Diffusion

Lend credence. And yes. About the 500 emails a day all positive thing... http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/journalgazette/12693576.htm That was written Tuesday. But... http://www.thetimesonline.com/articles/2005/09/21/sports/top_sports/34a5217e4c66417c8625708300128778.txt Also from Tuesday.

One really big factor for me in this Cy Young race is what happened last year, when Roger Clemens absolutely daylight robbery stole the Cy off Randy Johnson. IP Unit, 245.2 Clemens, 214.1 ERA Unit, 2.60 Clemens, 2.98 H/9 Unit, 6.48 Clemens, 7.10 HR/9 Unit, 0.66 Clemens, 0.63 BB/9 Unit, 1.61 Clemens, 3.32 K/9 Unit, 10.62 Clemens, 9.15 Runs Prevented (above average) Unit, 42.6 Clemens, 35.7 VORP Unit, 69.3 Clemens, 61.3 Essentially the Unit was better, comfortably, in every single category there besides home runs allowed, in which they were in a virtual tie. He allowed less hits, less walks, more strikeouts, lower ERA, all the rate stats were better, and, to top it all, he pitched 30 more innings than Clemens! He was flat out by far the better pitcher in 2004. Oh, and the Unit threw a perfect game. And Clemens won it because... W/L record Unit, 16-14 Clemens, 18-4 ...and because... Diamondbacks, 51-111, 5th in NL West Astros, 92-70, 2nd in NL Central, won WC And now Clemens bleats about not getting run support in this year's Cy Young race. I'll gladly consider Clemens for the Cy Young this year if he gives last year's Cy Young to its rightful winner. Because Clemens deserves this year's award. But he doesn't deserve to win two in a row, so I'd rather he was hard done by and they gave it to Carpenter.

Cliff. Fall off one.

They just don't come any bigger than tonight. Well, apart from the Scott Elarton vs Jon Garland bit. Tribe must win. GO INDIANS!

In fantasy baseball this year I'm scoring 323. It's a 17 team 24 category league though. Was as high as 325 at one point. I've been about 50 points minimum clear for two months now. Tragic, I know.

Absolutely. In fact, I'd go so far as to say that most players don't come from BA's top 100 list. Maybe I'll do something more comprehensive another time. But this has helped me get a bit of a better feel for Dusty's handling of prospects. He gave JR Phillips and Calvin Murray shots, and Royce Clayton was retained as a starter, for instance. If anyone knows the story with Steve Hosey, please do tell. That seems like a weird one.

He won't be a rookie next year. Regardless of whether he gets the at-bats, he's got more than 45 days of service time already.

It's not irrelevant if people want to try and fiction a history of Dusty Baker as a positional prospect wrecker.

