I agree with Craig on being wary of trying to cut deals with picks #27 and #30 to save money to try to allocate that to picks later on. Yes, we did save money in 2014 by being right on K. Schwarber and other teams not properly evaluating talent at the top. That said, I don't trust our scouts in identifying pitching talent in later rounds. Look at 2014, we moved that money we saved and spread it out among Sands, Steele and Cease. We were fortunate Cease fell that far and was willing to sign for $1.5 mil. He fell because he needed TJS and had a strong commitment to Vanderbilt. Everyone knew how talented Cease was and you don't have to employ amazing scouts to scout a talent like that. It's early, but I think we were wrong on Sands and Steele. I don't know who else was available in those rounds (I'd have to go and look again), but that's the problem with waiting to re-allocate the savings you get from underslot deals at the top of the draft -- there isn't enough talent left. I should probably better state that as meaning there are talented pitchers available, but correctly identifying them and signing them becomes incredibly difficult. It's too early to definitively judge the 2014 Cubs draft, but if they go 1/3 for the 3 overslot deals on Sands, Steele and Cease then great -- you'll take that and consider it a success. Again, we were lucky D. Cease fell and was willing to sign. Hypothetically speaking, if Cease wanted more money and as a result the Cubs decided to select some other talented HS pitcher the Cubs might very well have gone 0/3 on those overslot deals from the 2014 draft... Be careful with advocating that strategy (saving money and spreading it on later picks) because sometimes there isn't enough obvious talent to warrant those overslot deals.