Matthew Trueblood
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Having seen him add velocity in successive seasons via diligent training, the Cubs know that Javier Assad has the raw stuff to be a solid big-league pitcher. Assad showed poise and tenacity in his appearances for México in the World Baseball Classic, too, so there’s little question that he can handle the big moment. What must happen next, whether the transition is permanent or not, is for Assad to trade in the junkballing starter’s arsenal he’s used over the majority of his career for one befitting his new level and role. Here’s Assad’s pitch usage against left-handed batters since arriving in the majors. The 2023 data points aren’t just Saturday’s game; they also include his WBC work. That cutter is his favorite toy, and not without reason. It’s picked up 1.5 miles per hour of velocity this year, and now frequently reaches the 90s. With much more cut than its spin direction implies to the hitter and the ability to stay mostly on plane with his fastball, it really can be a great pitch for inducing weak contact. The trouble with the above chart is in the pitches he uses less often–because there are too many of them, and none that he uses enough. Even if the Cubs want to use Assad in a multi-inning relief role and keep him ready to move back to the rotation, his five-pitch approach doesn’t make sense. None of the offerings are good enough to justify trying to juggle so many of them. Before talking about how he should prune that particular tree, though, we need to look at how he approaches right-handed hitters, as well. Obviously, the same problem presents itself, in some measure. He uses five pitches against same-handed batters, too. He just swaps out his changeup for the slider. That’s a sensible substitution, but it’s lost in a pleonasm of stuff he’s trying. Let’s figure out what really needs to be done here. The first thing to decide is whether Assad can command both his sinker and his fastball, even if they’re used very sparingly. If so, then he should keep both, but they each need to be siloed. The sinker should be his fastball against righties, but never show up when he faces lefties. Against them, it’s not a useful pitch in any way. The four-seamer could work against righties, too, but not as part of the best arsenal we can build for him when facing them. Obviously, then, if Assad can’t sustain fastball command for both pitches, he should just junk the sinker and evolve into a four-seam guy. The cutter is as unhelpful a pitch for him against righties as the sinker is against lefties. The hard-hit Brian Anderson single that started the rolling snowball on Saturday came on a cutter that badly missed its target and ended up thigh-high on the inner third. There’s too much risk of mistakes just like that one with the cutter, and too little upside, especially because Assad has a slider now that is a much better fit. The rightmost dot on this scatter plot shows the increased horizontal (and vertical) movement on the slider Assad has shown this year. With that much depth on that pitch, it should become his secondary weapon against righties, whether he sticks with the sinker or focuses on the four-seam heat. Both fastballs better set up the slider than the cutter to a righty. That goes double for however long Assad is a reliever, be it a one-inning guy or a long man. His attempt to bring this varied repertoire with him to the bullpen misses a crucial fact of relief work, which is that the replacement level for strikeout rate there is higher. The stakes are higher, too, so a little bit of mediocre contact can kill you–as it did, in part, on Saturday, when Jesse Winker’s single found its way to the outfield and tied the score. In order to be a valuable reliever in the modern game, one needs to strike out at least 25 percent of opponents. The best way for Assad to do that is to go with his sinker and slider against righties (occasionally breaking out his four-seamer to attack the top of the zone with two strikes, if he can hone his control to that target), and to mix his four-seamer, cutter, and changeup against lefties, with a curveball every now and then to change their eye level and disrupt their timing. These are subtle changes. The most extreme would be throwing the slider as much as he should against righties, and even that would just be in replacement of the cutter. Assad has done the big things already. To cross the line between fringy arm and serious contributor, though, he has to get the small things right.