Referencing BA's top 100 prospect lists from 1990-2002 (Dusty was in charge from 1993-2002), here are some of the position prospects Dusty had to work with.... 1990, BA #52, Steve Hosey, OF 1991 BA #83, Steve Hosey, OF 1992 BA #61, Steve Hosey, OF 1993 BA #83, Steve Hosey, OF 1991 BA #52, Steve Decker, C 1991 BA #23, Royce Clayton, SS 1992 BA #6, Royce Clayton, SS 1992 BA #95, Derek Reid, OF 1993 BA #33, Calvin Murray, OF 1994 BA #83, JR Phillips, 1B 1995 BA #73, JR Phillips, 1B 1995 BA #90, Dante Powell, OF 1997 BA #92, Dante Powell, OF 2001 BA #85, Lance Niekro, 3B 2001 BA #60, Tony Torcato, 3B 2002 BA #83, Tony Torcato, OF Yes, literally, between 1997 and 2001, the Giants didn't have a single position prospect make the list. Wow. Now of course, the list isn't definitive by any means. Matt Murton wasn't in the top 100 before this year, and he won't be on it next year, so if I were looking back on the Cubs in 10 years time using just the BA list as a measure of our prospects, he'd be left out too. So, bear in mind that this isn't designed to be comprehensive. Let's take a closer look at the numbers of these prospects and how Dusty handled them, using the Baseball Cube. Please bear in mind that I know absolutely nothing about these prospects besides the numbers. If you know anything, and I’ve got something wrong, or you can fill gaps in my knowledge, go for it. Steve Hosey Hosey was a first-round draft pick out of college in 1989. He signed quickly enough that the Giants were able to assign him to play short season ball in the Northwest League that year, where his performance was mixed. He showed good power, hitting 13 home runs and 30 extra base hits in 288 at-bats for a .493 slugging percentage, and he hit .288 and stole 15 bases. However, he walked just 27 times while striking out 84 times, 84 times in 288 at-bats! Evidently he had serious problems making contact, but given that BA immediately put him into their top 100 at #52, and that he was a first-round draft pick, Hosey was very toolsy, power, speed, I’d bet he could field and throw too. The next year the Giants gave Hosey a double promotion, sending him to San Hose (High-A, California League) instead of Clinton (Low-A). Hosey really struggled, hitting just .232 (in what’s a very hitter friendly league now at least, I suspect it probably was then too). He struck out 139 times in 479 at-bats, and his power slipped as he managed just 16 home runs and 35 extra base hits. He stole 16 bases, and walked 71 times, both of which were encouraging. But those strikeouts, again about one every 3.5 at-bats, were an extremely serious problem. BA dropped him down their top 100 list to #83. Hosey was promoted again the next year though, so clearly he was very well thought of as a prospect. Again, I’m guessing very toolsy, makes the game look easy. So he went to Double-A and the Texas League (another league that right now is very hitter-friendly, I don’t know about then), where his average recovered to .293, and significantly he shed a lot of strikeouts, striking out just 88 times in 409 at-bats. That’s by no means fantastic, but it’s a big improvement. Hosey also walked a very decent 56 times, his power recovered a little as he hit 17 home runs and had 43 extra base hits for a .494 slugging, and he stole 26 bases on the year. Considering he was just 22, it was a good year, and BA pushed him back up their list to #61. But 1992 was going to be very important for him. Hosey was promoted to Triple-A and the Pacific Coast League (again, right now a hitter-friendly league, may well have been back then too). The strikeouts remained about as frequent as at Double-A, 98 in 462 at-bats. And he hit .286. But worryingly he walked just 39 times, and his power took a dip too. He managed 45 extra-base hits, but just 10 of them were home runs. His slugging percentage was a very unimpressive .442. All the same, Hosey was called up in September (Dusty Baker wasn’t yet the manager, he’d only take over the following year) and was given reasonably regular playing time, 14 starts, 7 appearances off the bench and 56 at-bats. Hosey though managed just .250/.241/.321. He didn’t walk once, struckout 15 times, had a sole 2B and a sole HR. And then Dusty Baker took over in 1993. And Hosey’s career seemingly stops dead in his tracks. In early September that year, Hosey managed 2 at-bats, 1 hit and a walk in 3 games, all as a pinch-hitter. Otherwise he might as well have disappeared off the face of the planet for all I can tell. The Baseball Cube doesn’t have any minor league numbers listed for Hosey after 1992. What happened in 1993 to him then, I have no idea. Maybe he was injured. Maybe he played in the minors but Baseball Cube for some reason doesn’t list it. But, whatever, he didn’t play any more than those 3 games in the majors for Dusty Baker, and in March 1994 he was shipped off to the California Angels for a minor leaguer named Bob Gamez, who never made the majors. And that, as far as I can tell, was that, because there’s no record of Hosey after that that I can find. Interesting. Steve Decker Decker was a 21st round draft pick out of college in 1988. He signed quickly enough that he was assigned to the Northwest League in the same year, and in just 13 games there his numbers were good enough that he was promoted to High-A to finish the year. Between the two levels, fresh out of college, Decker hit .359 in 217 at-bats, with 6 home runs and 11 doubles, 28 walks and 26 strikeouts. My guess is that he was a defensive catcher, and that the hitting numbers, particularly the power, were a bit of a surprise. Otherwise there’s no way he’d have fallen to the 21st round. Anyway, Decker started the following year at High-A again, but earned a promotion to Double-A before the year was out. Between the two he hit .302 with 55 walks and 60 strikeouts in 367 at-bats, but his power was unimpressive, as he managed just 4 home runs and 20 doubles, and a .390 slugging percentage. Though he stole 8 bases, I suspect Decker wasn’t very fast at all, being a catcher, and hardly ever hitting any triples. All the same, solid contact skills, can hit for average, not averse to the walk, good defence (I’m guessing), it’s a decent package. In 1990 Decker remained at Double-A for pretty much the year, where he had a very fine season. He continued to hit for average (.293) and to show decent plate discipline (40 BB, 64 K in 403 AB). But the biggest difference was that Decker hit for power! To the tune of 15 homers, 22 doubles and triple, a .464 slugging percentage. Though he was now 24 and repeating the league, the Giants were impressed enough to give him a September callup, during which he hit .296/.309/.500 in 15 games, 14 starts and 54 at-bats, and BA was impressed enough to put him at #52 on their next prospect list. The next two years Decker struggled though splitting time between San Francisco