed by Shaw. Vidal Brujan can do this same job, doens't matter much.  
    Remaining: cap right now: $50 million.     Wins projected now: 93
    Total cap hit of signings: 41 million. 
    Remaining after these signings: $9 million.  Wins after signings: 100 !!!! Oh boy, look out, Dodgers!

    *********************************************
    How would this set of signings affect 2026?

    Using this same path of roster construction, we could actually re-sign Tucker for 2026 if we did a few creative things. First, keep in mind we have $7.5 MM in money going to Smyly and Heyward that will be falling off. Then, DeJong departs. Then we trade Suzuki to clear Tucker's spot and Tucker's long-term money. Those moves, combined, frees up about 35 million. We don't resign Rea or Thielbar, taking us to 42mm. Half of that would go to Tucker, and the other half to cover all the youngster contract increases.  We then trade away Assad and Amaya to hunt for a long-term answer at catcher. We promote Caissie to platoon with Grichuk and that split duo performs similarly as Suzuki at DH. We promote Triantos to be our utility infield, and to understudy to replace Hoerner in 2027.  Alcantara is traded off by then, as there's no spot for him. He looks like a 2026 starter at a small market team that's rebuilding. I assume Ballesteros remains a minor-league callup for 2026 and replaces Kelly in 2027. 

    2026 Field Roster: 
    Outfield: Happ, PCA, Tucker, Grichuk, Caissie
    Infield: Shaw, Swanson, Hoerner, Busch, Triantos, "X replacing DeJong" from minors
    Catchers: Kelly, and "x", a trade/FA upgrade from Amaya. 
    2026 Rotation Options: Steele, Imanaga, Taillon, Boyd, Brown, Horton, Birdsell, Poteet 
    ************************************************
    How about 2027? Does this path still make sense then?
    Beyond this, many things can happen for 2027. However, we can imagine that we resign the irreplaceable Happ, let Hoerner go for Triantos, and extend Busch and PCA. We replace Grichuk with the next guy up from the minors... but as you can see, this is still a very strong and continuous roster with a clear identity. There's no sudden drop-off in 2027. There will also be enough money to replace Shaw or Triantos if either bombs. 
    2027 Roster projection: 
    outfield: Happ, PCA, Tucker, Caissie, x 
    Infield: Shaw, Swanson, Triantos, Busch, x, x
    rotation: Steele, Imanaga, Brown, Horton, Birdsell, x, x, x

    And throughout all this time, you have an elite closer duo in Scott/Hodge under contract. 
    What about the Bregman Route? To be honest, it's not much worse in the short run, but a tight budget long run. 
    Suppose we did this in 2025: 
    Closer: Finnegan. 2 years, 25 mil+ 3rd year option... 1.5 WAR
    Bregman at 3rd. 3 years, 90 mil. + 4 WAR
    No outfield signing. 
    Wins: about 98
    Budget remaining: <$8 million.
    With this approach, the budget is much tighter for 2026. After signing Bregman and Tucker, there would be no cash to upgrade at catcher. We'd be stuck with Amaya mediocrity. Second, we wouldn't have Grichuk as a 2026 DH, and the odds are we would simply promote a guy from within. Third, assume Shaw is now a long-term power hitting 2B for the Cubs. Bregman would be likely to plateau and decline as soon as 2027. This would still be a nice lineup but depress the 2027 roster's potential 100+ win tally to about 97, lock up a lot more money, and make it near impossible to spend on upgrading anything for the number of years that Bregman is under contract; and, finally we would lose Ian Happ as we couldn't commit to another big contract. 
    2027 with Bregman: 
    Outfield: x, PCA, Tucker, Caissie, x 
    Infield: Bregman, Swanson, Busch, Shaw, Triantos
    Catcher: Amaya, Kelly
    Wins: 97 or less (because Ian Happ walks and Amaya is so mid!)
    Conclusion: 
    In effect, I much prefer risking a big contract on Scott and having a near-perfect roster balance, than go for Bregman and tighten the budget for the preceding few years. However, I would be happier with either of these solutions than neither of these. 
     
     
  8. ryanrc

    Here's a Fun Topic: Who Should Replace Canario?