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One of the best and most intriguing stories to emerge from the Cubs’ spring was the emergence of Javier Assad as a potential bullpen weapon. That experiment got off to a rough start on Saturday, but it can still end well. The young righty just needs to make some adjustments. Having seen him add velocity in successive seasons via diligent training, the Cubs know that Javier Assad has the raw stuff to be a solid big-league pitcher. Assad showed poise and tenacity in his appearances for México in the World Baseball Classic, too, so there’s little question that he can handle the big moment. What must happen next, whether the transition is permanent or not, is for Assad to trade in the junkballing starter’s arsenal he’s used over the majority of his career for one befitting his new level and role. Here’s Assad’s pitch usage against left-handed batters since arriving in the majors. The 2023 data points aren’t just Saturday’s game; they also include his WBC work. That cutter is his favorite toy, and not without reason. It’s picked up 1.5 miles per hour of velocity this year, and now frequently reaches the 90s. With much more cut than its spin direction implies to the hitter and the ability to stay mostly on plane with his fastball, it really can be a great pitch for inducing weak contact. The trouble with the above chart is in the pitches he uses less often–because there are too many of them, and none that he uses enough. Even if the Cubs want to use Assad in a multi-inning relief role and keep him ready to move back to the rotation, his five-pitch approach doesn’t make sense. None of the offerings are good enough to justify trying to juggle so many of them. Before talking about how he should prune that particular tree, though, we need to look at how he approaches right-handed hitters, as well. Obviously, the same problem presents itself, in some measure. He uses five pitches against same-handed batters, too. He just swaps out his changeup for the slider. That’s a sensible substitution, but it’s lost in a pleonasm of stuff he’s trying. Let’s figure out what really needs to be done here. The first thing to decide is whether Assad can command both his sinker and his fastball, even if they’re used very sparingly. If so, then he should keep both, but they each need to be siloed. The sinker should be his fastball against righties, but never show up when he faces lefties. Against them, it’s not a useful pitch in any way. The four-seamer could work against righties, too, but not as part of the best arsenal we can build for him when facing them. Obviously, then, if Assad can’t sustain fastball command for both pitches, he should just junk the sinker and evolve into a four-seam guy. The cutter is as unhelpful a pitch for him against righties as the sinker is against lefties. The hard-hit Brian Anderson single that started the rolling snowball on Saturday came on a cutter that badly missed its target and ended up thigh-high on the inner third. There’s too much risk of mistakes just like that one with the cutter, and too little upside, especially because Assad has a slider now that is a much better fit. The rightmost dot on this scatter plot shows the increased horizontal (and vertical) movement on the slider Assad has shown this year. With that much depth on that pitch, it should become his secondary weapon against righties, whether he sticks with the sinker or focuses on the four-seam heat. Both fastballs better set up the slider than the cutter to a righty. That goes double for however long Assad is a reliever, be it a one-inning guy or a long man. His attempt to bring this varied repertoire with him to the bullpen misses a crucial fact of relief work, which is that the replacement level for strikeout rate there is higher. The stakes are higher, too, so a little bit of mediocre contact can kill you–as it did, in part, on Saturday, when Jesse Winker’s single found its way to the outfield and tied the score. In order to be a valuable reliever in the modern game, one needs to strike out at least 25 percent of opponents. The best way for Assad to do that is to go with his sinker and slider against righties (occasionally breaking out his four-seamer to attack the top of the zone with two strikes, if he can hone his control to that target), and to mix his four-seamer, cutter, and changeup against lefties, with a curveball every now and then to change their eye level and disrupt their timing. These are subtle changes. The most extreme would be throwing the slider as much as he should against righties, and even that would just be in replacement of the cutter. Assad has done the big things already. To cross the line between fringy arm and serious contributor, though, he has to get the small things right. View full article