and Triple-A. He started the 1991 season as the big league catcher, but by June the Giants were losing patience with him hitting around the Mendoza line, and by July they’d had enough, so they sent him down and played Kirt Manwaring instead. Decker had managed to hit just .206/.262/.309 in 233 at-bats. He hadn’t struck out that much (44 times), but his walks dried up a bit (16), nothing went his way on balls in play (.229) and his 1990 power was beginning to look like a fluke (just 13 extra base hits). But in Triple-A he hit 6 home runs and 12 extra base hits in 111 at-bats to finish the year. By the following year, which Decker spent almost entirely at Phoenix, he was back to being the same hitter he’d been in 1989. Average, not many strikeouts, decent number of walks, but not much power. He got a September callup, but he didn’t hit, and that was it. He was “lost” in the expansion draft to the Florida Marlins, and by the time Dusty Baker was appointed he was long gone. He never really amounted to much in the end in the majors, but continued to hit, and with a lot of power sometimes, in the minors. Anyway, he never had anything to do with Dusty with the exception of another stint with the Giants in 1996, by which time he was 30, when he again started the year as the big league catcher. This time though he didn’t actually do that badly, hitting .282/.356/.333 through May 21st, when the Giants decided enough was enough and relegated him to the bench. Between May 27th and August 9th, off the bench, Decker went 1-for-33! Royce Clayton You’ve probably at least heard of this guy. Drafted in 1988 out of High School, in the first round, let’s just say Clayton was picked for his defence at shortstop. But he was fast, young, projectible, and he would always have that good defence to fall back on. His minor league career with the bat though, was pretty much a write-off. Clayton started out in the Northwest League in 1988, where he hit .259 and slugged .321 in 212 at-bats, managing just 4 doubles and 3 homers to go with a handy number of walks (27) and more strikeouts (54). He also stole 10 bases. The speed and the walks were promising, but for someone so devoid of power, those strikeouts didn’t look particularly good, and that’s why he managed just .259. Which was better than he managed the next year. Promoted to the Midwest League (Low-A), Clayton hit just .236 and slugged just .286 in 385 at-bats. Eww. He managed just 16 extra base hits, not one of them a home run, walked a decent 39 times but struck out on a staggering 101 occasions. I can only guess then it was the stealing of 28 bases that earned him a promotion to High-A to finish the year. There, in 92 at-bats, things got even worse. He hit just .120 and slugged .141. 11 hits, 2 of them doubles that is. He walked a very useful 13 times, and he stole another 10 bases, which is pretty impressive considering he was on base just 24 times or so, but struck out 27 times. All in all, ugly, but he was still just 19 I suppose. The next two years were a lot better for Clayton. The first he spent at High-A again, the second at Double-A. The seasons were actually pretty similar. He hit .267 and .280 respectively, which is okay, with 68 and 61 walks, which is excellent, and 98 and 104 strikeouts, which is better but still far from perfect. He stole 33 and 36 bases, so he could really run, and, importantly, he started to show more power. A lot more, banging out 37 doubles, 18 triples and 12 home runs the two years combined. That meant he had a slugging percentage over 100 points more than his average! Wow! The Giants were so amazed they gave him a cup of coffee in September 1991, which Clayton didn’t like the taste of, struggling in a mere 26 at-bats. Clayton though was made the Giants’ starting shortstop in 1992. And Baseball America liked him, they rated him the 6th best prospect in baseball. And though he didn’t do that well, hitting .224/.281/.308 in 321 at-bats and requiring a two month stint at Triple-A in the middle, Dusty Baker liked him enough that when he took charge for the 1993 season, he let Clayton continue in the starting shortstop role, a role he didn’t lose until after the 1995 season when he was traded to the Cardinals, despite being, for the most part, absolutely awful with the bat. Whatever BA saw in him that gave them hope he might one day be able to hit wasn’t particularly well founded. Dusty Baker treated him somewhat like Corey Patterson. He was already in the job, there weren’t any better options, so Dusty stuck by him. It also looks to me like Dusty saw a lot of Neifi Perez qualities in him. He could play defence at shortstop, he could run a bit (though Neifi can’t) and steal, he could bunt. Ridiculously though Dusty batted Clayton 6th and 7th almost the entire time in those three years. But, for some reason, Corey and Neifi had to bat 1st and 2nd. Hmm. Anyway, I don’t think it’s fair to say Dusty ruined Clayton as a prospect. He just never was that much of one to begin with. Derek Reid 27th round draft pick in 1990, but he never made the majors and I’ve got no minor league numbers for him. Made the BA list in #95 in 1992, maybe he was blocked by Barry Bonds. Calvin Murray Murray was the 11th pick of the 1989 draft by the Indians, but he decided to go to college. Three years later he went 7th overall to the Giants, an outfielder out of the University of Texas. Before he’d even played a game in the minor leagues, BA had him on their list, at #33 as well. He was clearly a big, big prospect. But as soon as he started playing games, they took him off the list. And who can blame them. Even if you’d had no expectations of the guy, you’d have been disappointed by what he did. Murray started the 1993 season at High-A, where he performed well, .281 in 345 at-bats with 40 walks and 63 strikeouts, 24 doubles, 9 home runs, .435 slugging, 42 stolen bases. This was clearly a five-tool talent. All that was needed was the power to fully emerge as it surely would and he’d be in the majors in no time. Except when Murray was promoted to Double-A mid-season 1993, he was awful, hitting just .188 and slugging .232 in 138 at-bats. What the problem was isn’t clear. He walked (14 times), he didn’t strike out that much (29), he still stole bases (12). But he didn’t connect for a single home run, and he didn’t get many other hits either. He got a 5 game stint at Triple-A to finish his debut year, but nothing doing. He didn’t hit a home run there either. And for the next four years (yes, four years!), it was pretty much the same story. Bouncing between Double-A and Triple-A, Murray hit for pathetic averages and pathetic power, stole loads of bases, drew plenty of walks and didn’t strikeout that much. At the end of 1997, it must have looked as though it’d never happen for him, that he’d never make the big leagues at all. All he needed was the power, and balls in play to stop being so mean, and he’d be there. Well, in 1998, spending time at Double-A for the sixth season running, now aged 27, the balls in play did at last come and Murray hit .309 overall. He drew more walks than strikeouts, stole lots of bases, even the power wasn’t as awful as it had been, though it still wasn’t good. But again he went to Triple-A towards the end of the season, and reverted back to his old self. But in 1999, it happened! Murray hit for power! Six years too late, but Murray hit for power! 