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Hey all! 
    I appreciate all the readers of my first blogpost. I won't typically post twice in two days. I figured I'd keep this new blog momentum rolling, though, with a fun topic. In my first post I argued that Paul Dejong would be the best 1 year sub at 3B because of his combination of glove and power. In this Scenario, Shaw starts at Second for Hoerner and then slides into a platoon at 3rd with DeJong. We still haven't sorted out the other two bench spots: 1) The 5th outfielder; 2) The lefty utility glove smallball guy to replace Mastrobouni. Now, I doubt the latter will move the needle noticeably in our quest to win the division, so I'll ignore the Mastrobouni issue. Who cares about a role that is typically worth less than 1 WAR?  On the other hand, we could squeeze a 96+ win season if we have a killer platoon bat on the outfield bench. 
    QUESTION: 
    On our quest for 96+ wins, who should replace Alexander Canario as the 5th outfielder on the squad? I want a guy who can produce 1.5 - 2 WAR off the outfield bench. Let's go over the logic at play. 
    In a team with a stacked outfield, this is a luxury, one might say. Indeed, our top three outfielders are top 5 MLB defenders at their positions. All of our top four are starter quality. All four can hit AND steal, and all four are expected to top 20 HR.  Let that sink in- this is the best outfield we've had since Sammy Sosa was on the team. However, there may be ways for a 5th guy to justify his playing time. Let's go over them. 

    1) Our top 3 guys are lefties. Common sense would dictate the next guy up would be a righty. Well, we have that in Seiya Suzuki, who was the Cub's best hitter last year and is the default DH.  Suzuki's splits are fairly balanced, too. Happ is a switch hitter, and Tucker is a superstar, so neither needs to come off the field. This leaves Pete Crow-Armstrong. Well, his splits are classically lefty: He was a roughly .600/ .700 OPS against lefty/righty pitching last year. If my 5th guy sees any serious playing time, he'll be subbing for PCA somehow. To justify removing an elite glove from center field, the 5th guy needs to really MASH against lefty starters.   

    Conclusion: A righty platoon specialist makes tons of sense. 
    2) Our 5th guy doesn't need to play center. Happ can cover center, Suzuki has the corners. Suzuki can cover both corners with "meh" defense, but you're not actually afraid to give him the assignment. He was a Japanese gold glove type before he bulked up for power in the majors. Something tells me he could easily bounce back and play plus defense in his quest to be a superstar. His arm is solid anyhow. Now, Happ can slide over and cover center quite well - i don't get this narrative that Happ isn't enough glove at center if PCA goes down. Happ is, by some measures, THE BEST LF glove in MLB. He's a plus center fielder. So, the 5th guy really doesn't need to play the field much. He's a DH while Suzuki subs.    
    Conclusion: I'll take a righty who can play left field; however, I want my next guy up from the minors (6th outfield) to be a LEFTY, in case of a long-term injury. His name is Owen Caissie BTW. 
    3) How good must he be to take PCA off the field? We still look great with Suzuki(LF), Happ(C), and Tucker(RF) out there, so glove doesn't concern me. However, we really need as much hit and power tools as we can get to face teams like the Dodgers and Phillies. PCA could have an upside potential of hitting .700 against lefty pitching, and we want him to get some of those reps; however, PCA is not projected for a high batting average. Our 5th man doesn't need to run because we are stacked with those guys.
    Conclusion: This guy should reliably hit over .800 OPS against lefties with power- the more hit tool, the better. 

    4) How many at-bats are we talking? Many veterans avoid bench contracts because it drags down their lifetime expected earnings. They will, however, play the bench temporarily for a juggernaut contender. It can be tricky to find a guy at the START of a season who is a reliable bench slugger. This is why most teams have a Canario type guy and promote from within. Let's say this guy gets 100 at bats to cover for Happ, Tucker, and/or Suzuki's minor injuries, and another 150 platooning with PCA. He'll also get another 50 pinching for catchers or other position players. 
    Conclusion: Now we've got it narrowed to 300 at bats.
    5) How much money are we talking?  This is the key question for a tightwad organization. If I'm willing to contend, I want a guy with a 3+ WAR projection per 162 games, who is willing to play only 40% of the time, typically at DH. He will want to be paid a premium to sit and platoon. He's also good enough to start at DH full-time we lose a player for the season, or else he wouldn't be worth the dough. The Cubs have the cash to burn on a 1 year deal for this exact type of player. 
    Conclusion: I'm looking for a $10-$15 MM guy who strikes fear into the hearts of left-handed pitchers but can handle righties if necessary. I'm also willing to take him on a 2-year 30 MM contract if he's THAT good, especially if he can take over for DH in 2026 if Suzuki replaces Tucker in RF. I don't believe in arbitrarily making room for prospects that aren't ready during a contention year - that is a true small market philosophy and shouldn't be at the heart of Cubs roster building strategy.    
    The Big Reveal: Who Fits this Profile?
    As you might guess, a handful of guys could fill this role via trade, now or mid-season. However, among the available free agents there is one specific guy:

    Randal Grichuk. 
    The 33-year-old had a landmark season for the D-backs. He hit .291 with 12 home runs, 46 RBIs and an .875 OPS (140 OPS+) in 106 games. He absolutely dominated lefties while sharing a platoon role with the elite righty killer Joc Pederson. Here are his 2024 splits from Fangraphs: 
    Season Handedness G     AB     PA     H     1B     2B     3B     HR     R     RBI     BB     IBB     SO     HBP     SF     SH     GDP     SB     CS     AVG     2024 vs L as R 94 163 184 52 31 14 1 6 6 32 16 0 28 3 2 0 2 0 0 .319 2024 vs R as R 57 91 95 22 9 6 1 6 6 14 4 0 18 0 0 0 3 0 0 .240 Arguments Against Grichuk. 
    1) It's too much spend on the outfield. I disagree with this. We are blessed to have very few holes on the 26 man roster. The biggest need is more bat, and I'll spend for that because we haven't proven ourselves yet at the plate. This is one of only three places you can spend that money. Depth outfielders don't get hurt much compared to pitchers. So spend it on a killer platoon! Besides, he worked wonders for the Diamondbacks last year. 
    2) He won't want to play bench anymore. Aye, this is a problem. He had such a monster year that like the Pirates are begging for the guy as a full-time player. Our best counter-argument is that he's not getting any younger or better at defense. Grichuk projects as a 0 to -.5 WAR defender for the future. He's better off where he can focus more on the DH role and contend immediately. 
    3) We've got other young bats at no additional cost- stretch them out. If money was a concern, I wouldn't even be writing this. However, we've got it to burn this year. The only player we are really stifling is Canario. Alcantara needs 1 more year of seasoning to be anything but a glove. Caissie hasn't even burned options yet, and his lefty bat makes him a better injury replacement at DH than an Opening Day 5th man. I have both of them pencilled in as competing for 5th man in 2026, not 2025. 
    4) Suzuki would get madder.  Meh, this one doesn't concern me. Suzuki is the next GLOVE up- most of the time he's playing, Grichuk will be DH, with 3 of the top 4 guys playing the field. Suzuki should get as many glove reps as Grichuk gets DH reps. 
    5) Maybe we need a glove? If we want to lock down the #1 outfield defense in the majors, we could go with lefty Alex Verdugo. However, this WOULD make Suzuki mad, indeed, because it would remove any chances of him getting serious reps in the outfield. It would also defeat the purpose of platoon reps. I don't like it at all.  
    6) Wait until mid-season.  Let's go back to conventional wisdom - let the young guys get their cups of coffee in the outfield and then go get your veteran bat at the All-Star Break. Why don't I like this idea? Lately, rental bats haven't been very effective. I much prefer rental pitchers. Furthermore, I'd rather spend the money than the prospects for a rental bat. I want to only deal prospects for pitching because arms are what we lack in the low levels of the minors.  
    Verdict: Grichuk could be had for maybe 2 years, 20 million, or 1 year, 12 million. He'll definitely outhit Canario, especially because of his much lower strikeout rate and higher walk rate.  It would be a bold statement that we are really going for it and won't let anyone ride out a mid-season hitting slump in our outfield. 

    Please comment below if you have other suggestions. I will run a poll if we get enough interest!
  9. ryanrc

    Matt Boyd, now Colin Rea: What is This Strategy Anyway? 