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My favorite baseball truism is that every team wins 54 games, and every team loses 54 games. It’s what you do with the other 54 games that matters. That framework can be the best way to balance the twin dangers of a long baseball season, which are either minimizing the impact of a single game and overreacting to the same thing. With a little perspective and introspection, we can identify the games that fall into the third bucket of 54 games. Those are the only ones worth worrying much about. A team should have 54 wins every year you treat as essentially routine, without getting especially excited. They should have 54 losses you treat as routine, without getting upset. If a game falls into the third bucket, though, it’s worth your emotion. It’s not like your favorite team losing a key game in the NFL, because mathematically, even every game in the third bucket only constitutes a little less than two percent of the decisive segment of the team’s season. Still, it should sit with you a bit. Thursday’s win was a great one, with the vibes of Opening Day and the excitement of the four-run rally the Cubs cobbled together in the third inning. That was clearly a first-bucket game, though. By contrast, Saturday’s loss was a third-bucket game. That one could easily have gone either way, and the Cubs lost because they put together a dysfunctional roster to open the season and deployed it wrong. Justin Steele delivered everything the Cubs could have wanted. He put them in a position to win by shutting down the Brewers for six innings, while allowing just four baserunners and striking out eight. He’s an exemplar of something I increasingly believe about the nature of what we call command: that it’s less about pinpoint location than about consistent execution. Steele often seems to miss his spot by a significant amount, but his pitches have action, life, and deception to them even when that happens. That didn’t mean he didn’t need the support of his defense, of course, and he got it, in a gorgeous way. Dansby Swanson has exceeded reasonable expectations and lived up to every hope of Cubs fans so far. On Saturday, that meant quashing a Brewers rally with another beautiful double play off the bat of William Contreras, then robbing Contreras of a hit his next time up with a diving play to his right and a lightning-quick release. Thanks to both Steele and the fielders behind him, the Cubs were able to take a 1-0 lead into the seventh inning. Ross went to Javier Assad at that point, which was pretty reasonable. Assad had a great spring, after all, and looked especially good in relief in the World Baseball Classic. That’s how he made the roster, and it’s a solid reason to have him act as a bridge to the back end of the bullpen. Assad looked good in his first inning of work, too. The fatal flaw here is that I had to write the words between “good” and “too” in that sentence. With a fully fresh (albeit inexperienced and less-than-terrifying) bullpen from which to draw someone for the eighth, Ross instead had Assad come back. That led, in quick succession, to a hard-hit single and a bad walk, the latter issued over the desperate attempts of Garrett Mitchell to give the team an out by bunting the runner over. The seeing-eye single that then tied the game was a bit unlucky, but it was bad luck to which Ross exposed the team by not taking out Assad sooner. A few batters later, Michael Fulmer let the game get away from the Cubs for good, as he allowed Contreras to hit it away from Swanson and drive in the go-ahead runs with a single to right field. That single wouldn’t have fallen against a truly competent right fielder, but alas, the Cubs had Miles Mastrobuoni out there instead of one. That error, however, goes to the front office, not to Ross. So, for that matter, does some of the blame for Assad’s being left on the mound to make a mess of things. The Cubs only have two true outfielders on their roster right now, in Ian Happ and Cody Bellinger. Because they’re letting Nick Madrigal take up a spot on their 26-man roster and Eric Hosmer take up one on their 40-man at all, they’re consigned to using Mastrobuoni, Patrick Wisdom, and Trey Mancini in right field and praying for the best. Wrigley Field doesn’t go easy on right fielders, especially when they’re not yet familiar with it. I’m not sure whether Mike Tauchman or Christopher Morel would have caught Contreras’s hit, but it wasn’t entirely uncatchable, and Mastrobuoni never even looked comfortable in pursuit of it. Nelson Velázquez, whatever his other flaws, would have caught it easily. Relatedly, if the team had a left-handed reliever at all, it’s unlikely that Ross would have left Assad in to face Mitchell and Jesse Winker. They don’t, so he elected to roll with his young righthander. He paid for it. The Cubs didn’t build this roster to win in the short term, but we don’t have to accept that as a sound plan. They spent too much money this winter, and (from ownership to the front office to Ross himself) have talked too much about winning again this year to then hope to be graded on a gentle curve again. They had their first chance to win a third-bucket game Saturday, and they blew it. We don't need to freak out on every such occasion, because there will be 53 more such games. Still, it's a loss that should rankle.