23 home runs, 31 doubles, 7 triples, a .542 slugging percentage, and the five tool talent drew his walks, didn’t strike out too much, stole 42 bases, hit .334, scored a ridiculous 122 runs in 130 games. Six years too late! But the Giants rewarded Murray with a September callup, and he pinch-hit a number of times, but didn’t really do much. Murray stuck in the big leagues in 2000 and 2001, he got playing time off the bench and quite a few starts too, especially in 2001, but he was pretty rubbish, he didn’t hit for average or power, and when he started 2002 0-for-12, the Giants were fed up with him, and they just let him go to Texas. No big loss. Did Dusty ruin him? No way. JR Phillips Phillips was drafted out of HS in 1988 in the 4th round by the California Angels, and in his time in their minor league system, he struck out at simply staggering rates. 70 times in 210 at-bats in the short season A-ball in ’88, 78 times in 237 at-bats at the same level in ’90, 146 times in 442 at-bats at Low-A in ’89, 58 times in 162 at-bats at High-A in ’90 and 144 times in 471 at-bats at the same level a year later, and 165 times in 497 at-bats at Double-A in ’92. Wow. The guy had absolutely enormous problems getting his bat to hit the baseball. As a result, his minor league batting averages start… .190, .192, .198, .194… Wow. The guy was a natural .190 hitter for his first two and a half years out of high school, some 1000+ at-bats! And he didn’t walk anything more than a decent amount either. He must have had some ugly OBPs. That said, he was clearly expected to be a power threat, and eventually, by 1991, he did emerge as one when he bashed 20 home runs in 130 games at High-A, with 22 doubles too. Not amazing power, but decent. It got his average up to .248 at least. The following year though he hit 32 doubles but just 14 home runs, and his slugging percentage dropped to just .402, and 165 strikeouts to 32 walks wasn’t cutting it. The Angels tried to pass him through waivers. The Giants said “why thankyou” and claimed him. And at Triple-A the next year, Phillips mashed 27 home runs and 35 doubles in 506 at-bats, he walked more and struck out less, his average was .263 and his slugging .500. Phillips got a very short cup of coffee in September, and hit a double, triple and home run. Baseball America, obviously impressed by his power, put him on the back end of its list. Phillips went back to Triple-A the next year and hit 27 home runs, 28 doubles, 5 triples even in 360 at-bats. Despite 96 strikeouts still, all that power was enough to give him a .300 average and a .631 slugging. He got another cup of coffee, in June, but didn’t stay for long since despite some reasonably regular playing time, he flopped. Phillips, now 25, was given the Giants’ first base job at the beginning of the 1995 season (which was late April due to the strike), hitting 6-8 in the order. He played everyday, but after a month he was hitting .101/.183/.242 in 99 at-bats. He spent the rest of the year on the bench, pinch-hitting with just the occasional start. By the end of the year he’d raised his line to .195/.256/.351 in 231 at-bats, with 19 walks, 69 strikeouts, 9 home runs and 9 doubles. Rubbish, frankly, and he was sent to the Phillies to the following year. He didn’t hit there or anywhere else, except in Triple-A. Playing for the Colorado Springs (Rockies’ Triple-A affiliate) in 1999 he hit 41 home runs in a year. He spent 2005 in the Astros’ system. Dusty didn’t ruin him either. He just struckout too much, he wasn’t good enough, simple as that. He got a shot, and he was awful. 10-for-99, .101. That says it all. Dante Powell The amazing list of Giants position prospects continues with Dante Powell, who was their first round draft pick in 1994, going 22nd overall. The BlueJays tried to sign him out of HS in 1991, but he obviously elected to go to college. A toolsy guy by the looks of things then, because as with Calvin Murray, it was out of the draft and straight onto the top prospect list. Powell went to the Northwest League straight out of college, that’s short season A-ball. He put up decent numbers, hitting .309 and slugging .503, 27 stolen bases, 19 walks, 15 doubles, triple, 5 home runs, but he also struck out 47 times. Warning sign. In 1995 Powell was promoted to High-A, where he spent the whole year. But because he struck out 131 times in 505 at-bats, he hit just .248. He managed just 10 home runs, 23 doubles and 8 triples, good just for .384 slugging. He stole 43 bases, and walked 46 times. What is it with the Giants and toolsy outfielders? Or is it BA? Whatever, will they never learn? The next year Powell took what looked like a step forward at Double-A. He hit 21 home runs, 27 doubles in 508 at-bats, he struck out just 98 times and walked an impressive 72 times, he stole 43 bases again, overall he hit .280 and slugged .465. For a 22-year old at Double-A, not bad, there’s potential there. But apparently there wasn’t. Powell went to Triple-A the next year and the walks went back down, the power back down, the average back down, the only thing that went up was the strikeouts. Even his stolen bases went down, though he still stole 34. Overall he hit .241 and slugged .385, which is pretty much what he did at High-A two years earlier. He had a stint in April/May in the majors, and a cup of coffee, but he mostly sat on the bench and didn’t do enough to earn a spot the next year, 1998. Instead he went back to Triple-A, and got worse. The power still wasn’t there, but his strikeouts took a big leap in the wrong direction to 138 K in 448 AB. He walked a lot too, 71 times, and stole 41 bases, but overall he hit just .230 and slugged just .375. And that was the end of Powell with the Giants. He was traded to the Diamondbacks after 1998 for Alan Embree, and ended up getting just 31 major-league at-bats the rest of his career while doing nothing in the minors. Did Dusty ruin him? Hardly. Lance Niekro Didn’t make it to the majors in time to meet Dusty Tony Torcato Got a cup of coffee in 2002, but there was no case for him to be playing full time at any stage before that. He wasn’t hitting that much at Triple-A. Still isn’t, as a matter of fact. So there are all the “top prospects” the Giants provided Dusty with in his time there. Not a single good one amongst them, I can’t blame him for not building a team around them.