    By ryanrc,


    Transactions and Roster Construction
    Matt Boyd, now Colin Rea: What is This Strategy Anyway? 
    Let's get right into it, shall we? Many fans were disappointed by this dual signing of backend starters. Fans ALWAYS want to fill from the top of the depth chart - they wanted a new #1 or #2 (Max Fried, Garret Crochet) or at least a #3 to leapfrog Taillon (Walker Buehler, Luis Castillo). But there's more reasons to NOT do this than to do this - especially given the organization's strategy to cap salary at the tax line. Let's reflect on arguments in favor of the Hoyer Strategy. He wants to win "just enough wins" to take the division and go from there, without overspending, and without worsening the future roster. He clearly doesn't expect to win the World Series; still, it is his sworn duty to beat the Brewers this year if he wants to return to his Cubs role in 2026.  
    1) The price of #1-#3 starting pitchers is currently well exceeding the WAR value. Luxury spending teams are paying absurd premiums on 2025 pitching. The Mets are giving Sean Manea a salary about 50% over his WAR value...and then paying a tax on top of that! 
    2) Prices over/under WAR value are mostly determined by a short-term pitching scarcity.  The entire league is stockpiling extra pitching due to injury trends. They are still in process of adjusting their roster building strategies at the minor league level. This all leads to short-term over-bidding on starters. It's simply a bad year to be going nuts on pitching, especially if you like what you're developing internally. Take, for example, the absurd Red Sox proposition of a 21 MM PILLOW CONTRACT for a weak-throwing version of Buehler - about 50% over the expected price. Also, the 50% inflated example of the A's and Severino: a 3-year 66MM deal to play Ace when he's not better than our #3 Taillon. Frankly, any organization that can work around this pitching bubble deserves credit, as fans adjust to the realization that top arms are sitting out entire seasons lately.  
    3) The price of starting pitching will be more rational mid-season. Let's face it - when the primary cause of pitching prices is injury rates, the best time to buy pitching is mid-season. It allows young talent to emerge - and every year about 1/3rd of popular free agent arms are surpassed by lesser known or injured names. In fact, that's how Boyd ended up getting paid by the Cubs. He emerged from injury to have a killer run from August to October. As professionals know, most teams snag about 2 impactful pitchers later on, to push for contention. 
    in 2024, the Cubs did a phenomenal job in recovering their bullpen mid-season with cheap but excellent pitchers. I expect them to find such pieces in 2025 later on, especially in the LH closing dept. Also, don't forget that Cade Horton and Cody Poteet both have a real shot of stealing a rotation slot by August. 
    4) Workhorse starters should have a high floor, not high ceiling. To win a 162 game season, you want starting depth that can eat innings but need not be relied on to start in the postseason. These are 1 to 1.5 WAR players who fill out the #4 to #8 ranks of the depth chart. Their job is to NOT MESS UP. 
    The cubs have 4 guys who rightly fit this formula: Boyd, Assad, Rea, Poteet, and in a pinch, Wicks. Perhaps you want your #9 and #10 guys to be the youngsters with compelling high-upside. Well, we've got those in #9 (Horton) and #10 (Brown), although the team insists Brown is a bullpen guy for 2025.   
    5) Workhorse starters should profile as very healthy. You don't want hot young fireballers who blow out their arm. You want guys with mediocre stuff, whose pitching style focus on control and complexity offerings, with low risk of injury. You especially want them to have plausible narratives of having put any injuries behind them well BEFORE the season. 
    Boyd and Rea fit this bill nicely. Both project to be very healthy and to be pitching their career-best ball in 2025. Both can maintain this pattern because they don't rely on stuff, and they both had their elbow reconstruction already and look great health-wise ever since. They both unlocked new strategies in 2024 that maximize their 5 pitch arsenals to create confusion for hitters. And, they both have low walk rates, which means they can stay in the game for 1-2 more outs than average. 
    6) Workhorse starters should have a good WAR price. Because these guys are somewhat expendable for the post-season, and won't sell many jerseys, they should be good deals. This is a classic area of the roster for saving money when on a tight budget. 
    Boyd @ 1.5 WAR for AAV of $14.5 MM/year is not inflated, due to his upside of 2.5 WAR. Rea @ 1 WAR for $5 MM is actually cheap- his projected value is $7-8 MM. 
    7) The Cubs starters were good enough for the postseason in 2024, except for Hendricks. So, fans keep underestimating how hard it is to rank 6th in rotation ERA when you've got Hendricks throwing over 6. Hendricks' WAR was -1.6.
    Replacing his innings for Boyd @1.5 WAR is a positive swing of about 3. That's big. Rea's 1 WAR replacing 0.2 WAR Drew Smyly gets us yet another win. The combined cost of Boyd/Rea is also much cheaper than Hendricks/Smyly !  
    😎 Rea is a swingman - but he can push Assad. Despite Assad's success, his fundamentals are poor, especially his walk 9.9% rate. Rea has a very low walk rate and pounds the strike zone.  This is a great combo, because whenever Assad's junk approach falters, you've got a guy you can trust to throw strikes behind him. I've said it before - Assad needs to develop a true strikeout pitch. Maybe a Japanese-style splitter? While he figures that Out, Rea is a stable option. 
    9) Cubs need to hit. Period.  2024 was a tough year for hitters. Still, the top teams (Dodgers, Mets, Yankees, Phillies, Orioles) all had high slugging percentages. Many of the top pitching squads like Braves, Mariners, Tigers, Guardians, Brewers, AND CUBS didn't have the bat success to make it. When league batting averages are low, the big bats are the place to be spending. 
    By only spending $15MM in 2025 on Boyd/Rea, they can and should redirect that money for fixing their hitting weaknesses.