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The Cubs collapsed after late June 2021, and the rebuild that dare not speak its name began right then. That makes this the third season of the project, and if we’re that far into it, losses like Saturday’s can’t be treated as excusable moral victories. With an assist from Jed Hoyer, David Ross blew it. My favorite baseball truism is that every team wins 54 games, and every team loses 54 games. It’s what you do with the other 54 games that matters. That framework can be the best way to balance the twin dangers of a long baseball season, which are either minimizing the impact of a single game and overreacting to the same thing. With a little perspective and introspection, we can identify the games that fall into the third bucket of 54 games. Those are the only ones worth worrying much about. A team should have 54 wins every year you treat as essentially routine, without getting especially excited. They should have 54 losses you treat as routine, without getting upset. If a game falls into the third bucket, though, it’s worth your emotion. It’s not like your favorite team losing a key game in the NFL, because mathematically, even every game in the third bucket only constitutes a little less than two percent of the decisive segment of the team’s season. Still, it should sit with you a bit. Thursday’s win was a great one, with the vibes of Opening Day and the excitement of the four-run rally the Cubs cobbled together in the third inning. That was clearly a first-bucket game, though. By contrast, Saturday’s loss was a third-bucket game. That one could easily have gone either way, and the Cubs lost because they put together a dysfunctional roster to open the season and deployed it wrong. Justin Steele delivered everything the Cubs could have wanted. He put them in a position to win by shutting down the Brewers for six innings, while allowing just four baserunners and striking out eight. He’s an exemplar of something I increasingly believe about the nature of what we call command: that it’s less about pinpoint location than about consistent execution. Steele often seems to miss his spot by a significant amount, but his pitches have action, life, and deception to them even when that happens. That didn’t mean he didn’t need the support of his defense, of course, and he got it, in a gorgeous way. Dansby Swanson has exceeded reasonable expectations and lived up to every hope of Cubs fans so far. On Saturday, that meant quashing a Brewers rally with another beautiful double play off the bat of William Contreras, then robbing Contreras of a hit his next time up with a diving play to his right and a lightning-quick release. Thanks to both Steele and the fielders behind him, the Cubs were able to take a 1-0 lead into the seventh inning. Ross went to Javier Assad at that point, which was pretty reasonable. Assad had a great spring, after all, and looked especially good in relief in the World Baseball Classic. That’s how he made the roster, and it’s a solid reason to have him act as a bridge to the back end of the bullpen. Assad looked good in his first inning of work, too. The fatal flaw here is that I had to write the words between “good” and “too” in that sentence. With a fully fresh (albeit inexperienced and less-than-terrifying) bullpen from which to draw someone for the eighth, Ross instead had Assad come back. That led, in quick succession, to a hard-hit single and a bad walk, the latter issued over the desperate attempts of Garrett Mitchell to give the team an out by bunting the runner over. The seeing-eye single that then tied the game was a bit unlucky, but it was bad luck to which Ross exposed the team by not taking out Assad sooner. A few batters later, Michael Fulmer let the game get away from the Cubs for good, as he allowed Contreras to hit it away from Swanson and drive in the go-ahead runs with a single to right field. That single wouldn’t have fallen against a truly competent right fielder, but alas, the Cubs had Miles Mastrobuoni out there instead of one. That error, however, goes to the front office, not to Ross. So, for that matter, does some of the blame for Assad’s being left on the mound to make a mess of things. The Cubs only have two true outfielders on their roster right now, in Ian Happ and Cody Bellinger. Because they’re letting Nick Madrigal take up a spot on their 26-man roster and Eric Hosmer take up one on their 40-man at all, they’re consigned to using Mastrobuoni, Patrick Wisdom, and Trey Mancini in right field and praying for the best. Wrigley Field doesn’t go easy on right fielders, especially when they’re not yet familiar with it. I’m not sure whether Mike Tauchman or Christopher Morel would have caught Contreras’s hit, but it wasn’t entirely uncatchable, and Mastrobuoni never even looked comfortable in pursuit of