Ah, but this is easily solved! All the Cubs have to do is sign Marcus Giles. Then Brian will come running. And of course with Marcus around we can trade Todd Walker! What on earth am I going on about? Well, Tracy Ringolsby in the Rocky Mountain News thinks that... And we thought we had it bad with Paul Sullivan, Phil Rogers et al!

LF Murton, 2B Walker, 1B Lee, 3B Rammy, RF Giles, SS Nomar, CF Cameron, C Barrett. That's been my favoured arrangement for the last few days, but IF we could get Wilkerson, I'd very gladly scrap it in favour of... CF Wilkerson, 2B Walker, 1B Lee, 3B Rammy, RF Giles, SS Nomar, LF Murton, C Barrett. Now that's a really nice offence. Really nice. Wilkerson also gives the Cubs a backup 1B option to spell Lee from time to time, which is useful. Trouble is I don't think getting Wilkerson is that likely. What kind of return would the Nationals be looking for? I think it'd be pretty steep considering that Wilkerson is still two years removed from free agency (FA after 2007), only due to earn about $3-4m next year and a good, productive player. I think we'd have to overwhelm. Now it may just be worth doing that, but I think the chances of it happening are slim. Though not as slim as the chances of Adam Dunn, which are very slim.

Something you've got to consider is that Cameron has spent his entire career in pretty rubbish ballparks to hit in. At the time that Cameron was in New Comiskey Park (1995-98 ) the Baseball Reference park factors were 97, 95, 96 and 98, Cinergy Field was 99 in 1999, and Safeco Field from 2000-03 was 91, 93, 92 and 97. Shea Stadium in 2004 was 99, and I doubt it's much different this year. So, weighting those park factors, assuming plate appearances are split evenly year-on-year between home/road and saying that road park factors are 100 (which is a pretty big assumption, because a lot of the ballpark in the AL West and NL East are pretty pitching friendly), Cameron for his entire year prior to this year had effectively spent his every day hitting in a ballpark with a park factor of 97.8, and that could be an estimate on the high side. That's got to have had a negative effect on his numbers, meaning that his natural level perhaps isn't done justice by his .250/.340/.440 line, and that he's actually been more valuable than that. I kind of buy that theory, but the other thing to consider is he's going to be 33 next season, and he's coming off a crazy head injury. It's the type of thing that could cause vision issues and other things that could affect his game in 2006. I remember Johnny Damon suffered a terrible collision with his head in the 2003 post-season, and he responded by hitting .304/.380/.477 in 2004, his best ever year. So maybe all he needed was a wakeup call! But, yes, the injury is a concern. I suppose though you can look at it as a real case of buy low at least. It's entirely possible the Mets could end up giving him away because of what's happened, because of the same reservations you hold, they'll see a chance to get a bullpen arm, shed $6.5m in salary commitments and open up a spot for Victor Diaz short-term and Lastings Milledge long-term. Even if things turn sour, the Cubs will end up just $6.5m and what they dealt to NY out of pocket, which isn't a collosal amount. And there's a possibility of compensatory draft picks too. I think it's a risk worth taking given the poverty of the other options out there - Lofton, Cruz Jr, Williams, an expensive trade for Hunter, Corey, Hairston, it's grim.

Something you've got to consider is that Cameron has spent his entire career in pretty rubbish ballparks to hit in. At the time that Cameron was in New Comiskey Park (1995-98 ) the Baseball Reference park factors were 97, 95, 96 and 98, Cinergy Field was 99 in 1999, and Safeco Field from 2000-03 was 91, 93, 92 and 97. Shea Stadium in 2004 was 99, and I doubt it's much different this year. So, weighting those park factors, assuming plate appearances are split evenly year-on-year between home/road and saying that road park factors are 100 (which is a pretty big assumption, because a lot of the ballpark in the AL West and NL East are pretty pitching friendly), Cameron for his entire year prior to this year had effectively spent his every day hitting in a ballpark with a park factor of 97.8, and that could be an estimate on the high side. That's got to have had a negative effect on his numbers, meaning that his natural level perhaps isn't done justice by his .250/.340/.440 line, and that he's actually been more valuable than that.

I think their TV guys are pretty good too, in what little I've heard of them. I also like the Tigers' TV guys, though again I don't tune in that often. The Indians' manager for the record is Eric Wedge.

Could the Yanks make up 4 on the White Sox? Let's hope so! Actually, let's hope that the Yankees lose every remaining game and the A's and the Angels go on a massive roll together and it ends up Red Sox, Indians, A's and Angels!