    10) 3B is a solvable problem and the bigger problem. If Hoyer fails, the pitchforks are coming. So, after thoroughly defending Hoyer's pitching strategy, let's go to the real question: will he spend enough to finish the team? Let's suppose Hoyer stashes extra money for pitching mid-season, and so only spends 220MM on Opening Day Payroll. Where do you spend it?   
    I think me and everyone else would be okay with Alex Bregman, but that doesn't fit their spending strategy. So, let's assume they go for serious power bat on a short-term contract at 3B, so that Shaw can ease into the majors and the Cubs can solve their slugging dilemma. Problem is, they instead loaded up on cheap, sub-par LH hitters with gloves for camp, such as Gage Workman and Vidal Brujan, who are only playable as platoon hitters and can't hit a homer. There's really only one FA left with HR pop AND a glove, and that fit a 1-year profile: Paul DeJong. He projects as a .230 /.280/.440 hitter at Wrigley, with 30 HR per 162. He's a superb glove at 3B and only average at SS. I have him as a 2 WAR guy at the hot corner, with 1 coming from the glove and the other from his HR swing. His hitting splits are reverse: last year he was .730 against righties, which makes him a potential platoon with Shaw. Because the Cubs were -1 WAR at the position last year, this would be a 3 WAR swing, with a sticker price hopefully in the 8-10 million range. This would be EXACTLY where we need to be to aim for a 220 MM roster, assuming Hoyer spends the rest on a contract extension for Steele - the only guy I think will sign an extension soon.     
    So: is it a good strategy?
    Mostly, but I have a few concerns. Let's ADD THE WAR and find out. I have the Cubs as a much-improved team, in the 92-93 WAR range, even with the "weak signings" of Boyd/Rea. Carson Kelly gives you net 1 WAR at catcher. Tucker is about 3 net WAR. You expect PCA and Busch to combine for +2 WAR over last year. At least +3 from Boyd/Rea, although I'm expecting +4. And, +1 for starting the season with a closer/setup Hodge/Miller who will outperform Alzolay/Neris. This all takes us from about 83 wins to at least 93, even before we evaluate third base. We still have budget to upgrade the bench with a killer combo like DeJong/Shaw, which would add enough additional slugging to swing us into the 95 win level like the Phils and Orioles. Or, miracle of miracles, Jed pulls the trigger on Bregman and we are a 96 win team with exceptional fielding chemistry, 
    Now, if Hoyer fails to do enough, its unlikely the rotation. Blame it on a "meh" approach to bolstering our team slugging, and the glove-only infield bench. Should we really trust Canario as the OF bench solution, or would you have preferred moving him for an experienced player? I'm not sure on this. The catcher position still has a lot riding on it to improve - all the greatest teams have great catchers right now. 

    Conclusion

    If you like this kind of analysis, you'll like what I have planned for future articles on fornorthsidebaseball.com! I may even crack the odd joke or tell the odd story, but my writing style is on deeper analysis of publicly available facts that tell a better story. 
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