it. Nelson Velázquez, whatever his other flaws, would have caught it easily. Relatedly, if the team had a left-handed reliever at all, it’s unlikely that Ross would have left Assad in to face Mitchell and Jesse Winker. They don’t, so he elected to roll with his young righthander. He paid for it. The Cubs didn’t build this roster to win in the short term, but we don’t have to accept that as a sound plan. They spent too much money this winter, and (from ownership to the front office to Ross himself) have talked too much about winning again this year to then hope to be graded on a gentle curve again. They had their first chance to win a third-bucket game Saturday, and they blew it. We don't need to freak out on every such occasion, because there will be 53 more such games. Still, it's a loss that should rankle. View full article
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The Cubs' New Identity Was on Full Display on Opening Day
Matthew Trueblood posted an article in Cubs
There’s a little extra anxiety in following a team built on run prevention. On some level, one always knows that there will be moments, innings, and entire games in which the luck dragons will roar and even the best defense in baseball can’t vanquish them. Baseball is unlike every other major American sport in that way. Blocked shots don’t go into the hoop with any meaningful frequency. Nor do forced fumbles tend to lead to big gains for the offense. In baseball, though, a broken-bat blooper can be just as dangerous as a scalded line drive, and that makes building a team around anything short of a dominant pitching staff scary. On Opening Day, though, the Cubs did their very best to eliminate all of that worry. Marcus Stroman, who will usually generate lots of weak contact but not as many whiffs, struck out eight, thanks (in part) to a strike zone that neatly fit his stuff and location profile. Keegan Thompson, Brad Boxberger, and Michael Fulmer picked up right where he left off, fanning four in three innings of relief. Obviously, no team can count on 12 strikeouts every day, but the Cubs are an especially unlikely club to do so. FanGraphs’s Depth Charts project them to have the fourth-lowest strikeout rate by starters this year, and they’re only slightly higher than that in the bullpen. If they meaningfully outstrip that projection, a lot of things change for the better, so we can mark that as something to watch, but it’s unlikely that this one game tells us that such a thing will happen. In the meantime, then, there will be pressure on the fielders who come into play when the pitching staff doesn’t strike out 12 opponents. They passed all their early tests Thursday. Patrick Wisdom made a nice play ranging to his left, sliding to stop his momentum, and made a strong and accurate throw across the diamond for an out. Dansby Swanson had a similar play going toward the hole, the play I most wanted to see him make in this post-shift world, and (just as you’d hope) his extremely quick exchange and release made up for an arm that is no better than average. The play of the afternoon, though, was in the top of the third inning. The game was still scoreless, but the Brewers had loaded the bases and Stroman was getting wild. The entire contest could have tipped in Milwaukee’s favor at that moment. I was watching on TV, but I can only assume that Pat Hughes told radio listeners that things had reached an early turning point. What happened next is, for my money, the most aesthetically pleasing thing in baseball. c5cf196d-96a6-4fd8-a07f-d993c6222fad.mp4 The long 4-6-3, with the second baseman having to make a fairly long throw to the covering shortstop to start things, is gorgeous. The play seems to develop slowly, which can make you momentarily despair that the turn can be made. Often, that’s true, which is why it’s especially exciting when the defense does manage it. In this case, it helped that Rowdy Tellez was getting down the line, but there was still no margin for error. Nico Hoerner was lightning-quick on the pick and throw. Swanson was at the bag in time to set himself and fire the ball across, and Eric Hosmer made the slight stretch to sew things up. The emotion of that moment–the stop of the heart when Tellez put it in play in such a critical situation, the elastic stretch and swivel of one’s attention as the play unfolded right to left to right, the eruption from Stroman and from the crowd when the play was made–is the kind of magic good defense can deliver. It’s the payoff for all the anxiety of being built around that attribute, instead of having the lineup to blow people out. It might not work 90 times this year, and the Cubs will have to do more on offense than they did Thursday in order to make a surprise run to the playoffs, but the opener was a proof of concept.-
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