COME ON INDIANS! Remaining schedules, btw... Indians at White Sox (2 games) Cleveland at Royals (4 games) Twins at White Sox (4 games) Devil Rays at Indians (3 games) White Sox at Tigers (3 games) White Sox at Indians (3 games) You've got to love it. Indians get seven with the Royals and Devil Rays!

Yes they need pitching. Shea Stadium can superficially disguise things, but Tom Glavine turns 40 and Steve Trachsel 35 next year, and both I feel are only just hanging onto respectability, like Mike Remlinger did for a while. Victor Zambrano and Kris Benson are league average innings eaters at best, Kaz Ishii has made his last start as a Met, which is a blessing. Really all the Mets have to rely on Pedro Martinez, who's obvious still very good but he does have some injury and stamina concerns still, and Jae Seo. Seo's no spring chick, he'll be 29 next year, and throws a high-eighties, low-nineties fastball, a good changeup, a splitter and a cutter. He's a changing speeds guy. I think you're talking about a back of the rotation starter there really, maybe a No 3 at the outside. In the minor leagues the Mets have a couple of interesting pitching prospects. Yusmeiro Petit, Brian Bannister, Gaby Hernandez (but still quite a way away), Philip Humber (but he's had TJS, out for all of 2006), Alay Soler (but he's old and hasn't pitched against real hitters in ages, didn't even do that well against Cuban ones) and Mike Pelfrey (dunno if he signed) all are decent starting prospects, but none of them look like aces. I very much doubt the Mets would be against adding a good starting prospect, and, who knows, they maybe see Rich Hill as one (personally, I don't, but the Mets have been known to disagree with me). It's the bullpen where the Mets have the greatest needs though. It says it all that they've been giving chances to Danny Graves and Shingo Takatsu this year. Braden Looper belongs in the same company, he's done as a reliever, yet alone as a closer. After that there are a number of interesting arms (Heilman, Bell, Ring, McGinley, Yates in particular, and I like Heilman) but nothing that's at all reliable. The Mets have resorted to trying Victor Zambrano as closer. He's not reliable either, just wild, not very good and not worth Scott Kazmir. Roberto Hernandez has had a nice year but he's 56 years old. All the Mets boards are clogged with people suggesting "trade Cameron for bullpen help".

Barrett ©, Blanco (Bench), Lee (1B), Walker (2B), Nomar (SS), Ramirez (3B), Hairston (Bench), Cedeno (Bench), Murton (LF), Patterson (Bench), Greenberg (Bench), Prior, Zambrano, Wood, Maddux, Williams (all SP), Dempster (Closer), Ohman, Novoa, Wuertz, Van Buren, Williamson (all setup). I'd be more than happy with all those players coming back next year in those roles. Actually, I'm not happy with Maddux being back in the rotation, but it's going to happen regardless. Anyway, that's 22 players, leaving just CF, RF and a bench/bullpen role open. Obviously it's who we get for those CF and RF spots that's all important. Mike Cameron (via a trade of Rich Hill if possible, with Todd Wellemeyer if necessary) and Brian Giles via FA would be great, maybe Tom Gordon again for the bullpen. Milton Bradley could be an interesting option in CF, because there's no doubt that he can play. OUT: Rusch (trade/FA), Rich Hill (trade), Wellemeyer (trade/non-tender) Fox (FA), Koronka (DFA), Mitre (trade/waivers), Macias (trade/non-tender), Perez (FA), Burnitz (FA), Grieve (FA), Soto, McClain, Theroit (all back to minors). All of that though probably only leaves us with a payroll next year of around $96m, so there's still a bit of wiggle room. Maybe make a run at BJ Ryan as well for the bullpen and leave Van Buren at Triple-A for now.

Possibly. Well, last year the difference between the pitching staff that faced the least batters (Cards) and the pitching staff that faced the most (Rockies) was 431 plate appearances over the course of the entire year. On average a baseball game in 2004 was just under 39 plate appearances per team long, so 431 plate appearances is essentially 11 entire games. In other words, the Rockies essentially played 169 games last year in the same time that it took the Cardinals to play 158 while the major league average was 162. Now obviously with the Rockies the problem was rubbish pitchers and half the year having a rubbish ballpark to pitch in, as opposed to defence (the Rockies were actually among the best teams last year defensively if you believe error totals, which I don't), and they're an extreme case. But the Arizona Diamondbacks (who led the majors in errors) and Cincinnati Reds both threw to well more than 300 more batters than the Cards' staff did, in effect playing 166 and 167 games last year. So there's a definite trend that the less effective your pitching, for whatever reason, the more games you effectively play in the field, and the difference can be quite noticeable. 8, 9, 11 extra games than the Cardinals. What's that? 1500+ extra pitches? You've got to believe that that's really not doing the pitchers any favours whatsoever, and that that takes its toll both in terms of fatigue, injuries and general turnover of pitchers. And all of that of course only compounds things further, your pitching staff is depleted or tired, they get outs at an even lousier rate, they face more batters, they become more tired, and it's a vicious cycle. Now a lot of the differences there isn't fielding, but rather ballpark and the quality of the pitching staff, and I have absolutely no idea how that breaks down, but I think it's pretty clear that there's an effect there and that some of it is attributable to fielding. As a rule, the friendlier the hitting environment, the more pitches pitchers have to throw. And having lousy defence makes the hitting environment friendlier for the other team. I'll get back to you on this if I find anything. Right now all I've got is Bill James saying that they're equally important and Rob Neyer saying "While it's certainly possible that winning baseball is somewhat more than 50 percent pitching and defense, it's also quite likely that the figure can't be much higher than 50 percent." Neyer's opinion is roughly in line with my own.

Thanks goony, that's the kind of thing I was looking for :)

The Red Sox have already put him on waivers at least once. I think it's pretty clear they are willing to give him away. Did they put him on waivers again before this season? If not, they may not be willing to just give him away with that much less remaining on his contract. It might also be that they were willing to give him away when there was a Vlad or a Beltran on the open market, but not when Giles is the cream of the crop. Yes, I realize this, but my point is they were willing to give him away before. They've been talking about trading him ever since. The comment I responded to was the insinuation that the Cubs wouldn't have the value to satisfy Boston. I think it's quite clear it won't take equal value to get them to give up Manny. And if the Cubs wanted him, they could get a deal done. I just don't think there is anyway the suits, Andy or Jim will have any interest in risking another Sosa situation. No, the comment you responded to was a) making a point of the fact that everyone here is mentioning how trading for Manny Ramirez is such a swell idea, but no one's throwing any names out there as to just which players we could use to make this happen and b) making light of the fact that generally people seem to hugely overrate the Cubs' assets. I know that Boston aren't opposed to getting rid of Manny. They've actually got brains in Boston. What I want to know is what people here think we should give up to get Manny. You know, like, names.

All these "let's add Manny to the middle of the order" plans are very very original and interesting, but how exactly do we plan on going about making this happen? Who are we trading to the Red Sox? Todd Wellemeyer, Cliff Bartosh and used baseballs?

I have very little time for JP. I much prefer Hendry.

Pitching and fielding together is half the game, hitting being the other half. Actually, because in the long run good pitching/decent hitting wins more ballgames than good hitting/decent pitching, the pitching and fielding is slightly more than half. Why is it better? Well, if your starters allow less baserunners, they should throw less pitches, and if they throw less pitches, they should be able to throw more innings before they reach certain pitch counts. That in turn means less bullpen innings, which means that your relievers, on top of having better defence behind them, ought to be fresher, which gives you more effective pitching options, which can help you prevent further runs. If your starters and fielding is effective enough, you may not be able to find work for everyone in your bullpen, so you may be able to run with less pitchers on your staff, so you can have more bench options, which means more in-game flexibility, which, if exploited by the manager, can mean more runs for the offence, or still even better defence and less runs allowed. Furthermore, a pitcher that trusts his defence can be more effective at doing his job as a pitcher, partially because the confidence of his effective fielders rubs off on him, partially because there's no ineffective fielding to rattle him, partially because effective fielding can inspire him to raise his own game. An effective pitcher is often confident in himself too, and therefore better able to get over poor pitches, innings and outings, because he trusts himself and his own ability. Finally, an effective and efficient pitcher that throws less pitches is theoretically less likely to get injured or wear down as the season goes on, and fielders are less likely to get injured because there are less plays to make in the field and they spend less time in the field, which is less sapping for them too, especially catchers. The less tired your best players are the less off-days they need. And so on and so on and so on. Or, in other words, look at the Rockies.

Of course allowing fewer hits helps, but good fielding helps a team less if that team doesn't allow many balls in play. I'd be interested to know what the Cub's ratios are for Ks, BBs, HRs, and balls in play per PA. I'd bet they allow fewer balls in play than many other teams. Are you just going to completely ignore what I wrote? You preached the exact same unproven mantra about "good fielding helps a team less if that doesn't allow many balls in play" before and after my response, and paid absolutely no consideration to what I said, instead writing something about "of course allowing fewer hits helps", which is nothing like what I said. If you didn't understand what I was on about, then just say so. I'll explain. While a lot of strikeouts mean less balls in play, a lot of walks (and therefore baserunners) could mean that when there's a ball in play, it becomes more important to turn that ball in play into an out(s) than would otherwise be the case. For instance, it's more important to turn a ball in play into an out(s) with the bases loaded than it is with the bases empty, because the result of bad fielding with the bases loaded gifts the other team more runs than bad fielding with the bases empty. And walks are a really good way of ensuring that the bases aren't empty. So, it's possible that while strikeouts mean less balls in play, walks mean that the conversion of each of those balls in play is more important, and that despite there being fewer chances for the fielders due to strikeouts, the overall importance of fielding is either diminished less than might be thought, not at all or actually increased because of the walks putting the Cubs in more situations where they can less afford to gift the opposition an extra out in the inning. Obviously the fact that they've allowed so many walks is the greater problem. Ideally you'd have the Cubs not allowing any hits because they strike out every single batter, and you'd also have the Cubs never allowing any walks, hit by pitches. Or home runs. Nothing. Just 27 up, and 27 sent back to the dugout after swinging and missing. 81 pitches too, every one a strike. But it's not as simple as that. It's not as simple as saying, good, "you've got the strikeouts and the hits allowed in the right place, now walk less batters too". Do you not see that the same strikeouts that are limiting those hits are perhaps also the cause of the walks? The Cubs don't pitch to contact, instead pitching to the strikeout. That leads to them throwing a lot of pitches, and getting deep into counts. A lot of 3-1 and 3-2 counts. That's what's leading to both the strikeouts and the walks. The walks are a problem, but if you get the Cubs to limit the walks, you're most probably going to see the strikeouts take a dive and the hits shoot up a bit - more than improving your performance, you're just going to be redistributing it differently. There are only two real ways to improve performance, assuming that the Cubs' high strikeout plan isn't flawed and putting them at a disadvantage relative to pitch to contact plans that the Cardinals have (and I don't know whether it is flawed or not, but I hope not). One, attain or develop better pitchers than the ones you've already got. Two, attain or develop better fielders. Yes, but the fact that they give up homers is another reason that fielding becomes less important. Fielding only affects balls in play. The Cubs do not allow a ton of balls in play. You can't field a homer. Keeping baserunners off is important, but because they allow relatively few balls in play, the impact of an upgraded defense would be weaker than for most other teams. The problem isn't hits, it's walks, which our fielders have no control over. I'm not sure why you don't get this. If there's a runner on base when a home run is hit, that runner scores. If you allow a lot of home runs, as the Cubs have this year (I don't know whether this is a worrying long-term trend though, it may just be a blip), keeping runners off the bases in front of home runs is pretty important. Now, as with before, you keep runners off the bases either with better pitchers or with better fielders. Now the Cubs have a pretty talented pitching staff. Mark Prior and Carlos Zambrano are among the best pitchers in baseball, and Kerry Wood's natural ability is also beyond question. Jerome Williams has significant potential, a lot of it at this stage unrealised. Greg Maddux is fadding fast, but the Cubs are contractually tied to him. In the bullpen, Dempster has proven reasonably effective, and Wuertz, Novoa and Ohman have a lot of good stuff between them. A fully healthy Williamson has closer stuff. There's a pretty solid core there of good pitchers. On the other hand the Cubs have pretty rubbish fielding, they're defensively above average at just two positions right now - Lee and Burnitz (assuming that Nomar is SS, Rammy 3B and Hairy CF). And those are two of three least important defensive positions! And Burnitz could and probably should be packing his bags at the end of the year. So is it going to be easier to upgrade our pitching or our fielding? Sure, but once again, with the Cubs staff the impact of fielding on pitch counts is minimized. A good defense won't stop our aces from going into multiple 5+ pitch PAs in which the final result is a K or a BB, as it often is. Now if the staff was full of finesse pitchers, we'd be a lot less successful with shabby fielding, but power pitchers will rack up the pitches with or withoout a solid defense. And they'll rack up more with poor fielding. If a hitter puts a ball in play and it's not turned into an out, not only does the runner reach, but the pitcher has to get another out. And thus potentially an extra 5+ pitch PAs, and if the final result of that is a BB, another, and so on. With the error the inning could have been over ages ago, and the pitcher thrown a lot less pitches. Consider Sergio Mitre's inning against the Padres (which is the first example that pops into my head)... Bottom 5th: San Diego (Cubs leading 2-1) - S. Burroughs lined out to second - A. Eaton singled to left - D. Roberts reached on bunt single to pitcher, A. Eaton to second - G. Blum grounded into fielder's choice, A. Eaton to third, D. Roberts out at second, A. Eaton scored, G. Blum to second on shortstop N. Perez's throwing error [/b] Neifi threw away a double play ball. The inning could have been over and no runs have scored, the Cubs still leading 2-1 and Mitre back in the clubhouse having thrown 61 pitches through 5 frames. Instead, one run was already in and there were runners on second and third and just two outs. And then all this followed.... - R. Klesko walked - B. Giles walked, G. Blum to third, R. Klesko to second - P. Nevin singled to left, G. Blum and R. Klesko scored, B. Giles to second - R. Novoa relieved S. Mitre - R. Hernandez singled to left, B. Giles scored, P. Nevin to second - K. Greene struck out swinging Mitre threw another 12 pitches, and didn't get another out. Another two runs scored, and it was still 1st/2nd 2 outs when he left. Novoa came in and required another 8 pitches to get the third out, but not before he'd allowed one of the inherited runners to score. Who knows what would have happened had Neifi found Derrek Lee with the throw on the double play ball. Maybe Mitre would have collapsed the next inning. But the error meant that the Cubs ended up throwing 20 more pitches to get through 5 innings, and they were trailing 5-2 when they went to the top of the sixth rather than leading 2-1. The Cubs went on to lose the game 6-2. But hey, "fielding schmielding we've got a high strikeout staff"! Of course, Neifi for the rest of the year has been pretty terrific defensively. It would have been more apt had it been Ramirez or Walker or Nomar or Barrett or Dubois that had made the stupid play. Anyway, I don't think my point is weakened just because the critical error that I'm using as an example was made by a normally very good defensive player. The point is that you want to make as few such critical errors as possible. Now that's the bigger question. Like I said originally... If it's not possible, or not widely possible at least, then the Cubs have to come up with a another way of achieving the same effect. More big bats would probably do the trick, but that'll be more expensive. Ah, suck it up. But it's right that we should be discussing which is the most cost-effective way to improve the team. It's not right that you should be suggesting that fielding isn't important or ignoring possible caveats to the unproven mantra that strikeouts = defence less important.